Canada Innovation DA - Michigan 2024 CFMP

Canada DA
Neg
1NC---Canada---Stability
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Closing the innovation gap with America is crucial for Canadian growth and security
Robert D. Atkinson ’23 [Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), recognized as the world’s top think tank for science and technology policy. “Canada’s Innovation Gap: A Warning Sign for Economic Prosperity and National Security,” Robert D. Atkinson, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 12/18/23, https://itif.org/publications/2023/12/18/canadas-innovation-gap-a-warning-sign-for-economic-prosperity-and-national-security/] //AAA
In the hyper-competitive global economy, business investment in research and development (R&D) is crucial because it drives technological innovation, which is a key factor in any country’s economic prosperity and national security. Yet Canada’s levels of business R&D are far off the pace in technologically advanced, globally traded sectors of the economy.
A recent analysis paints a stark picture, revealing yawning chasms, not just between Canada and the United States but also between Canada and the size-adjusted global averages for business R&D in nine advanced sectors. In 2021, U.S. firms spent almost 103 times more than their Canadian counterparts on R&D in these sectors, despite U.S. GDP being just 11.7 times larger than Canada’s. Worse, Canada was below the global average by a factor of almost five. Such disparities should serve as a clarion call for Canada to reevaluate the R&D incentives it provides firms.
Using data from the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard—a dataset covering 90 percent of the world’s private sector R&D spending—ITIF assessed Canada’s levels of industrial specialization relative to the global average in nine technologically advanced, globally traded sectors: aerospace and defense, electronic and electrical equipment, general industrials, industrial engineering, pharmaceutical and biotechnology, software and computer services, technology and hardware equipment, alternative energy, and automobiles and parts.
Canada was below par by a factor of two or more in all nine sectors. Its strongest showing came in aerospace and defense, where its firms invested just 45 percent of the global average for business R&D, followed by software and computer services (41 percent of the global average), then automobiles and auto parts (27 percent), then pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (18 percent). In no other advanced sector did Canadian firms register higher than 10 percent of the global average for business R&D.
Meanwhile, U.S. firms invested more than the global average in five of the nine advanced sectors and less than the global average in four. Although, firms in America’s worst-performing sector for business R&D (alternative energy) still invested more in relative terms than firms in Canada’s best-performing sector (47 percent of the global average versus 45 percent).
While the United States maintains a more competitive position in R&D than Canada, its firms’ size-adjusted R&D spending was declining or stagnant in seven of the nine sectors ITIF analyzed, compared to five out of nine in Canada. This underscores both nations’ urgent need to bolster R&D investments to remain globally competitive.
While there are numerous steps nations can take to support R&D-intensive firms, the most straightforward thing Canadian policymakers can do is enhance R&D tax credits. As things currently stand, Canada’s R&D tax subsidy rate slightly exceeds the median for OECD and BRIC countries, while the United States has allowed itself to slip far behind the pace.
To become more competitive, Canada should consider replacing its Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax credit with something more akin to the U.S. Alternative Simplified Credit (ASC). This would entail limiting the credit to expenditures above 50 percent of base period spending and doubling the credit rate. These changes will incentivize companies to invest more substantially in R&D, fostering a culture of innovation. (For its part, the United States should at least double its ASC rate from 14 to 28 percent.)
Provincial governments in Canada should increase the incentives they provide, too. A concerted effort is required at all levels to nurture a policy environment conducive to innovation.
R&D expenditures, especially in advanced traded sectors, are a linchpin of a nation’s competitiveness in the global economy. Canadian firms have a long road ahead to catch up with the global average in R&D spending, while U.S. firms face their own challenges. However, the urgency of the situation demands swift action.
Stagnant growth causes collapses Canadian national stability— sparks World War III.
Daniel S. Matthews ’14 [Lieutenant currently assigned to Marine Corps University, preparing to take over the role as Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer for III MEF. Matthews has served in a wide range of sea and shore billets. LT Matthews is a native of Warrenton, Virginia, and graduated from Old Dominion University in 2007. “THE QUEBEC WARS”, Daniel S. Matthews, Center for International Maritime Security, 6/20/14, https://cimsec.org/quebec-wars/] //AAA
Thought of Canada being the region where the sparks for World War III will be struck may not seem likely, but there is one area where a foreign foe could surprise the West: Quebec. If Quebec were to secede from Canada, two unsettling possibilities could occur. The first is that Canada could go to war with its wayward province. The second is that some power like China or Russia could build an alliance with Quebec. While such possibilities are unlikely, there are means of defense. If Quebec were to secede from Canada, there are several points that could spark a civil war between the two. The least likely would be national pride. There are several economic reasons that could provide the tinder for war. Quebec controls the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and Quebec could use that control to wage economic war with Western Canada. In addition, Quebec possesses significant reserves of natural resources that currently contribute to the North American economy on a free basis. An independent Quebec would change that. Finally, Canada proper would become a split country, with a third of Canadian provinces being geographically separated from the Capital. In light of the fact that no state wants to be divided, and Canada already has several fluttering independence movements, the urge to prevent further dissolution will be strong. While it is true that Canada does not have a large military, and Quebec has none, it is not impossible for war to break out. The Quebec separatists have used violence before, most notably with the murder of Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, and it would be easy for a semi-independent Quebec to buy arms on the international market. If Canada did get involved in civil war with Quebec, there are several options open to both sides if the war drags on. Canada could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which could split NATO as France has traditionally expressed support for Francophone Quebec. It is unlikely Britain would be unconcerned with a core Commonwealth state being embroiled in civil war; especially depending on how the vote for Scottish independence goes this year. The United States would be committed, as they are deeply intertwined with Canada at every level. States like Russia, China, or Iran could use the distraction of a civil war in the very center of the Anglosphere to press their boundaries with the Western Alliance. Furthermore, they could start supporting the Quebec rebels, either directly or through third party means. If the war was presaged by an internationally recognized referendum, then Russia or China could take the position that they are upholding international norms, and paint the Western states in a negative light. Attempts at arming the rebels or openly supporting them would directly threaten the fundamental security of the United States, as it would provide a foothold on the continent from which hostile states could threaten the United States. While the first scenario of a successful Quebec independence movement immediately descending into world war is unlikely, the far more dangerous one of an independent Quebec making allies with states hostile to the West is possible. An independent Quebec would have the full ability to make alliances with foreign powers, and it is unlikely they would be readily welcomed into NATO, NAFTA, or other treaties with the Western powers. Canada would put pressure on any attempts to allow Quebec a seat at the table, and European countries would be wary of admitting Quebec, as it could fuel separatist movements within their own countries. In addition, the United States would not want the possibility of Canada dissolving, even if most of the providences would likely join the United States. This method of amalgamation would be undesirable, if for no other reason than there is no guarantee that each section of Canada would join the US, and a unified Canada is better for the US than a series of states on its northern border. The dissolution of Canada could also embolden separatist movements in the United States. Given the internal danger to Western countries an independent Quebec would present, it is likely that Quebec would be forced to look for friends elsewhere. Russia and China are the most likely candidates. Both countries would be interested in the natural resources of Quebec. China and Russia would also both enjoy the prospects of helping to develop Quebec’s Arctic resources. In addition, the possibility of a military alliance with Quebec would present an opportunity not present since Alaska became part of the United States; a land connection to the United States. Right now the Anglosphere is protected by its island status, with no major hostile powers sharing a land border with any member. An independent Quebec would be courted by hostile powers to allow such a chance thought. Russia would view it as retaliation for NATO expanding into the Baltics, Poland, and developing close relations with Ukraine and Georgia. China would view it as a chance to have a mirror for the US alliances in China’s First Island Chain, with the added bonus of a large land connection to the American heartland, as opposed to the slender one that the US has against China on the Korean peninsula. The presence of a near-peer competitor with bases on the North American heartland would greatly reduce the flexibility of Western countries as they exert their influence on the world. Such a situation would be more bothersome to the United States and its allies than the Zimmerman telegram of a century ago, or the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba half a century ago. It would have the same effect as Germany’s race to rival Britain on the high seas before World War I.
1NC---Canada---China
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Unequal innovation between the US and Canada and expanding American IP protection wrecks bilateral collaboration. Strong Canadian innovation and US-Canada colllaboration are key to compete with China— averts existential US-China war.
Touch 22 [Darren; January 22; - Schwarzman Scholar, Tsinghua University (Beijing, China); Founder and Chief Executive Officer; Canada China Forum; “China Challenge and U.S.-Canadian Innovation Collaboration"; https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/china-challenge-and-us-canadian-innovation-collaboration] //nina + AAA
Whether Canada likes it or not, increased competition between China and the United States will have significant implications for Canada’s domestic and global interests. As the United States seeks to compete and counter China through a collective approach with allies and partners, Washington will be increasingly looking towards Ottawa for support. Within the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, the legislation has a provision to create a strategy that would enhance cooperation with Canada in managing relations with China. As a result, there is increasing recognition in Washington that Canada can have a pivotal role in the U.S. competition with China. In a deeply divided America, challenging China’s rise as the world’s technology superpower has become a bipartisan issue between the Democrats and Republicans. In his first speech to Congress, President Joe Biden declared China as a “serious competitor” to the United States, calling upon legislators to boost governmental investment into scientific and technological research and development. His rally to the American people: ‘We are in a competition with China to win the 21st century.’ Locked in a fierce battle for technological primacy, the rivalry between China and the United States is still in its early stage. Both countries are fearful of losing any ground to the other in emerging fields that will define the 21st century, such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence. With its skilled and low-cost labor workforce, China has made tremendous progress on 5G networks, smartphones, drones and electric vehicles. However, for now, the United States continues to maintain its advantage in semi-conductors, an essential part of many innovative digital consumer products. Within both Houses of Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate put forward legislations to boost U.S. scientific competitiveness by allocating billions in new funding for scientific research and technology to counter China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence. In response to Biden’s rally, the House of Representative’s passed two bipartisan bills in June 2021, National Science Foundation for the Future Act and the Department of Energy Science for the Future Act, investing $128 billion to federally-funded science and technology research. Similarly, the Senate’s U.S. Innovation and Competition Act would invest $250 billion. As the legislative packages navigate their respective ways into the House and Senate, the final package, to be negotiated between the two chambers, has the potential to be one of the few major bipartisan achievements of the current Congress. Since the election, the Biden administration has been actively rebuilding bilateral and multilateral ties with a robust emphasis on the need to collective address China’s economic, diplomatic, military, and technological rise. Most recently, the United States entered a trilateral security pact, AUKUS, with the UK and Australia to bolster its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. In the communiqués from both the Carbis Bay G7 Meeting and the NATO Brussels Summit, China was explicitly mentioned, signaling that despite policy differences between Europe and the United States, common ground existed on issues such as the rules-based international order, human rights, security, political and trade issues. A fundamental difference between Trump and Biden in their approaches to China is Biden’s recognition that a collective response will be more effective than unilateral action. Middle power countries like Canada closely monitor the combative dynamics between Beijing and Washington for fears of entering an era of renewed great power competition as a new Cold War. Heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic as China and the United States compete to vaccinate their population and accelerate a post-pandemic economic recovery, both countries continue to be locked in prolonged conflict with very little progress made on de-escalating tensions. As the competition intensifies, there are concerns that both countries will fall into the “Thucydides’ Trap,” which maintains that war is inevitable when a rising power, China, challenges a dominant state, the United States. To avoid calamities between the two superpowers, Canada and other middle power countries will have to be prepared to navigate this rivalry that places their own interests and values at the forefront. Strategically, Canada has reinforced the need for the international community to strengthen a rules-based international order rather than a power-based one, managing competition between states with divergent values and interests. Many middle power countries are seeking to strike the right balance in their engagements with China and the United States – failure to do so could have consequential costs. Unfortunately, this is a reality Canada is all too familiar with. The consequence of being caught in the crossfire between China and the United States have not only contributed to the rapid deterioration of Canada China relations but have also been substantial for Canada in terms of human lives, trade, diplomacy, and politics. The end of the three-way diplomatic ordeal between Canada, China and the United States that resulted in the return of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou to China and Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor to Canada ended the stalemate in Canada’s bilateral relations with China, and also improved relations with the United States. However, it’s unlikely that Canada-China relations will improve anytime soon given recent announcements by Ottawa to join the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and the pending decision on whether to ban Huawei 5G. In contrast, there is momentum for Canada and the United States to work together on China. This recognition was echoed by newly confirmed U.S. Ambassador David Cohen, who in an interview to the Globe and Mail, emphasized one of his duties is to work with Ottawa on ways to challenge China on a range of issues. Moreover, he characterized “China as our greatest threat” and the need for Canada and the United States to align their China policy. As the U.S. envoy stationed in Ottawa serving at the pleasure of the president, China will be a high-priority item on his agenda as the Biden administration continues to build coalition as part of their strategy in confronting, competing and countering China. Uniquely within the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, there is an explicit reference to Canada and the Canada-U.S. relationship. The reference illustrates a recognition by congressional leadership that as competition intensifies between Beijing and Washington, Canada can have a consequential role in the United States’ strategy in response to China’s rise as a global power. If passed, the legislation would require the President to submit a strategy within 90-days to Congress that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with Canada in managing relations with China. The strategy is expected to cover key policy points of convergence and divergence in areas such as the Arctic, defense, democracy and human rights, technology, and trade. Moreover, at least twice a year for five years, the Secretary of State will report to Congress on the development and implementation of the strategy. The strategy would build upon the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership announced during the virtual meeting in February 2021, and the bilateral visit by Prime Minister Trudeau in November 2020 to Washington D.C. For the strategy to succeed and contribute to the renewal of the Canada-U.S. partnership, an investment of time, resources and personnel would be required by both countries. The challenge for Washington will be to decipher Ottawa’s China strategy. Re-elected with a new mandate in September, a new foreign affairs minister leading Canada’s diplomatic efforts, and the Two Michaels safely back in Canada, there is a need to recalibrate the bilateral relationship Trudeau government to be clear and explicit on its China policy. Under several foreign affairs ministers, there have been pressure on the Trudeau government to articulate its position through a parliamentary Special Committee on Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, and most visibly in the policy platforms of the political parties during the latest federal election in September 2021. Initiated by former foreign affairs minister François-Phillipe Champagne, the first ‘China 

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