AI VAT UBI Neg - DDI 2023 BK
AI VAT UBI Neg - DDI 2023 BK.docx
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RoboVAT Negative File Notes Strategy Maps/Notes 2NR – States + PTX 2NC/1NR – States + PTX, Econ DA or* Cap K 1NC – States, PTX, Econ DA or* Cap K *you could read the econ DA and the Cap K depending on whether or not you are willing to defend performative contradiction* States: The generic states CP with the VAT and UBI solvency should be sufficient. PTX: The UBI link should function relatively well, and I would recommend reading SNAP “Solves Economy” as a DA turns case argument in the block Case 1NC — Adv 1 Empirics flow neg – Ai adoption in firms increases employment, productivity, and compliments labor – a tax directly decreases employment which turns the aff. Seamans ‘21 Robert Seamans, Ph.D (UC Berkeley) . is an Associate Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. He recently completed a one year appointment as a Senior Economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers where he worked on a wide range of policies relating to technology, innovation and entrepreneurship. Professor Seamans’ research focuses on how technology and governance structures affect strategic interactions between firms, affect incentives to innovate, and ultimately shape market outcomes. “Tax not the robots,” 8/25/21, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/tax-not-the-robots/, (WA) Firms adopting robots see more employment and better performance Over the past couple of years there have been several firm-level studies on the effects of robot adoption in industrial settings. These papers all find that firms that adopt robots see an increase in employment. For example, a recent paper by Dixon, Hong, and Wu (2021) uses data on robot imports to identify Canadian firms that adopt robots.1 They then compare employment, behavior, and performance between robot-adopting and non-adopting firms. They find that the robot-adopting firms experience a subsequent increase in employment and that the employment increase is predominantly from low-skill workers. As another example, Acemoglu, Lelarge, and Restrepo (2020) find that, among French manufacturing firms, those firms that adopted robots add jobs.2 A similar finding is in a paper by Koch, Manulov, and Smolka (2019), who use firm level data from Spain.3 These studies also find that the firms that adopt robots see an increase in performance (measured as an increase in firm-level total factor productivity or revenue). Interestingly, the studies find that the non-adopting firms in the same industry as the robot adopting firms see decreases in employment. This may be due to reallocation from slower-growing, more poorly-performing firms to faster-growing, better-performing firms. In some cases, the decreases in employment at the non-adopting firms more than outweigh the employment gains at the robot-adopting firms, causing a location- or industry-wide fall in employment (as shown for example in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020)).4 There have also been papers on robot adoption in service settings. A paper studying the effects of robots on workers in Japanese nursing homes by Eggleston, Lee, and Iizuka (2021) finds that robots complement human labor and reduce labor turnover.5 The physically demanding nature of work in nursing homes can often lead to high turnover, so robots in these settings are intentionally designed to assist with the most physically demanding tasks such as lifting patients out of beds. The paper also highlights an interesting feature of the Japanese setting: that many Japanese prefectures provide subsidies for nursing homes that adopt robots. If indeed robots complement human labor, then subsidies make sense and may help spur adoption of robots in these settings. The evidence from this academic literature has two implications for the idea of a robot tax. First, there is no evidence that robots are directly substituting for human labor—indeed, robots may actually be complementing labor, resulting in increases in employment. Taxing firms that are adopting robots may then have the perverse effect of slowing employment growth. Second, while robots may in part be responsible for some labor reallocation within an industry, the bigger question is what to do about the non-robot adopting firms, since these are the firms experiencing employment decreases. Should these firms be allowed to shrink, perhaps ultimately going out of business, since they are less productive to begin with? Should there be robot subsidies, so that more firms are able to adopt robots, thereby presumably taking part in employment growth? Also, given the positive performance benefits for firms that adopt robots, why aren’t more firms adopting? Potential reasons could include lack of knowledge about the benefits that robots provide, lack of capital to invest in robots, or lack of skilled human capital at the firm or in the local labor market for adopting firms to hire, among other reasons. These are important questions for researchers and policymakers to study. Multiple UBI study’s prove they can’t solve inequality --- multiple warrants Coote 19 (Anne, is head of social policy for Nef - the New Economics Foundation. A leading analyst, writer and advocate in the field of social policy, Anna is commissioner for health with the UK sustainable development commission. 05-16-2019 “Universal basic income doesn’t work. Let’s boost the public realm instead” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/06/universal-basic-income-public-realm-poverty-inequality)//BH-NB// A study of UBI trials concludes that making cash payments to all is no solution to poverty and inequality A study published this week sheds doubt on ambitious claims made for universal basic income (UBI), the scheme that would give everyone regular, unconditional cash payments that are enough to live on. Its advocates claim it would help to reduce poverty, narrow inequalities and tackle the effects of automation on jobs and income. Research conducted for Public Services International, a global trade union federation, reviewed for the first time 16 practical projects that have tested different ways of distributing regular cash payments to individuals across a range of poor, middle-income and rich countries, as well as copious literature on the topic. It could find no evidence to suggest that such a scheme could be sustained for all individuals in any country in the short, medium or longer term – or that this approach could achieve lasting improvements in wellbeing or equality. The research confirms the importance of generous, non-stigmatising income support, but everything turns on how much money is paid, under what conditions and with what consequences for the welfare system as a whole. From Kenya and southern India to Alaska and Finland, cash payment schemes have been claimed to show that UBI “works”. In fact, what’s been tested in practice is almost infinitely varied, with cash paid at different levels and intervals, usually well below the poverty line and mainly to individuals selected because they are severely disadvantaged, with funds provided by charities, corporations and development agencies more often than by governments. Experiments in India and Kenya have been funded, respectively, by Unicef and Give Directly, a US charity supported by Google. They give money to people on very low incomes in selected villages for fixed periods of time. Giving small amounts of cash to people who have next to nothing is bound to make a difference – and indeed, these schemes have helped to improve recipients’ health and livelihoods. But nothing is revealed about their longer-term viability, or how they could be scaled up to serve whole populations. And there is a democratic deficit: people who get their basic income from charities or aid agencies have no control over how payments are made, to whom, at what level or over what period of time. The Alaska Permanent Fund, built from the state’s oil revenues, pays all adults and children a dividend each year – in 2018, it was $1,600 (£1,230). The scheme is popular and enduring; it has been found to produce some positive impacts on rural indigenous groups, but it makes no claim to sufficiency and has done nothing to reduce child poverty or to prevent widening income inequalities. Finland undertook a two-year trial, from January 2017 to December 2018, of modest monthly payments of €560 (£477) to 2,000 unemployed people – but the government has refused to fund further expansion. It told us little about UBI except that, when push comes to shove, elected politicians may balk at paying for a universal scheme. The cost of a sufficient UBI scheme would be extremely high according to the International Labour Office, which estimates average costs equivalent to 20-30% of GDP in most countries. Costs can be reduced – and have been in most trials – by paying smaller amounts to fewer individuals. But there is no evidence to suggest that a partial or conditional UBI scheme could do anything to mitigate, let alone reverse, current trends towards worsening poverty, inequality and labour insecurity. Costs may be offset by raising taxes or shifting expenditure from other kinds of public expenditure, but either way there are huge and risky trade-offs. Money spent on cash payments cannot be invested elsewhere. The more generous the payments, the wider the range of recipients, the longer the scheme continues, the less money will be left to build the structures and systems that are needed to realise UBI’s progressive goals. As this week’s report observes, “If cash payments are allowed to take precedence, there’s a serious risk of crowding out efforts to build collaborative, sustainable services and infrastructure – and setting a pattern for future development that promotes commodification rather than emancipation.” This may help to explain why UBI has attracted support from Silicon Valley tycoons, who are more interested in defending consumer capitalism than in tackling poverty and inequality. The report concludes that the money needed to pay for an adequate UBI scheme “would be better spent on reforming social protection systems, and building more and better-quality public services”. Redistributing the personal tax allowance and developing the idea of universal basic services (UBS) could offer a more promising alternative. This calls for more and better quality public services that are free to those who need them, regardless of ability to pay. Healthcare and education are obvious examples, and it is argued that a similar approach should be applied to areas such as transport, housing, social care and information – everyday essentials that should be available to all. Collective provision offers more cost-effective, socially just, redistributive and sustainable ways of meeting people’s needs than leaving individuals to buy what they can afford in the marketplace. Robot taxes bar innovation and drive production offshore. Summers ‘17 Lawrence H. Summers is President Emeritus of Harvard University. During the past two decades he has served in a series of senior policy positions, including Vice President of development economics and chief economist of the World Bank, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Director of the National Economic Council for the Obama Administration from 2009 to 2011, and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, from 1999 to 2001. Lawrence Summers, 3-5-2017, “Picking on robots won’t deal with job destruction,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/picking-on-robots-wont-deal-with-job-destruction/2017/03/05/32091f08-004b-11e7-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html?postshare=4531488791793643 (WA) First, I cannot see any logic to singling out robots as job destroyers. What about kiosks that dispense airplane boarding passes? Word-processing programs that accelerate the production of documents? Mobile banking technologies? Autonomous vehicles? Vaccines that, by preventing disease, destroy jobs in medicine? There are many kinds of innovation that allow the production of more or better output with less labor input. Why pick on robots? Does Gates think anyone, let alone Congress, the Trump administration or a commission composed of his fellow technocrats, can distinguish labor-saving activities from labor-enhancing ones? Surely even if experts could draw such distinctions, the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to administer them is in doubt. Second, much innovative activity, even of a robotlike variety, involves producing better goods and services rather than xsimply extracting more output from the same input. Autonomous vehicles will likely be safer than ones driven by humans. Robotics already help surgeons perform certain operations better than they can on their own. Online reservation systems are faster and more convenient than travel agents. Moreover, because of emulation and competition, innovators capture only a small part of the benefit of their innovation. It follows that there is as much a case for subsidizing as taxing types of capital that embody innovation. Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, why tax in ways that reduce the size of the pie rather than ways that assure that the larger pie is well-distributed? Imagine that 50 people can produce robots who will do the work of 100. A sufficiently high tax on robots would prevent them from being produced. Surely it would be better for society to instead enjoy the extra output and establish suitable taxes and transfers to protect displaced workers. It is hard to see why shrinking the pie, rather than enlarging it as much as possible and then redistributing, is the right way forward. This last point has long been standard in international trade theory. Indeed, it is common to point out that opening a country to international trade is like giving it access to a technology for transforming one good into another. The argument, then, is that since one surely would not regard such a technical change as bad, neither is trade, and so protectionism is bad. Gates’s robot tax risks essentially being protectionism against progress. None of this is to minimize the problem of job destruction and rising inequality (although it is a major paradox that we seem to be seeing unprecedentedly rapid job destruction by machinery while at the same time observing extraordinarily low productivity growth). Rather, it is to suggest that staving off progress is a poor strategy for helping less fortunate workers. In addition to difficulties of definition and collateral costs, there is the further problem that in an open world, taxes on technology are likely to drive production offshore rather than create jobs at home. Best Studies Prove automation won’t happen any time soon Wright & Przegalinska 22 (Aleksandra, is currently Associate Professor at the Department of Management in Digital and Networked Societies at the Kozminski University and the Leader of AI in Management Program and received her doctorate in the field of philosophy of artificial intelligence at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Warsaw. Robert, is a business, economic, financial, and monetary historian and the inaugural Rudy and Marilyn Nef Family Chair of Political Economy at Augustana University and is also a research economist at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 2022 “Debating Universal Basic Income” https://www.academia.edu/90270637/Debating_Universal_Basic_Income_Pros_Cons_and_ Alternatives pg.91-92)//BH-NB// *If the link doesn’t work just ask me for the PDF* Maybe someday an AI-enabled robot will stroll or roll into your workplace and take your job. But it won’t be today. Or tomorrow. Or any time soon. According to an editorial in Skynet Today, AI remains very narrow in scope. While half of all jobs may entail tasks that can be automated at some point, fewer than 5% of jobs will be fully automated by 2030 (Liang et al. 2019). Alarmists make extreme predictions because they thought in binary terms instead of placing jobs along a spectrum of risk of replacement based on the skills necessary to complete work tasks. Robert D. Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, concurs. “Stop listening to the hype,” he recently told readers, “either the techno-utopian hype that says the ‘AI revolution’ will be greater than the First Industrial Revolution or the techno-dystopians who say all is lost. The reality is that AI is just computer code” (Atkinson 2022). That explains why total factor productivity, a measure of overall economic productivity, has not sped up during the information age (Fernald 2014; Fernald and Matoba 2009; Basu et al. 2006). See Fig. 5.1. Multiple alt causes to populism surging Pinkas 5/15 — Alon Pinkas, MA in Government and Politics at Georgetown, was a foreign policy advisor for Ehud Barak and political advisor to Shimon Peres (“America's Possible Return to Nationalist Populism Sends Tremors Around the Democratic World,” Haaretz, Available Online at https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2023-05-15/ty-article/.premium/trumps-possible-return-should-send-tremors-around-the-democratic-world/00000188-1fc9-df77-afe9-5fcdc84a0000, Accessed 07-14-2023) There are global political trends negatively affecting and straining democracies: the growing alienation of people from the political system; resentment toward government policies and state institutions; majoritarian and authoritarian parties fanning the flames; identity politics becoming a defining aspect of identification; fear of modernization and technology that are perceived as discriminatory, thus contributing to anti-elite fomentation. Populism is no threat to democracy – multiple warrants Weyland 21 (Kurt, is Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts in the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 12-06-2021 “Why US Democracy Trumps Populism: Comparative Lessons Reconsidered” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D6EFD45DC709C4D27742C99992FF9417/S1049096521001876a.pdf/why-us-democracy-trumps-populism-comparative-lessons-reconsidered.pdf pg.478-479)//BH-NB// My comprehensive analysis of populist governments in Europe and Latin America showed that the risk to liberal democracy was lower than many observers stirred up by Donald Trump’s stunning election had feared (Weyland 2020). I define populism as a political strategy through which personalistic, typically charismatic leaders seek and exercise power through unmediated, quasi-direct appeals and connections to an amorphous, heterogeneous, largely unorganized mass of followers. Based on this definition, I theorized that personalistic plebiscitarian leadership suffocated democracy only when two types of conditions intersected: (1) when institutional weakness created room for maneuvering by personalistic leaders; and (2) when conjunctural opportunities, arising from severe and acute but resolvable crises or from hydrocarbon windfalls, allowed such leaders to obtain overwhelming support. My wide-ranging analysis substantiated these arguments by examining 30 cases of populist chief executives. It is interesting that they lined up along three paths in which a specific type of institutional weakness coinciding with a specific conjunctural opportunity led to democracy’s asphyxiation in only six cases— namely, under Latin America’s Bolivarian populism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; in Latin America’s neoliberal populism in Alberto Fujimori’s Peru; and under Europe’s ethno-national populism in Hungary and Turkey. My investigations thus found that populism was less dangerous for democracy than many feared; only in relatively few cases did personalistic plebiscitarian leaders manage to concentrate enough power to smother democracy. This examination yielded the prediction that Trump would not destroy US democracy. After all, a rigid constitution and resilient checks and balances provided institutional strength; and, given the absence of a severe and acute yet resolvabl
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