DA - Court Clog - MSDI 2024

MSDI 2024---Court Clog DA
1NC
Federal judiciary is effectively adopting strategies to relieve congestion now
Judicial Shop Feb 8 2024 “Discover Strategies to Make Court Run More Efficiently” https://judicialshop.com/blogs/news/discover-strategies-to-make-court-run-more-efficiently
EXPANSION OF WAYS TO PROVIDE SHORT AND LONG-TERM RELIEF FOR OVERBURDENED COURTS To alleviate the burden on overburdened courts, a strategic plan by the Federal Judiciary focuses on expanding ways to offer both short and long-term relief. This involves innovative policies developed due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, aiming to keep courts open and ensure equitable access to court-related services. Embracing technology has been pivotal for courts, not only in staying operational but also in advancing participation rates and facilitating efficient dispute resolution. These strategies are crucial steps toward achieving more effective court operations, relieving congestion, and improving overall fairness in judicial processes. Moreover, enhancing access to justice initiatives - such as improved evidence management and increased resources for conflict-free representation – play an essential role in this expansion effort. STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC RESOURCES Improving the use of judges and implementing effective case management are key strategies for maximizing public resources in civil courts. By streamlining processes and ensuring efficient allocation of resources, courts can better serve their communities and address the backlog of cases.
Strengthening intellectual property rights protections will generate a massive increase in lawsuits and trials, clogging the court
William Landes, (Professor of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School), 2003 “An empirical analysis of intellectual property litigation: Some preliminary results, 41 Hous. L. Rev 749 https://houstonlawreview.org/article/4918 *sub-script variables exist in original in fonts that are not replicated
The greater the degree of uncertainty about legal precedents and the outcome of a trial, the more occasions there will be for p* > p* and the greater the number of trials that will take place relative to settlements. Alternatively, if the legal rules are clear and the parties agree on the relevant precedents and facts, p and p are not likely to differ significantly, so a settlement will result. Although no direct data on legal uncertainty exists, the passage of new laws and amendments to existing laws—particularly if they create new or expanded rights as opposed to clarifying existing laws and regulations are likely to be associated with greater legal activity. In the area of intellectual property, for example, we expect that statutory activity will increase the number of lawsuits because the statutes will cover a greater range of subject matter and activities. Less obviously, trials should comprise an increasing proportion of terminations because greater legal uncertainty, until a sufficient body of precedents interpreting the new statutes is established, increases the relative number of disputes in which the degree of mutual optimism (p* - p*)J, is greater than the costs of going to trial. An expansion in the level of economic activity associated with the creation of new intellectual property is likely to increase the number of potential disputes that have a positive expected value and hence the number of lawsuits and trials.
Backlogs cause judges to banish data protection cases.
Haley 20. Thomas Haley, Law Professor at the Virginia Law School, 10-1-2020. “Data Protection in Disarray,” Washington Law Review, Volume 95, Number 3. https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5133&context=wlr. MSU-shARK
The Seventh Circuit may have said the quiet part out loud: "The standing rule reduces the workload of the federal judiciary...." (205) While literally true, that is neither an accepted nor acceptable justification for standing doctrine. (206) The existence of a "Case" or "Controversy" does not depend on how pleased the court will be to hear it. Article III does not give the judiciary the ability to set its caseload. And a dispute will be no less adversarial between the parties if it is the tenth hearing on a court's calendar rather than the first. Indeed, around the time that the Supreme Court threw standing jurisprudence for a loop in Clapper, it admonished that federal courts are obligated to hear cases falling within their jurisdiction. (207) Yet the appeal of the standing dismissal to the federal judge is impossible to ignore. The massive and increasing caseload in the federal courts is well known. In the data-protection context, cases typically promise to be long and involved. Most arise from large-scale data breaches or inappropriate, indiscriminate data collection. As such, they are usually brought as class actions and implicate complex technical issues. One can certainly understand why overworked judges might be eager to get such cases off their dockets. With that in mind, dismissal for lack of standing has a special appeal over other means of dispensing with a case: it is a non-merits dismissal. Even if erroneous or improperly motivated, a dismissal for lack of standing works relatively little injustice, as its effect is only to banish the suit to state court. Moreover, as the data show, state-law and common-law claims predominate in data-protection litigation--the majority of cases analyzed involved such claims, while fewer than half of cases asserted claims under federal law. Allowing state courts to deal with state-law claims is a hallmark feature of the federal system, CAFA notwithstanding. The Northern District of Illinois' BIPA series of cases may proceed from this impulse. Most were brought initially in state court, then removed to federal court by defendants who seemed intent on challenging plaintiffs' right to bring suit at all. Confronted with the prospect of overseeing a lengthy, complicated class-action lawsuit brought by plaintiffs who did not want to be in federal court in the first place against defendants who appeared to be engaging in gamesmanship, the judges of the Northern District of Illinois may well have viewed dismissal for lack of standing as the best of all possible worlds. The data are potentially consistent with this explanation. In particular, appellate courts have been significantly more solicitous [so-liss-i-tus] of plaintiffs in data-protection cases, finding standing in 75% of cases, compared to only 51% of district courts. In data-breach cases, which likely present both the most technically complicated inquiries and the most diffuse harms, appellate courts upheld standing in 79% of cases, compared to a mere 41% of district court cases.
Breaches empower authoritarian internet assaults and weaponized AI.
Mansted & Rosenbach 19. Katherine Mansted, Senior Adviser for Public Policy at the Australian National University’s National Security College and Eric Rosenbach, Co-Director of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, 9/17/2019, “How to Win the Battle Over Data,” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-09-17/how-win-battle-over-data. MSU-shARK
The United States has yet to show up to this information fight. U.S. cyberstrategists prioritize defending physical infrastructure—routers, servers, and endpoint devices such as laptops and smartphones—but consistently underestimate the economic and political significance of the information carried on that infrastructure. The U.S. private sector, which rarely acts in the American national interest, is primarily responsible for protecting data and information platforms. It can be tough to craft regulations and national security policies for data and technology that do not fall afoul of democratic and capitalist values. A national information strategy can sound, or indeed become, Orwellian without the right political leadership. But to thrive in the twenty-first century, democracies must now put information at the center of domestic, security, and foreign policy. MARSHALING DATA Russia’s interference in U.S. elections may be the most well-known case of a state using sensitive political and social information to attack another, but it is by no means the only example. In 2014, Chinese hackers stole the personal information of more than 22 million people connected to U.S. security clearance processes. That breach not only demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. government systems to hostile actors but also provided China with a tremendous resource. China could use the stolen data to profile and target U.S. officials and their families. It could also use the “clean” and highly structured data to train the algorithms that power military-related artificial intelligence projects, sharpening the weapons in its cyberwar arsenal. For similar reasons, China sponsors the theft of commercial data. Security officials believe that the data breach that rocked credit reporting giant Equifax in 2017—in which hackers stole the financial and personal information of approximately 147 million Americans—originated in China. That stolen U.S. information can make up for gaps in China’s own datasets. Although consumers provide plenty of data to Chinese e-commerce giants, China’s financial and health-care industries are threadbare compared to their U.S. counterparts. The Equifax operation provided the Chinese with detailed, organized information on nearly half the American population. Neat, easily searchable data, however acquired, is vital for companies to train artificial intelligence applications for both military and commercial use. No advanced economy boasts a national artificial intelligence strategy more mercantilist than China’s. Beijing seeks to lead the world in this area by 2030. Xi’s doctrine of civil-military fusion yokes together the research efforts of private corporations, China’s military industrial base, and the intelligence agencies of the People’s Liberation Army. China subscribes to the zero-sum ethos of data competition; states want to acquire data from others, while limiting access to their own data. To that end, China, India, Russia, and other countries have introduced tough data localization laws to prevent companies from taking certain types of information across national borders. In the private sector, access to data tends to create a virtuous cycle: more data lets companies build better applications, which makes them more profitable and allows them to harvest and monetize even more data. The dynamic explains why information giants, like Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Tencent are monopolies. But this commercial logic also prompts states to think in zero-sum terms. The United States should prepare for the prospect of authoritarian regimes ramping up cyberattacks against the databases of its major companies. If China, for instance, wanted to boost its own national champion as the dominant player in a particular market, even a minor cyberattack against a rival firm could be very damaging. Stealthily disrupting or “poisoning” inputs through a data-integrity attack or by manipulating the quality-control algorithms that govern industrial processes and the delivery of products could result in inferior, potentially harmful outcomes. Before an affected company even detects this kind of attack, it could face numerous economic, legal, and reputational problems, losing consumers and becoming dislodged from supply chains. Data-driven machine learning systems now assist decision-making in many areas of the private and public sectors. A data integrity attack does not even need to be successful to be catastrophic. The perception that an organization’s data is poisoned and its decision-making processes corrupted could reduce public trust in a company, in a government agency, and even in democratic process. Since the Internet was introduced in China in the 1990s, China has developed the world’s most sophisticated system of network control, censorship, and propaganda, and has maintained heavy restrictions on market access for foreign media and technology companies. Russia is following China’s lead. During recent protests in Moscow, authorities jammed mobile Internet access in the city to keep protestors from communicating with one another. In a more ambitious gambit, Russia plans to test a procedure that would altogether disconnect Russian Internet users from the global Internet. Even the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense has warned that democracies may need to step back from a commitment to the open Internet and consider “national or regional cyber borders.” Such moves would unwind decades of economic liberalism, fragment the relative openness of current information flows, and give rise to suspicion and animosity. Unless the United States can chart a different course, the world might stumble down this path.
Weaponized AI causes nuclear war
Ghlionn 24. John Mac Ghlionn, researcher and essayist. He covers psychology and social relations. His writing appears in UnHerd, The US Sun and The Spectator World. 1-28-2024, "China sparks nuclear attack fears as CCP plans to use AI to ‘control’ weapons," Express.co.uk, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1859867/china-nuclear-attack-artificial-intelligence. MSU-shARK
A recent paper by two Chinese academics suggests that China is now widely recognized as a formidable contender in the realm of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), particularly in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). The communist nation, according to the researchers, has established itself as a global frontrunner in the practical implementation of AI across various sectors, including facial recognition, speech technology, financial technology (fintech), research publications, patents, and deep learning. Notably, China's advancements in AI hold significant implications for military applications, including nuclear warfare. As other researchers have warned, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) refusal “to keep autonomy out of its nuclear command and control” should concern nations across the world. In an extensive essay, published on January 16 of this year, Paul Scharre and Michael Depp, two leading analysts at the Centre for New American Security, note the many ways in which the marrying of AI and nuclear weapons could prove to be catastrophic. “Improperly used,” they caution, “AI in nuclear operations could have world-ending effects.” Although “the United States has been extremely transparent and forward-leaning in establishing and communicating its policies on military AI and autonomous systems,” they write, other countries - like the aforementioned China and Russia - have not. The increasing adoption of AI and automation in militaries, add the analysts, has raised concerns about their use in nuclear operations. Without formal agreements, and more transparency from the likes of China and Russia, there is a risk of a gradual shift towards an avenue that could undermine nuclear stability. Scharee and Depp discuss Russia's Perimeter “dead-hand” system, which was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s as a failsafe in the event of a decapitation strike. It consists of a network of sensors that detect nuclear attacks. If these sensors are triggered while Perimeter is active, the system waits for a signal from senior military commanders. If no signal is received, indicating a successful decapitation attempt by the enemy, Perimeter bypasses the normal chain of command and grants nuclear launch authority to a junior officer on duty. Russian officials have confirmed that the system is still operational and has undergone significant improvements in recent years. The purpose of Perimeter was to alleviate the pressure on Soviet and Russian leaders to make hasty nuclear decisions with limited information. However, with the addition of AI it’s possible the system could become even more terrifying. The inclusion of autonomous systems in nuclear launch decisions poses a threat to stability, contend the authors. Moreover, AI increases the potential for nuclear accidents. The absence of human judgment during critical stages of nuclear operations could lead to errors or an increase in false alarms, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear incidents.
1NC --- Links
Links - Generic
Expansions in IPR protections increase the number of legal claims to enforce these rights
William Landes, (Professor of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School), 2003 “An empirical analysis of intellectual property litigation: Some preliminary results, 41 Hous. L. Rev 749 https://houstonlawreview.org/article/4918 *sub-script variables exist in original in fonts that are not replicated
Other things constant, an expansion in intellectual property protection is likely to increase the number of legal claims that allege violations of these expanded rights. Thus, an increase in the legal protection of intellectual property should generate increased litigation in trademarks, copyrights, and patents. It is undisputed that intellectual property protection has grown in the last fifty years or so, particularly since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. In a recent paper, Richard Posner and I estimated the expansion in intellectual property rights by the increase in the number of words in the principal intellectual property statutes, because most of the statutes expand intellectual property rights—or create new ones—rather than reduce existing rights. In the 1946-2000 period, Posner and I estimated that the copyright statute increased by nearly eleven-fold (from 11,550 words in 1946 to 124,300 words in 2000); the patent statute increased by more than four-fold (from 24,565 words in 1946 to 110,880 in 2000); and the trademark statute (the Lanham Act) by more than two-fold (from 10, 640 words in 1946 to 24,750 words in 2000). This translates into a 4.4% annual rate of growth for the copyright statute, a 2.9% rate for the patent statute; and a 1.4% rate for the trademark statute. We also showed that these increases were not continuous, but typically coincided with major statutory changes, such as the new Copyright Act in 1976; the Trademark Revision Act in 1988, and amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998 concerning digital copying and the copyright term.
Increased litigation forces resource trade-offs
Levy 13 – Martin K, Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law. “Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals”, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 81, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5539&context=faculty_scholarship, xx-xx-2013
For the past several decades, appellate judges and court scholars have struggled with the existence of, and potential responses to, an overwhelming predicament: the growth of the federal appellate caseload has far outpaced the growth of the federal appellate judiciary. 1 The average annual filings per active judgeship stood at 73 in1950, 2 jumped to 137 by 1978, 3 and hovers around 330 today 4 —even though the number of judgeships has nearly tripled in that time. 5 No wonder then that the phrase “crisis in volume” was coined, 6 and is now commonly used, 7 to describe the workload of the federal courts of appeals. To cope with their expanding caseload, appellate courts have adopted a wide array of case management techniques. 8 These include holding oral argument 9 and publishing opinions in a smaller percent- age of cases, 10 and having staff attorneys prepare dispositions in a larger percentage of cases. 11 Although specific practices vary considerably from circuit to circuit, 12 their animating rationale is the same: to keep the courts running, some sets of cases must receive considerably less judicial attention than others. 13
‘Floodgates’ reasoning ensures

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.