Neg - Carbon Dividend - Michigan 7 2023 BFHGR

CARBON DIVIDEND – NEG
POLITICS DA
1NC Link
Carbon taxes are cost PC. Politicians fear impact on businesses and international trade. Even if it does get passed, it’ll get repealed under a conservative administration – Australia proves.
Benney 18 [Tabitha M. Benney is a Professor in the University of Utah's Department of Political Science and affiliated faculty in the Environmental and Sustainability Studies Program, Latin American Studies, International Studies, Asian Studies, and the Center on Global Change and Sustainability., 04-07-2018, "The Challenge of Putting a Price on Carbon Emissions in the United States," Scholars Strategy Network, https://scholars.org/page/challenge-putting-price-carbon-emissions-united-states]//gbs-aarz
Taxing Carbon Fuels
Carbon taxes raise the price of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, natural gas, and biofuels, by amounts that can be determined by policymakers. Carbon taxes discourage cheating and are often touted as a simple approach to reducing emissions dangerous to the environment. In practice, however, carbon taxes are politically controversial and unpredictable in their economic impact.
Even if taxes are relabeled as “fees,” they are obviously politically controversial. This is especially true in a country like the United States where many people argue that climate change is not real or not amenable to government response. Without widespread citizen understanding and support, a large new tax on consumers and businesses is not likely to be enacted, even if it makes it onto the agenda of public discussion.
Australia shows the political difficulties a carbon tax can run into. In Australia, leaders with strong public support imposed a carbon tax and used the new revenues to fund dividends to compensate citizens. Following the best practice approach, the Australian program also targeted only the top polluters in certain industries and exempted agriculture and transportation, industries where a new tax and higher prices would have had the most disruptive impact. Australia’s tax program was very well designed from a theoretical standpoint and heralded as cutting edge because it even provided assistance to businesses that might be unfairly impacted. Slated tax increases were also very gradual, to allow people and businesses to adjust each step of the way. Nonetheless, despite the many ideal features, Australia’s carbon tax remained politically vulnerable. When a new, conservative government took office, it repealed the tax just two years after it was instituted.
A carbon tax will be difficult to enact without the support of corporations, whose lobbying associations invariably exercise huge clout. In general, businesses like the predictability of taxes. But when it comes to carbon pricing, most of them prefer policies like cap and trade. Business groups, consequently, may fight to block carbon tax legislation. Or if a tax somehow passes, business opposition may prevent proper implementation.
Any U.S. carbon tax will face another challenge: international trade. Imported goods from nations with a lower carbon tax, or no carbon tax, would have an advantage over domestic goods, undermining the effectiveness of the carbon tax. To prevent this, a carbon tax policy might include border adjustments, which are taxes on imports used to ensure that all goods in the United States, whether made at home or abroad, are taxed in a similar way. Without these adjustments, domestic producers would be unable to compete with foreign, non-taxed goods. Under current international law, however, border adjustments are illegal.
A nationwide carbon tax that included border adjustments on foreign imports would raise several issues. The World Trade Organization would likely consider the tax to be a direct violation of international trade agreements. International bodies might force the United States to roll back the carbon tax on all imported goods. And other nations would likely take actions of their own, levying retaliatory fees on American exports. The impact on U.S. competitiveness could be dramatic. A trade war could ensue and gravely damage the global economy, like the trade war a century ago that contributed to the Great Depression.
--xt: Links
Plan is politically difficult because of entrenched interests
Islam 22 [Roumeen Islam is Economic Advisor for the Infrastructure Global Practice, which covers digital development, energy and extractives, transport and logistics, and disruptive technologies. She has worked in countries in multiple regions, the most recent being the Europe and Central Asia Region. She also served as lead economist in the Development Research Group, in the office of the Chief Economist., 1-19-2022, "What a carbon tax can do and why it cannot do it all," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/energy/what-carbon-tax-can-do-and-why-it-cannot-do-it-all#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20a%20carbon%20tax,their%20consumption%20basket%20more%20expensive.]//gbs-aarz
There are good reasons why governments may not want to use carbon taxes, and one of them relates to their welfare impacts. For example, a carbon tax on fossil fuels is often regressive in its impact- hurting poorer people relatively more than richer ones. Even when it might be progressive, poorer people still suffer a welfare loss when prices rise, making their consumption basket more expensive. Devising transfers to compensate them for this loss is not a simple matter. Compensation systems may not be well developed, and it may be difficult to identify those hurt or to get funds to them. Thus, even if governments impose a tax, they may still balk at levying a carbon tax high enough to reduce emissions to the extent they desire. Another reason that governments may hesitate is that adopting new taxes can be politically difficult because there are entrenched business interests that would lose.
Carbon tax is unpopular
Morris 21, senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director for Climate and Energy Economics at the Brookings Institution (Adele, “Pricing carbon around the globe: Why it’s so difficult,” Climate Now Podcast, https://climatenow.com/podcast/pricing-carbon-around-the-globe-why-its-so-difficult/)//BB
Well, I think there are three reasons I think there is a certain hesitancy amongst the Democrats for a carbon tax. And it’s not generally a lack of appreciating the economics because you know, my profession is loud and clear on that. Number one is, President Biden promised not to raise taxes on anyone earning under $400,000 a year. And the economic incidence of a carbon tax would fall on individuals that include people who make less than $400,000 a year. Now, obviously you can use the revenue from a carbon tax to redistribute that in a progressive way, but I guess they’re feeling like that’s not part of their pledge. Second is, there are folks on the progressive left who really think the climate challenge is too big to rely on market forces. And you know that we’ve got to go straight to, you know, keeping it in the ground. Adele Morris (37:18): And then also there are folks in the environmental justice community that don’t support carbon pricing because the belief is that regulatory approaches on carbon are more likely to help air quality in their communities. And I’m sure it’s much more complicated than that, but I think there is a tepid support if any, on the far progressive left for carbon pricing, even if there is some lukewarm support among some Republicans for carbon pricing. I think the challenge though is, okay, you don’t want to do carbon pricing, you want to do regulation, well, what’s the environmental equivalent in the regulatory world and we’re not anywhere near close to that. I mean, even if they come up with a clean electricity standard, what are you doing for the rest of the two thirds of our emissions inventory? Are we going to do standards in every sector? How’s that going to work? And, you know, you might say, okay, well, a clean electricity standard is an easier legislative lift, but it’s not environmentally equivalent. You got to have that plus additional legislation to target the whole rest of the emissions inventory. So I still think a carbon price has a chance. It should be given a chance. I wouldn’t give up without trying, but then I’m not a political advisor. So maybe they’re listening to smarter people than me.
Link Turns Case
The link turns case. Politicization reduces the effectiveness of the tax on modelling and climate effectiveness.
Ben Ho 21, associate professor of economics at Vassar College, an adjunct at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, and former lead energy economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers, 4/26/21, "Time to Give Up on a Carbon Tax?," https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/04/26/retire-carbon-tax/
Despite its advantages, the U.S. has seen little progress in passing a carbon tax. Some conservatives dislike the imposition of a tax that would likely produce a massive (e.g., trillions of dollars) source of new government revenues that might be used poorly. Conservatives also worry about the harm it would cause to workers in fossil fuel industries and the increased prices faced by consumers. Liberals also object to the higher prices, which could disproportionately harm those with the lowest incomes.
In 2018, a tax designed to fight climate change in France led to weeks of violent “yellow vest” protests against rising fuel prices, among other concerns, causing the French government to back down. A plan for an E.U.-wide carbon tax has never been successful. Recent referenda in Washington State have failed again and again. In fact, no U.S. state has successfully passed a carbon tax (although many U.S. states and the E.U. have passed cap and trade policies).
Because for all of their vaunted benefits, carbon taxes have substantial drawbacks. I suspect that a carbon tax would be less transformative than its advocates promise. Economists Kenneth Gillingham and James Stock find we already have dozens of existing policies that place high implicit prices on carbon reductions: e.g. renewable portfolio standards that regulate electricity (with an implicit carbon price of $0-$190/ton), tax credits for solar power ($140-$2100/ton) or wind ($2-$260/ton), fuel economy standards ($48-$310/ton), corn ethanol standards ($-18 to $310/ton), or subsidies for electric cars ($350-$640/ton). The additional impact of a carbon tax at say the $51/ton social cost of carbon recently adopted by the Biden administration could have a smaller effect on these specific sectors relative to the policies already in place. It is true that a carbon tax would incentivize reductions in other sectors, but there are few major sources of carbon emissions in the U.S. that aren’t already regulated by existing policies.
A carbon tax on its own isn’t even the first best policy option because it doesn’t target other externalities that are potentially more important than the direct damage of climate change. In particular it doesn’t do enough to encourage the benefits that come when new technologies are invented, such as the innovations that have brought the price of solar down by 90% or more in the past 10-20 years. It also does little to address the infrastructure needed for a low carbon economy — infrastructure like a smarter grid, or a network of electric vehicle charging stations. Perhaps we should be focusing on those market failures first. For example, the innovation and network benefits associated with buying an electric car today is far greater than the direct benefit from reduced use of fossil fuels. Buying an electric car today does have a direct effect on reducing emissions, but the indirect effect of making electric cars affordable to all may be far more important.
In many ways, the types of policies that politicians tend to favor — policies that heavily target innovation and then phase out (such as subsidies for solar electricity or electric vehicles) or infrastructure projects like power grid upgrades — are preferable to Pigouvian taxes. Especially since the biggest political hurdle is getting international buy-in — getting countries like India, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia to adopt climate-friendly policies as well. Yes, passing a U.S. carbon tax might encourage other countries to pass similar policies of their own, but a more effective way to get other countries to go green could be to spur innovations like the ones that have made solar one of the cheapest forms of energy in much of the world and electric cars a viable alternative to gasoline-powered ones. While these seemed like pipe dreams not long ago and advocates were derided as techno-optimists, these goals now seem readily within reach (for example, GM just announced it plans to end production of gasoline powered cars by 2035 in favor of electric). Maybe it’s time to redouble our efforts.
AT Not Congress
Only Congress can do the plan
Burtraw and Palmer 15 – PhD in econ and MPP from Michigan, senior researcher at Resources for the Future; PhD in econ from Boston College, senior researcher at Resources for the Future
(Dallas and Karen, “Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates”, pp191-211, Routledge)
This may also explain the coexistence of a carbon price (below its efficient level) and other energy policies even when those other policies are less environmentally effective. Third, as noted above, concerns about impacts on the overall economy or com-petitiveness may be another reason why the tax level might be insufficient from an environmental perspective, or applied unevenly across the economy. One reason might be to lessen the loss of economic activity associated with introducing a new tax on top of already existing taxes. However, these concerns can be at least partly addressed through using some of the carbon tax revenues to lower tax burdens elsewhere in the economy, or use of additional measures to help energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries (see Chapter 9). Fourth, the mental model illustrated in Figure 11.1 also assumes that the carbon price would automatically be adjusted to assimilate new scientific information. However, it is hard to imagine how this would occur, since the tax level and per-haps a time path for automatic annual adjustments is established by congressional action and revisiting the technical basis for this legislative decision might be just as fraught or flawed as the initial implementation of a tax. One approach to assimilat-ing new information might be to delegate authority to adjust the carbon tax to an expert agency such as EPA (Fraas and Richardson 2013; Burtraw 2013). However, the authority to tax is the exclusive domain of Congress, and this is one power the legislative branch guards jealously and rarely delegates. In sum, economic theory tells us that a carbon tax is a relatively efficient instru-ment. However, an efficient instrument does not guarantee an efficient policy. The outcome depends on how the instrument is used, and that depends importantly on the institutional context for policymaking. The implementation of a carbon price seems likely to be imperfect suggesting a potential role for other policies to help mitigate carbon emissions.
TRADE DA
1NC---OFF
Trade is high now with every major nation.
Doug Palmer 23, reporter in Washington for more than three decades and has been covering trade for more than 20 years. He has been a senior trade reporter at POLITICO since 2013. He helps produce the Morning Trade newsletter each morning, and has covered trade negotiations and disputes with China, the EU and all regions of the world, 2/7/2023, "What cold war? U.S. trade with China hits new high," https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/07/trade-china-relations-economies-00081301 //gbs-aarz
U.S.-China relations have reached a low point after a Chinese spy balloon was discovered — and shot down — over U.S. territory last week, but trade between the world’s two leading economies just hit an all-time high.
According to numbers released Tuesday by the Commerce Department, two-way trade between the United States and China set a new record in 2022 — $690 billion — part of a surge in U.S. trade with partners around the world last year.
The U.S. had record imports from 90 countries in 2022, led by Mexico, Canada and Japan.
While some of the increase in last year’s trade figures may be a result of historic levels of inflation, the figures remain eye opening, particularly considering the years-long U.S. tariff campaign on Chinese imports and new efforts to stop the flow of U.S. tech to Beijing. And they demonstrate just how intertwined the U.S. and China remain, commercially at least, despite efforts to effectively “decouple” their economies.
“The decisions of consumers and businesses so far have been more powerful than governments,” said Ed Gresser, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics. “Tariffs are basically a form of taxation. They have an influence on trade flows, but they don’t have the overwhelmingly powerful influence, or at least they haven’t so far.”
After years of steadily rising imports from China, former President Donald Trump launched a tit-for-tat trade war in 2018 that led to tariffs on more than $300 billion worth of Chinese goods. That was driven initially by concerns over Chinese trade practices that forced American companies to turn over valuable intellectual property, but the original purpose was soon lost.
Beijing retaliated by hitting around $100 billion of U.S. products, and most of the duties imposed by both sides still remain in place two years into the Biden administration.
Trump justified a number of his trade actions in the name of national security, a trend that has continued during the Biden administration, especially in the form of export controls aimed at keeping the most sensitive U.S. technology away from China’s military.
That reflects concern over Chinese President Xi Jinping’s goal of reuniting China and Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing has long viewed as part of its territory and whose strategic position would help the Chinese military dominate the region.
Still, despite talk of “decoupling” from China, U.S. imports of Chinese goods increased to $538.8 billion in 2022, only slightly less than the record set in 2018. The U.S. also exported a record $153.8 billion worth of goods to China last year.
The gap between exports and imports in trade with China was $382.9 billion in 2022, which was also the second bilateral trade deficit highest on record.
A large share of the U.S. exports to China are agricultural goods, putting farmers on the frontline of any efforts to sever or scale back trade relations.
“I think decoupling from China would be a terrible mistake,” John Bode, president & CEO of the Corn Refiners Association and a member of the Farmers for Free Trade Coalition, told reporters recently. “What needs to happen is a strategic approach to managing the relationship so that strategically sensitive information is protected.”
That seems the more likely course at the moment, despite the current diplomatic uproar over a Chinese spy balloon discovered flying over U.S. territory and similar episodes — former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August — that have strained the relationship.
A recent report by the Boston Consulting Group forecasts trade between the U.S. and China to decrease by $63 billion, or just about 10 percent, through 2031, as companies look to avoid supply chain disruptions by shifting production to less geopolitically risky places such as Mexico, India and countries in Southeast Asia.
Instead of abandoning China completely, many companies and countries are developing “a China-plus-one strategy” to diversify their options, Nikolaus Lang, a managing director and senior partner at Boston Consulting Group, said in an interview.
Vietnam, in particular, has benefited as American companies

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.