CP - Mulitlateralism - Michigan 7 2023 BEJJP

This is primarily a work in progress, but we wanted to submit it so students would have a chance to take a look and improve if they are interested.
Multilateralism CP---BEJJP
1NC
The United States federal government should propose a multilateral agreement over [xxxx] and advocate [xxxx].
The counterplan reorients international institutions to be globally inclusive---that’s the only way to solve numerous existential threats.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam 22, senior minister of Singapore and member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, “Confronting a Perfect Long Storm,” June 2022, The International Monetary Fund, Geo-economic Puzzle: Policymaking in a More Fragmented World, pp. 6-9, ajs
The pandemic, war in Ukraine, the threat to food security, and the resurgence of global poverty. Heatwaves, droughts, and other extreme weather events. These are not random shocks. Nor are they a perfect storm in the conventional sense, a one-off conjuncture of bad events. We face instead a confluence of lasting structural insecurities—geopolitical, economic, and existential—each reinforcing the other. We have entered a perfect long storm.
We cannot wish away these insecurities or hope that problems that occupy one part of the world will not rebound on others. COVID-19 and its repeated mutations have brought that reality home, at immense human and economic cost everywhere. We can only restore optimism by recognizing the gravity and collective nature of the threats we face and organizing ourselves more effectively to address them.
First, the risk of escalating geopolitical conflict is greater than it has been in over three decades. The system of global rules and norms aimed at preserving peace and the territorial integrity of nation states was always fragile. But the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is not just another rupture in the system. Its ramifications go beyond any other, and in ways that could be catastrophic.
Second, we face the prospect of stagflation, with higher inflation and stalled growth for a period of time. What was seen by many as an improbable “tail risk” a year ago is now a likely scenario. Advanced economies’ central banks have a more complex task than any time in living memory, and their chances of taming inflation while achieving a soft landing in economic growth are getting slimmer. The task is made more difficult by the war in Ukraine and the disruptions it has brought to energy, food, and other critical commodity markets.
When the history of the decade is written, inflation in the advanced economies is unlikely to be viewed as its most serious problem—certainly not compared with the implications of distress in the developing world or a weakened international order. But prolonged high inflation will seriously erode the political capital needed for nations to respond to our larger challenges, domestically and globally, including the climate crisis. It can set the world back in ways that economic models cannot predict. Notably, an escalating cost of living will demoralize populations that are now much older than they were in the 1970s, when the advanced economies saw their last episode of high inflation.
Flying Blind
Third, the existential commons are deteriorating at an accelerating pace. Climate change, shrinking biodiversity, water scarcity, polluted oceans, a dangerously congested outer space, and the spread of infectious diseases will pose growing threats to life and livelihoods everywhere. We must address these threats in parallel because the science is clear on how they interact. Global warming and a degraded biosphere are leading to major shifts in animal life, with countless new and re-emergent pathogens hopping between species and into human communities. Recurring pandemics are already baked into the system. Yet two years into COVID-19, the world is still flying blind into the next pandemic. Scientists warn that it could come at any time and be even more lethal.
The unpalatable short-term reality is that the world will have to rely more on fossil fuels, including even coal, to ensure energy security and prevent sharply higher energy prices. But it also means we must redouble efforts to make the long-term transition to a low-carbon energy future. We need clear policy frameworks—including predictable schedules for carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidy phase-outs, and direct assistance to vulnerable groups—to achieve this critical transition while preserving energy security.
Fourth, we must confront the risk of growing divergences, within and especially across countries. Higher prices of basic foods, livestock feed, fertilizer, and energy are taking the biggest toll on poorer countries, which are already the hardest hit by extreme weather events—and especially on the poorest in their populations. Their governments have little fiscal capacity to offset these shocks. More than half of them are already in or near debt distress. Faced with these immediate constraints, we risk continued neglect of education and healthcare improvements, with dangerous longer-term and global consequences. Even before COVID-19, more than half of the children in low- and middle-income countries had not achieved basic literacy by age 10; the figure is now estimated to be as high as 70 percent. Girls especially have suffered large learning losses during the pandemic, with many not returning to school and millions being pushed into early marriage.
There is now a real prospect of rollback of the hard-earned economic and social gains that many of these developing countries made in the last two decades. It will risk permanent scarring of the young, further disempowerment of women, civil wars, and conflicts between neighboring states. Each of these would make it harder to address the world’s most pressing challenges.
Financing global public goods
We must address these threats, not on the basis of scenarios that reflect our hopes but through a realistic appraisal of what could plausibly go wrong. COVID-19 and the Ukraine war were not black swan events. The full scale of these tragedies may not have been foreseen, but the risks had been blinking visibly on the radar for some time.
We must bring preparedness for threats, known or unknown, into the mainstream of public policy and collective thinking, just as regulators learned from the global financial crisis and sought to fortify financial buffers in advance of the next crisis.
We have to invest at significantly higher levels, over a sustained period, in the public goods needed to address the world’s most pressing problems. We must make up for many years of underinvestment in a wide range of critical areas—from clean water and trained teachers in developing economies to upgrades of an aging logistics infrastructure in some of the most advanced economies. But we also have the opportunity now to spur a new wave of innovations to tackle the challenges of the global commons, from low-carbon construction materials, to advanced batteries and hydrogen electrolyzers, to combination vaccines aimed at protecting simultaneously against a range of pathogens.
To fund these investments we must embark on public-private collaboration on a scale never before adopted. Public sector finances will not be able to meet these needs on their own. As it is, debt-servicing costs will take an increasing share of government revenues. Governments in the advanced world have also declared the end of the “peace dividend” that had prompted many of them to spend less on defense over several decades.
We must now reorient public finance, in partnership with philanthropic capital where possible, toward mobilizing private investment to meet the needs of the global commons. The world will need to invest an estimated $100 to $150 trillion over the next 30 years to achieve net zero carbon emissions. That may sound daunting. But the $3 to $5 trillion annual cost is not a large percentage of the world’s $100 trillion capital markets, which grow by about that amount each year.
There is no lack of private and market finance. But channeling it to meet the needs of the commons requires a proactive public sector and well-designed frameworks for risk-sharing with the private sector. Policies and standards to rapidly scale up the deployment of clean energy technologies that are already proven, and to incentivize large scale infrastructural investments such as in smart transmission and distribution grids, will be critical to achieving significant cuts in emissions by 2030. However, almost half the technologies needed to reach net zero by mid-century are still being prototyped. Governments must put skin in the game to leverage private sector R&D, and promote demonstration projects, to accelerate the development of these technologies and bring them to market. Besides getting to net zero on time, they should aim to spur major new industries and job opportunities.
The social returns to protecting the global commons will typically be far in excess of the private returns, which makes a strong case for the public sector to share risks with private investors. Developing and producing vaccines at scale for the next pandemic is a strong illustration of the point. A project to immunize the world’s population even six months earlier will save trillions of dollars and countless lives.
Making multilateralism work
However, we cannot address the challenges of this new era without a more effective multilateralism. UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ report, Our Common Agenda, sets out a bold and credible vision of multilateralism: one that is more inclusive of different voices, more tightly networked, as well as more effective in delivering outcomes and hence more trusted.
It does not require a root and branch reconstruction of multilateralism or building entirely new institutions. But we have to move with urgency to reorient existing institutions for a new era, devise new mechanisms for networked cooperation among the multilaterals and other institutions including non-state players, and pool resources in ways that can meet both nations’ collective interests and self-interests more effectively.
First, we need new thinking on the global commons. We must view money spent on strengthening them not as aid to the rest of the world but as an investment that benefits nations both rich and poor many times over. As the G20 High Level Independent Panel on financing pandemic security showed, the additional international investment required to plug major global gaps in preparedness, with contributions fairly distributed across countries, will not only be affordable for all but also enable us to avoid costs that would be several hundred times larger if we fail to act together to prevent another pandemic. The longstanding aversion to collective investment in pandemic preparedness reflects political myopia and financial imprudence, which we must overcome urgently.
Solvency
Solvency---2NC
CP uniquely avoids profit shifting, tax competition, and insufficient social expenditures
IMF 22, alliance between 188 member countries to ensure stability of the international monetary system, 4/2022, “Coordinating Taxation Across Borders,” https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2022/April/English/ch2.ashx //ST
From a global perspective, uncoordinated tax interactions among independent jurisdictions, with their different objectives, often lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. To illustrate, if a country lowers its tax on capital, it attracts tax bases from other countries in the form of real capital or “paper” profits, even without real capital movement (that is, profit shifting). The corresponding contraction in the other countries’ tax base lowers those countries’ tax revenues. Also, spillovers do not end with profit and capital movements. The other countries are under pressure to lower their capital taxes, too, with further repercussions. A similar interaction can occur in the context of taxing the rich. This “race to the bottom”—which can result in inefficiently low taxation and hence insufficient public investments and social expenditures (Keen and Konrad 2013)—has been reflected in the downward trends of corporate and top personal income tax rates (Figure 2.1).
Depending on context and specifics, international coordination on the level or location of taxation can improve global outcomes with or without disadvantaging some countries. In federations, tax competition can be alleviated, and compensation can take place through fiscal transfers between subnational governments or through central policies. However, countries need to find common ground in coordination and be guided by economic assessment to understand global and country-specific effects. The ideal assessment entails comparing coordination options not only with the status quo, but also with counterfactuals of futures, with and without coordination. For example, unchanged policies may be more beneficial now but less beneficial in the future relative to coordinated outcomes.
Only CP accesses unique framework for international taxation to avoid shortcomings
Aaron Junge 19, worked on Tax Counsel of US House of Representatives and is currently an International Tax Partner of the second largest professional services network in the world, et al., 9/2/2019, “Design Choices for Unilateral and Multilateral Foreign Minimum Taxes,” https://www.taxnotes.com/special-reports/international-taxation/design-choices-unilateral-and-multilateral-foreign-minimum-taxes/2019/08/30/29wp3#sec-5 //ST
1. Ultimate Shareholder Approach
Under an ultimate shareholder approach, a country imposing a foreign minimum tax (the ceding country) would not impose that tax if a higher-tier shareholder is subject to a foreign minimum tax substantially similar to that of the ceding country. Under a multilateral foreign minimum tax, this approach ensures that an item of income is subject to only one foreign minimum tax: the one imposed on the ultimate shareholder. If the ultimate shareholder is not subject to a foreign minimum tax (for example, it is tax resident in a country that declines to adopt the multilateral foreign minimum tax), the first lower-tier holding company that is subject to a foreign minimum tax would serve the role of the ultimate shareholder. This approach operates similarly for branches, meaning that the country in which the branch owner is tax resident may be a ceding country.
Example 2: Assume Parent, a Country A company, wholly owns Regional HoldCo, a Country B company, which wholly owns Target, a Country C company, which wholly owns OpCo, a Country D company. Assume that OpCo earns $200 of income subject to a uniform Country D tax of 5 percent and thus pays $10 of Country D tax. Assume further that countries A and C impose foreign minimum taxes that follow an ultimate shareholder approach and with minimum tax rates of 12 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Under Country A’s foreign minimum tax, the minimum tax base for OpCo’s income is $200. Under Country C’s foreign minimum tax, the minimum tax base for OpCo’s income is $210.95 In this case, if Country A’s foreign minimum tax is substantially similar to that of Country C, Country C is the ceding country. Consequently, Target is not subject to the Country C foreign minimum tax, and Country A imposes $14 of residual tax (that is, $200 * 12 percent - $10) on Parent. See Table 1.
For most multinational enterprises, an ultimate shareholder approach results in the enterprise being subject to only the parent jurisdiction’s foreign minimum tax. Often (but not always) an MNE has more compliance expertise and resources for its parent jurisdiction than for others. Moreover, applying only one foreign minimum tax reduces complexity and compliance burdens. Both of these factors facilitate compliance and enforcement.
Solvency---IMF/Say Yes---2NC
IMF changed its goals to advise countries on how to reduce income inequality
Anna Yukhananov 14, experience foreign policy reporter on foreign monetary policy, 3/13/2014, “IMF economists offer countries tools to shrink inequality,” https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-fiscal-inequality/imf-economists-offer-countries-tools-to-shrink-inequality-idINDEEA2C0NY20140313 //ST
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Raising the retirement age and scrapping regressive taxes such as deducting the interest on mortgages can help richer governments address income inequality without straining their pocketbooks, IMF staff said in a paper on Thursday.
In recent months, the International Monetary Fund has taken an increasingly vocal stance on the widening gaps between rich and poor nations. IMF staff say they have focused more on inequality due to interest from the Fund’s 188 member countries.
From Asia to the United States, the richest one percent of earners have taken home a growing share of the economic pie, leading to pressure on policymakers to do something about it.
In a wide-ranging paper, IMF officials offer cash-strapped governments a menu of options on how to customize their social protection programs to get the biggest bang for their buck.
“The key message that I want to convey today is that when it comes to fiscal redistribution, design matters,” David Lipton, the IMF’s first deputy managing director, said in a speech. He presented the paper at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.
Richer countries with aging populations may consider raising the retirement age to preserve pensions while saving money, the IMF staff said.
Developing economies could focus on better targeting social programs and raising property taxes, among other policies, the economists said. For other advice, see the paper:
Lipton noted that in most developing countries, the poorest 40 percent of the population ends up receiving less than 20 percent of the benefits from social spending.
The IMF analyzes the economies of each of its 188 member countries and offers advice on government budget and monetary policies. Lipton said the IMF has always assessed the impact of countries’ tax and spending policies on “distributional goals.”
“There are many cases where we will express our view if we think that policies are likely to undermine growth ... by having adverse consequences upon the poor,” Lipton told reporters.
IMF economists also point out that 50 percent of IMF programs include a requirement that authorities not reduce social spending below a certain level.
But the Fund had not traditionally focused on income inequality until recent years. IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde sounded the trumpet on rising income disparities in two major speeches last month.
And another IMF study two weeks ago said income inequality can lead to slower or less sustainable economic growth, while redistribution can actually help an economy.
“We hope this signals a long term change in IMF policy advice to countries - to invest in health and education and more progressive fiscal policies,” said Nicolas Mombrial, a spokesman for the development advocacy group Oxfam.
IMF has experience advising economies – advised Britain to carbon tax
David Milliken 23, experience journalist reporting on economic and political news, 7/11/2023, “Bank of England may need to keep rates higher for longer, IMF says,” https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/bank-england-may-need-keep-rates-higher-longer-imf-says-2023-07-11/ //ST
LONDON, July 11 (Reuters) - The Bank of England may have to keep interest rates high for an extended period if inflation pressures persist, and it was right to raise them by half a percentage point last month, the International Monetary Fund's directors said on Tuesday.
British inflation was the highest of any major economy in May at 8.7%, and financial markets have priced in increasingly high peaks for BoE rates as wage and price data have come in hotter than expected in recent months.
Markets see a roughly 50% chance that BoE rates will peak at

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