Heg Good - CNDI 2024

Hegemony Good Impact – CNDI 24
1AC
1AC – New Hege Good Card !
Only American hegemony deters revisionists---otherwise, extinction from numerous crises.
Dr. Michael Ignatieff ‘24. PhD in history from Cambridge University, 3-5-24, “The Threat to American Hegemony is Real,” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-western-hegemony-vulnerable-to-russian-chinese-coordinated-challenge-by-michael-ignatieff-2024-03, acc 7-11-24, aun
The post-1945 world order – written into international law, ratified by the United Nations, and kept in place by the balance of nuclear terror among major powers – is hanging by a thread. The United States is divided against itself and stretched to the limits of its capabilities. Europe is waking up to the possibility that, come November, America may no longer fulfill its collective-defense obligations under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Faced with this new uncertainty, Europe is cranking up its defense production, and European politicians are screwing up the courage to persuade their electorates that they will need to ante up 2% of their GDP to guarantee their own safety.
The Western alliance doesn’t just face the challenge of doubling down on defense while maintaining unity across the Atlantic. It also now faces an “axis of resistance” that might be tempted to threaten Western hegemony with a simultaneous, coordinated challenge. The lynchpin of this axis is the Russia-China “no-limits” partnership. While the Chinese supply the Russians with advanced circuitry for their weapons systems, Russian President Vladimir Putin ships them cheap oil. Together they have imposed autocratic rule over most of Eurasia.
If Ukraine’s exhausted defenders are forced to concede Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the Donbas region, the Eurasian axis of dictators will have succeeded in changing a European land frontier by force. Achieving this will threaten every state on the edge of Eurasia: Taiwan, the Baltic countries, and even Poland. Both dictatorial regimes will use their vetoes on the UN Security Council to ratify conquest, effectively consigning the UN Charter to history’s dustbin.
This partnership of dictators works in tandem with a cluster of rights-abusing renegades, led by Iran and North Korea. The North Koreans provide Putin with artillery shells while plotting to invade the rest of their peninsula. The Iranians manufacture the drones that terrorize Ukrainians in their trenches. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – are helping Russia and China by tying down America and Israel.
Unless the US can force Israel into a long-term ceasefire, it will find itself struggling to control conflicts on three fronts (Asia, Europe, and the Middle East). Not even a country that outspends its rivals on defense by two to one can maintain a war footing simultaneously across so many theaters.
The idea that democracies around the world will join up with America and Europe against the authoritarian threat seems like an illusion. Instead of joining with the embattled democracies of the Global North, the rising democracies of the Global South – Brazil, India, and South Africa – seem unembarrassed to be aligning with regimes that rely on mass repression, the cantonment of entire populations (the Uighurs in China), and shameless murder (Navalny being only the most recent example).
To be sure, the authoritarian axis currently is united only by what it opposes: American power. It is otherwise divided by its ultimate interests. The Chinese, for example, cannot be overjoyed that the Houthis are blocking freight traffic through the Red Sea. The world’s second most powerful economy doesn’t have all that much in common with an impoverished Muslim resistance army or with theocratic Iran.
Moreover, both Russia and China remain parasitic beneficiaries of a global economy that is sustained by US alliances and deterrence. That is why they still hesitate to challenge the hegemon too directly. However, like sharks, they smell blood in the water. They have not only survived US sanctions but continued to prosper, replacing their dependence on embargoed markets with new markets in Latin America, Asia, and India. Both Russia and China have discovered that American control of the global economy is not what it once was.
This discovery of American weakness might tempt them to risk a joint military challenge. As matters stand, US diplomacy and deterrence have successfully kept the axis divided. CIA Director William Burns and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan are keeping the channels open to China. Blowback American strikes against Iran have apparently convinced the theocrats to rein in Hezbollah and the militias in Iraq – though not the Houthis, whom nobody seems able to control.
It doesn’t take strategic genius to see the opportunity China and Russia might be contemplating. If they decided to mount an overt challenge to the American order – for example, with a coordinated, simultaneous offensive against Ukraine and Taiwan – the US would struggle to rush weapons and technology into the breach.
Nuclear weapons would not necessarily deter China and Russia from risking a coordinated attempt to take Taiwan and the rest of Ukraine. All parties would pay a horrendous price, but Russia has shown what it is willing to expend in Ukraine, and both China and Russia may believe that there will never be a more opportune moment to overthrow American hegemony. If they were to combine forces, we would face the most serious challenge to the global economic and strategic order since 1945.
Nobody has any idea what the world would be like on the other side of such a confrontation. We cannot even assume, as we have always done, that America would prevail if faced with a simultaneous challenge from two formidable powers. If a pessimist is someone who imagines the worst in order to forestall it, we should all be pessimists. Keeping the authoritarian axis from becoming a full-fledged alliance should be America’s first-order priority.
1AC – Impact Filter
US heg promotes nonproliferation of nukes, biosecurity, democracy, human rights, responsible AI norms, and alternatives to combat climate change
Denise Jenkins 22, Ambassador, Ph.D. in International Relations from UVA, MPA from State University of New York at Albany, JD from Albany Law School, BA from Amherst, graduate from The Hague Academy for International Law, retired US Naval Reserve Office, member of the New York State Bar, adjunct professor at adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law School, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and George Washington Elliott School of International Affairs, special envoy and coordinator for threat reduction programs under Obama, 5/26/2022, "Priorities Regarding the New and Emerging Challenges to International Security," United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/priorities-regarding-the-new-and-emerging-challenges-to-international-security/, kav
Welcome and good afternoon.
I want to thank all of you for joining me here today when I know how very busy all of you are.
Last Spring, Secretary Blinken set out the Biden-Harris Administration’s vision of a foreign policy that leads with diplomacy, revitalizes our global network of alliances to meet emerging global challenges, and delivers for the American people. It is a vison, as the Secretary noted, that springs from two fundamental principles: that American leadership and engagement matters, and those countries need to engage and cooperate, now more than ever. It is the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation.
Today, I am happy to be here to present my priorities as Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security; known inside of the State Department as ‘T.’
The ideas I list today are in light of the many changes that we see in the international security landscape. I chose today to present my priorities, just as we mark the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972. To me, it is a humbling reminder that even as we face monumental international security challenges today, our predecessors prevailed through the power of diplomacy. In everything we do, we will look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength.
I should note that while I am presenting these ideas, adjustments will be made as we continue to better understand the changes that are taking place and the security environment around us settles. Little did we know last year at the beginning of the Biden Administration that Putin would invade Ukraine. Things are continuing to change on a large scale.
Some of today’s arms control and international security landscape remains the same, such as the DPRK’s insistence on advancing its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and refusing to engage in diplomacy. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still the most viable option to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, remains unclear. We remain strongly committed to our efforts regarding both the DPRK and the JCPOA. In the meantime, there are other changes – like Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and the growing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that present us with many more questions than answers.
Now is the time to consider a new way to address what are new challenges. Russia’s unprovoked invasion has led us to consider what gaps now exist. What does the new landscape mean for us and the issues within T such as arms control, deterrence, nonproliferation, security assistance, and emerging technologies? The People’s Republic of China is also posing new challenges in many areas of our responsibility. How do we address those challenges? Technology is advancing, as are the opportunities and challenges posed by an increased interest in space, while at the same time, climate change and resource limitations can lead to conflict if not addressed. We need to focus on the headlines of today, while keeping an eye on the trendlines for the challenges to come.
The T Family is comprised of three Bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is my honor to lead these Bureaus and work closely with their leadership to use our diplomatic engagements and programs and when needed, sanctions and other pressure, working with the interagency, to implement these priorities of mine.
Let me give you a preview. I have nine priorities. They are as follows:
Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities
Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance
Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective
Protect and promote the U.S. and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages
Promote, protect, and advance the U.S. Civil – Nuclear Industry
Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships
Building the “T Family Brain Trust” to Address New and Emerging Challenges to International Security
Examine “New” Areas of Conflict in International Security
Strengthen and Amplify the T Bureaus
The three T Bureaus are developing or will develop a way forward on these priorities, including new priorities I have asked them to incorporate. While these are my priorities, I note that all of the work of the Bureaus are important to the U.S. and to international security.
Priority One: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities
The T Family will continue to engage the international community in strengthening existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes, and related activities, including in light of recent challenges to those regimes. This includes, where possible, meaningful engagements and dialogues with Russia and the People’s Republic of China.
I have worked in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament for 30 years and I can say that arms control remains as important today as it ever was. While there have certainly been challenges to and violations of international arms control agreements by a handful of countries, arms control is not dead as some would like you to believe. Arms control remains an important means to increase allied and global security by reducing risk and enhancing stability. The importance of arms control will also grow as we face competitors pursuing reckless and destabilizing buildups of their nuclear forces combined with opaque, nontransparent nuclear use doctrines. However, progress can only be made in a situation of de-escalation, not escalation. In all cases, we need willing partners sitting across and around the table.
We remain committed to the implementation of New START and eventually getting back to the table to continue the dialogue on laying the groundwork for future arms control and to the pursuit of follow-on measures to the New START treaty. As you know, following Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, we have suspended our Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD). That said, the issues that have been laid out prior to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are even more important now. In that respect, we want to sustain limits on the Russian systems covered under New START beyond 2026, limit the new kinds of nuclear weapons Russia has fielded or is developing, and address all nuclear weapons including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.
We must also be flexible as we consider the ways in which we pursue risk reduction and future arms control measures. We will be looking at the different types of forms these efforts can take, including but not be limited to a traditional approach of focusing on negotiating treaties. The way forward in this new international security landscape may be in the form of initiatives like the U.S. voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing recently announced by Vice President Harris, or codes of conduct, or best practices. We can see from the current crisis that the security environment remains complex and is becoming more complex. There is no single, elegant solution to managing nuclear or other 21st century risks. The U.S. is prepared to be creative in finding ways forward and partnering with others to make the world safer. That is what being a leader in arms control is about.
On nuclear disarmament, we remain committed to a world without nuclear weapons in the context of enhancing international security overall. While our concerns about the ability of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to achieve its goals have not changed, we remain committed to engaging in pragmatic efforts to pursue effective measures related to nuclear disarmament. This includes work conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), with whom we work closely.
We support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will work to achieve its entry force while maintaining our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to seek negotiations on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call on all relevant countries to join us in declaring and maintaining a moratorium on such production. We will also continue to work with our P5 colleagues, circumstances permitting, to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its three pillars. The U.S. assumes coordination of the P5 Process in June, and we hope to build on previous efforts. The recent P5 statement on the prevention of nuclear war is a good example of the important work we can do together; we must hold each other to those commitments.
We will put renewed focus on these efforts and now that travel restrictions have lifted, we are looking at when we can meet face to face with partners in these forums and discuss ways to move ahead, especially taking into account how the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine has impacted the landscape of that work. Indeed, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling only underscores the importance of preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons.
Our Bureaus will also continue to lead efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government by partnering with the interagency, academia, the scientific community, non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others.
There are other new challenges that require continued attention. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly building up a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal. The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the estimated size that the United States projected just two years ago in 2020.
As I noted in my speech last year at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Conference, and it remains true to this day, the U.S. continues to request that the PRC be more transparent about the purpose and direction of its nuclear strategy. There is currently no formal dialogue between our governments on this subject, and limited tools are available to mitigate risk and prevent crisis escalation with the PRC. We will continue to seek engagement with appropriate PRC officials on risk reduction.
As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, or NPT RevCon, will at long last take place in August in New York. With the Russian government’s reckless and destabilizing rhetoric, it is more important now than ever for all States Parties to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and recommit to its goals. The August NPT RevCon provides an opportunity to do that. While the U.S. recognizes the challenges that Russia’s actions pose to the NPT, we will emphasize practical actions responsible nuclear powers can take to reduce nuclear risks and pursue a realistic path on arms control and disarmament, and to ensure that all NPT Parties can realize its full benefits. The RevCon presents an opportunity to reflect both on how much has been accomplished and on what can and must be done to preserve and extend that progress. The NPT remains instrumental in limiting the risk of nuclear war by avoiding a cascade of nuclear proliferation and laying the groundwork for progress on disarmament.
The U.S. will use the Review Conference to promote its objectives in all three of the NPT’s pillars – the areas of nonproliferation and strengthened safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. We plan to find areas of common ground on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and a positive dialogue among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).
The U.S. is also committed to the third pillar of the NPT – the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. In that respect, the U.S. and the UK have co-led an effort to build a multilateral deliverable, called the “Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses,” to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The Sustained Dialogue aims to integrate non-traditional stakeholders in the NPT process to promote broader acceptance of peaceful uses as a solution to development challenges and to create a lasting framework that better captures peaceful use assistance as a dividend of the NPT. It provides a benefit of the NPT that often gets overshadowed by political de

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