Impacts - Heg Good v K Supplement - Michigan 7 2023 BFHGR

Heg
Big thanks to group members: Katie Carpenter, Lauren Nieto, Mile Ki, Rohan Lingam, Sarah Kwon, Sid Bidare, Steven Yu, William Agustin
Heg Good
Heg Good---2AC
Unipolarity staves off revisionist quests that go nuclear. Any attempt at multipolarity ends in great-power conflict.
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth 23. Brooks is a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, a Guest Professor at Stockholm University, and has a PhD from Yale University. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, and has a PhD from Yale University. 4-18-2023. "The Myth of Multipolarity"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-multipolarity-myth; Accessed 7-20-2023
ROUGH TIMES FOR REVISIONISM
All this might seem cold comfort, given that even the limited revisionist quests of China and Russia could still spark a great-power war, with its frightening potential to go nuclear. But it is important to put the system’s stability in historical perspective. During the Cold War, each superpower feared that if all of Germany fell to the other, the global balance of power would shift decisively. (And with good reason: in 1970, West Germany’s economy was about one-quarter the size of the United States’ and two-thirds the size of the Soviet Union’s.) Because each superpower was so close to such an economically valuable object, and because the prize was literally split between them, the result was an intense security competition in which each based hundreds of thousands of troops in their half of Germany. The prospect of brinkmanship crises over Germany’s fate loomed in the background and occasionally came to the foreground, as in the 1961 crisis over the status of Berlin.
Or compare the present situation to the multipolar 1930s, when, in less than a decade, Germany went from being a disarmed, constrained power to nearly conquering all of Eurasia. But Germany was able to do so thanks to two advantages that do not exist today. First, a great power could build up substantial military projection power in only a few years back then, since the weapons systems of the day were relatively uncomplicated. Second, Germany had a geographically and economically viable option to augment its power by conquering neighboring countries. In 1939, the Nazis first added the economic resources of Czechoslovakia (around ten percent the size of Germany’s) and then Poland (17 percent). They used these victories as a springboard for more conquests in 1940, including Belgium (11 percent), the Netherlands (ten percent), and France (51 percent). China doesn’t have anything like the same opportunity. For one thing, Taiwan’s GDP is less than five percent of China’s. For another, the island is separated from the mainland by a formidable expanse of water. As the MIT research scientist Owen Cote has underscored, because China lacks command of the sea surface, it simply “cannot safeguard a properly sized, seaborne invasion force and the follow-on shipping necessary to support it during multiple transits across the 100-plus mile-wide Taiwan Straits.” Consider that the English Channel was a fifth of the width but still enough of a barrier to stop the Nazis from conquering the United Kingdom.
Japan and South Korea are the only other large economic prizes nearby, but Beijing is in no position to take a run at them militarily, either. And because Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have economies that are knowledge-based and highly integrated with the global economy, their wealth cannot be effectively extracted through conquest. The Nazis could, for example, commandeer the Czech arms manufacturer Skoda Works to enhance the German war machine, but China could not so easily exploit the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Its operation depends on employees with specialized knowledge who could flee in the event of an invasion and on a pipeline of inputs from around the globe that war would cut off.
If America came home from Europe or Asia, a more dangerous, unstable world would emerge.
Today’s revisionists face another obstacle: while they are confined to regional balancing, the United States can hit back globally. For instance, the United States is not meeting Russia directly on the battlefield but is instead using its global position to punish the country through a set of devastating economic sanctions and a massive flow of conventional weaponry, intelligence, and other forms of military assistance to Kyiv. The United States could likewise “go global” if China tried to take Taiwan, imposing a comprehensive naval blockade far from China’s shores to curtail its access to the global economy. Such a blockade would ravage the country’s economy (which relies greatly on technological imports and largely plays an assembly role in global production chains) while harming the U.S. economy far less.
Because the United States has so much influence in the global economy, it can use economic levers to punish other countries without worrying much about what they might do in response. If China tried to conquer Taiwan, and the United States imposed a distant blockade on China, Beijing would certainly try to retaliate economically. But the strongest economic arrow in its quiver wouldn’t do much damage. China could, as many have feared, sell some or all of its massive holdings of U.S. Treasury securities in an attempt to raise borrowing costs in the United States. Yet the U.S. Federal Reserve could just purchase all the securities. As the economist Brad Setser has put it, “The U.S. ultimately holds the high cards here: the Fed is the one actor in the world that can buy more than China can ever sell.”
Today’s international norms also hinder revisionists. That is no accident, since many of these standards of behavior were created by the United States and its allies after World War II. For example, Washington promulgated the proscription against the use of force to alter international boundaries not only to prevent major conflicts but also to lock in place the postwar status quo from which it benefited. Russia has experienced such strong pushback for invading Ukraine in part because it has so blatantly violated this norm. In norms as in other areas, the global landscape is favorable terrain for the United States and rough for revisionists.
US-China War---2AC
US-China nuclear war causes nuclear winter---guarantees extinction.
Nicole S. Lovenduski et al. 20. PhD, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder; Cheryl S. Harrison, PhD, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research; Holly Olivarez, Environmental Studies Program, University of Colorado; Charles G. Bardeen, PhD, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; 6 , Owen B. Toon, PhD, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics; Joshua Coupe, PhD Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers; Alan Robock, PhD, Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers; Tyler Rohr, Water Power Technologies Office, Department of Energy, and Samantha Stevenson; Bren School of Environmental Science and Management. “The Potential Impact of Nuclear Conflict on Ocean Acidification”. Geophysical Research Letters. 47, e2019GL086246. https://doi.org/10. 1029/2019GL086246
Nuclear warfare could have devastating impacts on millions of people, yet it has been suggested that regional or global nuclear conflict may be possible in the future (Toon et al., 2019). In addition to the calamitous impacts of nuclear conflict on a local level, research conducted with a range of climate models finds a global cooling in response to various conflict scenarios (Coupe et al., 2019; Malone et al., 1985; Mills et al., 2014; Pausata et al., 2016; Robock et al., 2007; Turco et al., 1983). This global cooling is driven by fires started by the nuclear weapons. These fires inject smoke into the upper troposphere, where rapid lofting can spread the sunlight-absorbing soot particles into the stratosphere (Turco et al., 1983). Recent research implies that even a small nuclear conflict may have impacts on the global climate system, affecting the state and circulation of the atmosphere (Robock et al., 2007), increasing the sea ice extent in both hemispheres (Mills et al., 2014), and reducing plant productivity and crop yields in regions far from the conflict location (Özdogan et al., ˘ 2013; Toon et al., 2019; Xia & Robock, 2013). While less studied, the potential impacts of nuclear conflict on the ocean are many. Numerous physical, chemical, and biological processes in the ocean are temperature dependent, and sunlight is a critical ingredient for photosynthesizing phytoplankton at the base of the marine food web. Using a climate model with an interactive ocean, Mills et al. (2014) evaluated the ocean physical response to a potential India/Pakistan nuclear war that lofts 5 Tg of black carbon particles into the stratosphere; they find a 0.8◦ C decrease in globally averaged sea surface temperature, with smaller temperature reductions at depth. Recently Toon et al. (2019) used an Earth system model that includes a representation for phytoplankton to evaluate the ocean biological response to nuclear conflict; they report a 5–15% decrease in phytoplankton productivity under a range of conflict scenarios. Such findings prompt further investigation into how nuclear conflict and the resulting global cooling may alter the chemical state of the ocean. Perturbations in the ocean's carbonate chemistry are of particular interest, owing to their importance for ocean acidification. Ocean acidification is an ongoing, large-scale environmental problem driven by fossil fuel emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Cumulatively since the preindustrial era, the ocean has absorbed 41% of the carbon emitted by human industrial activities (McKinley et al., 2017). While this ocean absorption of carbon has partially mitigated anthropogenic global warming, it has fundamentally altered the carbonate chemistry of the ocean, increasing the concentration of hydrogen ions ([H+]) while decreasing the concentration of carbonate ions ([CO2− 3 ]). Observations collected at time series sites across the global ocean find statistically significant reductions in the potential hydrogen (pH = −log([H+])) and the saturation state of the calcium carbonate mineral aragonite (Ωarag, which is proportional to [CO2− 3 ]) over the past few decades (Bates et al., 2014). These changes are a direct consequence of the ocean absorption of anthropogenic carbon; carbonate chemistry dictates that the excess carbon will react with water and CO2− 3 to decrease ocean pH and Ω (Feely et al., 2004). Both of these changes may have negative consequences for marine organisms, in particular for those that precipitate calcium carbonate shells (e.g., coccolithophores, pteropods, foraminifera, corals, molluscs, and echinoderms), as the precipitation is hindered by low pH, and because decreases in Ω favor shell dissolution (Doney et al., 2009). To date, there have been no studies of the effects of nuclear conflict on ocean acidification, though past modeling studies on the ocean's response to volcanic forcing and to proposed geoengineering schemes have intimated that ocean carbonate chemistry is highly sensitive to these types of external forcings. Using a fully coupled carbon-climate model, Frölicher et al. (2011) find that volcanic-induced cooling following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption led to immediate increases in the flux of carbon from atmosphere to ocean and consequently, increases in the total dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) concentration in the surface ocean. Eddebbar et al. (2019) demonstrate that air-to-sea CO2 fluxes are significantly enhanced following the eruptions of Agung, El Chichón, and Pinatubo in a large ensemble of simulations with an Earth system model. Matthews et al. (2009) conduct solar radiation management climate engineering simulations with an intermediate complexity model of the coupled climate-carbon system; they find changes in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of the anomalous cooling. Similarly, Lauvset et al. (2017) indicate that radiation management geoengineering leads to changes in North Atlantic pH in a fully coupled Earth system model, but they do not explore changes in Ωarag. While these studies are suggestive of the carbonate chemistry response to nuclear conflict, the external forcing perturbations are of a different magnitude and duration than those imposed by nuclear conflict. Further, it is difficult to mechanistically understand the ocean carbonate chemistry response to such external forcing perturbations in fully coupled models, where the terrestrial response to forcing additionally influences the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Here, we use a state-of-the art Earth system model to simulate the ocean carbonate chemistry response to a range of nuclear conflict scenarios. We decouple the ocean carbon cycle from that of the terrestrial carbon cycle via a direct prescription of the atmospheric CO2 boundary condition used for air-sea CO2 flux, that is, changes in the terrestrial biosphere have no influence on the atmospheric CO2 that the ocean sees. As we will demonstrate, we find large perturbations in ocean pH and Ωarag as a result of nuclear conflict. These perturbations have relatively long duration (order of 10 years) and are driven by decreases in temperature and subsequent increases in the ocean carbon inventory. 2. Methods We analyse output generated by the Community Earth System Model (CESM) version 1.3, a state-of-the-art coupled climate model consisting of atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea ice components (Hurrell et al., 2013). The atmosphere component of CESM in our simulations is the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM; Marsh et al., 2013) with nominal 2◦ resolution, 66 vertical levels, and a model top at ∼145 km; it uses the Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for GCMs (RRTMG; Iacono et al., 2000) for the radiative transfer. The Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres (Bardeen et al., 2008) is coupled with WACCM to simulate the injection, lofting, advection, and removal of soot aerosols in the troposphere and stratosphere, and their subsequent impact on climate (Coupe et al., 2019; Toon et al., 2019). The ocean component of CESM is the Parallel Ocean Program version 2 (Danabasoglu et al., 2012) with nominal 1◦ resolution and 60 vertical levels. The biogeochemical ocean component of CESM is the Biogeochemical Elemental Cycling model that represents the lower trophic levels of the marine ecosystem, full carbonate system thermodynamics, air-sea CO2 fluxes, and a dynamic iron cycle (Doney et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2004, 2013; Moore & Braucher, 2008; Long et al., 2013; Lindsay et al., 2014). LOVENDUSKI ET AL. 2 of 9 Geophysical Research Letters 10.1029/2019GL086246 The ocean in the coupled CESM simulation is initialized from rest with World Ocean Circulation (WOCE) temperature and salinity (Gouretski & Koltermann, 2004). Biogeochemical tracers are initialized to observationally based climatologies where possible (Lauvset et al., 2016); where these were not available (such as dissolved iron and phytoplankton biomass), the model is initialized with fields interpolated from an existing CESM simulation. The new, fully coupled simulation was spun up for 4 years to an approximate steady state with a constant atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio of 370 ppm, representative of the mixing ratio in the year 2000. Due to the relatively short spin-up period, the globally integrated air-sea CO2 flux is not in steady state (drifting at a rate of 0.14 Pg C year−2) when the perturbation forcing is applied. We therefore present our results as anomalies from the drifting control integrations. Three control simulations of 20-year duration are generated using round-off level differences in atmospheric initial conditions. As each of these control simulations has different phasing of internal variability (e.g., El Niño-Southern Oscillation), we use the standard deviation across this ensemble to identify statistically significant perturbations due to nuclear conflict. We report on the anomalies generated from four simulations of nuclear conflict with varying amounts of soot injection: three India/Pakistan conflict scenarios that inject 5, 27, and 47 Tg of soot, respectively, and one US/Russia conflict scenario that injects 150 Tg of soot. The initial soot injection amounts are generated from plausible scenarios for nuclear conflict following advice from a number of military and policy experts; the reader is referred to Toon et al. (2019) for further details on scenario development. In each case, we prescribe that the conflict begins on 15 May of the 5th year of the first control simulation, and we integrate the model for a 15-year period following the injection. We assume that the smoke generated by mass fires from nuclear conflict is injected into the upper troposphere above the target sites (in the U. S./Russia case, smoke is spread evenly over the two nations), as in Toon et al. (2019). WACCM lofts much of this smoke higher into the stratosphere via solar heating of black carbon aerosols in the smoke, where the black carbon aerosols persist for about a decade. The resulting annual mean, post-conflict (May to the following April) anomalies in aerosol optical depth are shown in Figure 1a. These optical depth changes result in a 10–40% reduction in incoming solar energy (Toon et al., 2019). While we discuss the anomalies generated from all four of these conflict simulations, we describe two in greater detail throughout this manuscript: the U. S./Russia case, as it is the largest climate perturbation overall, and the India/Pakistan 47-Tg case, as it is the largest climate perturbation generated by a regional nuclear conflict. Ocean biogeochemistry in the version of CESM used for our simulations has been extensively validated in the literature (Brady et al., 2019; Freeman et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2018; Krumhardt et al., 2017; Lindsay et al., 2014; Lovenduski et al., 2015, 2016; Long et al., 2013, 2016; Moore et al., 2013; McKinley et al., 2016; Negrete-García et al., 2019). Of particular note for our study, the simulated surface ocean carbonate ion concentration from a long, preindustrial control simulation of CESM compares favorably with reconstructed observations, albeit with lower interannual variance than has been measured at subtropical time series sites (Lovenduski et al., 2015). In Figure S1 in the supporting information, we illustrate the comparison between observationally based estimates of surface ocean pH and Ωarag (from GLODAPv2; Lauvset et al., 2016) and the CESM control ensemble mean. In this comparison, we note that the observational estimates have been extensively interpolated and are intended to represent year 2002 carbonate chemistry parameters, whereas CESM has been integrated under an atmospheric CO2 mixing ratio that corresponds to year 2000 forcing. We find high correspondence between the spatial patterns of modeled and observed pH and Ωarag, giving us confidence that CESM is capable of representing the mean state of these two variables. 3. Results Globally averaged surface ocean pH increases in response to each of the nuclear conflicts, where the magnitude of the pH anomaly scales with the amount of soot injected (Figure 1b). In each case, the pH anomaly exceeds the interannual standard deviation of pH in the control ensemble mean (gray shading in Figure 1b). We observe the largest increases in surface ocean pH in response to the U. S./Russia 150-Tg case; here the globally averaged surface ocean pH anomaly exceeds 0.05, corresponding to a ∼10% decrease in the global mean hydrogen ion concentration. Under each scenario, the pH anomaly peaks 2–4 years after the conflict and persists for ∼10 years. With the exception of the high-latitude oceans, the pH increase following the nuclear co

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