DA - Elections - CNDI 2024

Elections DA – CNDI 2024
Notes
Different polls cited in the file:
“The Bayh-Dole Coalition is a diverse group of innovation-oriented organizations and individuals committed to celebrating and protecting the Bayh-Dole Act, as well as informing policymakers and the public of its many benefits.”
“YouGov was founded in 2000 and is a pioneer of online polling. We take pride in our accuracy and we’re trusted by the world’s biggest brands to get it right, making us the most quoted pollster in the world.”
“Data for Progress is a progressive think tank and polling firm arming movements with the tools they need to fight for a more equitable future. Led by a team of policy and data experts, we produce quality polling, data-based messaging, and policy generation for progressive causes, campaigns, and candidates.”
538 Polls info – https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/polls-policy-and-faqs/#:~:text=In%20building%20our%20polling%20database,details%20about%20the%20population%20sampled.
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Biden wins now – BUT it’s close.
Dorn 6-18 [Sara Dorn, Forbes news reporter who covers politics. “Biden Vs. Trump 2024 Election Polls: Biden Leads In Latest Survey—As Trump Loses Support With Independents,” June 18, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2024/06/18/biden-vs-trump-2024-election-polls-biden-leads-in-latest-survey-as-trump-loses-support-with-independents/]
TOPLINE President Joe Biden leads former President Donald Trump in a new survey that comes as polls show Trump’s conviction in Manhattan has dented his support among independents—a small, but potentially significant impact in a race that remains marginally close.
Biden is up one point over Trump in Morning Consult’s weekly survey for the second week in a row after previously trailing Trump for a month—the latest survey to show Trump’s lead has slipped in the wake of the verdict.
The two are tied in a PBS/Marist poll released Tuesday that found Trump has lost six points with independents compared to the groups’ May survey taken before his conviction, while Biden has gained eight points and now leads Trump by two points among independents.
Thirty-two percent of independents said they’re less likely to support Trump after he was convicted in Manhattan last month on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records, according to a Politico/Ipsos poll released Monday, that found 33% of voters overall said they’re less likely to support Trump, including 9% of Republicans.
A June Times/Siena survey also found Trump’s lead has declined one point and Biden’s has increased one point among the same group of 2,000 voters polled in April and May, before Trump was convicted last month by a Manhattan jury, though Trump still leads Biden 47% to 46%, the survey found.
Strong copyright and patent regimes create intellectual monopolies that drive up costs and slow growth.
Qureshi 18 [Zia Qureshi, Senior Fellow - Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institute. “Intellectual property, not intellectual monopoly,” July 11, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/intellectual-property-not-intellectual-monopoly/]
“The copyright and patent laws we have today look more like intellectual monopoly than intellectual property,” wrote Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles in their recent book about the U.S. economy. Concerns about overprotection of intellectual property acting as a barrier to innovation and its diffusion are not new. But they have gained greater salience now that knowledge has emerged as a dominant driver of economic activity and competitive advantage.
Digital technologies have enabled the emergence of an “intangible economy,” based on soft assets like algorithms and lines of code, rather than physical assets like buildings and machinery. In this environment, intellectual-property rules can now make or break business models and reshape societies, as they determine how economic gains are shared.
Yet the main features of today’s IP regime were established for a very different economy. Patent rules, for example, reflect the long-held assumption that strong protection provides an essential incentive for businesses to pursue innovation. In fact, recent studies by Petra Moser and Heidi Williams, among others, find little evidence that patents boost innovation. On the contrary, because they lock in incumbents’ advantages and drive up the costs of new technology, such protections are associated with less new or follow-on innovation, weaker diffusion, and increased market concentration. This has contributed to growing monopoly power, slowing productivity growth, and rising inequality in many economies over the past couple of decades.
Patents also invite considerable lobbying and rent-seeking. A majority of patents are used not to produce commercial value, but to create defensive legal thickets that can keep potential competitors at bay. As the system expands, patent trolling and litigation soar. Lawsuits by patent trolls comprise more than three-fifths of all lawsuits for IP infringement in the U.S. and cost the economy an estimated $500 billion in 1990-2010.
Some argue that the patent system should simply be dismantled. But that would be too radical an approach. What is really needed is a top-to-bottom reexamination of the system, with an eye to changing excessively broad or stringent protections, aligning the rules with current realities, and enabling competition to drive innovation and technological diffusion.
All of which is unpopular with voters.
Orth 23 [Taylor Orth, director of survey data journalism at YouGov polling. Carl Bialik contributed to this article as well. “Most Americans oppose monopolies and support antitrust laws,” November 06, 2023. https://today.yougov.com/economy/articles/47798-most-americans-oppose-monopolies-and-support-antitrust-laws]
This year, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stepped up its enforcement of antitrust laws, bringing major lawsuits against companies including Amazon, Google, and Meta. Recent YouGov polling finds that most Americans support antitrust laws and believe that penalties for violating them should be increased. The vast majority hold negative views of monopolies, and while most believe there is at least some competition within U.S. industries, more than one-third believe it is not enough. Americans are far more likely to believe stricter antitrust enforcement would help the U.S. economy rather than hurt it — and the same holds for views on the effects of stricter enforcement on consumers, workers, and small businesses. Large companies, on the other hand, are more likely to be thought to be hurt by such laws rather than helped.
When asked broadly, most Americans (67%) say it is a bad thing for a single company to dominate a market; just 6% say it is good, 16% say neutral, and 11% aren't sure.
Small companies are generally viewed by Americans as superior to big companies when it comes to their ethics, their treatment of employees, the quality of their products, and their impact on the environment. When it comes to consumer prices, however, Americans say by a margin of two to one big companies charge less than small companies.
While most Americans (65%) say there is at least some competition between companies within U.S. industries, just 23% say there is a "a lot" of competition. How much competition they think there is depends on the industry.
Some of the 10 industries asked about are viewed as highly competitive, particularly the restaurant industry (56% say it has a lot of competition) and the retail industry (47%). Others, such as the pharmaceutical industry (26%) and oil and gas industry (25%) are less likely to be seen as very competitive. Despite recent antitrust cases involving tech companies, many Americans say the tech industry is highly competitive (38%), though somewhat fewer say the same about the social media industry specifically (27%).
Most Americans (69%) strongly or somewhat support antitrust laws, which were defined in the survey as "government regulations of business aimed at preventing monopolies and ensuring fair competition among companies." Just 9% strongly or somewhat oppose antitrust laws. While the highest share of Democrats (83%) are supportive of antitrust laws, majorities of Republicans (62%) and Independents (60%) are also in favor.
While one in three Americans aren't sure whether antitrust laws are too strict or not strict enough, people who do have an opinion are more likely to say current laws are too lenient. A total of 36% of Americans say the laws aren't strict enough, while 24% say they're about right and 6% say they're too strict.
There is more consensus on the effects of stricter antitrust enforcement, with nearly half of Americans believing that more enforcement would help each of the following: consumers, small businesses, workers, and the U.S. economy as a whole. Far fewer say more enforcement would hurt each of these. More Americans say that stricter enforcement would hurt rather than help large companies.
Trump re-election causes extinction---great-power-wars, U.S. belligerency, AND trade collapse.
Feaver 24, PhD, Professor of Political Science. (Peter, 2-19-2024, “The Real Challenge of Trump 2.0,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/real-challenge-trump-20)
Title: The Real Challenge of Trump 2.0
What has changed is that the members of a new Trump administration will be far less likely to restrain his worst impulses. In Trump’s first term, many of the most important members of his national security team, as well as Republican allies on Capitol Hill, held more traditional Republican views. When Trump expressed a desire to go in a different direction, they had access and clout to explain why that might be a bad idea, and they often persuaded him. This is what played out, for example, in the Afghanistan strategy review of 2017. Just as important, for the many issues on which Trump simply did not engage, his traditional appointees were able to conduct a normal policy below his radar, as was the case with the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Finally, in the few areas where slow-rolling and end-running and other normal bureaucratic gimmicks were used to thwart a determined Trumpian policy flourish, the paucity of true-believing MAGA warriors at every level of the bureaucracy made it difficult for Trump to have his whims fulfilled. It is far from clear that there will be such guardrails this time around.
Trump has already developed plans to intimidate the bureaucracy by reclassifying employees so as to deny them civil service protections and make it possible to fire them en masse. His allies are talking about using the powers of the presidency to root out members of the military who do not show sufficient MAGA leanings. Trump certainly won’t repeat his first-term mistake of appointing senior officials and military brass, such as retired generals Jim Mattis and John Kelly, who were adamant about placing their loyalty to the Constitution ahead of personal loyalty to Trump. And many MAGA loyalists who did serve in the first administration now have a better understanding of the bureaucracies that once frustrated them—and will be better positioned to enact more radical changes if they regain power.
In theory, Congress could still constrain a destructive president. If the Democrats managed to retain control of the Senate, or to regain control of the House, they would be able to use the power of the purse to direct what the executive branch could or could not do. But these legislative tools are weaker than they appear. Congress has, for instance, passed a law making it harder for a president to withdraw formally from NATO. Yet the law is constitutionality dubious. And a president who simply disowns those alliances as a matter of policy—for example, by reducing to zero the number of U.S. troops deployed to NATO or by loudly insisting he will not come to the defense of countries if Russia attacks them—can effectively undermine the alliance even without a formal U.S. withdrawal. There is simply no good way for Congress to Trump-proof U.S. foreign policy, given the considerable powers of the executive branch. Trump would also face a Congress less inclined to impose such constraints, having established ideological mastery of the Republican Party, whose old-line elites can no longer claim that his agenda is aberrant and must be resisted.
But perhaps the greatest reason Trump 2.0 will be different from Trump 1.0 is the changes in the geopolitical environment abroad. If he returns to the Oval Office, Trump would be acting in a far more disordered world. In 2017, Trump took office as the post–Cold War era was ending. There were tensions with China and hot wars in the broader Middle East against the Taliban and the Islamic State, known as ISIS, but the situation is far more dire today. Now, he is running for a second term amid major hot wars in eastern Europe and the Middle East, a growing risk of conflict across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, escalating tensions with Iran and North Korea, and other crises. An unruly world demands more of the international engagement and leadership Washington has often provided since 1945—the opposite of what it will likely get if Trump returns.
MORE KABUKI, MORE CHAOS The foreign policy of a second Trump administration will likely be an unusual mix of continuity and change. Some of his policies would, at first, seem to differ from Biden’s only by degree. Trump would surely intensify economic competition with China, albeit with a focus on cutting the bilateral trade deficit and onshoring critical supply chains. He might announce a Reagan-like “peace through strength” agenda that raises U.S. defense spending, a goal that could split hawks from doves within the Democratic Party just as aid to Ukraine now splits internationalists from neoisolationists within the Republican Party. But such policies would come, of course, with a Trumpian spin. A military buildup would likely be accompanied by an aggressive politicization of the military, as Trump would seek to root out senior leaders that he believes showed inadequate loyalty to him in the past. Economic competition with China will likely go hand in hand with a renewed quest for a “historic” trade deal of the sort Trump sought but failed to achieve between 2017 and 2020. And in dealing with many adversaries, Trump will once again fall back on a strategy of kabuki competition—hot rhetoric and rising tensions, but without coherent policy or clear strategic purpose. More important, Trump would likely pursue sharper versions of the policies of his first administration. As his campaign has already made clear, he seems certain to intensify his attacks on U.S. alliances, especially NATO: former National Security Adviser John Bolton has warned that Trump would have withdrawn from the alliance had he won a second term in 2020. Regardless of whether Trump goes that far, he could easily, on his own, attach more conditions to effective U.S. participation in NATO and U.S. partnership with treaty allies in East Asia, demand exorbitant financial tributes from other member states, or simply undermine relations within such multilateral groups by stoking tensions over such issues as climate policy and trade. Trump has already proposed a universal tariff, which would shred the existing international trade regime by unilaterally taxing all imports to the United States. Meanwhile, European states on NATO’s frontlines and Asian governments such as Taiwan and South Korea would have to contend with a more transactional, less committed United States. Trump has already mused about ending the war in Ukraine in 24 hours, and his first-term attempt to hold Ukraine’s security hostage to pursue a vendetta against Biden may indicate a readiness to impose an unfavorable peace deal on Kyiv. Trump would also be less committed to Taiwan’s security. If Beijing attacks the island, he once remarked, “there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.” Broadly speaking, a Trump administration seems likely to step back further from the greater Middle East. Since Trump has no interest in providing U.S. security for the world, his administration would presumably be less willing to take steps, as the Biden administration has, together with the United Kingdom, to protect vital shipping lanes from Houthi attacks. It is hard to imagine that the Trump administration would be as committed as the Biden administration to achieving a stable peace that addresses both Israeli and Palestinian interests. The desire for a big deal with Saudi Arabia might push Trump to address the Palestinian issue—something that was off the table in the Abraham Accords but cannot be ignored after the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza. There are few plausible scenarios for a favorable outcome in the Middle East and none that would not require a significant U.S. commitment. So it is hard to see how Trump would be able to square his support for Israel with a desire to shed U.S. commitments in the Middle East. A second Trump term would also likely involve further policy incoherence in the Middle East, however, since he might also be willing to pair a retreat from the region with some dramatic military action on the way out the door. Given Trump’s order to assassinate Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, in 2020—a risky move that many in the administration feared would set off an escalation spiral with Tehran—he may prove more willing than Biden has been to conduct lethal strikes against Iran and its proxies if they target U.S. personnel, or to return to what the Trump administration called a “maximum pressure” policy meant to deliver a better nuclear deal than the one he inherited in 2017. A new Trump administration will also almost certainly further downgrade democracy and human rights as policy objectives. And just as Trump talked endlessly about migrants and building a wall on the Mexican border during his first term, he would likely take a more extreme approach in his second—namely, a more militarized border and more restrictive policies on refugees, combined with an intensified war on drugs. HUGGING, HEDGING, AND OTHER HACKS During the first Trump administration, many foreign leaders developed “Trump hacks” for dealing with this most unusual of presidents. The first approach consisted of hiding and hedging, a strategy that appealed to countries such as France and Germany that had the most to lose if Trump dismantled the American-led international order. Thus, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel both attempted to keep some distance from Washington to minimize points of friction with Trump, yet at the same time tried to fill the leadership vacuum in transatlantic institutions and assert a greater role for bodies such as the European Union. Although they avoided a full-blown transatlantic crisis, they could not prevent Trump from stirring up numerous diplomatic insults and skirmishes that were mitigated somewhat by reassurance from the more pro-ally factions within the Trump administration and by Republicans on the Hill. Moreover, they simply lacked the full range of tools—military, political, economic, and diplomatic—to compensate for Trump’s abdication of America’s traditional leadership role. The second approach for dealing with Trump involved hugging and humoring, a strategy that appealed to leaders with personalities that were well matched to Trump’s. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a point of flattering Trump and stroking his ego to smooth relations. Likewise, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went to extraordinary lengths to court Trump, even giving him a gold-plated golf club after his electoral victory in November 2016. These efforts paid dividends: Japan fared better than other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific during Trump’s presidency, and Trump did not

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