CP - Stakeholders - Michigan 7 2023 CFMP

CP---Stakeholders---CFMP
To Cut
Notes
Commission vs Stakeholder Commission:
Regular commissions use experts and avoid accountability – Wallace says that’s bad
Stakeholder commission arguably avoid that because the stakeholders are elected and composed of citizen leaders rather than people external to politics
As a result of this, Stakeholder commission probably link more to politics than normal commissions, so you could always take the Hines and Logue evidence and read that as your advocate w/ a politics nb if you don’t want the internal net benefit
What is institutional analysis?
Mostly from the Whalen ev but also mentioned in the Ho ev. Institutional analysis is part of a four-step process to resolve incompetency in the legislature. Another part of stakeholder engagement which is where the 1NC whalen ev is cut from. If you put institutional analysis in the CP text, you can leverage solvency cards based on it and make it an external DA on pdb bc the plan does not achieve all four parts.
Top Level
1NC---Stakeholders CP
Text: The United States federal government should divest authority over [plan] to an institutional analysis-based stakeholder commission with managers incentivized to pass [plan].
Stakeholder engagement solves better and fosters participatory democracy.
Whalen 13 Charles J. Whalen, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Office, 2013, “Core Concepts of Institutionalist Public Finance:Problem Solving, Institutional Analysis,Strategic Choice, and Stakeholder Engagement”, Forum for Social Economics, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/epdf/10.1080/07360932.2012.727360?needAccess=true&role=button, liam.
Stakeholder Engagement
Given conflicting economic interests and competing views of the ‘‘good society,’’ whose strategic choices should drive economic problem solving? The usual answer is to leave the making of public decisions to the legislative process. But institutionalists have long expressed concern about the quality of legislative decision making and the ability of the legislative process to adequately consider the interests of all economic stakeholders. In fact, more than a century ago Commons (1894: 155) began an essay on legislative reform as follows: ‘‘The legislature is the weak point in democratic government.’’ Commons (1934a, 1934b, 1950) ultimately concluded that the legislative processes found in the United States should be supplemented with institutional arrangements that engage all economic stakeholders in problem-solving discussions. In particular, he envisioned advisory commit-tees and administrative commissions composed of representatives elected to speak for specific economic interests (thus, there would be representatives for bankers, farmers, business owners, consumers, workers, etc.). Such stakeholder engagement, Commons argued, would enhance the quantity and quality of information in the problem-solving process, permit the fashioning of explicit tradeoffs, and increase the likelihood of public support for the policies eventually enacted.19In short, Commons (1934a: 93) thought stakeholders need a forum where they can engage in a problem-solving dialogue driven by persuasion, not by the coercion that often results from inequalities of economic and political power. Indeed, he argued that broad stakeholder engagement is appropriate19 Klein (1984: 60–65), an institutionalist, takes a similar view and describes ensuring that stakeholders have such a voice as achieving a ‘‘higher efficiency.’’ Commons (1934a, 1950) called it the pursuit of ‘‘reasonable value.’’ FORUM FOR SOCIAL ECONOMICS370for addressing problems at all levels from the workplace (where he believed that labor and management should jointly address problems through shop-floor committees and other study teams) to the formation of national economic policy (Commons 1950, 1934a). Moreover, Commons did not just recommend such structures; he also helped to fashion them in Wisconsin andelsewhere.20Stakeholder engagement has remained an important part of institutionalist problem solving. In fact, institutionalists’ attention to the need for such engagement increased considerably in the early 1980s in response to concerns about US economic competitiveness, macroeconomic instability, and the increasingly adversarial nature of US policymaking. As such concerns mounted, many institutionalists—including Marshall (1982) and Gruchy(1984, 1985)—called for an economy-wide mechanism for stakeholder engagement, supported by its own research staff.21In particular, they argued such an arrangement would: .clarify the nature of the economic problems facing the country; .moderate adversarial relationships by fostering mutual understanding and a greater appreciation of shared interests; .foster consensus on many issues and clarify the reasons for disagreement on others; and .generate innovative solutions (that is, ideas not envisioned initially by any of the participants).22More recently, stakeholder engagement has appeared in the institutionalist literature as a call for institutions that foster wider participation in the policymaking process and a more ‘‘participatory democracy’’ (O’Hara 2006;Dugger and Waller 1992), but the arguments remain the same. Support for the institutionalist emphasis on stakeholder engagement can be found in the experience of a number of longstanding regional development initiatives and in the work of a panel convened in 2002 to20 Commons (1934b) also had first-hand experience with such bodies through his work on the staff of US Industrial Commission and the privately organized National Civic Federation as well as his service on the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, the US Commission on Industrial Relations, and the Wisconsin Minimum Wage Board.21 In the 1980s, scholarly attention to consensus-building mechanisms was not limited to the realm of national policymaking. Like Commons, many believed the stakeholder engagement had far wider applicability (Dunlop 1984; Whalen 1988).22 The calls and claims of institutionalists in the 1980s were not entirely ignored. In 1983, for example, President Ronald Reagan established the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. In many respects, that commission demonstrated the promise of such institutions, even though its work had little immediate influence on US economic policy (Hughes 2005).CORE CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONALIST PUBLIC FINANCE371examine the future of retirement security in the United States. The development initiatives of the Milwaukee-based Wisconsin Regional Train-ing Partnership and the Monongahela Valley-based (Pittsburgh) Steel Valley Authority show that stakeholder engagement can be the basis for successful workforce development projects and other forms of regional problem solving(Parker 2004; Croft 2004). Similarly, the work of the Retirement Security Project—a two-year, civic-engagement initiative convened in 2002 and sponsored by the nonprofit Interactivity Foundation—shows that even highly diverse groups of people with no federal policymaking experience can constructively address challenging issues such as Social Security, pensions and healthcare (Whalen 2005b).23Thus, stakeholder engagement joins problem solving, institutional analysis, and strategic choice as a core concept of institutionalist public finance. In fact, the US government took a small step in this direction when President Barack Obama signed an executive order creating the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform in early 2010. However, unlike the sort of stakeholder forum envisioned by institutionalists, that commission—co-chaired by a retired US Senator and a former White House chief of staff—consisted of 12 federal legislators and only two business leaders (one from the manufacturing sector and one from the service sector),one union leader, and an economist from the Brookings Institution. Moreover, the commission’s policy proposal was drafted by the co-chairs alone and distributed to the other members only three weeks before the commission was required to submit and vote on its final report (Fiscal Commission undated).
Civic engagement is key to democracy.
Kennedy 22 Kerry J Kennedy, Previously Professor Kerry Kennedy was Dean of the Faculty of Education and Human Development, Associate Vice-President (Quality Assurance), and Research Chair Professor of Curriculum Studies. He has a Master of Education degree from the University of New South Wales and a Master of Letters degree in History from the University of New England. He completed an MA and PhD at Stanford University. His research interests are in curriculum policy and theory with a special interest in citizenship education, 2022, “Civic Engagement in Changing Contexts”, Springer, https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/978-981-16-7495-2.pdf?pdf=button, liam.
Historic Meanings of Civic Engagement
Very often, discussion of early forms of civic engagement hark back to ancient examples in Greece and Rome where participation in government was often encouraged. Despite endorsement from notables such as Aristotle and Plato, however, the civic participation of ancient times cannot really be equated with modern day understandings of civic engagement. This is because it was more civic exclusion than participation. In Greece, for example, women of all classes were excluded, slavery was endorsed, and immigrants were not included. Ancient forms of participation were about the engagement of male elites to the exclusion of everyone else. Hanchard (2018) described Greek: the citizenship regime of Athens after the Persian Wars was a gendered, ethno- national regime...(in which) slavery, according to its proponents, made Athenian democracy practicable. (p. 2) Democratic civic engagement, therefore, cannot be attributed to the ancients. What the West inherited from these ancient cities was not so much democracy as exclusion. This can be seen, for example, in the development of the Italian city states that were certainly not advocates for an inclusive democracy since ‘elections, in theory aiming at recruiting the most competent, in practice restricted the government to the noble and rich’ (Tangian, 2014, p. 57). It was not until the English Puritans argued in the seventeenth century for greater parliamentary representation that the faintest glimpse of democracy appeared in Europe, with the impetus coming from their Christian theology rather than the ancients in Greece and Rome. The concept of civic engagement, therefore, cannot be traced from the exclusionary practices of these ancients. The American and French Revolutions might seem like more obvious starting places, but these were largely middle-class affairs that sought to replace one form of tyranny with another. It is not coincidental, for example, that slavery remained entrenched in the new United States after independence, and women remained an excluded group. The same can be said of the 1688 Revolution in Great Britain after which issues of gender exclusion and human enslavement remained unaddressed for over a century in the case of the latter and for over two centuries in the case of the former. What was missing in these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political experiments was any notion that struggles against oppression were struggles on behalf of all citizens rather than the vested interests of a few. An exception was the election of the French National Convention in 1792 that allowed all males to vote in recognition 2 1 Civic Engagement—What Is It and Why Is It Important? of the broader principle. Yet it was not until 1848 that the practice was cemented into the French political system although it took until 1944 for women to be included in the franchise. Yet it was this idea of broad inclusion (delayed considerably in the case of women) that characterises the development of democracies to the point where Douglas (2013) argued that: Voting is the foundational concept for our entire democratic structure. We think of voting as a fundamental-the most fundamental-right in our democracy. When a group of citizens collectively elects its representatives, it affirms the notion that we govern ourselves by free choice. An individual's right to vote ties that person to our social order, even if that person chooses not to exercise that right. Voting represents the beginning; everything else in our democracy follows the right to vote. Participation is more than just a value. It is a foundational virtue of our democracy. (p. 81) What this suggests, from the point of view of the argument in this book, is that the engagement of all citizens is an essential, if not the essential, component of democracy and marks it out from other political systems. Such civic engagement provides the baseline for any understanding of democracy both over time and currently. Yet once democracies developed the baseline, inclusive electoral voting, came to be seen as the form of civic engagement that most characterised democratic societies. In this sense, voting was not only a hard won right (especially for women and some cultural groups) but also a civic responsibility that in most countries was left to the initiative of individual citizens (only twenty countries have opted for compulsory voting). A persistent issue studied by political scientists and others has been the extent to which this somewhat liberal view of voting has been successful as the key form of civic engagement in democratic societies. This issue will be addressed in the following section.
Democracy solves extinction.
Belfield 23, Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (Haydn, “Collapse, Recovery, and Existential Risk,” in How Worlds Collapse: What History, Systems, and Complexity Can Teach Us About Our Modern World and Fragile Future, p. 74-76)
A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world would be worse. It would increase the risk of another collapse and extinction and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories (Beckstead, 2013). Totalitarian states are incompetent. They are bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters (Caplan, 2008).16 This can be seen most clearly in the great famines of Communist China and the USSR, in which millions died (Applebaum, 2017; Becker, 1996; Dikotter, 2010; Snyder, 2010). In comparison, functioning multiparty democracies rarely, if ever, experience famines (Sen, 2010). “Established autocracies” (or “personal”/“sultanist”) are particularly bad, as there are few checks or restraints on arbitrary rule and the whims and ideology of the single individual, even from other elites (Svolik, 2012). From the inside, the “inner circle” around Mao, Stalin, and Hitler seems incredibly chaotic, with elites strongly incentivized to conceal information and encouraged by the autocrat to squabble and feud—so they are divided (Conquest, 1992; Kershaw, 2008; Zhang & Halliday, 2006). If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems, then a world dominated by them would likely be worse at responding to risks of collapse and extinction. A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have major wars. States with near-universal adult suffrage rarely (if ever) go to war with one another (Barnhart et al., 2020), so a world dominated by democracies has fewer wars. Miscalculation might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate information, leading to well-known strategic disasters such as Hitler and Stalin’s blunders in World War II (Bialer, 1970; Noakes & Pridham, 2001), or at a smaller level, Saddam Hussein’s rejection of diplomacy (Atkinson, 1993). War makes collapse and extinction more likely, by raising the chance of weapons of mass destruction being used. Linked to this, totalitarian states are less cooperative than democratic states. While cooperation is possible (Ginsburg, 2020), their internal norms are characterized by paranoia and treachery, and their lack of transparency limits their ability to credibly commit to agreements. This is bad for all risks that require cooperation such as pandemics or climate change (Tomasik, 2015). Finally, continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of collapse and extinction. Social progress could reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could help address natural risks and climate change (Sandberg, 2018), differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019), and solve safety challenges in AI or biotechnology (Russell, 2019). However, as we will now discuss totalitarian states would likely inhibit social progress. A central question from a longtermist perspective is: Which values should shape the future? I would argue that we should prefer it to be shaped by liberal democratic values. This is not to say that the current democracy-dominated world is perfect—far from it. The fate of billions of factory-farmed animals or hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty makes that abundantly clear. However, democracies have two advantages. First, democracies have space for cosmopolitan values such as human rights, plurality, freedom, and equality. These are better than those that characterize life under totalitarianism: Fear, terror, subjection, and secrecy. Second, they have within themselves the mechanism to allow progress. In the last 100 (or even 50) years, the lives of women, LGBT people, religious minorities, and non-white people have dramatically improved. Our “moral circle” has expanded, and could continue to expand (Singer, 1981). The arc of the moral universe is long, but given the right conditions, it might just bend toward justice (King, 1968). A global society dominated by these values, and with the possibility of improving more, has a better longterm potential. A totalitarian-dominated world, on the other hand, would reduce the space for resistance and progress—distorting the human trajectory. We should be particularly concerned about “bottlenecks” at which values are particularly important—where there is a risk of “locking-in” some particular set of (possibly far from optimal) values. While they are currently far-off, future technologies such as artificial general intelligence, space settlement, life extension (of autocrats), or much better surveillance could enable lock-in (Caplan, 2008).17 Conditional on them avoiding new catastrophes, world orders dominated by totalitarians could be quite long-lasting (Caplan, 2008). Democracies can undermine authoritarian and totalitarian regimes through the following ways: Control, including conquest; contagion through proximity; and consent, promoting receptivity toward democratization (Whitehead, 2001). Democracies can actively undermine these regimes through war, sanctions, hosting rebellious exiles, or sponsoring internal movements. Passively, through contagion, they offer a demonstration that a better, more prosperous life is possible. For example, in the final years of the USSR, ordinary Soviet citizens were able to see that the West had a higher standard of living—more innovation, more choice, and more consumer goods. The elites were able to read books from the outside, and travel—Gorbachev’s contacts and friendships with European politicians may have made him more favorable to social democracy (Brown, 1996). Democracies can undermine the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2004). However, in a world not dominated by democracies, all these pressures would be far less. A world in which, say, totalitarian regimes emerged 

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