DAOs Neg - Michigan 7 2024 HHIRS

Neg---DAOs---HHIRS
Thank you to Raghav Laxminarasimhan & Nikhil Gupta and for their hard work on this file (email raghav.laxminarasimhan@gmail.com for questions or recommendations)
CP---Court Curbing
1NC
1NC---CP
The United States Congress, publicly supported by the President of the United States, should unanimously pass a concurrent resolution threatening the judiciary if it does not [xxxx].
It competes and solves---the court’s hand will be forced by overwhelming, external pressure.
Mark ’19 [Alyx and Michael Zilis; September 11; Government Professor at Wesleyan University; Political Science Professor at University of Kentucky; Political Research Quarterly, “The Conditional Effectiveness of Legislative Threats: How Court Curbing Alters the Behavior of (Some) Supreme Court Justices,” vol. 72]
Discussion
Existing evidence suggests that Court curbing is an effective tool for Congress: the judiciary is much more willing to eschew judicial review when faced with formal threats from the legislature. However, until this point, no evidence speaks to the micro-level mechanics that underpin judicial responsiveness. Here, we detail two alternative models that can account for responsiveness. In a homogeneous responsiveness account, implicit in much of the literature, Court curbing leads to a uniform change in behavior, with each justice aware of threats from Congress and willing to moderate her behavior accordingly. In another, Court curbing leads to a conditional change that depends on the weight various justices place on other decision-making inputs.
The heterogeneous responsiveness insight leads us to posit that Court curbing is particularly impactful in shaping the behavior of the chief justice, whose administrative duties require regular interactions with Congress, and the swing justice, who as an ideological moderate is attentive to a variety of external signals, including threats from the legislature and opposition from the public. Our evidence shows support for our theory. We find that Court curbing influences these two justices, in particular, making both the chief justice and the swing justice much less likely than their colleagues to vote to strike down federal legislation. We also note that given the swing justice’s willingness to weigh a variety of factors in decision-making, the effect of Court curbing is made more powerful for this justice when underscored by concerns about the Court’s popular support. These effects are substantively meaningful; in some instances, they lead to nearly a two-thirds reduction in the likelihood of voting to strike legislation. Therefore, while Congress may be able to guarantee a deferential Court by shaping the behavior of the two justices that are most inclined to react to its threats, our findings also suggest a novel limit on inter-institutional responsiveness.
Our findings speak to multiple literatures. First, some scholarship considers the degree to which a justice's position on the Court shapes her propensity to behave in a strategic fashion (e.g., Enns and Wohlfarth 2013). The general takeaway from this work is that the swing justice, in particular, is inclined to behave strategically. However, this largely overlooks the important role played by the chief justice, whose administrative responsibilities have an influence when the Court is faced with legislative threats to its institutional authority. Our findings add to this literature by showing that, under certain conditions, the chief justice is similar to the swing justice - inclined to evince a higher degree of strategic responsiveness than his colleagues. More broadly, however, they show that different considerations govern the behavior of individual justices, including the chief and swing justices, when the Court faces external constraint. Second, scholarship on Court curbing and separation-of-powers struggles has made tremendous advances in recent years. A considerable literature now verifies that the judiciary is inclined to take prospective action when it faces threats from the legislature (e.g., Clark 2009; Harvey and Friedman 2006; Sala and Spriggs 2004; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). These models have reshaped our understanding of Congress's power to change judicial behavior. But with few exceptions, this work focuses its attention on either institutional response or homogeneity in behavior across justices. This means that scholars have very little sense of which justices are most likely to react to congressional threats.
The process builds statutory controls that constrain extremism.
Hanna ’22 [Thomas; July 27; research director at The Democracy Collaborative, Vice President of the National Center for Economic and Security Alternatives, Political Economy PhD Candidate at the University of Glasgow; In These Times, “The Supreme Court Is Gutting the Regulatory State. Let's Look at Our Other Options,” https://inthesetimes.com/article/supreme-court-regulatory-state-environmental-protection-agency-climate-change]
At the end of June, the conservative-dominated U.S. Supreme Court issued an explosive series of politically and ideologically motivated decisions designed to fundamentally reshape society. Over the course of just a few days, the Court struck down federal abortion rights, trampled on indigenous people’s rights, further eroded the separation between church and state, aided the proliferation of gun violence, and kneecapped the federal government’s ability to address climate change.
While shocking, these rulings are not surprising. In fact, they are part of a decades-long, highly successful war by the political Right to dismantle the mild regulatory and social democratic state that developed following the New Deal and World War II, and revive and reinvigorate private, elite (i.e. wealthy and white) control of society and the economy. While such efforts must be resisted, and the war is far from over, progressives can no longer avoid the fact that the contemporary model of regulating private enterprise and blunting the worst excesses of capitalism is failing — failing not because people aren’t voting the right way or because of changes in how we communicate, but failing because of its own structural limitations.
Given the existential threat of catastrophic climate change, and the rising tide of right-wing extremism, a different approach is needed, and needed soon. One alternative is to shift away from the strategy of trying to regulate for-profit corporations and tax large concentrations of privately owned wealth, and instead move toward a system based on principles of genuine economic and political democracy, and comprised of various forms of public and collective ownership.
Whither Social Democracy?
Social democracy was initially founded on the idea that society could transition from capitalism to socialism peacefully via democratic political institutions. But in its modern incarnation, the term more often refers to a political and economic system based on the idea that the excesses and injustices of capitalism can be ameliorated primarily through state regulation of private enterprise, rather than large-order shifts in the ownership of those enterprises. As the German revisionist Marxist Eduard Bernstein, often considered the father of social democracy, once put it, socialization ​“can also take place if the general public intervenes ever more strongly in support of economic life through laws and ordinances,” via, for instance, minimum-wage legislation, occupational safety standards, price controls and other regulations. This regulatory approach is, then, usually combined with both a strong social safety net supported by tax-and-spend policies and the extension of political and social rights to traditionally marginalized groups.
Following World War II, social democrats (in either name or deed) came to power in many countries around the world, especially those in Europe that had been economically and socially devastated by the war. With the economic and business elite in many of those countries temporarily discredited by their associations and infatuations with fascism, some of these countries were able to build strong welfare states characterized by empowered trade unions, reductions in economic inequality, and marked improvements in health and living standards. In the United States, a weaker version of social democracy took hold through the federal government’s robust response to the Great Depression (the New Deal) and the centralizing forces of war mobilization.
While some significant ownership shifts did occur, especially in the early days of the New Deal, the U.S. variant of social democracy was always primarily regulatory in nature, with famous examples being financial laws such as the Glass-Steagall Act (which limited the activities of private banks), environmental laws (which restrict pollution and extraction), food, drug and medical device quality laws, labor laws, and so on. Moreover, actual implementation and enforcement of these laws was often delegated to regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, giving rise to the term the ​“regulatory state.” Like in Europe, this approach initially found some success. By the late-1970s, income and wealth inequality had hit historic lows, poverty was falling, rivers and the air were being cleaned up, labor unions were still comparatively strong, living standards had risen, and life expectancy had improved dramatically.
However, since its inception, business elites and their political allies have chafed against this regulatory approach to moderating capitalism (while, paradoxically, often using it to their own material benefit). Commenting on the opposition he faced, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) once famously stated ​“we had to struggle with the old enemies of peace — business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering… Never before in all our history have these forces been so united against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their hate for me — and I welcome their hatred.” Like today, these business interests attempted to thwart the implementation of FDR’s social democratic programs through the Supreme Court — but, ultimately, he was able to face them down through, for instance, threatening to ​“pack” the Court.
However, the real counterattack against the regulatory state began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Capitalizing on the social and economic upheavals of the time, the business community and economic elite, along with their ​“free market” allies in academia, sprang into action. In 1971, just a few months before he was nominated to serve on the Supreme Court, Lewis F. Powell Jr. — a corporate lawyer who sat on the board of the tobacco company Philip Morris — wrote a letter to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce castigating the business community for its supposed inattention to (and complicity in) the ​“attack on the American free enterprise system.”
The business elite responded, and soon vast sums of money began flowing to an array of new and existing right-wing organizations — including the American Enterprise Institute (founded in 1938), the Reason Foundation (founded 1968), the Heritage Foundation (founded in 1973), the Cato Institute (founded in 1977), the Manhattan Institute (founded in 1977), the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC; founded in 1973), and the Federalist Society (founded 1982). The effort was so successful that by Ronald Reagan’s first term, these organizations provided more than half of his high-level presidential appointments.
Under the influence and direction of these organizations and their acolytes, deregulation of the U.S. economy kicked into high gear, championed by both Republicans and Democrats alike. This includes high-profile legislation like, for instance, the 1999 law which essentially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. However, more insidiously, it also includes a full-blown assault on the agencies tasked with implementing and monitoring regulatory rules. Regulatory agencies are regularly swamped with industry lawsuits and lobbying, vilified by corporate-funded propaganda campaigns, purposefully saddled with leaders who are hostile to their mission (e.g. Rick Perry’s being appointed Secretary of Energy in 2017, an agency he called to be eliminated a few years earlier), sapped of talent by the private sector and, most recently, undercut by the Supreme Court.
In the recent case of West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Supreme Court’s six conservative judges (all of whom are members of the Federalist Society) ruled that the regulatory agency had overstepped its authority by promulgating the Clean Power Plan rule — which had the goal of reducing carbon emissions by requiring utilities to invest in efficiency measures and shift generation from high-emitting to low emitting sources. By both action and deed, the EPA case demonstrates the Supreme Court’s intent to dismantle as much of the remaining regulatory apparatus as possible. First and foremost, that the Court took up the case was highly unusual given that the Clean Power Plan had been scrapped by President Trump and was never formally implemented. Second, for the first time, the Court’s majority specifically invoked the ​“Major Questions Doctrine,” which is a relatively novel and deeply ambiguous judicially created concept (in other words, created by the Court) that allows the Supreme Court to intervene and strike down a regulatory agency’s action if it ​“concerns an issue of vast economic and political significance.” And third, the ruling — specifically, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s concurring opinion — explicitly takes aim at ​“the explosive growth of the administrative state.”
Extinction.
Petrie ’20 [Bruce; 2020; Partner in the Cincinnati Law Firm of Graydon Head, Chair of the Graydon Education Group, Adjunct Professor at Miami University and University of Cincinnati, JD from Northwestern University Law School; the Constitution Needs a Friend Like You, p. 43-81]
We realize that more perfect union necessarily has many more meanings, discovered and still undiscovered, for us today. The words express the hope that 50 states covering an abundant swath of planet earth’s surface can cooperate. There is of course nothing simple about the challenge of cooperation between the governments of 50 states and the federal government. But this is part of what the endless work of forming a more perfect union entails. Today, more perfect union involves whether states can cooperate with each other and with the federal government over the biggest problems of our times, including a pandemic, economic crisis, public health, social justice, climate change, gun violence, terrorism at home and abroad, immigration and a long list of other pressing issues for humanity and our life on earth.
In July, 2020, protestors and local officials in Portland, Chicago, Seattle, Washington, D.C., Albuquerque, N.M., Louisville, Ky., Kansas City, Mo. and other American cities decried the Trump Administration’s use of federal force in cities dealing with protests and violence in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd. In the disorienting summer of 2020, amid pandemic, recession, racial tension, protest, violence, and heated calls for police reform, the stressors on federalism are manifold. The Preamble’s more perfect union is a dream in the sense that Martin Luther King, Jr. had a dream. It uses poetic-sounding language to express the unavoidable interdependency between We the People and their constituted governments, state, local and federal. It is a dream based on the hard stuff of interdependency in a world where one person’s plastic ends up on another person’s shore. Or where an individual’s infection ends up infecting a community. Abraham Lincoln used the famous house divided, biblical metaphor to express what’s at stake in our dream of union: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” For the Preamble, for Lincoln and for us today, the hard work of cooperation, of getting along with each other, of working together, of sacrificing some self-interest is a practical necessity if the republic is to stand.
What is the more perfect union we now seek today? What does it look like? What priorities, investments of time and effort, and sacrifices will it take?
To be sure, our work is now more than hand-stitching together the homespun of 13 colonies. For many today, a more perfect union means things like a safer neighborhood for their kids. Or the opportunity to achieve a better life. Or freedom from fear. Or a vaccine. Or getting back to normal after covid. Or returning to face to face classes. Perhaps we can imagine those kinds of dreams were in the hearts and minds of 18th century people as well.
The Preamble is realistic. It qualifies the word perfect with “more.” Our neighborhoods, we don’t realistically expect, will be perfectly perfect. But it is not too much to dream that our neighborhoods, along with our republic, can be better for more people.
Justice
What does the word justice mean to you? Recall those times in your life when you thought others didn’t treat you fairly. Our sense of justice is often based on our experiences with being treated fairly or unfairly. I can’t believe the ref called a foul on that. The other team has been getting away with murder. Whose side is the ref on? Or, why was that store clerk so rude to me but so nice to that other person? Or, everybody else on this highway is speeding and the cop pulls me over? What’s that about? Or, why was my starting salary $10,000 less that that guy’s? Our senses of justice, of comparative treatment and fairness, start young.
The Preamble’s “why” to “establish Justice” are the 16th and 17th words of the Constitution: i.e., one of the first and top priorities. The historical context of these words is monumental, linking to the July 4, 1776 Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War. The Declaration was mostly, in terms of word count, a recitation of injustices. The Declaration recited “a long train of Abuses and Usurpations” by the King, the monarch, George III, referred to as “He” repeatedly so as to reinforce, like a pointing and jabbing finger of blame, where the injustices had come from. Having declared independence from tyranny, the opposite of justice, the Preamble made establishing justice a top priority.
But we also know how contingent and imperfect that 18th century view of justice was, requiring later constitutional amendments to include African Americans, women, Native Americans and others within the meaning of justice. As we think about justice in today’s context, we see that the word “equality” is missing from the Preamble, at least expressly in the text. We’ll see that later amendments, especially the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment, put equality into the Preamble.
The word justice links to what we today call America’s justice system: courts, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, public defenders, police, jails and so on. “Equal justice under law” was engraved (in 1932) on the front of the U.S. Supreme Court building in D.C. American rule of law, despite many flaws and setbacks in actual practice, aspires to a preambular virtue of equal justice.
The Preamble’s reference to Justice connects to other language in the text, especially Article III and judicial powers. Federal judges, also known as Article III judges, preside in 94 federal judicial districts, including at least one district in each state, in D.C. and Puerto Rico. The U.S. courts of appeals (or circuit courts) are divided into 13 circuits, each one hearing appeals from the district courts within their boundaries. At the top is the U.S. Supreme Court, currently with 9 Justices.
The Constitution makes plenty of room for judicial power to be exercised with reason, wisdom and compassion, because the 

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