Dedev - CNDI 2024
Dedev - CNDI 2024.docx
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Economic Growth Bad
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1NC – Generic
Economic growth is unsustainable, collapse now spurs transition – that’s key to prevent extinction level climate change – Independently, more equitable societies are a decision rule
-More sustainability evidence: resource depletion, price spikes, unattainable influence and warming
-Yes transition: creates political will and signals need
-Now key: must be below 450 ppm
Jackson 9 {Tim, ecological economist and professor of sustainable development (Surrey), Professorial Fellow to the Economic and Social Research Council, “Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet,” London: Earthscan, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga13/prosperity.pdf}
This third phase of the limits debate is different from the last two. Resource scarcity — the problem of 'sources' in the language of environmental economists — is only part of the concern. The debate is driven even more strongly by the problem of 'sinks' — the capacity of the planet to assimilate' the environmental impacts of economic activity. 'Even before we run out of oil,' explains ecologist Bill McKibben, 'we're running out of planet.'19 Climate change is one of these sink problems. It's brought about by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere — accelerated by human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels. The ability of the climate to assimilate these emissions without incurring 'dangerous' climate change is fast running out. Brought to the world's attention in the late 1980s by climate scientist James Hansen and others, climate change has risen up the political agenda inexorably over the last two decades. Its visibility was given a massive boost by the influential Stern Review published in 2006. A former World Bank economist, Nicholas Stern was asked to lead a review of the economics of climate change for the UK Treasury. The review concluded that a small early hit on GDP (perhaps as low as 1 per cent of GDP) would allow us to avoid a much bigger hit (perhaps as high as 20 per cent of GDP) later on.20 Its telling that it took an economist commissioned by a government treasury to alert the world to things climate scientists — most notably the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — had been saying for years. This is partly a testament to the power of economists in the policy world. But the impact of the Stern report was also due to the seductive nature of its message. Climate change can be fixed, it said, and we'll barely notice the difference. Economic growth can go on more or less as usual. We'll have occasion to look at that message a bit more closely in what follows. The history of climate policy certainly suggests some caution in believing things will be that easy. The Kyoto Protocol committed the advanced economies to greenhouse gas emission reductions equivalent to about 5 per cent over 1990 levels by 2010. But things haven't worked out that well. Globally, emissions have risen by 40 per cent since 1990. In the meantime, the science itself has moved on. The Stern Review took as its target the task of stabilizing carbon emissions in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million (ppm).21 Most scientists — and Stern himself — now accept that that target won't prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change. The IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report argues that a 450 ppm target will be needed if climate change is to be restricted to an average global temperature increase of 2°C." Achieving that target could mean reducing global emissions by up to 85 per cent over 1990 levels by 2050." Two articles published in the journal Nature in April 2009 challenge even that conclusion. The authors argue that what matters is the total greenhouse gas budget we allow ourselves over the period to 2050. Global atmospheric concentrations are already at 435 ppm. And if we want a 75 per cent chance of staying below 2°C, the global economy can only afford to emit a total of 1 thousand billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO.) between the year 2000 and the year 2050. Crucially, they show that by 2008 we had already used up a third of this budget. Staying within the budget is going to be more demanding even than existing 450 ppm stabilization scenarios suggest.24 The message from all this is a profoundly uncomfortable one. Dangerous climate change is a matter of decades away. And we're using up the climate slack' too quickly. It may take decades to transform our energy systems. And we have barely started on that task. As the science improves it becomes clearer that a warming world may pose the gravest threat to survival we face. Though it came late to the party, the climate may just turn out to be the mother of all limits. This brief sketch of ecological limits does no justice at all to the accumulating wealth of understanding about resource scarcity or climate change. It hasn't even touched on questions of rapid deforestation, historically unprecedented biodiversity loss, the collapse of fish stocks, water scarcity or the pollution of soil and water supplies. Interested readers must go elsewhere for detailed discussions of these issues.2* In a sense, the details are not the point. Nobody seriously disagrees with the assessment of impacts. It's now widely acknowledged, for example, that an estimated 60 per cent of the world's ecosystem services have been degraded or over-used since the mid-20th century.26 During the same period of time the global economy has grown more than 5 times. If it continues to grow at the same rate, it will be 80 times bigger in 2100 than it was in 1950.27 This extraordinary ramping up of global economic activity has no historical precedent. It's totally at odds with our scientific knowledge of the finite resource base and the fragile ecology on which we depend for survival. A world in which things simply go on as usual is already inconceivable. But what about a world in which an estimated 9 billion people all achieve the level of affluence expected in the OECD nations?28 Such an economy would need to be 15 times the size of today's economy (75 times what it was in 1950) by 2050 and 40 times bigger than today's economy (200 times bigger than in 1950) by the end of the century." What on earth does such an economy look like? What does it run on? Does it really offer a credible vision for a shared and lasting prosperity? For the most part, we avoid the stark reality of these numbers. The default assumption is that — financial crises aside — growth will continue indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where a better quality of life is undeniably needed, but even for the richest nations where the cornucopia of material wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well-being. The reasons for this collective blindness are (as we shall see in more detail later) easy enough to find. The modern economy is structurally reliant on economic growth for its stability. When growth falters — as it did dramatically during the latter stages of 2008 — politicians panic. Businesses struggle to survive. People lose their jobs and sometimes their homes. A spiral of recession looms. Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists and revolutionaries. But question it we must. The idea of a non-growing economy may be an anathema to an economist. But the idea of a continually growing economy is an anathema to an ecologist. No subsystem of a finite system can grow indefinitely, in physical terms. Economists have to be able to answer the question of how a continually growing economic system can fit within a finite ecological system. The only possible response to this challenge is to suggest — as economists do — that growth in dollars is 'decoupled' from growth in physical throughputs and environmental impacts. But as we shall see more clearly in what follows, this hasn't so far achieved what's needed. There are no prospects for it doing so in the immediate future. And the sheer scale of decoupling required to meet the limits set out here (and to stay within them while the economy keeps on growing in perpetuity) staggers the imagination. In short, we have no alternative but to question growth. The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the 1 billion people who still attempt to live on half the price of a cup of coffee each day. It has failed the fragile ecological systems on which we depend for survival. It has failed, spectacularly, in its own terms, to provide economic stability and secure peoples livelihoods. Of course, if the current economic crisis really does indicate {as some predict) the end of an era of easy growth, at least for the advanced nations, then the concerns of this book are doubly relevant. Prosperity without growth is a very useful trick to have up your sleeve when the economy is faltering. The uncomfortable reality is that we find ourselves faced with the imminent end of the era of cheap oil, the prospect of steadily rising commodity prices, the degradation of air, water and soil, conflicts over land use, resource use, water use, forestry and fishing rights, and the momentous challenge of stabilizing the global climate. And we face these tasks with an economy that is fundamentally broken, in desperate need of renewal. In these circumstances, a return to business as usual is not an option. Prosperity for the few founded on ecological destruction and persistent social injustice is no foundation for a civilized society. Economic recovery is vital. Protecting peoples jobs — and creating new ones — is absolutely essential. But we also stand in urgent need of a renewed sense of shared prosperity. A deeper commitment to justice in a finite world. Delivering these goals may seem an unfamiliar or even incongruous task to policy in the modern age. The role of government has been framed so narrowly by material aims and hollowed out by a misguided vision of unbounded consumer freedoms. The concept of governance itself stands in urgent need of renewal. But the economic crisis presents us with a unique opportunity to invest in change. To sweep away the short-term thinking that has plagued society for decades. To replace it with considered policy capable of addressing the enormous challenge of delivering a lasting prosperity. For at the end of the day prosperity goes beyond material pleasures. It transcends material concerns. It resides in the quality of our lives and in the health and happiness of our families. It is present in the strength of our relationships and our trust in the community. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the life of society. Prosperity consists in our ability to flourish as human beings — within the ecological limits of a finite planet. The challenge for our society is to create the conditions under which this is possible. It is the most urgent task of our times.
Decline doesn’t cause war – empirically denied
-Specifically says nationalism/democracy/game theory/liberal institutionalist norms won’t lead to war if they occur
-Says no diversionary theory because public w/n demand war
Jervis, 11 (Professor PolSci Columbia, ’11 (Robert, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
Growth causes war
Trainer 2 (Ted, Visiting Fellow in the Faculty of Arts at the University of New South Wales, “If You Want Affluence, Prepare For War,” Democracy & Nature, Volume 8, Number 2, p. 296-297)
Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars [end page 296] regularly occur during a period of economic expansion.’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75
2NC
Growth is unsustainable, causes extinction, and makes war inevitable
Ted Trainer 20, Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales. PhD from University of Sydney, “1. Unsustainability,” The Simpler Way: Collected Writings of Ted Trainer, 2020, https://www.degrowth.info/en/catalogue-entry/the-simpler-way-collected-writings-of-ted-trainer/, kyujin
The way of life we have in rich countries is grossly unsustainable. There is no possibility of all people on Earth ever rising to rich world per capita levels of consumption of energy, minerals, timber, water, food, phosphorous etc. These rates of consumption are generating numer-ous alarming global problems, now threatening our survival and the survival of other species. Most people have no idea of the magnitude of the overshoot – of how far we are beyond sustainable levels of re-source use and environmental impact. If all the estimated 9.8 billion people living on earth in 2050 were to consume resources at the pres-ent per capita rate in rich countries, world annual resource production rates would have to be about eight times as great as they are now.
For instance, the ‘Ecological Footprint’ analysis indicates that the amount of productive land required to provide one person in Australia with food, water, energy and settlement area is about 6.6 ha (Global Footprint Network, 2019). If 9.8 billion people were to live as Australians do, approximately 65 billion ha of productive land would be required. However, the total amount of productive land available is only 12 bil-lion ha. If we assume one third of this should be set aside for nature (see, e.g., Baillie Yang, 2018) the amount available for humans might be about 8 billion ha. In other words, our rich world per capita footprint is about eight times as big as it would ever be possible for all of the world’s people to sustainably share.
Figures for some other items indicate much worse ratios. For instance, the top 10 nations consuming iron ore and bauxite (from which we ob-tain aluminium and steel) have per capita use rates that are respectively around 65 and 90 times the rates for all the other nations (Wiedmann et al., 2015). Mineral ore grades are falling. All people could not rise to present rich world levels of mineral use. The same case can be made with respect to just about all other resources and ecosystem services, such as agricultural land, forests, fisheries, water and biomass.
These simple figures clearly demonstrate the impossibility of all people ever having the material ‘living standards’ we have taken for granted in rich countries like Australia. We are not just a little beyond sustainable levels of resource demand and ecological impact – we are far beyond sustainable levels. Rich world practices, systems and ‘living standards’ are grossly unsustainable, and can never be extended to all the world’s people. Again, few people seem to grasp the magnitude of the over-shoot. We must face up to dramatic reductions in our present per capita levels of production and consumption.
1.1. Now add the absurd commitment to economic growth
The main worry is not the present level of resource use and ecological impact discussed above, it is the level we will rise to given the obsession with constantly increasing the amount of production and consumption. The supreme goal in all countries is to raise incomes, ‘living standards’ and GDP as much as possible, constantly and without any idea of a lim-it. That is, the most important goal is economic growth.
Consider the implications. If we assume a) a 3% p.a. economic growth, b) a population of 9.8 billion, c) all the world’s people rising to the living standards we in the rich world would have in 2050 given 3% p.a. growth – in that scenario, the total volume of world economic output would be 20 times as great as it is now and doubling every 23 years thereafter.
So even though the present levels of production and consumption are grossly unsustainable, the determination to have continual increase in income and economic output will multiply these towards absurd and impossible levels in coming decades.
Why analyse in terms of 9.8 billion rising to rich world levels? Because a) it is not morally acceptable to assume that they remain much poorer than we are, and b) that’s what everyone aspires to, so we had better think about whether it is viable.
1.2 But what about technical advance?
When confronted by global sustainability problems most people just assume that technical advance and ‘green growth’ will solve them, enabling us to go on living with ever-increasing levels of affluence. They do not realise that the magnitude of the problems rules this out.
The core ‘tech-fix’ faith is that resource demand and environmental impacts can be ‘decoupled’ from economic growth, i.e., that produc-tion and consumption can go on increasing while resource demand is sufficiently reduced. This is extremely implausible (see Part Three of this anthology for more detail). How likely is it that the world’s amount of production could be multiplied by 20 while resource use and environmental impacts are reduced by, say, 50% – i.e., a factor 40 reduction? None of the thirty or more reports over the last 20 years show any global reduction at all; they all show that as GDP rises so
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