Puerto Rico SS Aff - DDI 2023 KM
Puerto Rico SS Aff - DDI 2023 KM.docx
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AFF---Puerto Rico---KM 1AC 1AC – Puerto Rico Vaello-Madero is the latest in a series of the “New Insular Cases” – racially barring Puerto Ricans from the SSI benefits they deserve entrenches their colonial subjugation at the hands of the US. Vélez'22 [Katerina Martínez; 2022; Hearing Officer University of Missouri-Columbia; " Trouble in Paradise: Puerto Rico's Routine Exclusion from Federal Benefit Programs as a Result of the Alien-Citizen Paradox," The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review,, Vol. 6, Issue/2. , p. 17-18//JJB] Adherence to the Insular Cases, which has no foundation in the Constitution and instead relies on racial stereotypes, has permitted the justification of exclusion from important social benefit programs, as exemplified by the Vaello-Madero decision. SSI is designed to support the neediest Americans; it is a program aimed at preventing severe poverty. In 2019, 43.5% of Puerto Rican residents lived below the poverty line, more than triple the national percentage of 12.3%.161 Despite a large portion of Puerto Ricans qualifying as “needy Americans,” its residents are continuously denied federal benefits solely based on residency. The differential treatment of Puerto Ricans cuts deeper than simply denying them federal benefits. Contemporary law scholars view the Insular Cases as evidence of racist American imperialism, allowing the U.S. to expand its empire without being compelled by the Constitution to accept as citizen populations of an “uncivilized race.” In fact, Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Downes, decided in 1901, noted that he objected to the morality and unfairness of the incorporation doctrine, which is still in effect today.162 It is important to note that the same Court that decided the 1901 Insular Cases also decided Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court upheld the legality of racial segregation and of the “separate but equal” doctrine. Notably, Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter in Plessy.163 It is therefore evident that both the incorporation doctrine of the Insular Cases and the “separate but equal” doctrine were built on the same “racist worldview.” In fact, contemporary critics of the Insular Cases call the resulting doctrine “the doctrine of separate and unequal.”164 Plessy has long been overturned, yet the Insular Cases remain in effect today. As a result, the U.S. government continues to have sovereignty over Puerto Rico, but its citizens are not treated equally despite having to adhere to all federal laws, pay federal taxes in some cases, and pay federal import and export taxes. However, not all hope is lost; Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, along with Justice Thomas’s and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrences in Vaello-Madero, set the stage for how the next “modern Insular Case” case should be decided.165 Justice Harlan’s dissent emphasized equal citizenship; he recognized that citizenship and equality go hand in hand.166 His reasoning suggests that citizenship itself carries with it a right to equal treatment independent of the “equal protection of the laws” guaranteed to all persons under the Equal Protection Clause.167 Similarly, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Vaello-Madero notes that “[t]he Citizenship Clause’s conferral of the ‘dignity and glory of American citizenship’ should prohibit the federal government from denying citizens equality with respect to civil rights.”168 President Woodrow Wilson once spoke of the U.S. territories as lying “outside the charmed circle of our own national life.”169 He then admitted that, although Puerto Rico was once treated as a mere possession, it is now to be administered with the same sense of responsibility as toward citizens living on the mainland.170 He said: “We can satisfy the obligations of generous justice toward the people of Puerto Rico by giving them the ample and familiar rights and privileges accorded our own citizens.”171 The question then remains: why has the United States, with its vision of greatness, and self-professed leader of the free world, refused for over 100 years to fully accept or free nearly four million U.S. citizens that make up part of its hidden empire? Vaello Madero must be overruled. It is haunted by the specter of the Insular Cases, a precedent that subjects Puerto Ricans and those of other colonized territories to Constitutionally sanctioned political apartheid. Any efforts to repurpose the precedent will fail, and instead reinscribe territorial subordination. Ponsa-Kraus 22, George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History at Columbia Law School [Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, June 2022, the George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History at Columbia Law School, o-editor of Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution, and the author of several articles and essays on the constitutional implications of American territorial expansion, served as a law clerk to Judge José A. Cabranes on the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and to Justice Stephen G. Breyer on the Supreme Court, “The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories,” Yale Law Journal, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/the-insular-cases-run-amok] /RS The Insular Cases have been enjoying an improbable—and unfortunate—renaissance. Decided at the height of what has been called the “imperialist” period in U.S. history, this series of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the early twentieth century infamously held that the former Spanish colonies annexed by the United States in 1898—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam—“belong[ed] to . . . but [were] not a part of the United States.”1 Although previous U.S. territories were “incorporated” into the United States upon annexation, these new ones had been annexed but not incorporated.2 What exactly this meant has been the subject of considerable debate even as those decisions have received widespread condemnation.3 According to the standard account, the Insular Cases held that the entire Constitution applies within the United States—defined as the states, the District of Columbia, and the incorporated territories—while only its fundamental limitations apply in what came to be known as the “unincorporated” territories. According to an alternative account (to which I subscribe), the Insular Cases did not carve out a largely extraconstitutional zone of territory subject to formal, internationally recognized U.S. sovereignty where none of the Constitution applies except for certain fundamental limitations. Instead, when it comes to which constitutional provisions apply where, the Insular Cases stand for a more modest twofold proposition. First, provisions defining their geographic scope with the phrase “United States” may or may not include unincorporated territories. Second, either way, fundamental limitations certainly apply within unincorporated territories, though what counts as “fundamental” may vary from one unincorporated territory to the next.5 Although what it means to be “unincorporated” remains contested to this day, every account of the Insular Cases agrees that they also stand for a considerably less modest proposition: that the federal government has the power to keep and govern territories indefinitely, without ever admitting them into statehood (or deannexing them, for that matter).6 Before 1898, territories annexed by the United States were presumed to be on a path to statehood.7 However, the annexation in 1898 of three territories populated largely by nonwhite people gave rise to a public debate over whether the United States, for the first time in its history, could continue to hold a territory indefinitely without eventually admitting it as a state.8 The Court found a way. It simply invented, out of whole cloth, the distinction between incorporated territories, which were on their way to statehood, and unincorporated territories, which might never become states, and placed these newly annexed territories in the latter category.9 The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories thus served as the cornerstone of a racially motivated imperialist legal doctrine10: the idea of the unincorporated territory gave sanction to indefinite colonial rule over majority nonwhite populations at the margins of the American empire.11 Since the Founding, territories had been subject to U.S. sovereignty but denied federal representation. The political illegitimacy of unrepresentative federal rule over their inhabitants had been justified by the shared understanding, confirmed by consistent practice, that territorial status was a temporary necessity that would end when a territory became a state.12 But by giving constitutional sanction to the new and subordinate category of unincorporated territories, which might never become states, the Insular Cases raised the possibility that the United States could, if it so desired, govern unincorporated territories indefinitely despite the fact that their residents had neither representation in the federal government nor the assurance that such representation would be forthcoming upon their territory’s eventual admission as a state. After the Insular Cases, that possibility became a reality that has persisted for nearly 125 years. The unincorporated territory was a judicial innovation designed for the purpose of squaring the Constitution’s commitment to representative democracy with the Court’s implicit conviction that nonwhite people from unfamiliar cultures were ill-suited to participate in a majority-white, Anglo-Saxon polity.13 With the creation of the unincorporated territory, the Court implicitly embraced the view that the theory of political legitimacy underlying the Constitution allowed for an exception, born of practical necessity and motivated by racism, permitting a representative democracy to govern people deemed inferior indefinitely without representation. The raison d’être of the Insular Cases was, therefore, to provide the constitutional foundation for perpetual American colonies. But recent efforts to “repurpose” the Insular Cases have breathed new life into those reviled decisions.14 Adopting the standard account of the Insular Cases, according to which they created a nearly extraconstitutional zone for the unincorporated territories, proponents of repurposing argue that precisely because the Insular Cases swept aside most constitutional restraints upon government action in those territories, they now—counter-intuitively—hold the key to the survival of the unique and diverse cultures of these places: today, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI), and American Samoa.15 These territories, all unincorporated, remain subject to U.S sovereignty, and overwhelming majorities of their populations apparently want to keep it that way.16 At the same time, several of them have certain traditional cultural practices that could be in tension or outright conflict with the U.S. Constitution.17 The practices at issue include, for example, racial restrictions on the alienation of land in the Pacific U.S. territories, which are meant to protect native land ownership where land is scarce and central to cultural identity.18 Ordinarily—in what most people think of as the United States—racial restrictions on the alienation of land would clearly violate the Equal Protection Clause.19 But here the repurposed Insular Cases come into play. If, as the standard account has it, these decisions relegated the unincorporated territories to a nearly extraconstitutional zone, then the Constitution does not stand in the way of territorial cultural practices deserving of protection. Or so the argument goes. A recent Harvard Law Review Special Issue features several contributions explaining the repurposing view and arguing that it might offer the best way to protect the distinctive cultures of the unincorporated territories.20 As one of them explains, “[w]here the doctrine [of the Insular Cases] once served colonial interests in an era of mainland domination of the territories, a revisionist argument would see it repurposed today to protect indigenous cultures from a procrustean application of the federal Constitution.”21 Another advocate of the repurposing project argues that judicial adoption of the repurposing view is “defensible and perhaps even necessary” in order to protect culture and promote self-government in the U.S. territories.22 An early defender of repurposing, Stanley Laughlin, sums up the argument like this: The genius of the [doctrine of the Insular Cases] is that it allows the insular areas to be full-fledged parts of the United States but, at the same time, recognizes that their cultures are substantially different from those of the mainland United States and allows some latitude in constitutional interpretation for the purpose of accommodating those cultures.23 As these quotations make clear, the repurposing project aims to achieve not one but two interrelated goals: cultural accommodation and continued U.S. sovereignty. That is, if the sole goal were the protection of culture, then separation from the United States through independence would render irrelevant any tension with the U.S. Constitution and no repurposing would be necessary. But since support for independence in the territories is minimal at best, it becomes necessary to reconcile the cultural practices at issue with the U.S. Constitution. Enter the standard account of the Insular Cases, providing support for the idea that constitutional obstacles can be swept aside in the unincorporated territories. This Article makes the case against the repurposing project.24 My argument is that the Insular Cases gave rise to nothing less than a crisis of political legitimacy in the unincorporated territories and that no amount of repurposing, no matter how well-intentioned—or even successful—can change that fact. On the contrary: repurposing the Insular Cases will prolong the crisis. The felt imperative to derail the recently annexed territories from the statehood track, while still permitting the United States to retain them, drove the Court to abandon a settled understanding that otherwise would have constrained it: that annexed territories would eventually become states. The famously unclear and erroneous reasoning of the Insular Cases is famously unclear and erroneous precisely because it simply could not be reconciled with that settled understanding. To accomplish the end of giving constitutional sanction to permanent colonies, the Court had to carve out an exception to settled constitutional law. The doctrine of territorial incorporation it produced has long been the source of serious judicial confusion and even incoherence.25 The cases and scholarship seeking to repurpose the Insular Cases now pursue a defensible end, but in the process they not only inherit but dramatically exacerbate a legacy of resorting to shoddy legal reasoning in pursuit of an end that otherwise appears out of reach.26 My case against the repurposing project begins with a refutation of the standard account, but it does not end there. Refuting the standard account is necessary because its error with respect to the applicability of constitutional provisions forms the basis for the repurposing project, which relies on the idea of a nearly extraconstitutional zone to pursue the goal of cultural accommodation. This keeps the Insular Cases alive—and as long as the Insular Cases remain alive, the Court’s imprimatur will remain on permanent colonialism. But refuting the standard account is not sufficient because even on the alternative account, the Insular Cases constitutionalized permanent colonialism by introducing the unincorporated territory into American constitutional law. What defines unincorporated territories is that they can remain territories, subject to U.S. sovereignty and federal laws but denied representation in the federal government, forever. So while I argue that the Insular Cases did not create a nearly extraconstitutional zone, and I explain and clarify what they did hold, I do not argue that the solution to the problem of the Insular Cases lies in a correct interpretation of them. Instead, it lies in overruling them and erasing the doctrine of territorial incorporation from American constitutional law.27 Ironically, it may be possible to achieve the objective of cultural accommodation in the territories by employing ordinary constitutional doctrines, such as standard equal-protection doctrine or the plenary power jurisprudence under the Territory Clause.28 I argue below that many, perhaps all, of the claims advanced under the rubric of the repurposing project could and should be decoupled from the Insular Cases jurisprudence and reframed and adjudicated under precisely these doctrines.29 However, even if one believes, as the advocates of repurposing do, that it would be tragic not to find a way to accommodate cultural practices in the U.S. territories, those ends cannot justify their doctrinal means, because the cost of resorting to such means is the perpetuation of a system of permanent colonies. In my view, even if certain diverse cultural practices in the territories cannot be reconciled with the Constitution, this fact would not justify the repurposing of the Insular Cases. To put it bluntly: arguing that we need to repurpose the Insular Cases to accommodate culture is like arguing that we need to repurpose Plessy v. Ferguson to accommodate benign racial classifications.30 We do not. We must not. Just as we cannot turn a blind eye to the racist premise driving Plessy, even if doing so appeared necessary to constitutionalize benign racial classifications, neither can we tolerate, let alone expiate, the racist premise of the Insular Cases, and the flagrant political illegitimacy it licenses, in order to pursue the independently laudable goal of preserving important cultural practices in U.S. territories. Like Plessy, the Insular Cases are bad law. They cannot be redeemed, even by conscripting them into service for the noble goal of protecting their victims from a certain harm. Democratic representation is an inviolable commitment of the Constitution’s own bedrock conception of political legitimacy. Perpetual territorial status violates it. Part I explains the Insular Cases, criticizing the standard account and clarifying what those decisions held. My goal here, in short, is to refute the claim that forms the basis of the repurposing project: that the Insular Cases relegated the unincorporated territories to a nearly extraconstitutional zone. While those decisions did introduce the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories into the Court’s constitutional law on the territories, the standard account misunderstands it.31 The doctrine of territorial incorporation does not mean, as the standard account holds, that the “entire” Constitution applies in the incorporated territories while “only” its fundamental limitations apply in the unincorporated territories. Part II describes several Supreme Court decisions relying on the Insular Cases since the original series came down between 1901 and 1922.32 Each of them concerns a constitutional challenge originating in formally foreign territory where the United States exerts some form of control. One involves trials of civilians on U.S. military bases abroad; another, a search by U.S. agents of a Mexican national’s home in Mexico; still another, the detention of persons labeled enemy combatants in Guantánamo, a place the Court concluded is subject to de facto U.S. sovereignty though located in de jure foreign (Cuban) territory.33 Together, these cases kept alive the standard account of the Insular Cases by endorsing an understanding of those cases according to which constitutional provisions do not apply abroad if it would be “impracticable and anomalous” to apply them. Developed in the context of foreign ter
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