T Updates - DDI 2023 TT

Topicality
FR---Progressive
1NC---FR = Progressive
“Fiscal Redistribution” must include a tax and transfer designed to reduce inequality
McIntosh 16, Professor Steven McIntosh, Head Professor of Economics, Research from the Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheff Economics Research, 2-4-2016, "Fiscal redistribution ahead of elections to bolster democracy," Medium, https://medium.com/@sheffeconomics/democratic-government-policies-tackling-inequality-before-elections-supports-democracy-17006e6eb29, HK
A new study by the political economists Dr Pantelis Kammas (University of Ioannin) and Dr Vassilis Sarantides (University of Sheffield) looks at the behaviour of incumbent governments in “new democracies”.
Previous research work tends to assume that these governments behave opportunistically around elections, adopting generous and expansionary fiscal policies in order to improve their chances of staying in office.
Kammas and Sarantides argue that while these governments do adopt redistributive policies to improve their re-election prospects, they also do this in order to signal to the population that democracy works; this can prevent a reversion to a non-democratic regime at a time of high vulnerability.
This is important because while it is frequently argued that only anti-democratic elites like military groups and oligarchs, can pose a serious threat in newly established democracies, the evidence strongly suggests that the support of the public towards democracy cannot be taken for granted. A few years after the democratisation in Brazil, for example, the poorest citizens were the least supportive of democracy.
Kammas and Sarantides develop a framework which allows them to examine fiscal redistribution around elections when democracy is not “the only game in town” and there is a threat of revolution from some groups of agents. They analyse data for a panel of 65 developed and developing countries over the past five decades.
Fiscal redistribution is defined as the reduction in income inequality, brought about by government via taxes and transfers. Their findings indicate that only in countries characterized as young democracies do elections exert a positive impact on fiscal redistribution.
Requiring progressiveness is consistent with the formal economics definition of the term.
Van Camp 98, Andre Decoster & Guy Van Camp, Decoster is at KU Leuven; Van Camp is at FOD Sociale Zekerheid, “The unit of analysis in microsimulation models for personal income taxes: fiscal unit or household?,” Center for Economic Studies, Papre DPS 98.33, HK
If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: Π [ ] RS = − ∫ L p L p dp XT X − 2 0 1 () () (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and L p xf x dx X y ( ) ( ) = ∫ µ 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (3) L p x t x f x dx t X T y − = − − ∫ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) µ( ) 1 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income ( x ) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income ( x tx − ( ) ), with: p : the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f x( ) : the density function of x F x( ) : the distribution function of x µ : mean income (pre tax) t x( ) : the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t : the average tax rate.
Violation: they defend giving money to rich military officials which is clearly not progressive
That’s a voter for predictable limits ground and topic education---their interp allows affs to grant jobs to any tiny group of rich people and is highly divorced from an income inequality topic
AT: We Meet---Military Jobs Aff
OBVIOUSLY NOT: The primary goal of your policy is clearly not “fiscal” or “redistribution.” it clearly centers its issue on militarism not income inequality if you were to show this 1AC to anybody the first thing they would think is never fiscal redistribution so there is no logical reason a neg team should be ready to prep for it.
The people you help are rich not poor:
All the promotions including Eric Smith and Timothy Haugh are generals – They make 5 times the average Americans wage.
Military Ranks 23, 2023, "O-8 Major General Salary," Military-Ranks.org, https://www.military-ranks.org/army/major-general-pay,HK
Including the most common pay allowances, the average total compensation for a Major General may range from $142,989.48 to $204,653.88 per year as of 2023.
The Government calculates poverty at 14k a year – that’s clearly lower than all the people you help.
Department of Health 23, 2023 "Federal Poverty Level (FPL)," HealthCare.gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/
Federal poverty level (FPL)
A measure of income issued every year by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal poverty levels are used to determine your eligibility for certain programs and benefits, including savings on Marketplace health insurance, and Medicaid and CHIP coverage.
The 2023 federal poverty level (FPL) income numbers below are used to calculate eligibility for Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 2022 numbers are slightly lower, and are used to calculate savings on Marketplace insurance plans for 2023.
Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
Note: Federal Poverty Level amounts are higher in Alaska and Hawaii.
AT: C/I---Regressive---2NC
[EXTEND OUR 1NC CARD FIRST]
Requiring progressiveness is consistent with the formal economics definition of the term.
Van Camp 98, Andre Decoster & Guy Van Camp, Decoster is at KU Leuven; Van Camp is at FOD Sociale Zekerheid, “The unit of analysis in microsimulation models for personal income taxes: fiscal unit or household?,” Center for Economic Studies, Papre DPS 98.33, HK
If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: Π [ ] RS = − ∫ L p L p dp XT X − 2 0 1 () () (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and L p xf x dx X y ( ) ( ) = ∫ µ 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (3) L p x t x f x dx t X T y − = − − ∫ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) µ( ) 1 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income ( x ) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income ( x tx − ( ) ), with: p : the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f x( ) : the density function of x F x( ) : the distribution function of x µ : mean income (pre tax) t x( ) : the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t : the average tax rate.
This is the most reasonable definition---it sets a floor for the literature.
Mulle 18, Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Researcher, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; 2018; “The Nationalism of the Rich: Discourses and Strategies of Separatist Parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Scotland”; Routledge, ISBN: 978-1-315-15895-2, Chapter 2, HK
The formation of ERC’s claims of fiscal exploitation and their degree of credibility also depend on other factors than just the existence of a fiscal deficit with the central administration. While the ‘adequate’ level of social redistribution is a political question that does not concern us here, what can be discussed from a technical perspective is whether there are major flaws in the system that might nourish discontent with concrete forms of social redistribution. Ways of looking at this include the evaluation of: overcompensation effects, considerations of efficiency and regional economic convergence, trends in taxation and public finances, and the overall evolution of the economy. A minimal definition of fiscal redistribution entails that regions should contribute in accordance with their income but receive equal per capita spending. Hence, those with a higher than average income should be net contributors and those with a lower one net recipients. Uriel and Barberan (2007, p. 412) show that, in the period 1991–2005, Catalonia’s position was in line with this assumption. Yet, there also are some overcompensation effects,6 although their precise size is unclear. Using data for 2005, Espasa and Bosch (2010) argued that Catalonia received between 12 per cent and 14 per cent less than the Spanish average. Yet, De la Fuente (2005) calculated the same amount at 6 per cent below the average for the period 1990–97. Furthermore, this has affected other contributory regions and not exclusively Catalonia (Tortella 2016, pp. 441–443). What, instead, seems to be uncontroversial is the disproportionately low amount of infrastructural investment received by Catalonia. De la Fuente – who has otherwise provided very conservative estimates of the fiscal deficit (e.g. De la Fuente 2001) – has pointed out that the Generalitat received less investment than all other autonomous communities during the 1990s. Such spending represents a small share of the deficit claimed by ERC, but it probably had a sizable negative impact on the development of the Catalan economy in recent years.
AT: C/I---Regressive---Extra
Fiscal Redistribution must be designed to redistribute income from rich to poor households
OECD 22, ["Income redistribution, "OECD, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is an intergovernmental organisation with 38 Member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade, Better policies for better lives, https://www.oecd.org/economy/public-finance/incomeredistribution/, HK]
Income redistribution
Over the past decades, household incomes have become more unequally distributed in most OECD countries. Taxes and transfers redistribute income from richer to poorer households in all OECD countries, lowering inequality.
‘Fiscal redistribution’ refers to transfers of wealth from the rich to the poor.
Alan Altshuler 13, Ruth and Frank Stanton Professor of Urban Policy and Planning at Harvard University, Spring 2013, “Equity as a Factor in Surface Transportation Politics,” https://www.accessmagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/10/Equity-as-a-Factor-in-Surface-Transportation-Politics.pdf, HK
Fiscal Redistribution
Defined here as transfers from more to less affluent groups, and at times special benefits for those with disabilities.
Regressive taxes are not fiscal redistribution.
Hicks ’86 [Alexander Hicks, Northwestern University; 1986; “Class Influence on Redistributive Policy: The Case Of U.S. State Governments, 1951-1961*”; Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14, HK]
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
Fiscal Redistribution is taxes and transfers that take money from the rich and give it to the poor.
Coady and Le 20, IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers [Prepared by David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le, David Coady is Lead Social Spending Expert at the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) in the IMF. Prior to joining FAD, he was a Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute and a Lecturer in Economics in the University of London. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics in 1992. Expert International Monetary Fund BA Berkley MA Georgetown, June 2020, HK]
Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015)
AT: No Brightline
Consensus in the lit goes neg
Whether or not a policy is considered FR is measured using math.
Hallaert ’20 [Jean-Jacques; July 31; economist who has spent most of his career with international organizations (IMF 2000-09 and 2011 to present, and OECD 2009-11); International Monetary Fund, “Poverty and Social Protection in Bulgaria,” Issue 147]
Therefore, this paper analyzes fiscal redistribution in Section III, but it should be noted that other policies could help reducing income inequality. In particular, adequate spending on education (a priority of the Bulgarian authorities) and health as well as appropriate labor-market regulations5 foster an environment for a less unequal distribution of market income in the future (Blanchet et al., 2019).
Gini Coefficient of Market and Disposable Incomes 1/
Source: Euromod.
1/ Low (high) fiscal redistribution is defined as the difference between market and disposable income Gini coefficients being less (greater) than 0.2.
It’s easy to calculate ‘net redistribution’
Jesuit ’17 [David and Vincent A. Mahler; 2017; Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, from 2000 to 2003 he served as project manager of the Luxembourg Income Study; Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago; Fiscal Redistribution in Comparative Perspective, ed. Marc Buggeln, Martin Daunton and Alexander Nützenadel, “Recent Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Data Centre,” Cambridge University Press]
Income Inequality and Government Redistribution: An Overview
We now describe our data, with a particular focus on changes since our dataset was last updated. As we have indicated, our complete 116-case dataset is available in an online appendix to our chapter.11 For ease of exposition, we begin our summary by focusing on national averages over multiple LIS waves for each of our twenty countries.
We begin with pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality.12 As can be seen in the first column of Table 8.1, countries vary quite widely in the extent of income inequality generated by the market and, to a much lesser extent, private transfers: pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality ranges by 164 Gini points across our twenty countries, from a high of 0.542 in Greece to a low of 0.378 in Iceland.13
{Footnote 13]In measuring inequality we have employed the Gini index, which ranges from 0 (all households receive the same income) to 1 (one household receives all income). Gini coefficients can be measured on either a 0-1.000 scale or a 0-100 scale; we use the former. By 'Gini point' we mean an increment of 0.001. As to redistribution, we have reported the absolute rather than the relative change in the Gini index as a result of redistribution, a measure that is not only more straightforward but also has the benefit of allowing one to compare the extent of state redistribution in a way that is not affected by levels or trends in market income inequality. In practice, these variables are strongly positively related, with a bivariate r of +0.930 across our 116 country-years. For those who prefer them, relative-change figures can easily be calculated from our pre- and post-tax/transfer figures. In calculating redistribution, we employ the approach often attributed to M. Reynolds and E. Smolensky, Public Expenditures, Taxes and the Distribution of Income: The U.S, 1950, 1961, 1970 (New York: Academic Press, 1977), which re-ranks households after public social transfers have been added and direct taxes deducted from private sector income when calculating the Gini coefficient (see also Caminada and Wang, Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset; and Caminada et al., 'Disentangling Income Inequality and the Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Transfers in 20 LIS Countries over Time'). This is termed 'net redistribution'; it is computed using the 'SGINI' Stata module (P. van Kerm, 'SGINI: Generalized Gini and Concentration Coefficients (with Factor Decomposition) in Stata', www.researchgate. net/publication/255589700_Generalized_Gini_and_Concentration_coecients_%28with_ factor_decomposition%29_in_Stata (2010)). [End Footnote 13]
The large countries of the developed world fall between these extremes: Italy reports the third highest level, followed by the United Kingdom in fourth, the United States in sixth and Germany in thirteenth place. All the Nordic countries, with the exception of Finland, are in the lower part of this spectrum, along with Canada, Switzerland and Japan.
Pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality bears only a limited resemblance to inequality of disposable income in our countries, since in every case the state plays an important role in redistributing income by way of taxes and social transfers. That said, there is considerable variation in the extent of redistribution, as is evidenced by comparing the distribution of pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality to that of disposable income, which is listed in section A of Table 8.1. The country with the highest level of disposable income inequality, the United States, is separated by 121 Gini points from the country with the lowest level of disposable income inequality, Sweden. With respect to rankings, one of the most dramatic changes is the rise of the United States from being the sixth most inegalitarian of our countries in terms of pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality to the most inegalitarian in terms of disposable income. Switzerland, for its part, moves from the third most egalitarian pre-tax and pre-transfer distribution to the middle of the pack when taxes and social transfers are taken into account. In the lower part of the disposable income spectrum are the Nordic countries, Belgium and the Nethe

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.