DA - Military Recruitment - Michigan 7 2023 BEKS

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Recent recruitment stats have been trending up – training courses are enabling thousands to enlist.
Beynon ‘6/2 [Steve Beynon; Beynon is a reporter for Military.com based in Washington D.C. He specializes in covering ground combat.; 6-2-2023; "2023 Ain't 2022: More Americans Signing Up with Army Guard, Internal Docs Show"; Military; https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/06/05/army-national-guard-recruiting-numbers-looking-better-after-horrendous-year.html; Accessed 7-2-2023; DQ]
The Army National Guard is behind on its recruiting goals for this year but is bringing more people into the ranks compared to last year, the worst recruiting year since the military went to an all-volunteer force.
The service component has come up about 10% short of its goals on recruits for each month between October and February, according to internal documents reviewed by Military.com. That's a big improvement compared to the same time frame last year in which the Army Guard came up 40% short, on average. October is the start of the military's fiscal year.
"We've seen a steady increase in our recruiting abilities," Gen. Daniel Hokanson, the National Guard's top officer, told lawmakers at a hearing last week. "The Army National Guard is on the path to meet our end strength by the end of the year. I am not declaring victory; I am saying that, right now, all of the trends are very positive."
In March, the Army National Guard exceeded its recruiting goal by 200, bringing in 3,206 new troops. Hokanson told lawmakers that the service component has exceeded recruiting goals in April and May as well, though the data Military.com obtained did not have those numbers.
But the numbers paint a complicated picture. The Guard is aiming for a smaller end strength. Last year, it was authorized to have 336,000 soldiers, and that was reduced by 11,000 this year. Thus, the recruiting goals were also reduced.
In December, for example, the National Guard recruited 2,308 new soldiers, missing its goal of 2,697. That same month the previous fiscal year, the Guard recruited 1,965 soldiers with a goal of 3,358. Between October and March, the Guard recruited 445 more soldiers on average each month, compared to the same time frame last fiscal year.
The Army National Guard's upswing is likely indicative of its active-duty counterpart, which came up 15,000 soldiers short of its goal of recruiting 60,000 new troops last year. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told Congress on multiple occasions that, while the Army as a whole will not meet its recruiting goals this year, it has made progress compared to last year's uniquely grim performance courting Gen Z.
Military.com asked the Army for two months to provide data on its recruiting performance, but officials refused to offer any numbers. The National Guard did not dispute this reporting but declined to comment.
The recruiting slump is due to a culmination of factors as the services struggle to pitch enlistment to a skeptical new generation and to an ever-shrinking pool of eligible young Americans. An internal Defense Department study found that Gen Z members are less inclined to want to leave their hometowns and believe service has an inherent risk of death. Media attention on suicide and sexual assault in the services has also likely played a role in recruiting prospects.
Army officials have estimated that only 23% of young Americans are eligible to enlist or commission, mostly due to poor performance on the SAT-style entrance exam, and an obesity crisis making too many potential applicants too overweight to serve. Last year, the Army started pre-basic training courses for applicants who come up short on the entrance test or are slightly above the body fat standards.
Those courses allow applicants to come into compliance with the Army's standards in 90 days and move on to basic training. Service officials have touted the early success of those programs, with the overwhelming majority of applicants being able to join the Army. Those pre-basic courses have the capacity to graduate 12,000 soldiers into boot camp, who otherwise wouldn't have been able to enlist. The Navy also started a similar program.
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Military recruitment is key to readiness---solves hotspot escalation
Radha Iyengar 17, senior economist at the nonpartisan, nonprofit RAND Corporation, former director of Personnel on the White House National Security Council, 7/27/17, “MILITARY POWER IS ALL ABOUT PEOPLE: A RETURN TO PERSONNEL POLICY,” https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/military-power-is-all-about-people-a-return-to-personnel-policy/
The U.S. military is often described as the “best fighting force in the world,” and we agree. It’s superior to its possible adversaries in nearly every way. No other military has the globe-spanning responsibilities, the all-domain combat experience, or the technological edge. Yet, as the United States remains militarily engaged around a world that demands unyielding attention and unwavering commitment, its military faces a dynamic threat environment that includes new and resurgent challenges in emerging battle domains such as cyber. With tensions on the Korean peninsula, a continuing series of crises in the Middle East, a rising China, and a resurgent Russia, it would be wise to keep front and center the key source of strength in the armed forces — our people. Policy debates have raged about Syria, Yemen, NATO, North Korea, and beyond. At the same time, defense acquisition experts publicly debated options related to new technologies and acquisition reform. But the new and growing challenges facing the country are all the more reason to also think about what additional approaches are needed to acquire the key personnel skills and capabilities needed to meet America’s growing and changing military requirements. The new administration has called for “a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force, driven by a new National Defense Strategy that recognizes the need for American superiority not only on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, but also in cyberspace.” To do this, the Department of Defense has become increasingly focused on three key objectives: sustaining and improving the deterrent and warfighting prowess; establishing a force with the capabilities needed to meet the challenges in the coming years; and resetting and rebalancing after decades of conflicts.
Readiness solves nuclear war, terror, and WMD prolif but ground forces are key.
Bonds 17 [Timothy M. Bonds is vice president, Army Research Division, and director, RAND Arroyo Center. Bonds has served as a RAND vice president since 2011. Previously, he was deputy director of the Arroyo Center from 2003 to 2011, acting director from March 2009 to May 2010, and, from 1999 to 2003, director of the Aerospace Force Development Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. Prior to joining RAND, Bonds spent nine years in the aerospace industry, where he led projects to develop high-speed vehicle and weapons concepts. He holds an M.S. in aero/astro engineering from the University of Illinois and an M.B.A. from Washington University, St. Louis. Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need--An Update. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces on March 1, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT466/RAND_CT466.pdf]
For our first example, what might happen if the United States does not continue its missions to defeat ISIL, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent extremist groups around the world? One potential regret is enduring terror movements that continue to destabilize vulnerable nations and whole regions; harm captured peoples; exploit captured territory to train terrorists, raise funds, and attract new recruits; and export violence to the United States and its allies and friends.
It remains unknown whether currently deployed forces are sufficient to achieve U.S. objectives. In fact, the United States has steadily increased troop deployments to Iraq and Syria and extended the mission in Afghanistan. However, this analysis assumes that U.S. ground forces will remain engaged at their current levels against extremist groups in order to continue to degrade them. Therefore, we assume here that these troops could not be pulled away for other operations without ending this mission. It is also possible that countering violent extremists will require more troops if the mission changes—for example, if additional ground troops are committed to combat operations, such as those in Syria and Iraq. Total troop requirements would remain those shown earlier as the worldwide commitments.
For our second example, how might Russia take the same course in the Baltics that it has taken in Ukraine? Russian “volunteers” could enter and destabilize Estonia and Latvia, or worse, conventional forces could launch a surprise invasion and present a fait accompli to NATO. We estimate that against currently stationed forces, the Russians could reach the Baltic capitals in 36–60 hours. That would leave the President with few and bad choices. The President could negotiate for the Russians to leave and risk the fracture of NATO if negotiations and sanctions drag on for months or years, or the President could choose to launch a counteroffensive to retake NATO territory—against a nuclear-armed Russia that has threatened first use of nuclear weapons to defend its territory from conventional attack and prevent its military from being destroyed. While the risk of war with Russia is small, and the risks of escalation to nuclear conflict are smaller still, neither risk is zero. Since the human and financial costs of both would be catastrophic, it is prudent to hedge against them.
Instead, NATO—and the United States—might place armored brigades in the Baltics. These armored brigades, along with other U.S. and NATO forces able to quickly deploy on warning, would be capable of denying Russia a quick victory. Such forces could be permanently stationed or rotationally deployed. These ground forces would be supported by air and sea power from the United States and its NATO allies. The European Reassurance Initiative and the four NATO battalion tactical groups deployed to Poland and the Baltics have made an important statement of alliance commitment and an initial “down payment” on the forces needed, but are not yet close to the amounts required to deny Russia a quick overrun of the Baltics.
If the Russians attacked under this scenario, the United States and NATO would send air, sea, and land reinforcements to deny a Russian victory. Additional U.S. and NATO forces would be needed to defeat Russian forces and reverse any Russian territorial gains.
We will now assess the numbers of ground forces needed for the missions described above. We will begin with continuing infrastructure tasks, including training new troops, supporting joint missions, and current overseas missions. Adding the forces supporting current missions, we have a demand for 434,000 soldiers to support infrastructure tasks and current missions. This includes the troops who are rotationally deployed; those forward-stationed in Europe, South Korea, and other places; and those supporting generating- and strategic-force operations (but who are not in the GRF or available for other missions). How large of an additional force would be required to deter and defeat aggression in the Baltics (shown here in orange)? For the deterrent force, we estimate that a total of three armored brigades would be needed on the ground in the Baltics on the day fighting started, along with the two U.S. brigades and supporting soldiers already in Europe, and two other U.S. Army and NATO rapid reaction brigades (the 82nd Airborne GRF and the NATO Very High Readiness Task Force) that can deploy to the Baltics on warning. In the future, our NATO allies should be able to provide one or more of the three armored brigades needed. However, in the near term, it is unlikely that any one of these nations would be able to sustain a deployed armored brigade. Therefore, we assume that the U.S. would need to deploy two more armored brigades and a fires brigade in addition to the forward stationed forces already in Europe and the armored and aviation brigades already deployed in a “heel to toe” fashion. In total, 36,000 additional soldiers would be needed over and above those already forward stationed or rotationally deployed to Europe. When deployed at a 1:2 rotation ratio, keeping 36,000 soldiers on the ground in the Baltics requires 108,000 soldiers to maintain a continuous presence. Including the 283,000 soldiers forward deployed in or rotating to Europe and other theaters, and the 151,000 soldiers engaged in infrastructure activities, a total of 542,000 soldiers would be required for these activities alone. This number exceeds the 476,000 soldiers now planned for the regular Army, forcing the DoD to reduce day-to-day operations, continuously deploy 66,000 National Guard or Army Reserve soldiers, grow the regular Army, or take some combination of these measures. Worse, this leaves no margin for higher demands if deterrence fails and war breaks out in Europe, Korea, or elsewhere in the world. In wartime, therefore, the DoD might be compelled to suspend troop rotations to maintain sufficient numbers of forces to meet contingency needs. From this point on in this testimony, we will discuss wartime demand, with troops deployed without rotation for the duration of a conflict. Such extended deployments for the duration of the conflict will impose extraordinary strain on troops and their families. (We should also note that some troop rotation will still be needed within theaters, so battle-worn units can pull back from the line for rest, refit, and replacement of casualties). If troop rotations to all theaters are suspended, including the deterrent force in the Baltics, troop demands will decline somewhat. The additional demand in the Baltics would decline to the 36,000 soldiers deployed at any one time; demand for the combination of other theaters would decline to 146,000, while the demand for infrastructure forces would remain steady at 151,000 soldiers. The total troops needed for these missions would decline to 334,000 soldiers when on a wartime footing. Additional troops would be needed if the Russians were not deterred and decided to invade. To expel the invading Russian forces, we estimate that an additional 85,000 U.S. troops, including six armored brigades and associated artillery, aviation, headquarters, and other supporting troops, would be needed to defeat a Russian invasion (shown in brown), along with eight brigades and a similar number of troops from our NATO allies. This raises the total U.S. troops needed to around 420,000 soldiers. This includes soldiers tasked to conduct infrastructure missions, continue current missions around the world, and deploy the U.S. contribution to the NATO deterrent and war-winning forces shown above. Once again, this assumes a wartime footing for all of these troops with no rotations of soldiers. We now turn to a third example—a war resulting from a provocation cycle that escalates to a North Korean attack on South Korea. Current DoD force planning seems to focus on an invasion threat to South Korea from North Korean forces, as depicted on the map. But the threat is changing. A provocation cycle could escalate out of control and lead to an artillery barrage of Seoul, involving some of the 10,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, firing from hardened positions that the DoD believes to be in range of South Korea.10 Or North Korea might collapse as a result of war or economic failure, leaving up to 200 nuclear, chemical, and biological program sites unsecured (as represented by dots on the map above)..11 In either event, a significant burden would fall on U.S. forces. To counter North Korean artillery, U.S. ground forces would need to provide forces to evacuate U.S. noncombatants; engineering, logistics, and maneuver units to sustain South Korean and U.S. operations to clear artillery within range of Seoul; WMD-elimination task forces to secure chemical or nuclear munitions deployed with artillery units; and ground combat forces to protect each of these types of units. South Korean forces would also be stretched to gain control over North Korean military forces, exert political control over territory captured, and deal with a massive humanitarian catastrophe—all at a time when the South Korean Army is decreasing in size by one-third from its peak.
For these reasons, countering an artillery barrage or North Korean WMDs would require significant U.S. ground forces.
Uniqueness
uq—recruitment high—2nc
Recruitment rising—revised tactics
Jackson, 23 – (Jon Jackson, honors in journalism, “Will U.S. military recruitment struggles cripple response to wars?,” Newsweek, 3-20-2023, Available Online: https://www.newsweek.com/will-us-military-recruitment-struggles-cripple-response-wars-1789001, Accessed: 6-25-2023)//ILake-FI
As for what can be done to help persuade more people to join the military, Riley said the Air Force has a team "examining existing policies and procedures to ensure they reflect the service members needed for the future." In one policy move to reflect changes in American culture, Riley said the Air Force recently updated its policy to allow for some hand and neck tattoos, since having body ink was found to be "irrelevant to war-fighting." Another area in which military branches are easing up on the rules is cannabis use. As medical and recreational marijuana becomes legal in more states across the country, a growing number of people who are of enlistment age have likely experimented with cannabis. As a result, Asch said the Army, for one, now allows new recruits to retest after a short period if they test positive during their initial physical exam. Other steps have also been taken to ramp up recruitment. Signing bonuses have been offered to new recruits, while new marketing initiatives have been implemented. For the Army, the latter includes returning to a tried-and-true formula. After two decades of experimenting with new slogans, the Army returned to the popular "Be All You Can Be" motto early this month.
Army app increasing recruitment rates now!
Lt. Col. Kamil Sztalkoper 6-6-23, ( Kamil Sztalkoper is a Public Affairs Officer with the United States Army who is committed to telling the story of Soldiers, Veterans, and family members. Over 17 years of experience in peacekeeping operations, leadership, team building, social media, media relations, and community relations in multiple stateside and overseas locations. "Army launches ‘app’ to increase engagement with recruits," U.S. ARMY, https://www.army.mil/article/267318/army_launches_app_to_increase_engagement_with_recruits
WASHINGTON - U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the Army Recruiting and Retention Task Force (ARTF) have partnered to launch a new program, the Prep for Success Digital Engagement Experience. This program aims to enhance the recruit-recruiter experience by helping future soldiers prepare for basic training while streamlining the recruitment process. Applications designed to serve as training aides and information guides are easily downloaded directly onto the cell phones of recruits at no cost. At the same time, Recruiters get a new tool making it easier for them to do their mission. Late in the Fall of 2022, the ARTF held a design-thinking workshop which included Army recruiters, Army Reserve officers, other members of the Army’s accessions enterprise and even some members of the Air Force. During the workshop the need for an enhanced engagement experience between recruiters and prospective recruits became glaringly obvious. Several of the Army Reserve officers with civilian careers in recruiting or in technology and design, br

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