DA - Rare Earth Elements - Michigan 7 2023 STARTER

DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet
Notes
A big thank you to those who provided evidence and feedback on the development of this file, including: Tim Alderete, Scotty P, DHeidt, Michael Wimsatt, Sid Bidare, Anish Guddati, Ashrit Manduva and Harry Wang.
This file is part of the Green New Deal negative and is designed to be a net benefit to a federal jobs guarantee that doesn’t focus on increasing green energy.
The thesis of the disadvantage is that the infrastructure for renewable energy and electronic vehicles requires the mining and processing of rare earth elements (“REE” – or also referred to as rare earth minerals – “REM”). While China has largely controlled the mining and processing of these minerals in recent years, the U.S. and allies are working to develop an alternative supply chain that would minimize China’s influence. Unfortunately, the plan requires so much short term demand for REE to power a clean energy transition that it would necessitate even greater dependence on China. China could leverage its enhanced control of the market to bolster its geopolitical dominance, either through embargoes or threatened cutoffs, and to undermine competitors by selectively flooding the market. U.S. dependence on China would also make it more difficult to effectively challenge its military assertiveness. Depending on time and other priorities, the link evidence from Ernst and the terminal impact to Taiwan conflict can be removed to the 1nc. The negative could also read a more simplified argument about how the expanded demand for rare earths to construct clean energy would strain supply chains and tradeoff with those necessary for advanced military equipment. This argument is represented in the 1nc evidence from Foss & Koelsch and Ernst and there is 2nc extension evidence.
The affirmative should exploit a conceptual problem with the disadvantage, namely that many/most negative authors still support a clean energy transition and identify the problem(s) of Chinese control as being inevitable in the status quo and something that can and should be overcome by reinvigorating domestic mining, sourcing minerals from more friendly countries or using recycling or other alternatives. The affirmative should argue that increasing demand for clean energy will accelerate the efforts of Biden and U.S. industries to ramp up domestic production and processing of REEs. There is an additional uniqueness problem because a clean energy transition to some degree is already underway both domestically and globally, and other non-renewable energy sources also require these critical resources.
While I think the affirmative angle might be stronger, this evidence set should allow for good debates. The negative should lean heavily on China’s short term ability to undermine U.S. clean energy development by manipulating REE supply and even more importantly mineral processing, and also its ability and willingness to flood the market with cheaper inputs to undermine any perceived competitors retain its monopoly. The conclusion would be that the U.S. can’t win a renewables race with China if mineral supply is disrupted, and by trying it just makes us more dependent while handing China even more diplomatic leverage.
FYI – Both the Serpell, et. al, 21 and Cho, 23 articles recommend that clean energy transition be fueled by more domestic production of rare earth minerals, especially in a sustainable manner. This is a normative recommendation, rather than a guarantee that it will result from the plan. Determining if the plan either directly mandates or indirectly facilitates more domestic rare earth mining (or recycling), and whether that mineral production will be accompanied by environmental reviews and regulations will be central to whether the negative can win. The negative should emphasize that the plan’s significant new short-term demand for clean energy will make it less likely that a sustainable strategy is developed or result in a “circular economy” (Cho explains that as “an economy that aims for zero waste and pollution by keeping materials, products, and services in circulation for as long possible”) because there will be pressure to reduce environmental and social safeguards. Additionally, since this will be a multi-year process, the party that wins the next Presidential election (and/or controls Congress) will have a big say in how it unfolds.
Looking ahead to next year, I think there are better disadvantages than this to read against clean energy affirmatives to avoid some of the terminal uniqueness issues. Trade-offs associated with natural gas or oil are strong candidates and if the negative wants to stay focused on rare earths they could explore the environmental harms of obtaining the minerals domestically or the geopolitical problems of getting them from sources other than China (domestically and/or from an expanded network of allies) which could trigger containment fears and intensify the strategic rivalry.
1nc DA REE
There is momentum now to check China’s monopoly on rare earth elements and prevent military aggression --- Xi has been down recently but could still exercise his trump card by cutting off exports
Mabuni, 23 --- MA in Asian International Affairs and resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum (3-15-2023, Brandt Mabuni, "Breaking China’s rare earths monopoly," Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/breaking-chinas-rare-earths-monopoly/ SRB)
State of the market
Thirteen years later, the green shoots of new market entrants display a small but meaningful movement toward diversifying the world’s rare earths supply. The United States and Australia have demonstrated political resolve to break the PRC’s hold on the market.
Japan and India are also attempting to establish domestic industries but the barriers to entry remain formidable. The industries of mining and ore refinement are notoriously lengthy and capital-intensive – doubly so in countries with complex licensing and ecological surveying requisites.
The PRC still dominates the entire vertical industry and can flood global markets with cheap material, as it has done before with steel and with solar panels. In 2022, it mined 58% of all rare earths elements, refined 89% of all raw ore, and manufactured 92% of rare earths-based components worldwide.
There is no other global industry so concentrated in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, nor with such asymmetric downstream impact, as rare earths – so the United States and others should pursue further diversification with unique urgency.
The United States: Reviving heavy industry
Beijing’s 2010 dispute with Tokyo was one of several assertive foreign policy maneuvers that set off alarm bells in Washington and precipitated the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.”
As the swiftness of the PRC’s rise continued to outpace expectations during the Trump years, American political appetite shifted from defending hegemony in Asia, to addressing vulnerabilities at home – including the outsourcing of mining industries for rare earth elements, among other minerals such as lithium, nickel, and graphite.
The global bottleneck for midstream industry segments, including refining, is so severe that the few American rare earths miners in operation send their raw ore to China for processing before it returns to the United States as permanent magnets for use in F-35s, Tesla Model 3s, and the like.
In conjunction with an overarching strategy to address this weakness by revitalizing domestic supply chains for critical minerals, the US government is supporting the buildout of processing facilities in California and Texas for two rare earths juggernauts-in-the-making: MP Materials, an American company, and Lynas Rare Earths, an Australian firm.
Additionally, the Biden administration’s recent Inflation Reduction Act provided tax incentives for critical mineral businesses and supercharged the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office and the Defense Production Act. That will allow the executive branch to bolster industrial development on an ad hoc basis.
The United States should continue focusing grants towards venture past the proof-of-concept stage in rare earths refining and magnet manufacturing, so that they can then access the Department of Energy’s lending resources to scale quickly.
China: tightening the reins
The media often characterize the PRC’s rare earths dominance as the “trump card” of wolf warrior diplomacy, but Xi Jinping likely understands that the implicit threat of applying this leverage outweighs the cost-benefit of its actual use.
The international environment of today is far less forgiving than that of 2010, and a rare earths embargo applied tomorrow on a nation like Japan or the United States would easily spark a bellicose trade dispute and push a tsunami of funding toward emerging competitors.
However, there exists a dangerous window during the next several years, when the PRC’s influence over the global industry is diminishing but still overwhelming enough to put importing nations in a bind. In this sense, Beijing could still use its “trump card” over a critical political moment – something that would become even more tempting once its monopoly’s decline started to seem inevitable.
Beijing’s cognizance of this scenario is reflected in its recent merger of three state-owned mining giants into the China Rare Earth Group. This massive consolidation allows the party to more easily control the market and develop synergies to bring costs even lower, which will hamper foreign upstarts.
Realist conclusions in a global market-based system
In the long run, monopolistic behavior will be solved by the interconnected markets on which modern society is built.
The strategic calculus and narratives between great powers may be swiftly changing, but the fundamental rules of the game remain. The more likely the world perceives the weaponization of the rare earths industry by Beijing, the more pressure will be applied on the two competitive market forces already working towards solutions.
The first is the potential for new market entrants. Rising Chinese export tariffs and spiking prices signal opportunity. Canada, India, and the United Kingdom have all recently announced their intent to develop their first domestic refineries for rare earth elements, with national security interests undoubtedly providing propulsion.
Relatively small investments now could pay off big by shaking up market dynamics later this decade, so the United States could seed promising ventures abroad, and consider this high-profile sector an opportunity to build up “friendshoring” partnerships with alternate producers.
The second is the threat of substitutes. Necessity is the mother of invention—and if substitutes can replace rare earths in end-use products, then supply fears may be sidestepped. The embedded risks of the elements have already been driving manufacturers like Toyota and Volkswagen to redesign their electric motors’ magnets to use less rare earths material – or use alternative (and less efficient) magnet metals.
The US Energy, Defense and Commerce departments have been pursuing alternatives, but governments should also consider rewarding companies that find innovative ways of designing their products without rare earth elements in the style of bug bounties. Even without implementing substitutes, establishing backup options builds supply chain resilience and saps the power of a monopoly.
Tetrataenite is one promising breakthrough in magnetic alternatives. Until recently, this nickel-iron alloy was only observed in meteorite samples, but last year it was successfully replicated in a University of Cambridge laboratory. Experts say it has an outside chance at upending the entire rare earths industry in the years to come.
Aside from pressing into the two competitive market forces of new entrants and substitution, the United States should continue subsidizing the rapid development of its rare earths supply chains—particularly the midstream layers: ore processing, mineral refining, and alloying.
The faster it can do so, the narrower the window will be for Xi Jinping to play hardball during the waning years of China’s monopoly, and the less likely that opportunity will coincide with an attempted invasion of Taiwan.
The economic downturn, domestic discontent and international scrutiny resulting from Beijing’s stringent Covid-19 lockdown policies have left Xi’s political capital temporarily spent as he works to patch up relations and entice businesses back to the PRC.
To break the global refining monopoly without sparking a larger geopolitical firestorm, an inflection point in broadening supply diversification needs to be achieved soon.
The plan would force greater dependence on China AND trigger tradeoffs with military weapons development that rely on rare earth elements
Ernst, 22 --- U.S. Senator from Iowa (5-4-2022, Joni, “DEMOCRATS' GREEN AGENDA RISKS NATIONAL SECURITY,” https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/democrats-green-agenda-risks-national-security, SRB)
Democrats have spent the past year pursuing their radical Green New Deal energy agenda. Now the left is using Russia’s war in Ukraine to try to justify a massive transition to electric vehicles and renewable energy. If enacted, this would significantly increase our dependence on China for certain “critical minerals” and other materials needed for these energy sources. If the left successfully implements its flawed agenda without strengthening supply chains, the United States could become significantly dependent on China for its energy needs. China could use its commanding influence over green energy technology to get its way in the future, just as Russia used its energy to influence Europe not to act prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
GROWING DEMAND FOR CRITICAL MINERALS
Critical minerals are specific substances identified as being vital to a range of industries including energy, electronics, and the military. Electric vehicles and renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, require significant amounts of critical minerals. One analysis by several professors from the United Kingdom found that to swap the UK’s 32 million cars with EVs would demand about double the world’s annual output of cobalt, almost all the neodymium, and 75% of the lithium. Comparatively, about eight times as much would be required to convert the entire U.S. fleet of 260 million cars.
A 2021 report by the International Energy Agency found that by 2040, anticipated global green energy commitments could increase demand for “rare earth elements,” a subset of critical minerals, by as much as 700%. Demand for nickel could grow by 1,900%, cobalt by 2,100%, and lithium by a staggering 4,200%. These minerals are needed for the development of wind turbines and solar panels, as well as for electric vehicles.
These substances also play a key part in our national defense. Construction of each F-35 combat aircraft requires more than 900 pounds of critical minerals. Copper, lead, cobalt, uranium, and a significant amount of other minerals are needed for munitions, armor, and communications gear. Ships, vehicles, and aircraft will continue to require these materials to keep up with advanced technological needs. The problem is acute; the DoD is facing a critical shortage of munitions and the defense industry is having trouble meeting the demand for more advanced weapons. The U.S. military’s stockpile of critical minerals is already shrinking and increased demand will continue to stress those reserves.
If we add to the demand for these minerals to make more electric vehicles and solar panels, while not increasing domestic production, we would only make it tougher to meet the need for military applications. In a recent Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing, one defense industry executive discussed how competition from other products has affected his ability to get parts needed to make advanced weapon systems.
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN MINERAL SUPPLIES
The problem is not just that Democrats’ plans will increase the demand for these elements. It is also a question of where the materials come from. The pandemic made us all aware of how dependent we are on the global supply chain and what happens in one link of that chain breaks. The supply of critical minerals is no different. The batteries for a typical electric car require 19.6 pounds of lithium, and 58% of the world’s lithium is processed in China. Batteries also require high-quality nickel; almost 20% of global supply is produced by Russia.
Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate what can happen when one country controls a large share of the global energy market. European countries have grown dependent on the Russians for much of their oil, natural gas, coal, and other energy supplies. Now they are scrambling to find alternative sources of fuel to heat their homes and fuel their economies. For many of these countries, their dependence was fueled by radical climate policies such as phasing out nuclear power and limiting fracking.
Democrats, through their anti-fossil-fuel agenda, have been trying to eliminate America’s ability to produce domestic oil and gas that could help us respond to this kind of shock to the energy markets. Furthermore, the Biden administration’s sanctions provide loopholes to allow for energy transactions until June 24. Democrats have a way to relieve the pressure Russia places on energy markets, mainly by increasing domestic production, but so far they have seemed more interested in pursuing a progressive campaign against energy.
Instead of learning a lesson about the danger of depending on other, often antagonistic, countries for critical materials, the Biden administration and Democrats in Congress are pushing an agenda to make things worse. Democrats are actually trying to use Russia’s war in Ukraine to justify their climate goals, while disregarding the fact that we do not have enough of the raw materials necessary to support their pipe dreams and will therefore be forced to rely more on China.
Just as the Russians have used energy to influence Europe, the Chinese have already used their command over the critical minerals market to advance their political agenda. In 2010, the Chinese government temporarily stopped all exports of critical minerals to Japan over a diplomatic dispute around a collision at sea, foreshadowing what is to come if the world depends on China for the majority of its energy-related mineral needs.
Prioritizing rare earths for defense instead of clean energy wins support for a domestic supply chain to ensure combat readiness --- reducing dependence on China checks military aggression
Foss & Koelsch, 22 --- *Fellow in Energy, Minerals and Materials at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, AND **Research Associate, J.A. Green & Company and Former Research Intern, Center for Energy Studies (December 19, 2022, Michelle Michot Foss, Jacob Koelsch, “Of Chinese Behemoths: What China’s Rare Earths Dominance Means for the US,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/chinese-behemoths-what-chinas-rare-earths-dominance-means-us, SRB+JMP))
The U.S. government, of course, has its own part to play. First, strategic planners must honestly distinguish rare earth demand for defense and other strategic purposes from non-strategic demand. While both strategic and non-strategic demand must be balanced in order to stabilize supply, delivery delays for defense purposes carry significant implications for combat readiness, especially in an era of heightened major-power tension. It is also crucial that the U.S. government ensure its strategic stockpiles of REE are filled to aid in these efforts.
Conclusion
The recent merger that created the China Rare Earth Group is a major development for the global rare earth industry. It is the most recent chapter in the Chinese government’s efforts to quell an industry that has been unruly at times. Given 

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