DA - Court Clog - JDI 2024

Court Clog DA---JDI 2024
Notes
This is the GFM court clog DA for wave 1.
This disadvantage argues that because of the complexity of intellectual property enforcement, litigation after the plan would clog or otherwise overwhelm the courts system, pushing out FTC data privacy antitrust cases.
The FTC is the Federal Trade Commission, the agency responsible for the enforcement of United States antitrust laws. Biden’s appointee for the chair of the FTC, Lina Khan, has filed data privacy suits against Big Technology companies like Google and Amazon for selling Americans’ data. The disadvantage argues that without these cases, privacy violations will cause the general public to lose faith in the government and democracy generally given the power of corporations.
This disadvantage has strong link evidence. However, the truth of the argument is in question. Further research might be warranted for UQ, I/L, and impact, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions such as the overturning of Chevron deference which will likely spark litigation. We have decided to omit evidence surrounding those questions as we wait for more articles to be written about the decision.
NEG
1NC
1NC---Court Clog DA
The FTC is laying on a litigation press against anticompetitive data privacy violations---that litigation will be judicially prioritized AND change corporate practice for the better.
Chen 23, J.D. Candidate at the University of California College of the Law (Sammi Chen, 2023, “NOTE: The Latest Interface: Using Data Privacy as a Sword and Shield in Antitrust Litigation,” 74 Hastings L.J. 551, University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis)
Privacy is increasingly becoming a significant factor in antitrust litigation, both as justification to defend against alleged anticompetitive conduct and as an element of product quality that can be diminished as a consequence of alleged anticompetitive conduct. 257 This trend will continue in litigation and will in turn affect the legal landscape, along with corporate practice. Given the recent antitrust litigation involving both defendants and plaintiffs raising privacy concerns, this Part examines the consequences of using data privacy as a shield and sword to alleged antitrust misconduct from a regulatory, litigation, and corporate perspective.
The trend of incorporating privacy into antitrust litigation will continue. In the last year, the Biden Administration made three key appointments that could potentially impact the future of antitrust and privacy. 258 First, President Biden nominated Lina Khan, who was confirmed by the Senate to serve as the Chair of the FTC. 259 Khan, a strong proponent of the Hipster Antitrust movement, has published literature discussing the implications of Big Tech companies handling vast amounts of user data. 260In a 2019 Harvard Law Review article discussing the relationship between privacy and antitrust, Khan and her coauthor wrote that "any broad regulatory framework ... that focuses on abusive data practices[] [*580] without attending to issues of market structure is likely to be at best highly incomplete and at worst an impediment to necessary reforms." 261 Thus, Khan's appointment may lead to more robust antitrust enforcement that incorporates data privacy in its review.
President Biden also nominated Alvaro Bedoya, who was confirmed by the Senate to serve as an FTC Commissioner. 262Bodeyo founded Georgetown's Center on Privacy & Technology and has written extensively on privacy-related topics and issues, 263and will bring a fresh privacy perspective to the FTC. Finally, President Biden appointed Tim Wu to serve as Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy. 264Wu, the author of The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, has criticized tech firms for their anticompetitive conduct, which he argues allows them to get away with deficient data privacy protections. 265Wu may bring this perspective into his role. Given President Biden's pro-privacy nominations to his Administration, it is likely that regulators will wield privacy concerns in antitrust enforcement.
Additionally, in July 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, focused specifically on the technology industry. 266 It states:
It is the policy of [the] Administration to enforce the antitrust laws to meet the challenges posed by new industries and technologies, including the rise of the dominant Internet platforms, especially as they stem from serial mergers, the acquisition of nascent competitors, the aggregation of data, unfair competition in attention markets, the surveillance of users, and the presence of network effects. 267
As for the judicial landscape, it is likely that more courts will accept privacy claims and defenses in antitrust litigation, especially in light of hiQ Labs and Klein. It is also likely, depending on the outcomes of Klein and Google, that more consumer class actions against Big Tech companies will be brought. Both cases involve antitrust defendants who rely on selling consumer data for profit and have faced the most scrutiny regarding their lack of data privacy protections.
The law has only barely begun to scratch the surface in addressing the intersection between antitrust and data privacy. Courts are also likely to consider both in conjunction, given the current Administration and its scrutiny of Big Tech. However, legislators and regulators must work together to intertwine the bodies of data privacy and antitrust law to create a more robust analysis of data privacy in antitrust litigation.
IP protections flood the courts with litigation, pushing other cases back for years.
Ciolli 8, J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School (Anthony Ciolli, 2008, “ARTICLE: LOWERING THE STAKES: TOWARD A MODEL OF EFFECTIVE COPYRIGHT DISPUTE RESOLUTION,” 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 999, University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis)
Some have argued that mediation is the process best suited to handle many intellectual property disputes. 76 Intellectual property disputes -- whether rooted in copyright, trademark, or patent law -- are often more complex and difficult [*1014] to comprehend than other types of litigation. 77 However, many important figures in the civil litigation process, such as judges and jurors, may not understand the issues before them due to an inability to understand confusing scientific or technical issues. 78 By participating in mediation, parties in intellectual property disputes can select neutrals that possess the expertise necessary to "concentrate on the details and specifics of the case, as opposed to trying to learn or better understand the technical process," which should "result in a fairer resolution to both parties." 79
Economic concerns, however, likely explain why mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution are often promoted as alternatives to traditional litigation in intellectual property disputes. Due to their highly complex nature, intellectual property disputes are among the most costly to litigate, with the typical intellectual property lawsuit costing more than $ 400,000. 80 While copyright lawsuits are often less expensive to litigate than trademark or patent disputes, 81 they remain costly -- for instance, the median cost to litigate a "low stakes" copyright dispute (defined as damages less than $ 1 million) through discovery is $ 101,000, with the median cost of litigating a "low stakes" dispute through trial and appeal is $ 249,000. 82 In contrast, the average cost of resolving a dispute through mediation is $ 50,000. 83 Furthermore, intellectual property disputes, particularly patent litigation, often take a significant amount of time to litigate. Although copyright and trademark disputes, unlike patent disputes, rarely face the danger of a very lengthy trial, the parties often will have "a genuine concern for swift resolution" in order to "prevent companies from experiencing devastating financial setbacks." 84 Mediation, "by allowing the parties to begin negotiations immediately, without having to wait months or years to appear on a court docket," may greatly reduce economic costs by resulting in a speedier resolution than traditional civil litigation. 85 [*1015]
3. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois: A Case Study in Court-Sponsored Mediation
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has been a pioneer in implementing court-sponsored mediation in certain intellectual property disputes. On September 30, 1996, this district court amended its local rules 86 to create the Lanham Act Mediation Program. This mediation program, which was "the result of collaboration between the intellectual property bar and the judicial leadership in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois," 87 sought to provide speedier and more cost-effective resolutions to trademark disputes arising under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the "Lanham Act"). 88
A. Program Structure
Under the local rules, all Lanham Act cases in the Northern District of Illinois are automatically assigned to the Lanham Act Mediation Program. 89 Despite this initial assignment, the program is voluntary, for the parties can decline to participate. 90 However, if the parties do not wish to participate, they must submit a joint written statement to the court outlining the reasons for non-participation, without disclosing which party in the dispute did not want to enter mediation. 91 If the parties do wish to commence mediation through the program, they must submit a joint written notice to the court confirming their intent to participate. 92 The parties must submit a joint written notice regarding their participation in the program by the first scheduling conference or within sixty days of the filing of the complaint, whichever occurred earlier. 93
Parties choosing to mediate their dispute through the program would commence mediation within forty-five days of submitting the joint written notification to the court. 94 The court would choose mediators from a roster of neutrals who have practiced law related to the Lanham Act for at least five years or who have served as neutrals for three or more years. 95 Mediation would end [*1016] within thirty days of its commencement, at which point the mediator would have ten days to report the outcome of the mediation to the district court. 96
B. Empirical Measure of Performance
In response to concerns from the district court and the Illinois bar that the program was rarely used and a potential failure, the Center for Analysis of Dispute Resolution Systems ("CAADRS"), conducted a research study to evaluate the Lanham Act Mediation Program's effectiveness. 97 CAADRS conducted its study by surveying 202 lawyers and thirty mediators who had been affected by the Lanham Act Mediation Program, 98 as well as reviewing court dockets for all Lanham Act cases filed between January 6, 1997, and December 31, 1999. 99
The CAADRS study resulted in several key findings. Though the relatively rare use of court-sponsored mediations was primarily attributed to many Lanham Act cases settling before mediation could have realistically taken place 100 as well as attorneys and mediators failing to comply with the local rules by not submitting the proper forms to opposing counsel or the court, 101 the lawyer survey indicated that many attorneys did not believe mediation was a viable option given their client's needs. For instance, 63.96 percent of lawyers stated that a client's need for injunctive relief made a case inappropriate to mediate, 102 with 46.85 percent concluding that "the need to establish legal precedent made mediation unsuitable." 103 Lawyers found that cases were most amenable to mediation when there was a need to avoid the expense of litigation, quickly resolve the dispute, or preserve an ongoing business relationship. 104 Mediators who were surveyed expressed virtually identical sentiments. 105 Finding that the program was "sufficiently effective," few changes to the program were recommended. 106 [*1017]
4. Problems with Mediating Copyright Disputes
Despite assertions to the contrary by proponents of mediation, court-sponsored mediation in copyright disputes is unlikely to resolve the underlying problems with the current copyright system. Many copyright disputes are not easily amenable to mediation. Just as a large percentage of Lanham Act disputes involve a request for injunctive relief, plaintiffs in copyright disputes also often ask for remedies that are difficult to obtain in mediation, including injunctions. 107
More importantly, many plaintiffs, even those in copyright infringement lawsuits that do not request injunctive relief, have little incentive to choose mediation over litigation. Lanham Act disputes, by their very nature, often involve businesses as parties, many of whom have pre-existing relationships that they wish to preserve. Many copyright litigants, however, do not even have a relationship with each other prior to the lawsuit, let alone have an incentive to preserve such a relationship. For instance, the RIAA and similar organizations have little incentive to submit their disputes with individual infringers to court-sponsored mediation, particularly when the facts are straightforward or the defendant cannot afford a lawyer. In such situations, wealthy plaintiffs -- particularly wealthy plaintiffs who have sued many individuals for copyright infringement and have expert knowledge of the relevant law and the process -- may believe they have little to gain from mediation, since the defendant would likely accept any settlement offer made by the plaintiff or risk a default judgment. Wealthy plaintiffs, rather than viewing mediation as a cost-effective method of resolving disputes, may consider it a hindrance, for participating in mediation may cause defendants who would otherwise settle immediately after being sued to hold out until the mediation process has concluded, thus causing the plaintiff to incur additional costs. 108
Pressuring Big Tech to prioritize data privacy is key to prevent authoritarian data attacks---collapses democracy.
Mansted and Rosenbach 19, *Senior Advisor for Public Policy at the Australian National University’s National Security College, **Co-Director of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense (*Katherine Mansted, **Eric Rosenbach, September 17, 2019, “How to Win the Battle Over Data,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-09-17/how-win-battle-over-data)
The United States has yet to show up to this information fight. U.S. cyber strategists prioritize defending physical infrastructure—routers, servers, and endpoint devices such as laptops and smartphones—but consistently underestimate the economic and political significance of the information carried on that infrastructure. The U.S. private sector, which rarely acts in the American national interest, is primarily responsible for protecting data and information platforms.
It can be tough to craft regulations and national security policies for data and technology that do not fall afoul of democratic and capitalist values. A national information strategy can sound, or indeed become, Orwellian without the right political leadership. But to thrive in the twenty-first century, democracies must now put information at the center of domestic, security, and foreign policy.
Marshaling Data
Russia’s interference in U.S. elections may be the most well-known case of a state using sensitive political and social information to attack another, but it is by no means the only example. In 2014, Chinese hackers stole the personal information of more than 22 million people connected to U.S. security clearance processes. That breach not only demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. government systems to hostile actors but also provided China with a tremendous resource. China could use the stolen data to profile and target U.S. officials and their families. It could also use the “clean” and highly structured data to train the algorithms that power military-related artificial intelligence projects, sharpening the weapons in its cyberwar arsenal.
For similar reasons, China sponsors the theft of commercial data. Security officials believe that the data breach that rocked credit reporting giant Equifax in 2017—in which hackers stole the financial and personal information of approximately 147 million Americans— originated in China. That stolen U.S. information can make up for gaps in China’s own datasets. Although consumers provide plenty of data to Chinese e-commerce giants, China’s financial and health-care industries are threadbare compared to their U.S. counterparts. The Equifax operation provided the Chinese with detailed, organized information on nearly half the American population. Neat, easily searchable data, however acquired, is vital for companies to train artificial intelligence applications for both military and commercial use.
No advanced economy boasts a national artificial intelligence strategy more mercantilist than China’s. Beijing seeks to lead the world in this area by 2030. Xi’s doctrine of civil-military fusion yokes together the research efforts of private corporations, China’s military industrial base, and the intelligence agencies of the People’s Liberation Army. China subscribes to the zero-sum ethos of data competition; states want to acquire data from others, while limiting access to their own data. To that end, China, India, Russia, and other countries have introduced tough data localization laws to prevent companies from taking certain types of information across national borders.
In the private sector, access to data tends to create a virtuous cycle: more data lets companies build better applications, which makes them more profitable and allows them to harvest and monetize even more data. The dynamic explains why information giants, like Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Tencent are monopolies. But this commercial logic also prompts states to think in zero-sum terms.
The United States should prepare for the prospect of authoritarian regimes ramping up cyberattacks against the databases of its major companies. If China, for instance, wanted to boost its own national champion as the dominant player in a particular market, even a minor cyberattack against a rival firm could be very damaging. Stealthily disrupting or “poisoning” inputs through a data-integrity attack or by manipulating the quality-control algorithms that govern industrial processes and the delivery of products could result in inferior, potentially harmful outcomes. Before an affected company even detects this kind of attack, it could face numerous economic, legal, and reputational problems, losing consumers and becoming dislodged from supply chains.
Data-driven machine learning systems now assist decision-making in many areas of the private and public sectors. A data integrity attack does not even need to be successful to be catastrophic. The perception that an organization’s data is poisoned and its decision-making processes corrupted could reduce public trust in a company, in a government agency, and even in democratic process.
Authoritarianism causes nuclear wars AND extinction.
Belfield 23, Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (Haydn, “Collapse, Recovery, and Existential Risk,” in How Worlds Collapse: What History, Systems, and Complexity Can Teach Us About Our Modern World and Fragile Future, p. 74-76)
A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world wo

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