Tuberville Neg - DDI 2023 KM

NEG---KM vs KM Tuberville
T – Jobs Guarantee
1NC---T—Job Guarantee
Interpretation: a job guarantee must be universal
A JG is a permanent, universal program.
Tcherneva 18 [Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Economics at Bard College, the Director of OSUN’s Economic Democracy Initiative, and a Research Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, NY. She specializes in modern money and public policy, “The Job Guarantee: Design, Jobs, and Implementation,” Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 4-xx-2018, https://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_902.pdf, accessed 7-27-2023, HKR-SWY]
The job guarantee (JG) is a public option for jobs. It is a permanent, federally funded, and locally administered program that supplies voluntary employment opportunities on demand for all who are ready and willing to work at a living wage. While it is first and foremost a jobs program, it has the potential to be transformative by advancing the public purpose and improving working conditions, people’s everyday lives, and the economy as a whole.
A FJG guarantees everyone a job
Bhandari 19 Former Senior Policy Advisor, Economic Program [3-25-19, “What is a federal jobs guarantee? And what are people saying about it?” https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it, accessed 7-18-23, angelina]
A federal jobs guarantee is as simple as it sounds on the surface: everyone in the country will be guaranteed a job by the US government should they desire one. There are two versions right now gaining attention. One plan is written by academics Mark Paul, Sandy Darity, and Darrick Hamilton. The other was written by Pavlina Tcherneva.
Violation: the aff only guarantees jobs for current Senate nominees
Vote neg:
1] functional limits – strategically limiting the number of affs that have an unconditionality key warrant is good – that creates good debates on core parts of the topic
2] ground – conditional affs deck neg ground by avoiding core generics like the econ DA, politics DA, and the states CP and it incentivizes a race to the margins to find the smallest aff possible
2NC – T Job Guarantee – Cards
A federal job guarantee must provide jobs to all workers as a means of eliminating poverty and reducing unemployment.
Darity 18 [William Darity—Samuel DuBois Cook Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA., 2018, "The Federal Job Guarantee," Intereconomics, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2018/number/3/article/the-federal-job-guarantee.html]
To remedy this, we have been long-time advocates of the permanent establishment of a federal job guarantee to eliminate working poverty and involuntary unemployment. Our plan constitutes a genuine public option for employment that enables existing workers, particularly those confined to the low end of the labor market, to bargain and obtain higher wages, greater benefits and better working conditions. The job guarantee would offer a permanent, viable alternative to low pay, low benefits and poor working conditions for all Americans. It would produce a structural transformation of the American labor market and the American economy.
T – Fiscal Redistribution
1NC---T—Fiscal Redistribution
Interpretation: fiscal redistribution means taxes
A - "Fiscal" means "relating to government revenue, especially taxes."
Oxford English Dictionary, 2011, In Concise Oxford English Dictionary Luxury edition
fiscal /'fisk(ə)1/ ► adj. 1 relating to government revenue, especially taxes. 2 chiefly N. Amer. relating to financial
matters. ■ N. Amer. denoting a financial year: the deficit for fiscal 2008.
- DERIVATIVES fiscality n. fiscally adv.
B - It is not "redistribution" unless it includes "the obligatory payment of money to a central political authority" - i.e., taxes.
Novatorov 2001 [EDOUARD V. NOVATOROV—St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, Russia, and JOHN L. CROMPTON—Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Campus. 2001, “Reformulating the conceptualization of marketing in the context of public leisure services,” Leisure Studies, https://college.agrilife.org/rptsweb/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2020/08/Reformulating_the_conceptualization_of_m.pdf] VL
Dalton (1971) defines redistribution as the obligatory payment of money to a central political authority which uses the receipts for its own maintenance, to provide community services, and as an emergency reserve in case there is a community disaster. Thus, in the context of leisure services, redistribution involves the obligatory payment of property and sales taxes to local and state governments, and income taxes to state and federal governments, which redistribute portions of what they receive to provide leisure services for the community.
Violation: the aff does not do a tax
Vote neg:
1] ground – affs without a taxes mechanism deck neg ground by avoiding core generics like the econ DA, politics DA, and the taxes DA
2] predictability – [insert explanation here]
2NC – T Fiscal Redistribution – Inequality
Fiscal redistribution must reduce income inequality
Sheff Economics Research 16 [Sheff Economics Research, 2-4-2016, "Fiscal redistribution ahead of elections to bolster democracy," Medium, https://medium.com/@sheffeconomics/democratic-government-policies-tackling-inequality-before-elections-supports-democracy-17006e6eb29] VL
Fiscal redistribution is defined as the reduction in income inequality, brought about by government via taxes and transfers. Their findings indicate that only in countries characterized as young democracies do elections exert a positive impact on fiscal redistribution.
Security K
1NC---Security K
The aff’s securitizing rhetoric makes the China threat a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Turner 13 [Oliver Turner is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He is a former Hallsworth Research Fellow of the University of Manchester, where he also gained his PhD.Oliver is a former editor of the British Journal of Politics and International Relations. He has acted as convenor and co-convenor of BISA's US Foreign Policy working group, and is a former visiting research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2-8-2013, ‘Threatening’ China and US security: The international politics of identity. Review of International Studies, 39(4), 903-924. doi:10.1017/S0260210512000599, accessed 7-28-2023, HKR-SWY]
The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.Footnote121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon.
Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’ – whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants – have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.Footnote122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of Beijing's intentions.
Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded.
Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.Footnote123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes.
Securitizing rhetoric creates Sinophobic sentiments and racist practices.
Lachapelle 22 [François Lachapelle has a PhD and is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Department of Sociology. He is the co-founder and lead data scientist at relational-academia, an innovative higher education data start-up. He is also a research fellow with the Center for Chinese Research (CCR) at the Institute of Asian Research (UBC) and the Higher Education Research Group (UBC)."Media Securitizer and the Racist “China-Threat” Discourse—Ascension, Peak, and Downfall." 4-7-2022, https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=ko&user=-pyCOokAAAAJ&citation_for_view=-pyCOokAAAAJ:M3ejUd6NZC8C, accessed 7-28-2023, HKR-SWY]
“Lots of cars go over 60 miles per hour, but this is like ticketing just one because the driver had a Chinese face”84 Cecilia Chang, a friend of Dr. Wen Ho Lee’s family, said to a Times journalist outside the courtroom in 1999. For the scientist’s colleagues and friends, there was little doubt Dr. Lee was a victim of racial profiling in a moment of securysteria. The two China-Threat episodes documented in this paper reveal a security paradox: the unintentionally racist effect of over-securitizing a state adversary like China. Namely, unsupported and dropped prosecutions against American citizens of Chinese heritage accused of acting as foreign spies contributed, in both cycles, to the waning of the China-Threat. I call these events “reflexive triggers.” While agenda-setting scholars argue that information shocks (Jones, 1994; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) can propel issues from obscurity to prominence, I suggest instead that reflexive trigger can move securitizing vocabulary from visibility to obscurity since they expose the fear-inducing, alarmist, and paranoid nature of the China-Threat perspective. In addition to the real-life effect of the China-Threat discourse, what else contributes to the fading of sinophobic sentiments and racist legal practices? Consistent with the literature, both declining China-Threat cycles discussed in this paper show the significant role of state power (Zhang, 2010). Following the collapse of Dr. Lee’s case, the U.S. War on Terror definitively ended the 1996-2001 China-Threat cycle in 2001. The 2010-2016 period saw not a drastic shift in state enemy—from Communist China to Islamic Terrorism and Rogue States—but the implementation of state mechanisms designed to prevent over-zealous national-security prosecutions from targeting Asian Americans. The War on Terror—the securitization of states that the U.S. believes are sponsoring terrorism and radical Islam networks—has exacerbated policing and racist sentiments against North American citizens of Arabic heritage and Islamic faith (Love, 2017; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2018). My findings show similar patterns with sinophobic moments, between both 1996 and 2001, and 2010 and 2016. The American-media writing of China using securitizing rhetoric has real-life consequences: mediatic scripts and sounds reverberate back into key political and social realms to reinforce already-rooted worldviews, as The Times discovered in the early 2000s. Al-Jazeera Center for Studies recently pointed at Fox News for its “media-driven reinforcement of the alleged Muslim-terror menace” and the rise of Islamophobic politics on U.S. soil (Cherkaoui, 2016:2-3).
K comes first - the aff's discourse is prior to the plan's effects, because the ideas and assumptions that go into justifying the plan shape the solutions we see as valuable - claims to plan 'objectivity' mask the political interests underlying the aff's representations
Campion 20 [Andrew Stephen Campion, PhD is a Senior Research Fellow and Executive Board Member of the Atlantic Council of the UK (ACUK). Doctorate in international relations (IR) from Newcastle, “From CNOOC to Huawei: securitization, the China threat, and critical infrastructure,” 3-22-2020, Asian Journal of Political Science, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2020.1741416, accessed 7-29-2023, HKR-SWY]
While the China Threat Discourse has become dominant in the West, other readings challenge the notion that China’s rise cannot be peaceful (Zhang & Buzan, 2010). Such different readings underscore the role of perception to analysis. Capturing this requires a methodology unbound by positivist approaches that focus on objective conditions in order to build explanatory theories that attempt to accord IR theorists with predictive powers (Sterling-Folker, 2013, p. 7). Whereas positivists use transhistorical structures to determine why actors will take certain actions, Doty notes that ‘explanations for why-questions are incomplete in an important sense’ (1993, p. 298). Sterling-Folker argues that for post-positivists ‘the primary activity of an IR theorist is to reveal how international events are described … and how those descriptions justify actions and arguments in a self-fulfilling cycle of codetermination’ (2013, p. 9, emphasis added). This article aligns itself with post-positivist exploration of how-questions to analyse the codetermination between the central discourses it explores.
In the US, the China threat tends to be propagated by (neo)realists who ‘assume that insecurity derives from the objectively threatening complexion of certain issues’ (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 496). Indeed, American Sinophobia has relied on realist arguments that couch China threat arguments in positivist language and conceal otherwise subjective arguments in the language of objective truths (Yang & Liu, 2012, pp. 707-708). However, positivist analyses do not help us understand what these case studies mean and how they are discursively interlinked because ‘knowledge is not neutral … problem-solving positivism needs to be replaced by a critical theory, aware of the political interests it represents’ (Smith, 1997, p. 24). Post-positivism allows us to examine discursive constructions and biases that underscore foreign policy, and therefore national security. This article examines how perceptions of the Chinese Other, and, implicitly, the US Self, have affected US foreign policy. Hansen notes that ‘foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced’ (Hansen, 2006, p. 1). Because ‘policy is not always based on rational choices and interests, but can be affected by the cognitive beliefs, perceptions, and personalities of key individuals’ (Skonieczny, 2001, p. 437), post-positivist methods are essential to the examination of the Sino-American relationship as they can engage with key elements that positivist approaches disregard as immaterial. Securitization is central to this analysis because it is able to engage with social constructs of foreign policy and how material factors are ideationally ‘read.’ It has become so dominant as a theory that it is now an ‘analytical shorthand for the political construction of security’ (McDonald, 2012, p. 581).
A clearly-defined and coherent China Threat Discourse has been employed to protect particular US interests, and elements that constitute it will be unpacked in order to demonstrate how it interacts with particular discourses of US national security which, in the postCold War era, have become increasingly linked to critical infrastructure (Collier & Lakoff, 2008, p. 31). The 2017 USNational Security Strategy directly ties issues of critical infrastructure to national security because ‘securing vital systems in the face of various potential disruptions [is] now a core responsibility of government’ (Collier & Lakoff, 2015, p. 42). Policy documents tend not to articulate their theoretical assumptions, but US critical infrastructure policy is based on realist security logic defined by objective threats. While they list them, documents like the National Security Strategy are not able to articulate how threats came to be. Nyman posits that ‘in the existing literature, “threats” to energy security are defined in a way that implies objectivity in the designation, with negligible analysis given over to the process by which threats are socially constructed’(2014:, p. 47) and energy security is ‘contested and contingent, rather than an objectively identifiable goal’ (2014:, p. 47). This article will explore critical infrastructure via discursive analyses of energy and cyber security to examine how they have become primary components of, and intertextually linked with the China Threat Discourse.
Vote neg to reject the aff’s securitizing, reductionist representation of China
Pan 4 [Chengxin Pan is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. He has held visiting positions at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Peking University, Fudan University and the University of Macau, and was an Endeavour Research Fellow at the Australian Studies Centre, Peking University, and is on the editorial board of Series in International Relations Classics. “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 3, 2004, pp. 305–31. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645119. accessed 7-27-2023, HKR-SWY]
Not only does this reductionist rep expense of understanding China as a dy try but it leads inevitably to a policy o tends to enhance the influence of real extremism, and hard-line stance in dose of the contain

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.