GND JG Neg - DDI 2023 TT
GND JG Neg - DDI 2023 TT.docx
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CASE Populism The impact of economic insecurity on Populist support is minimal while resentment towards structural changes is massive Margalit, 19 --- Professor, Department of Political Science Tel Aviv University (Yotam Margalit, "Economic causes of populism: Important, marginally important, or important on the margin", 12-20-2019, CEPR, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-causes-populism-important-marginally-important-or-important-margin)//EG A populist wave is engulfing Western democracies. One would have to go back decades to find a comparable political wave affecting so many countries at the same time in such profound ways. Still in the throes of great political turbulence, making sense of this populist moment is of obvious import. Yet it is far from straightforward. While the term 'populism' has different definitions, it is first and foremost characterised by its claim to represent the will of the true people versus some ‘other’, commonly represented as a corrupt and self-serving elite. The Brexit vote in June 2016 and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election later that same year have perhaps received the most attention, but the populist phenomenon stretches across a wide range of countries and contexts. Its widespread and growing appeal has spawned intense debate over both its causes and consequences. A prominent set of studies centre on its economic antecedents (e.g. Autor 2016, Colantone and Stanig 2018, Fetzer 2019, Frey et al 2017, Dippel et al. 2015). Though they cite somewhat different causal factors, they share a similar storyline: a certain development – globalisation, automation, the financial crisis – had transformed labour markets and generated widespread dislocation and economic insecurity. These developments in turn eroded voters’ trust in the political system and led those on the losing side to opt for populist parties that represent a break from the status quo and offer seemingly appealing solutions to voters’ economic malaise – be it trade protectionism, building a border wall, or exiting the EU. The debate over the causes of populism has often been framed as pitting these economic-centric arguments against cultural explanations, which focus on structural social changes as the source of populist disaffection (more on which below). Sensibly, contributions to this Vox debate offer more nuanced accounts that assign importance to both sets of causes and note the ways in which they interact. Nonetheless, assigning importance to both sets of causes doesn’t address the question of just how important they are. The answer is not only pertinent for our understanding of the populist phenomenon; it also has considerable implications for the debate regarding how the populist tide may be countered. I contend that the economic-centric accounts, even in their more nuanced versions, tend to overstate the role of economic insecurity as an explanation of populism's electoral success. In a recent article (Margalit 2019) I discuss several reasons why the focus on economic causes deserves more critical assessment, but here I shall mention two. First, the claim that economic insecurity is important in understanding the electoral success of populism conflates what I define as ‘outcome significance’ and ‘explanatory significance’. Consider the Brexit vote, which was decided by a margin of less than four percentage points. Economic insecurity and displacement caused by globalisation may well have shifted the vote by a few points, enough to tip the referendum in favour of the ‘Leave’ camp. The outcome significance – transforming loss to victory – was therefore high. However, the overall phenomenon to be explained is why 52% of the electorate voted to leave the EU. The swing of a few percentage points hardly amounts to ‘explaining’ the phenomenon of the overall electoral backing for Brexit. Put differently, the explanatory significance of that factor is low. The broader point this example illustrates is that a certain factor can have major consequences for the phenomenon of interest, without being a major explanation for that phenomenon. Yet this distinction seems to get muddled in the debate over populism’s causes. This can also be seen with other examples commonly used to demonstrate the importance of economic factors in shaping the populist vote. In explaining Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, analysts have often cited his alleged appeal to globalisation’s losers, helping him crack the Democrats’ ‘blue wall’ in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Analysis by Autor et al. (2016) gives credence to this argument in terms of outcome significance, by finding that the adverse effects of the massive import shock from China accounted for a vote share of several percentage points, sizable enough to flip these states in favour of Trump. Their estimates indicate that if the import shock had been half of what it was, the margin in favour of the Republicans in Pennsylvania would have shrunk by 1.7 percentage points and the Democrats would have won the state by 0.5%. Likewise, the simulation indicates that the electoral impact would also have been sizable enough in Wisconsin and Michigan (2.2 and 1.8 points, respectively) to overturn the Electoral College results. It may therefore be correct that, without the impact of the China shock, Trump would have lost. But the magnitudes of the estimated effects indicate that we are dealing with fairly small additions to a much larger electoral phenomenon. Examination of the empirical evidence regarding an array of other European countries reveals a similar pattern: shocks that increase the economic insecurity of voters affect the electoral outcome on the margin, yet the overall explanatory significance for the level of support for populists is modest (e.g. Colantone and Stanig 2018a, 2018b, Dippel et al. 2015, Malgouyres 2017). In some instances, this effect is consequential in differentiating between loss and victory, but that is not always the case. For example, in proportional representation systems, support for populists – particularly far right parties – affects the distribution of votes within the ideological bloc, but has little bearing on the overall division of votes between the competing blocs. In ‘first past the post’ systems, where districts often lean heavily towards one party, support for the populists is too small to meaningfully affect the vote. Moreover, individual-level studies of the vote for populist parties consistently find that variables that capture labour market standing or economic insecurity explain only a small fraction of the variation of interest (Guiso et al 2017, Gidron and Hall 2017). While variables capturing these explanations are mostly statistically significant, one must not overlook the fact that their usefulness in accounting for the broader question of who supports the populists is, in fact, very limited. A second issue with attributing a central role for the economic causes has to do with immigration, often the most salient issue for populist parties and voters. In describing immigration as an ‘economic cause’ of populism, there is a need to distinguish between two questions: Is immigration in itself economic-driven? And are the economic effects of immigration – whether real or perceived – a major cause of the populist vote? On the first question, there is ample evidence that, indeed, immigration to the West is largely instigated by economic forces (poverty, lack of jobs opportunities, wage differentials). But on the second question, the weight of the evidence clearly indicates that Western voters' concerns regarding immigration have little to do with its impact on their material standing or level of economic insecurity. This conclusion comes up in both observational studies and studies employing a range of survey-experimental methods including list, vignette, and conjoint designs (e.g. Sniderman 2004, Janus 2010, Bansak et al. 2017; see Haimmueller and Hopkins 2014 for a review of the evidence). Even when examining cases where the labour market threat posed by immigrants is most direct, the effects on natives' attitudes are very limited (Hainmueller et al. 2015, Malhotra et al. 2013). Thus, while immigration is often a major concern of populist voters, treating it as an economic driver of populism in this latter sense seems misguided. What, then, explains the populist appeal? Out of space limit, I will note only that structural, long-term social changes strike me as central to understanding the resentment underlying much of its appeal. By this account, structural changes – such as increased access to higher education, urbanisation, and growing ethnic diversity – have led to significant progressive cultural shifts. These changes, and the perceived displacement of traditional social values, have caused a sense of resentment among segments of the population in the West, particularly among white men, older people, conservatives, and those with less formal qualifications (see Inglehart and Norris 2019 for an extensive exposition of this view). Increased exposure to foreign influences that comes with globalization and, even more so, the effects of waves of immigration have exacerbated the sense of a cultural and demographic threat. With gradual generational change, these formerly predominant majorities have increasingly felt their social standing erode, buying into the populist nostalgia for a ‘golden age’ when there was cultural homogeneity and traditional values and a strong national identity prevailed. They have also grown receptive to populist charges against a disconnected elite that has turned its back on them and the values they hold dear. There’s an obvious, and understandable, reluctance to accept such ‘soft’ explanations. Cultural explanations of populism can be harder to measure or identify causally. Yet that of course doesn’t mean that a cultural explanation is incorrect. One should be careful not to equate quantifiability with importance. Note, though, that the cultural account does not dismiss the role of economic factors. In addition to the electoral impact of the causes noted earlier (e.g. trade, automation), hard economic times also tend to undermine the perceived competence of the economic and political elites, and thus help fuel popular distrust in them. It is therefore likely that the financial crisis contributed to the populist wave, as some have suggested (Algan et al. 2017, Mian et al. 2014). But given the weak empirical association between measures of economic insecurity and support for populism, we should view the crisis as more of a trigger than a root cause of widespread populist support. Economic insecurity alone does not lead to support for populism Diamond, 18 --- Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. His is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford. (Larry Diamond, "Illiberal, Nativist Populism: Is Economic Insecurity the Cause?", 4-7-2018, https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/speeches/illiberal-nativist-populism-economic-insecurity-cause)//EG I have two purposes in this paper. The first is conceptual. Nationalist and xenophobic sentiments—different versions of “America first” and “build a wall”— seem to be sweeping through the advanced industrial democracies. How should we define and think about these various political movements? I argue that they are best understood as expressions of nativist, illiberal populism, rather than nationalism per se, since they are often quite friendly to external actors, like Russia and China, who pose grave threats to the real national interest. Second, what is driving growing support for illiberal nativist parties and movements? My answer here will be somewhat speculative, but I do not believe the evidence supports a strictly economic interpretation of the causes. My argument is that these movements are best seen as opportunistic, demagogic efforts to exploit status and identity insecurities as well as a classic sociological cleavage between urban cosmopolitans and rural traditionalists. These anxieties often interact with economic insecurity, but economic insecurity alone is not sufficient to induce support for nativist populism. This requires an identity grievance that renders people ripe for the politics of nativist resentment. Econ/employment good now The economy is on the positive trajectory now – inflation is falling, the labor market is steady, and unemployment is low Sheidlower, 7/12 --- Noah Sheidlower is the Economy Fellow with Insider. Before joining Insider, Noah received his Bachelor's in Sociology and English from Columbia University. (Noah Sheidlower, "The economy is doing exactly what we need to avoid a recession and keep booming", 7-12-2023, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/inflation-slowing-strong-labor-market-avoiding-recession-fed-economy-2023-7)//EG The economy is doing what it needs to do to achieve probably its best possible near-term outcome: inflation falling while keeping unemployment low, all the while staying out of a recession through the rest of this year. Recent data shows the labor market has performed well, inflation continues to cool after being at such a high rate, and the housing market is showing some signs of resilience. This may be music to the Federal Reserve's ears, as the central bank considers whether to slow the economy even further. The Fed's ideal "soft landing" is a balancing act between slowing the economy to bring inflation down while ensuring growth stays strong and unemployment doesn't get too high. That's exactly what's happening in the economy right now. The job market is cooling down but still strong Hiring slowed dramatically in June, while still remaining high compared to before the pandemic, adding 209,000 nonfarm payroll jobs, nearly 100,000 less than the revised growth in May. Job creation on the whole has slowed from the year's highs in January, with some industries such as retail losing jobs from May to June. The latest jobs report is "mostly what the Fed wants to see, which is the labor market sort of coming back into balance, no longer overheating and being sort of sustainable, steady, robust, those kinds of words, rather than sort of exceptionally hot and supply constrained," Julia Pollak, chief economist at ZipRecruiter, told Insider on Friday. Additionally, the most recent Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey for May reveals job openings are still high, while continuing their overall downward trend, echoing the job growth figures in showing a cooling but still-strong labor market. And despite a year of the Fed raising interest rates to fight inflation, unemployment is still remarkably low. The unemployment rate fell in June to 3.6% after rising by 0.3 percentage points in May. Other measures also show that the job market is still very healthy. The prime-age employment-population ratio, the share of people in the 25 to 54 age range with a job, surged from 80.7% to 80.9%, the highest since April 2001. Nick Bunker, economic research director for North America at the Indeed Hiring Lab, told Insider that the slowing but still good employment data suggests the US is heading toward stronger and more sustainable growth. "It's just a matter of, is this pace of moderation quick enough for the Federal Reserve?" Bunker said. "Is this a trend that'll have more time to play out, or will tighter monetary policy or some other stumbling block get in the way of seeing how painless this recalibration can be?" Inflation is coming down as fast as it went up Inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index rose by just 3.0% in June from a year prior, a great sign for Americans' wallets and the lowest rate since March 2021. Inflation had been dramatically cooling before the latest report out Wednesday. The year-over-year change in this index has slowed ever since peaking back in June 2022 at 9.1%. Core CPI, which excludes food and energy, has been extremely high, but it also cooled in June. After a year-over-year increase of 5.3% in May, the index rose by a smaller 4.8% year over year in June. Wage growth as seen by year-over-year changes in average hourly earnings has also plateaued. Despite that plateau, the fall in inflation means that real wages are up on average. Data from the National Federation of Independent Business released Tuesday revealed the number of small businesses that raised their prices fell in June to the lowest level since March 2021, dropping to just 29%. This suggests small businesses have adjusted to still-rising prices, despite about 90% of owners reporting they had few or no qualified applicants for job openings. Despite declining inflation and high GDP growth Americans continue with unwarranted panic about the economy Sheidlower, 7/5 --- Noah Sheidlower is the Economy Fellow with Insider. Before joining Insider, Noah received his Bachelor's in Sociology and English from Columbia University. (Noah Sheidlower, "You probably think the economy is much worse off than it is", 7-5-2023, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-is-us-economy-recession-outlook-2023-6)//EG Recent economic data is showing the US economy is doing quite well, but many Americans are not convinced. Why would they be when lots of available jobs and increased gross domestic product haven't often translated to paychecks that can keep up with rent and grocery prices? And when business leaders are crying recession. Some say the US is in a "vibecession," a disconnect between how the economy performs and how Americans feel about its performance. Still-rising prices, a correction from the unusual economic conditions of the coronavirus pandemic, and public conversation about a still-looming threat of a recession may have overshadowed healthy economic data. Even now, with slower inflation, paused interest-rate hikes, and a healthy job market, Americans can't give up the idea that the economy is in trouble. Public discourse about a looming recession and skepticism of progress Americans' views of the economy, as tracked in a long-running survey by the University of Michigan, were around the lowest they've been since 1980 last summer. Despite a small jump since July 2022, consumer sentiment fell between February and May, with an improvement in June, and these levels more or less match those of the Great Recession. Sentiment is expected to rise further over the next few months, Joanne Hsu, director of the Surveys of Consumers, told Insider. The sentiment crosses party lines. In a Pew Research survey conducted in late March and early April, a large majority of Republicans and Democrats alike still had a negative outlook on the economy. Democrats and Republicans surveyed by Pew have consistently rated the economy lower under President Joe Biden than they did during the Trump administration. This could be caused by pessimism carried over from the start of the pandemic, negative news headlines, and some very real data showing more Americans are experiencing homelessness and attending food banks. It could also be because of falling real wages, or pay when adjusted for the cost of inflation, compared with the past three years. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, real hourly compensation for all workers has fallen more since 2020 than at any time at least since World War II. For that reason, people could just be feeling the stark difference from when they were flush with cash early in the pandemic. After household savings reached a record high in early 2020, real disposable personal income — what Americans can spend after inflation and taxes — is now back to pre-pandemic levels. If you're comparing your financial situation with tha
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