AT Capitalism K - Michigan 7 2023 STARTER

Aff
Notes
When constructing a 2AC, keep in mind that many of the cards in the blocks make for good external offense. For example, you could read some of the “AT: War” cards even if the 1NC only includes an environment impact. Basically everything overlaps to some degree or another, so don’t pay too much attention to how I organized the evidence when it comes to block headings.
More of the aff answers in this file are impact- and alt-focused, because the nature of the link means that link answers will depend on exactly what parts of the aff you’re most ready to defend. The aff files will have more materials for link answers—especially in places you might not expect, such as solvency/internal link extensions!
Framework—2AC
Framework: The negative must prove that the consequences of the plan are uniquely worse than the status quo or a solvent alternative.
The impact is competitive clash. Any lower burden for the negative creates a strategic incentive to avoid leaning into the controversy through nuanced, well-researched neg strats in favor of “you-link-you-lose” frameworks or unpredictable utopian alts that affs can’t effectively prep for. Competitive clash is the intrinsic good of debate—it’s the distinguishing feature of the activity and an essential part of whatever broader purposes that it might serve.
Clash link turns alt solvency. Refusing to compare the alt to the plan dooms the transition.
Albert, 23—Lecturer in International Relations, SOAS, University of London (Michael, “Ecosocialism for Realists: Transitions, Trade-Offs, and Authoritarian Dangers,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 34:1, 11-30, dml)
This leads to the second conjoined tendency, which is to neglect difficult strategic questions, trade-offs, and dangers that would likely emerge during the transition process and beyond. The majority of ecosocialists ignore these sorts of questions altogether, while others address them more tepidly. Michael Löwy, for example, who has done some of the finest work on elaborating the ecosocialist alternative, does not consider whether there might be a trade-off between calls for “democratic planning” and the simultaneous emphasis on biospheric limits within which we must constrain consumption. Indeed, he affirms that “nobody has the right to tell people what their needs are” (Löwy Citation2015, 34), but then the question of whether this may require allowing energy-intensive modes of consumption that transgress planetary boundaries to persist is left unaddressed. Instead, Löwy expresses faith that “the rationality of democratic decisions will prevail once the power of commodity fetishism is broken” (28). This is perhaps plausible, but as Löwy himself recognizes, there will be a long period of transition in which the “old habits of consumption would persist” (34), and he doesn’t grapple with the question of how they would be transformed within the requisite timeframe to avoid runaway climate change (i.e. by 2050 or shortly thereafter). Joel Kovel and Michael Lebowitz also recognize that ecosocialism(s)-in-transition would remain marked by the defects of capitalism for some time; thus they emphasize the importance of democratic praxis in forging the new subjectivities and social relations that would be needed to sustain a long-term revolutionary transformation, which otherwise risks lapsing into the same authoritarian statism that has plagued socialism throughout its history (Kovel Citation2007, 272; Lebowitz Citation2006, 66). This is an important insight, though it still begs the question of how a society-wide transformation towards ecosocialist/degrowth principles might occur in the needed time-frame. Given the possible intransigence of energy and emissions-intensive consumption practices, particularly in a context of rising rightwing populism and “fossil fascism” (Malm and Collective Citation2021), we should grapple squarely with the risk that state coercion would be needed enforce ecosocialist degrowth in rich countries. On the other hand, if we choose to follow the democratic will wherever it leads us, even if this entails the perpetuation or even expansion of material-energy intensive modes of living, then we must deal with the biospheric consequences. Might there be a trade-off, then, between degrowth and non-degrowth paths to ecosocialism, each with its own set of challenges and dangers? Ecosocialists have not systematically investigated these sorts of questions.
In sum, we can see that the ecosocialist and degrowth movements have so far devoted limited attention to important strategic questions and trade-offs regarding ecosocialist transitions. Thus they are vulnerable to critiques like those of Matt Huber, who claims that degrowth variants of ecosocialism fail to articulate how their utopian aspirations could be “realistically built out of the present” (Huber Citation2019). Instead, Huber advocates what he calls a “scientific ecosocialism” that eschews the emphasis on degrowth and instead endorses a “traditional socialist politics not of limits and less, but of more” (Huber Citation2019). Unfortunately, Huber’s proposal is itself “utopian” in that it disregards the biospheric devastation that would be entailed by more consumption in the already over-developed global north (which I will expand on below). However, he indicates a crucial problem that must be addressed by the degrowth ecosocialist left: how might an ecosocialist vision based on degrowth (in rich countries) win popular majorities? As Hubert Buch-Hansen bluntly states: “the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes” (Buch-Hansen Citation2018, 160). This is undoubtedly true, at present, and thus more strategic thinking about the how of transition is needed. Following Sam Gindin, we need “an honest presentation of the risks, costs, and dilemmas the [eco]socialist project will face, alongside credible examples and promising indications of how the problems might be creatively addressed” (Gindin Citation2018, 14). Furthermore, as Erik Olin Wright says, we need to understand “not simply the obstacles and openings for strategies in the present, but how those obstacles and opportunities are likely to develop over time” (Wright Citation2010, 18).
In this sense, following Gindin and Olin Wright, we can develop a “realist” or “realist utopian” approach to ecosocialism that combines rigorous social and ecological analysis with speculative imagination, working through the likely constraints on utopian potentials, how they might be surmounted, and the likely challenges, tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas we would face even in the best-case scenarios. No one could ever pretend to have fully worked out answers to these problems, and the claims of “realism” (i.e. “being realistic”) can always be contested, given that we are dealing with an inherently open and uncertain future (Wright Citation2010). But the difficulties of developing more realistic models of possible futures and theories of systemic change should not lead us to dismiss the importance of facing them as rigorously (and humbly) as possible. To this end, I will first develop a plausible (r)evolutionary scenario of how something like ecosocialist degrowth might emerge in the coming decades, and then think through some of the likely trade-offs and dangers that would accompany the transition process.
Perm—2AC
Do both. Mutual exclusivity precludes effective socialist organizing.
Martell, 23—Teaching Fellow and Professor of Sociology at the University of Sussex (Luke, “Conclusion,” Alternative Societies: For a Pluralist Socialism, Conclusion, pp. 180, dml)
Fuchs (2020b) talks about ‘class struggle social democracy’. This aims to move to democratic socialism and involves: a pluralist convergence of radical reforms and the gradual transformation of institutions; trade union industrial action with working-class struggle (trade unions are another topic that could get more attention when discussing alternative societies and routes to them); new social combinations across classes and other divisions and identities; electoral parliamentary politics, social movements and movement parties; organization spontaneity and new prefigurative forms of social co-operation; the building of democratically controlled commons within as well as beyond capitalism; leadership and mass action; both conflict antagonistic politics and taking power. This includes different but complementary political strategies and rejects seeing these as contradictory or mutually exclusive. There are parallels here with what I am advocating in this book. I may not use the term ‘social democracy’ for this approach as that implies staying within capitalism, although in this context it refers to building from political reformism within capitalism to something beyond. Fuchs discusses thinkers as diverse as Rosa Luxemburg (2008), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2017), and Bhaskar Sunkara (2019) as advocating change along these lines. Likewise, Eagleton (2022: 191), discussing a post-Corbyn Left in the UK, argues that the ‘the priority must be to grow this movement through every available channel’, numerous existing and thriving examples of which he gives.
Authoritarianism—2AC
The alt risks authoritarian takeover in even best-case scenarios.
Albert, 23—Lecturer in International Relations, SOAS, University of London (Michael, “Ecosocialism for Realists: Transitions, Trade-Offs, and Authoritarian Dangers,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 34:1, 11-30, dml)
The scenario sketched above highlights that ecosocialist degrowth transitions would most likely occur in a context of deepening political-economic crisis, intensifying climate shocks, and worsening insecurity for the majority of populations. A key danger, then, is that even in the best-case scenario in which powerful red-green movements decisively shift the balance of power vis-à-vis capital and elect leftist parties following ecosocialist platforms, this could lead to “authoritarian” forms of ecosocialism, understood as ecosocialist regimes that institutionalize “state of emergency” provisions such as unchecked executive power, the suspension of democratic rights and procedures, restrictions on free speech, and military-police repression of dissent (Petras and Fitzgerald Citation1988). This has of course been one of the primary challenges confronting all socialist transitions historically, which have had to fight off external military intervention, resistance from capitalist elites, and reactionary currents from below in order to protect revolutionary gains. Things would be no different for future ecosocialisms-in-transition, particularly given the likely contradiction between the speed at which consumption cuts may need to be made in the global north and the slowness with which post-materialist cultural change would occur, yet such problems have not been systematically explored by ecosocialists and degrowth scholars. The risks are twofold: first, that authoritarian measures would be needed to enforce lifestyle changes upon recalcitrant populations and “deal with the exceptional circumstances of direct and serious threat” to the survival of ecosocialist regimes in their early phases; and second, that such measures, rather than being temporally limited and abolished once the “exceptional circumstances” are dealt with, become the new normal (94).
Quincy Saul and Andreas Malm are among the few ecosocialists who don’t shy away from this problem. Saul, for one, writes that “a period of ‘emergency rule,’ when the expropriators are expropriated, must be revised for the twenty-first century, it cannot be dismissed or glossed over” (Saul Citation2011, 58–59). Similarly, Malm suggests that carrying out the transition in the needed time frame would require.
warlike state management of all industries … centralized decisions on who can consume what goods in what amounts, [and] punishment of transgressors threatening the annual emissions targets … [which] can only be feasible under an exceptional regime dealing with an unheard-of emergency (Malm Citation2015, 187)
The risk, in other words, is that ecosocialist regimes that are democratically elected in a context of unprecedented climate-energy-economic crises may be forced down an authoritarian path in order to enforce carbon rationing, enact rapid and far-reaching transformations in land-use, break through the gridlock of dysfunctional and polarized legislatures, and defend themselves against violence and sabotage from capitalist elites and the far-right. The danger is exacerbated by the fact that worsening climate and political-economic crises, far from neutralizing the threat of rightwing populism, will most likely intensify ethnonationalist reaction and political polarization. As Malm and the Zetkin Collective explain: “the higher the temperatures, the more acute the antagonism between a left that alone stands ready to pick up the instruments for alleviating the crisis and a right that, for that very reason, refuses to contemplate it” (Malm and Collective Citation2021, 286–287). Additionally, given that ecosocialist transitions would entail a “life-threatening situation” for most if not all sectors of the capitalist class, many of them would likely ally with the far-right in order to halt such transitions in their tracks and restore capitalist power “by any means necessary” (241). Thus even in the best-case scenario in which ecosocialists are able to assume power in core states, this would almost certainly occur in a context of rabid far-right resistance in alliance with global capital. The risks are particularly acute in, but not limited to, the US, where the spectacle of armed insurrectionists storming congress to try overthrowing the 2020 presidential election give us a taste of what ecosocialists are up against.
Authoritarianism—1AR
Authoritarianism is likely due to lack of mechanisms for allocation or conflict resolution.
Terzi, 22—Economist at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Adjunct Professor at Sciences Po and at HEC Paris (Alessio, “Post-Growth Dystopia,” Growth for Good: Reshaping Capitalism to Save Humanity from Climate Catastrophe, Chapter 3, pp. 75, dml)
Degrowth, by definition, will reduce available resources and create some scarcity, albeit, according to its advocates, only for goods or ser vices that are unnecessary or superfluous. The implicit assumption, or hazardous bet, is that this would be voluntary scarcity—that everyone, once free from the iron cage of consumerism, would gladly embrace it as part of a superior mode of simple living.68 In this chapter we saw that, if this were not to happen, and the “infinite desire for more” (as Daniel Cohen calls it) were to remain prevalent, degrowth would likely turn into the proverbial road to hell, paved with good intentions.
Ecosocialism does not have an allocation mechanism, or a way to assuage tensions within society. The problems this chapter has described would rapidly cause the entire degrowth utopian vision to unravel, leaving citizens with some combination of perceived misery, social tension, autarky, emigration, and welfare reductions. An intricate web of rules would be spun up to regulate most aspects of life—all presided over by a strong central government at high risk of turning illiberal in its efforts to shore up its ideological raison d’être. The distance between ecosocialism and ecoauthoritarianism is shorter than one might imagine.
Cronyism—2AC
Cronyism DA:
They conflate capitalism with cronyism. The free market is efficient, sustainable, and just.
Foss, et al, 22—Professor of Strategy at the Department of Strategy and Innovation, Copenhagen Business School, Honorary Adjunct Professor, Department of Marketing & Management, Southern Denmark University (Nicolai, with Peter Klein, W. W. Caruth Endowed Chair, Professor of Entrepreneurship, and Chair of the Department of Entrepreneurship and Corporate Innovation, Baylor University, Adjunct Professor of Strategy and Management at the Norwegian School of Economics, Carl Menger Research Fellow at the Mises Institute, and Research Affiliate at GRANEM, and Samuele Murtinu, Chair Full Professor of International Business and Interim Head of Section (Entrepreneurship) at the Utrecht University School of Economics, “The economy doesn’t need a reset, and neither does management theory,” Scandinavian Journal of Management, Volume 38, Issue 3, September 2022, dml)
While the Great Reset is fundamentally a set of normative propositions—a call for large-scale political and corporate action in the service of broad, societal goals such as sustainability—it is based on underlying descriptive assumptions. The basic, and mostly unanalyzed, premise of the Great Reset is that the existing social organization of economic activities (imprecisely described as “neo-liberalism”) has proven unable to deal with “grand challenges.” These challenges include the Covid-19 pandemic (as well as future, as yet unknown pandemics), the alleged increase in worldwide inequality, the various climate challenges, and the supposed declining innovativeness of private business which translates into reduced ability to deal with the other challenges. In other words, the Great Reset thesis rests on a strong claim of what economists call “market failure” (mainly “externalities”; Bator, 1958; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999).
Those who call for the Great Reset may not use this terminology. Instead, they criticize “capitalism” for causing inequality, making natural resources being too heavily exploited, failing to direct innovation in the best possible ways, ignoring sustainability concerns, and so on (World Economic Forum, 2020). Much of this critique lacks concreteness and is entirely “boilerplate.” In particular, it is rarely explained how exactly “capitalism” does all these things; all are common to all known forms of social organization. Economic activity is driven by human wants and needs and the ability of people to satisfy those wants and needs, given the constraints of scarcity, production, and knowledge. Capitalism is merely a way of dealing with these basic facts (although some may of course argue that capitalism creates “unnecessary” needs and wants). Many proponents of Great Reset thinking claim they are not against capitalism per se, just the forms of capitalism that are most common today.
Thus, the critique of capitalism is interspersed with the critique of neoliberalism which comes across as the politico-ideological superstructure to current capitalism. A recent short essay by a WEF associate announces the “end of neoliberalism” as policymakers need to act against increasing concentration of profits among a few industries, concentration of profits within industries (which, the author claims, are “hoarded” rather than invested), increased dispersion of wages within industries causing rising inequality, and increasing market power exercised by “platform companies” such as Alibaba (Buckup, 2017). All this sounds fairly damning and seems like a rehash of familiar Marxian themes. However, the author also tellingly notes that “as neoliberalism took hold, policymakers became less concerned about big firms converting profits into political influence, and instead worried that governments were protecting uncompetitive companies.”
2.2. Capitalism—properly understood
What these critics are describing here is not capitalism but “cronyism” (Rubin, 2016). As Klein et al. (2021) argue, confusing capitalism and cronyism is a long-standing mistake. Classic proponents of the free-enterprise system such as Schumpeter (1942)¸ Mises (1922), or Friedman (1962) describe capitalism as a mode of social organization which entails that (1) productive resources are (mostly) privately owned, (2) markets are used to allocate resources, products and services, (3) indiv

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