Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2023 DDI Negative

Degrowth JG Neg - DDI 2023 KM

Degrowth JG Neg - DDI 2023 KM.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
NEG---KM vs KB Degrowth
China DA
1NC
Economic interdependence high now – US and Chinese economies exchange hundreds of billions of dollars a year
Kenneth Gatten, 23, US International Trade Commission International Trade Analyst, "U.S.-China Relations: Short and Long-Term Implications for the Global Economy – School of Public Policy," Pennsylvania State University, https://publicpolicy.psu.edu/faculty-and-research/policy-perspectives/u-s-china-relations-short-and-long-term-implications-for-the-global-economy/
Financially, however, neither country has seriously moved to decouple.
In possession of $1.05 trillion of low-return U.S. Treasury securities, China’s central bank has tried to diversify its portfolio but must continue buying these securities to create demand for the dollar, which boosts its value relative to the renminbi, making Chinese exports more competitive and preserving the value of its central bank’s dollar-denominated holdings.
Nor has the U.S. begun to decouple financially from China, whose purchases of Treasury securities paper over the U.S. trade deficit.
But whether the U.S. and China are decoupling in trade is more complicated.
The U.S. and China are economically interdependent. The U.S. is China’s largest export market, and China is the U.S.’s largest import market. China relies on the U.S. for roughly $580 billion of exports per year, total foreign direct investments of $124 billion, joint ventures in high-growth industries, and more. The U.S. relies on China for economic growth in investments, people flow, idea flows, and trade in key industries. Estimates suggest that decoupling would cost the American aviation industry up to $875 billion by 2038; the semiconductor industry up to $159 billion and 100,000 jobs; the medical services industry more than $479 billion over the next decade; and more.
Economic interdependence prevents war – Empirics of US-China relations prove
Mina E. Tanious, 11-23-2018, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), Giza, Egypt and Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt "The impact of economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states The case of “American–Chinese relationship on Taiwan since 1995” " Review of Economics and Political Science, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-10-2018-010/full/pdf?title=the-impact-of-economic-interdependence-on-the-probability-of-conflict-between-states-the-case-of-american-chinese-relationship-on-taiwan-since-1995
5.4 The impact of economic interdependence over conflict on Taiwan
Oneal and Russett tested a three independent variables (Economic Interdependence, democracy, and Joint Intergovernmental Organization membership) against the dependent variable conflict, Oneal and Russett found that independently, democracy, economic interdependence and joint IGO membership all reduce conflict (Clarke, 2008, p. 60).
In their book triangulating peace, Oneal and Russett found that increasing the level of interdependency by a single standard deviation decreased the level of conflict by 44 per cent. (Clarke, 2008, p. 58), and the potential for conflict compared to when the state had almost no trade represents as 27 per cent decrease in the potential for conflict, calculating the impact of all three variables, Oneal and Russett believe that the potential for conflict has been reduced by 58 per cent for the dyad (Clarke, 2008, p. 59). During the pre US–China interdependence (1949-1977), there was an overage of 0.79 MIDs/year, compared to 0.26 MIDs/year following China’s economic reforms (1978-2001) (Clarke, 2008, p. 60). The length of hostilities was longer during the pre- interdependence period (with an average of 11.13 months versus 5.33 months) and reached a higher average level of hostile action (3.7 versus 3.2 on the 1-5 COW scale). On the other hand, all of the six MIDs during the 1978-2001 period occurred from 1994-2001, while three occurred during 2001, when the two economies were becoming truly intertwined.
5.5 Can economic interdependence reduce china’s incentives to use force?
A-The impact on Taiwan–China conflict: it is plausible to argue that business interests are likely to impose restraint by both Taipei and Beijing. It is also a widely held belief among government officials and academia that trade and investment with the mainland might reduce incentives for the PRC to use force.
In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman asserted that the economic ties between mainland China and Taiwan greatly affect the possibility of military conflict between the two sides since such a development would cause “mutual assured economic destruction. (Ezra and Chen, 2003, p. 42)
Degrowth reduces international trade – Reliance on trade is a tenet of growth, degrowth necessarily challenges it
Filka Sekulova, 8-30-2016, Filka holds a Bachelor Degree in Psychology from the Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski and in Economics and Business from the Universiteit van Amsterdam, a Masters in Environmental Economics and Transport from Vrije Universiteit, and a PhD in Climate Change Economics and Happiness from the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. She is a member of the academic think-tank Research & Degrowth, “What are the degrowth implications for long-distance trade?”, Degrowth Conference Budapest 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-1qiYMSeYE
Reminding us that degrowth implies before all challenge to profitability of maximization as the primary driver of human material, of human behavior implies also challenge to the hope the quality of standardization of the high consumption lifestyle that we are having. Challenge the idea of the dependence on market transactions as something intermediary all human relations and implies living giving less room to economic and market transaction and more to be human interventions and human reality is part and parcel of the growth driven imaginary: trade for growth and growth of trade so then so the international trade now become a goal in itself it's done for its own sake and it's also kind of questionable toward extending contributes to the to the types of well-being and social justice. On the contrary if international trade is viewed from an ecological and cultural perspective to be the most efficient colonizer of imaginary. This fantasy we use: producer countries traded in others if they create imaginary of what are the goods that we want to have in our livelihoods.
US weakness causes war – Lack of capability invites miscalc and nuclear war
Grady Means, 8-30-2021, economist in the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, served in the White House as Assistant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and led the Food and Nutrition Task Force to reform the Food Stamp program, served as White House oversight to the National Health Insurance Experiment, chaired working groups on environmental protection and civil rights, and helped draft the bicentennial State of the Union Message of 1976."Biden brings the world closer to nuclear war" Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/569732-biden-brings-the-world-closer-to-nuclear-war/
Over the past six months, the world has edged closer to nuclear war than it has been since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Doomsday Clock is ticking toward midnight. The global power balance has been dramatically reshuffled, and the potential for disastrous miscalculation hasn’t been so high in 80 years. The match and fuse for this is instability — an exaggerated sense of U.S. weakness and lack of capability and resolve — that could lead to huge, aggressive military miscalculations and mistakes by our enemies. The Biden administration has set the table for such a catastrophe.
The timing could not be more dangerous. China has changed strategic direction and has been building its nuclear stockpile and delivery systems. China also has continued to develop hypersonic weapons, including stand-off “carrier killers,” space weapons and cyber capabilities to blind opponents’ strategic and conventional systems. Russia has been advertising (mostly for domestic consumption, but nonetheless worrying) its “unstoppable” delivery systems, and has a very capable nuclear stockpile and military. Iran will continue to move forward with building nuclear weapons. Pakistan and India both have significant nuclear capability in an increasingly unstable part of the world. Nuclear-armed North Korea is again assuming a more belligerent posture. Israel has a full nuclear triad (land, air, subs) to respond to existential aggression. The U.K. and France have significant nuclear deterrents. The world is a powder keg.
In Hollywood terms, today’s capacity for nuclear holocaust is thousands of times greater than the era portrayed in the Armageddon films “On the Beach,” “Fail Safe,” or “Dr. Strangelove.” There would not be anything left for “Mad Max.” Climate disasters may be unfolding over the next hundred years. Nuclear disaster is unfolding now. COVID-19 has killed more Americans than the flu typically does. Nuclear war could kill us all. Our leaders must get their priorities straight.
The danger lies in the growing global perception of weakness and incompetence in the Biden administration, combined with claims of the politicized weakening of the FBI, CIA, State Department and Defense Department. This has crystallized in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s unsure Anchorage meeting with the Chinese, Biden’s wooden Geneva summit with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the colossal failure of the Afghan withdrawal, which may devolve into a humiliating hostage crisis for America, and the budget- and inflation-based defunding of Defense. In addition, the fully politicized Intelligence and Armed Services committees on Capitol Hill add to the danger. Our enemies may decide that now is the time to move.
US-China War goes nuclear – Quickly escalates due to miscalc, existential risk
Max Boot, 4-17-2023, "In the U.S.-China competition, the real ‘existential’ danger is nuclear war," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/17/china-united-states-nuclear-conflict-danger/
But Gallagher is right that the United States and China are locked in an existential struggle, because this new cold war, like the original Cold War with the Soviet Union, has the potential to turn into a nuclear conflict. This is a danger that China hawks — and the U.S. public in general — do not pay sufficient attention to. President Biden, for example, repeatedly says that the United States will defend Taiwan if it’s attacked, without any mention of the potential consequences of a conflict with China.
“It seems odd that war with China over Taiwan seems a comfortable assumption for so many when the U.S. and NATO remain cautious about Russia’s war in Ukraine precisely because of the perceived risk of nuclear escalation,” John K. Culver, a CIA veteran and former national intelligence officer for East Asia, told me.
Even many worst-case scenarios about China are too sanguine about the outcome of a conflict. In March, for example, House Republicans took part in a U.S.-China war game organized by retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. After the exercise was first reported by my Post colleague Olivier Knox, I reached out to Montgomery to ask how it unfolded and whether it included a nuclear exchange.
He said, “The war game ended up with China having a lodgment on Taiwan, but not having defeated the Taiwan Army.” The United States suffered “significant casualties” and Taiwan “awful casualties.” Montgomery explained that the scenario “did not escalate to nuclear, although that is certainly a possibility in this sort of contingency.”
The lack of a nuclear exchange is quite common in U.S.-China war games, at least those conducted at the unclassified level. (A senior defense official told me this is no longer the case with top-secret Pentagon war games.) A recent war game organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), like the congressional war game, had the United States and its allies defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Victory came at “high cost” — “The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members” — but not at the highest cost: i.e., the destruction of U.S. cities. CSIS senior adviser Mark F. Cancian told me that, although he would pursue “a follow-on project that looks at nuclear operations,” he wanted to focus specifically on conventional operations.
That’s a perfectly legitimate choice, but it inadvertently risks reinforcing assumptions that a U.S.-China conflict could avoid nuclear escalation. Even a New York Times op-ed in February written by an Australian scholar, headlined “A War With China Would Be Unlike Anything Americans Faced Before,” focused on cyberwarfare and economic warfare — not nuclear warfare.
And yet China is in the midst of a rapid nuclear buildup. The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military power projects that its nuclear stockpile will grow from 400 warheads today to 1,500 warheads by 2035. The report also warns that, while China nominally adheres to a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons, “Beijing probably would … consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC survival.” Given that a failed invasion of Taiwan could threaten the CCP’s power, it’s reasonable to worry that China could up the ante by going nuclear.
The risk of nuclear escalation is all the greater because, as a senior U.S. admiral explained to me, it would be difficult for the United States to win a war over Taiwan by attacking only Chinese ships at sea and Chinese aircraft in the skies. The United States could find itself compelled, as a matter of military necessity, to attack bases in China. China, in turn, could strike U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, even Hawaii and the West Coast.
Culver, the former intelligence officer, told me, “Even if Beijing announced that its retaliatory strikes against Hawaii or the West Coast of the U.S. were conventionally armed, it would risk immediate U.S. escalation. Can a U.S. president refuse to launch in the 30 minutes between missile launch from China and impact in the U.S.?”
When two nuclear-armed powers attack each other’s territory, it would be difficult to keep the conflict contained at a conventional level. Both sides, admittedly, would have an incentive to avoid “mutual assured destruction,” but countries often act rashly in the heat of battle, particularly after they have suffered significant casualties and feel the need to ensure that their troops did not die in vain.
For a sense of how destructive a war with China could be, read “2034: A Novel of the Next World War” by retired Adm. James Stavridis, a former supreme allied commander in Europe, and Marine combat veteran Elliot Ackerman. It ends — spoiler alert — with nuclear devastation in both countries.
Stavridis told me: “If the U.S. and China manage to sleepwalk into a conventional war, the chances of it escalating into a nuclear exchange are significant. Two great powers who face each other in combat are unlikely to avoid using tactical nuclear weapons, at least at sea. Once that threshold is crossed, it is but a short step to a much broader nuclear conflict. Think 1914 with nuclear weapons at the ready.”
1914 with nuclear weapons? Now that’s an existential dangero.
UQ
Economic interdependence prevents US-China war – China is too reliant on trade with the US to risk provoking a major conflict
Michael Bluhm and Jeremy Mark, 2-9-2023, senior editor at The Signal, previously the managing editor at the Open Markets Institute, Ph. D. Mark is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a specialist in political, economic and financial issues related to Asia and Africa. With the GeoEconomics Center, he writes on US-China issues, worked for the International Monetary Fund as a communications specialist for more than two decades, holds a BA in East Asian Studies and Chinese language from Vassar College, an MA in Southeast Asian Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London and an MSc in Journalism from Columbia University, "If the US and China go to the brink, can they figure out how to de-escalate?," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2023/2/9/23591561/us-china-relations-philippines-japan-australia
Michael Bluhm
How volatile is the situation in the Asia-Pacific?
Jeremy Mark
The situation is quite volatile, but I don’t think it’s a powder keg.
Over the last decade, in particular, China has taken actions that have created volatility unaccustomed in the region since the Vietnam War. China has bullied and intimidated Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. At its land border with India, China’s provocations in the last two years have resulted in soldiers losing their lives. All this points to a significant escalation of tensions.
That said, I don’t think there is a looming regional or US-China conflict. Trade and business are proceeding. The integration of supply chains among China and its trade partners remains very deep.
China is profoundly preoccupied with its own economy at the moment because of the impact of Covid, a severe real-estate slump, high youth unemployment, and several other issues. This is not a country that’s about to endanger its future by launching a war.
Michael Bluhm
What are the possible consequences of the Philippine bases for regional security?
Jeremy Mark
The US sees the consequences positively. There has essentially been a hole in the US regional defense against China — one which is now being filled by this agreement.
It’s also a message to China that its provocative actions have resulted in the Philippines returning to the pro-American place that it once had in regional security arrangements.
But from China’s point of view, this increases volatility. The presence of US troops in the north of the Philippines’ Luzon island — the closest island to Taiwan — may introduce more tension into some situations.
Michael Bluhm
This agreement is only the latest in a series of new defense ties with countries in the region, such as the recent deal with Japan and the AUKUS submarine deal. How do you see Washington’s strategy here?
Jeremy Mark
I would add to that last week’s announcement of a technology exchange between the US and India and some other, smaller arrangements. They all underline the deep concern across much of Asia with China’s posture.
In the last 10 years, the Japanese have radically changed their approach to military policy. They’ve even revised their constitution to give greater power to their Self-Defense Forces, allowing for a higher level of defense vis-à-vis China. Australia has concerns about China’s actions regarding Australia’s exports and in the Solomon Islands, and Canberra’s decision to acquire nuclear submarines reflects that concern.
All these add up to a strong consensus among many Asian countries that they need greater cooperation with the US — and with each other — to address China.
Michael Bluhm
Let’s look at China’s perspective. How do you see China’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific?
Jeremy Mark
A lot of China’s strategy is oriented inward. The Chinese Communist Party, before and during the era of Xi Jinping, has had a crisis of legitimacy. Xi has addressed this in various ways, including a wide crackdown on corruption soon after he came to power. The Chinese government has used nationalism — and the threat from the US, in particular — to galvanize public opinion, and they’ve been very effective.
More broadly, China sees itself as a rising power. Its rhetoric portrays the US as a declining power, and it says that the time has come to redefine China’s place in the world order.
China clearly sees the im

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.