T - MSDI 2024

MSDI - Topicality
Strengthen ≠ Expanding Eligibility---1NC
1---Interpretation: ‘strengthen’ means to improve existing protections, which excludes expanding qualifications for gaining IP rights.
Cambridge, ND [Cambridge Dictionary, xx-xx-xxxx, "strengthen," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/strengthen, accessed 5-20-2024] // enjen
to make something stronger or more effective, or to become stronger or more effective:
2---Violation: eliminating judicial exceptions would expand the scope of patent-eligible subject matter to include new material.
USPTO 23 [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2-16-2023, "2106-Patent Subject Matter Eligibility," https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html, accessed 6-9-2024; enjen]
I. TWO CRITERIA FOR SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
First, the claimed invention must be to one of the four statutory categories. 35 U.S.C. 101 defines the four categories of invention that Congress deemed to be the appropriate subject matter of a patent: processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter. The latter three categories define “things” or “products” while the first category defines “actions” (i.e., inventions that consist of a series of steps or acts to be performed). See 35 U.S.C. 100(b) (“The term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”). See MPEP § 2106.03 for detailed information on the four categories.
Second, the claimed invention also must qualify as patent-eligible subject matter, i.e., the claim must not be directed to a judicial exception unless the claim as a whole includes additional limitations amounting to significantly more than the exception. The judicial exceptions (also called “judicially recognized exceptions” or simply “exceptions”) are subject matter that the courts have found to be outside of, or exceptions to, the four statutory categories of invention, and are limited to abstract ideas, laws of nature and natural phenomena (including products of nature). Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1980 (2014) (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589, 106 USPQ2d 1972, 1979 (2013). See MPEP § 2106.04 for detailed information on the judicial exceptions.
3---Vote NEG:
A---Limits. It makes the caselist infinite by permitting infinitesimal expansions to patent-eligible material---each judicial exception becomes a new AFF.
B---Ground. Allowing AFFS to expand patentability would make being NEG impossible by removing predictable negative positions. Every 2NR boils down to a process CP or “patents bad.”
AT: Strengthen ≠ Expanding Eligibility---2AC
1---We meet: Clarification of eligibility requirements strengthens IPR.
Tomoshige 23 [Hideki Tomoshige (Associate Fellow, Renewing American Innovation Project), 8-28-2023, "Four Actions to Strengthen the U.S. Intellectual Property System," Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/four-actions-strengthen-us-intellectual-property-system, accessed 6-29-2024; enjen]
Action 2: Clarify Patent Eligibility Requirements
In order to obtain a patent in the United States, the invention for which an application is filed must satisfy certain statutory requirements in Title 35 of the United States Code, such as novelty (Section 102) and non-obviousness (Section 103). Subject matter eligibility (Section 101) is another statutory requirement that must be satisfied, and this one on particular has been debated for many years in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Alice v. CLS Bank created a two-part patent test to determine whether a patent application recites patentable subject matter. However, this two-part patent eligibility test has been difficult to apply. This has led to uncertainty for innovators and investors, along with unpredictable business results. In 2022, Senator Thom Tillis introduced the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act of 2022 with the goal of resolving the confusion surrounding Section 101, but the legislation has not yet passed.
That’s the AFF.
Law360 23 [Law360, 8-7-2023, "What Patent Bills Would Mean for Infringement Litigation," Farella Braun + Martel LLP, https://www.fbm.com/publications/what-patent-bills-would-mean-for-infringement-litigation/, accessed 6-29-2024; enjen]
The Patent Eligibility Restoration Act is designed to completely overhaul the law around patent eligibility by eliminating judicial exceptions to Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Section 101. [1] The bill asserts that these judicial exceptions have rendered an increasing number of inventions ineligible for patent protection, and that patent practitioners and courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have for years requested greater clarity on Section 101 patent eligibility. The proposed Patent Eligibility Restoration Act would eliminate these judicial exceptions to patent eligibility and replace them with newly crafted statutory exceptions.
2---Counterinterp: “Significantly strengthening protection” of IPR includes both enhanced protections and expanding eligibility to unprotected areas.
Hughes 94 [William J. Hughes (U.S. Representatives from 1975 to 1995; Chairman, House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration), 11-29-1994, “Speech on the House Floor Regarding the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,” Cong Rec vol. 140, no. 147, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-1994-11-29/html/CREC-1994-11-29-pt1-PgS43.htm, accessed 6-20-2024; enjen]
Title V of the act contains a number of important amendments to U.S. intellectual property laws that will significantly strengthen protection for authors and investors both domestically and overseas.
The intellectual property provisions are the result of extensive work and cooperation with the office of the U.S. Trade Representative to ensure that the implementing legislation was both reflective of the GATT agreement and responsive to U.S. needs. While I wish the final GATT agreement had required more in the area of national treatment and eliminated European and national content requirements in the area of audiovisual works, these are areas that will be the subject of continuing negotiations. The protection for pharmaceutical products also could have been accomplished in a shorter timeframe. We must not lose sight, however, of the fact that there are many industries and individuals which will benefit substantially from H.R. 5110.
I would like to briefly note the changes that are made to copyright, patent and trademark laws by H.R. 5110.
copyrights
Subtitle C contains four amendments on copyright and related rights:
(1) Section 511 lifts a 1997 sunset on the commercial rental of computer programs;
(2) Section 512 provides a new civil cause of action for performers to prevent bootlegs of their live musical performances;
(3) Section 513 provides new criminal penalties for bootlegging done "knowingly, and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;"
(4) Section 514 provides protection to preexisting works whose country of origin is another member of the Berne Convention or the World Trade Organization if those works are in the public domain in the United States due to noncompliance with formalities, lack of national eligibility, or, in the case of pre-1972 sound recordings, lack of subject matter protection. This amendment places the United States fully in compliance with its obligations under article 18 of the Berne Convention.
None of these provisions are, to my knowledge, controversial, and all are expected to strengthen the rights of U.S. copyright holders overseas as other countries change their laws in order to comply with their GATT (TRIPS) obligations.
Even President Clinton in his role as a jazz performer will benefit, since section 512, as required by articles 14(6) and 70(2) of the TRIPS agreement, extends protection to preexisting bootlegs, and it is my understanding that a bootleg recording of the President's jam session in Prague is currently being sold by mail order from New York. I've also heard the President's recording doesn't pose any competition to recordings of Lester Young or Coleman Hawkins.
patents
H.R. 5110, changes patent law in a way that will benefit American inventors and the public. Contrary to those ads you've been subjected to in the newspapers, the patent law changes will not reduce the length of the term of a patent.
The most significant change will alter the term of a patent from the present 17 years measured from date of the grant of a patent to a 20-year term measured from the date of filing of the patent application. This is the best policy for the operation of the U.S. patent system. This change alone will benefit the vast majority of patent owners by providing a longer term of protection instead of a shorter term as claimed by opponents.
3---Prefer our interp:
A---PRECISION. Our interpretation comes from provisions of bills pertaining to patent protection and cite codified statutes.
B---LIMITS AND GROUND. Strikes the best balance by forcing affirmatives to alter the structure of patent law which preserves disad links and CP competition.
C---OVERLIMITING DA. Their interp unnecessarily shrinks AFF ground to prevent engagement with core topic literature.
D---FUNCTIONAL LIMITS. Other terms in the resolution and a limited literature base prevent miniscule, abusive affirmatives.
E---ARBITRARY. No intent to exclude or reason why strengthening cannot be an expansion of eligibility.
4---Reasonability: Good is good enough, meeting a serviceable interpretation of the resolution is sufficient---don’t punish us for not having the best interp.
Terms
Significantly
Assorted Definitions
“Significantly” means the outcome is very unlikely by chance.
Bradley 11 [Dr. James Bradley, (Professor of mathematics emeritus, Calvin College), November 2011, "Why Dembski’s Design Inference Doesn’t Work," BioLogos, https://www.fliedner.es/media/modules/editor/cienciayfe/docs/biologos/41-bradley_scholarly_essay.pdf, accessed 5-20-2024] // enjen
“Significantly” means that the difference was large enough to be very unlikely by chance. When the testing period was complete, the rate of polio incidence was 28 per 100,000 children in the vaccinated communities and 71 per 100,000 children in the control communities. Statisticians were able to calculate that the probability of this great a difference happening by chance was less than one in a million. Thus they concluded that the vaccine had been effective. Due to the Salk and later Sabin vaccines, polio has today been eliminated in most of the world.
In the context of IP law, “significance” is measured by whether a feature is essential to an article’s use or purpose.
Breyer 95 [Stephen Breyer (American lawyer and jurist, served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1994-2022), 3-28-1995, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 115 S.Ct. 1300, 131 L.Ed.2d 248, accessed via HeinOnline; 5-17-2024] // enjen
The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of a product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects [its] cost or quality." Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. Reports 850 , n. 10, 102 S.Ct., at 2186 , n. 10. The functionality doctrine thus protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features. For example, this Court has written that competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where that color serves to identify the kind of medication ( e.g., a type of blood medicine) in addition to its source. See id., at 853, 858, n. 20, 102 S.Ct., at 2188 , 2190, n. 20 ("[S]ome patients commingle medications in a container and rely on color to differentiate one from another"); see also J. Ginsburg, D. Goldberg, & A. Greenbaum, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 194-195 (1991) (noting that drug color cases "have more to do with public health policy" regarding generic drug substitution "than with trademark law"). And, the federal courts have demonstrated that they can apply this doctrine in a careful and reasoned manner, with sensitivity to the effect on competition. Although we need not comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the green color of farm machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to match) and have barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard boat motors (because black has the special functional attributes of decreasing the apparent size of the motor and ensuring compatibility with many different boat colors). See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85 , 98 (SD Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (CA8 1983) ; Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 , 1532 (CA Fed.1994), cert. pending, No. 94-1075; see also Nor-Am Chemical v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316 , 1320, 1987 WL 13742 (ED Pa.1987) (blue color of fertilizer held functional because it indicated the presence of nitrogen). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adds that, if a design's "aesthetic value" lies in its ability to "confe[r] a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs," then the design is "functional." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17, Comment c, pp. 175-176 (1995). The "ultimate test of aesthetic functionality," it explains, "is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competition." Id., at 176.
The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant nontrademark function—whether to distinguish a heart pill from a digestive medicine or to satisfy the "noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things," G.K. Chesterton, Simplicity and Tolstoy 61 (1912)—courts will examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient. That examination should not discourage firms from creating aesthetically pleasing mark designs, for it is open to their competitors to do the same. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 , 343 (CA7 1985) (Posner, J.). But, ordinarily, it should prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson's hypothetical "color depletion" argument, when, and if, the circumstances of a particular case threaten "color depletion."
Significance = Statistical
“Significantly” indicates statistical significance.
Law Insider, ND [Law Insider Legal Dictionary (citing Gallaudet 2019), xx-xx-xxxx, "Significantly Definition," https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/significantly, accessed 5-20-2024] // enjen
Significantly means the difference was statistically significant.
That means it must affect more than twenty percent of IP.
Doi Todd 11 [Kathryn Doi Todd (Retired associate justice, CA Second District Court of Appeal), 10-3-2011, “Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin,” No. B222531, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California, accessed online via FindLaw @ https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ca-court-of-appeal/1584403.html; 6-27-2024; enjen]
(1) Section 714 prohibits homeowners associations from imposing covenants, conditions or restrictions that effectively prohibit the installation of a solar energy system. (§ 714, subd. (a).) The statute further provides: “This section does not apply to provisions that impose reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it is the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of solar energy systems and to remove obstacles thereto. Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy system are those restrictions that do not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy conservation benefits.” (§ 714, subd. (b).) Section 714 defines “significantly” as “an amount exceeding 20 percent of the cost of the system or decreasing the efficiency of the solar energy system by an amount exceeding 20 percent, as originally specified and proposed” for a solar water or swimming pool heating system, and as “an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) over the system cost as originally specified and proposed, or a decrease in system efficiency of an amount exceeding 20 percent as originally specified and proposed” for a photovoltaic system. (§ 714, subd. (d)(1)(A) & (B).)
Significant = Common Meaning
“Significance” is defined by context but is always lesser than or equal to “substantial”.
Wilson et al. 20 [Lord Wilson (Ret. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom; current member of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council.), Lady Hale, Lady Black, Lady Arden, and Lord Kitchin, 4-29-2020, "AM (Zimbabwe v Secretary of State for the Home Department," The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0048-judgment.pdf, accessed 5-16-2024] // enjen
31. It remains, however, to consider what the Grand Chamber did mean by its reference to a “significant” reduction in life expectancy in para 183 of its judgment in the Paposhvili case. Like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context. Here the general context is inhuman treatment; and the particular context is that the alternative to “a significant reduction in life expectancy” is “a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in … health resulting in intense suffering”. From these contexts the adjective takes its colour. The word “significant” often means something less than the word “substantial”. In context, however, it must in my view mean substantial. Indeed, were a reduction in life expectancy to be less than substantial, it would not attain the minimum level of severity which article 3 requires. Surely the Court of Appeal was correct to suggest, albeit in words too extreme, that a reduction in life expectancy to death in the near future is more likely to be significant than any other reduction. But even a reduction to death in the near future might be significant for one person but not for another. Take a person aged 74, with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were that person’s expectancy be reduced to, say, two years, the reduction might well - in this context - not be significant. But compare that person with one aged 24 with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were his or her expectancy to be reduced to two years, the reduction might well be significant.
Default to ordinary meanings.
Arkush 2 [David Arkush (JD Candidate at Harvard University), Winter 2002, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,” 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, accessed via HeinOnline; 5-20-2024] // enjen
Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Subs

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.