Innovation Bad - AI Ag - Michigan 2024 BFHR

AI-AG INNOVATION GOOD/BAD
1NC + IMPACT OPTIONS
1NC
AI integration in ag is low now. AI innovation leads to widespread adoption.
Robert Sparrow et al 22. Professor of philosophy, a School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia. “Managing the Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Agriculture.” 02-24-22. NJAS: Impact in Agricultural and Life Sciences, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 172-96. gautam
Inevitably, the pursuit of these benefits will also involve risks. In this section, we highlight various possible unintended consequences of the applications of AI in agriculture and the impacts for agriculture of developments in AI elsewhere. We describe these as “risks” rather than “costs” because it is not certain that each will eventuate (or to what extent they will eventuate if they do eventuate) and because some of them, especially those involving changes in power relations or transformations in social practices, are not necessarily negative for all parties concerned.Footnote3 We have chosen to spend more time on the risks of AI than the benefits, not because we think that the risks are more likely than the benefits, or will outweigh the benefits, but because the incentives, particularly in the private sector, to realise the benefits are stronger, and more likely to be effective, than are the incentives to avoid the risks, which may require acting in the collective interest rather than in the pursuit of private gain. For this reason, we believe it is important to clearly identify the risks and draw them to the attention of those actors and institutions that might have the power to mitigate them. The risks should be of especial concern to governments, which are charged with serving the public good, and to the broader community who may be affected by them. Although we do not treat it separately below – not being a risk “of” AI – it is also clear that failure to secure the potential benefits from AI should itself be counted as a risk that should be taken seriously in deliberations about these matters.
3.1. Technologically mediated unemployment
Perhaps the first risk that occurs to people when they think about AI is that it will take over their jobs.Footnote4 The capacity of AI to replace human beings in carrying out cognitive tasks is both what makes it AI and makes it attractive to industry. Once machines are better at performing the tasks that are required to produce some good and/or can produce it more cheaply, there will be little incentive to employ human workers.
Use of agricultural robots enabled by AI, for the most part, might threaten the jobs of people currently performing manual labour. However, the idea that AI might eliminate many white-collar positions is now being widely promulgated (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, Citation2014) suggesting that AI might threaten job losses in both blue-collar and white-collar roles in agriculture, as elsewhere in society (Frey & Osborne, Citation2017). While the applications of AI will undoubtedly generate some new jobs it seems unlikely that will create as many jobs in agriculture as it would eliminate.
However, there is significant uncertainty regarding the timescale over which job losses due to AI are likely to occur. The extent to which AI impacts on farming and rural communities will depend upon how capable AI becomes and how widely it is adopted. In particular, it depends on how long it takes for improvements in machine vision, navigation, and planning to allow robots to play a significant role in agricultural production. In the short term, we suspect that large impacts are unlikely, given the limitations of existing robots (Kamilaris et al., Citation2018), which struggle to integrate the various discrete technologies (machine vision, navigation and localization, battery technologies, safe operations, and dextrous grasping) required to carry out useful tasks in agricultural contexts (Duckett et al., Citation2018) and/or to operate effectively in the unstructured, often cluttered and highly variable environments characteristic of agricultural settings (Bechar & Vigneault, Citation2016), despite the current hype around them.Footnote5 Over the longer term, however, we anticipate large impacts.
[INSERT IMPACT]
Impact---Food---1NC
That destroys food security.
Robert Sparrow et al 22. Professor of philosophy, a School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia. “Managing the Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Agriculture.” 02-24-22. NJAS: Impact in Agricultural and Life Sciences, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 172-96. gautam
3.5. Vulnerability to hacking
Adoption of AI, as with other forms of information and computing technology, renders users vulnerable to hacking and other cyber-attacks by malicious actors, which must be counted as a risk in agriculture as elsewhere. While this may seem speculative, so called “ransomware” attacks are increasingly common in industry more generally, with some attacks having caused millions of dollars of damage (Greenberg, Citation2018). The impacts of such cybercrime, where it does occur, are likely to increase with concentration of ownership (and thus electronic infrastructure) in the agricultural sector. If AI comes to be sufficiently widespread and play a sufficiently important role in agriculture, this may even render industrialised nations’ agricultural sectors vulnerable to cyber-attack during, or prior to, war (Clarke & Knake, Citation2010). For instance, a software exploit that caused autonomous tractors to plant seed too deep, or to under-water crops, or that simply “bricked” them when they were most needed, might cut a nation’s agricultural output by an appreciable amount, which in turn might have broader, even catastrophic impacts on food security and, therefore, social order.
Food insecurity goes nuclear.
Karagül ’22 [Ibrahim; January 1; Turkish journalist and a former editor in chief of the newspaper Yeni Safak, J.D. from Dokuz Eylül University, “The food wars have begun! This constitutes both an external and internal threat! Food prices are an issue of national security. A state of emergency must be declared in agriculture,” https://www.yenisafak.com/en/columns/ibrahim-karagul/the-food-wars-have-begun-this-constitutes-both-an-external-and-internal-threat-food-prices-are-an-issue-of-national-security-a-state-of-emergency-must-be-declared-in-agriculture-3587611]
China has bought almost half the world’s food reserves in the last 12 months. This will cause worldwide inflation, we well as famine in some countries. This report provides us with clear information on what we should prepare for in the 21st century.
Prices will rise globally, including in the U.S. and Europe; a significant portion of lower-income states will be doomed to famine. The fact that the U.S. and Europe are gravely concerned about inflation for the first time is an indication that this process has already started.
A horrific power struggle
The Covid-19 pandemic drove global production to a halt, cutting supply lines. The world stood still for two years. Surely this would lead to grave consequences. However, this is not what we are discussing here. It goes much beyond that.
Within the global economy, conflicts and battles arise more so than production and supply crises. This conflict will be prolonged through resources, markets, and trade corridors.
This new situation will be a geopolitical showdown, a horrific power battle sustained through the economy.
Reliable basins of solidarity
Great pressure will form over countries. No state will have the strength to resist on its own. They will be driven to seek asylum in regional solidarity basins. Every country will seek new and reliable refuges.
This is the reason underlying Europe’s withdrawal, the U.S.’s contraction, African countries’ search for new asylums, and rapid convergence with Turkey.
This is why Middle Eastern countries have suddenly shifted their axis and Russia took advantage of the opportunity and returned to its former imperial region.
Food wars: Both an internal and foreign threat
We now have a new sort of security threat that spells doom for countries experiencing production and resource issues. This will pose both an internal and external threat.
As price hikes and food crises within lead to mass eruptions, those abroad will take advantage of this situation. Foreign threats and attacks will be plotted through these social explosions. Weak countries may experience major plundering.
We will witness appalling state brutality. This signifies war between countries and regions – and it has already begun. Countries will disperse; new partnerships will be established; the human race’s greed will peak.
Kazakhstan is the first global example. Countries may be divided.
The unrest in Kazakhstan is an internal conflict scenario in which price hikes and income inequality will be utilized as weapons, leading to that country’s division and border changes.
Kazakhstan is currently under attack, both internally and externally. If it fails to overcome this, the central government will atrophy, leading to the country’s collapse. The threat truly is this great, and tells the world a great deal.
Kazakhstan is the first such example, and many countries face the same threat. This is the primary concern for all Central Asian countries. Russia and China will not let this opportunity pass them by. Furthermore, the U.S. and Europe will fully exploit this weakness.
Our opposition’s aim is the same, but it’s miscalculated
Strangely, the political opposition in Turkey has also been reformatted within the scope of this plan and in accordance with this conflict. Their political theories, their discourse, their use of the country’s weaknesses as weapons are all within the scope of this project.
This is the reason behind their heedless partnerships with the terrorist organizations fighting Turkey within, and their submission to those threatening Turkey from abroad. Turkey’s issue is certainly not internal politics, but the clash of global scenarios. But they have miscalculated.
The number of global superpowers has grown. Turkey is a central country, as well as a hub of attraction. There will be clustering around Turkey as well. Hence, Turkey will not be affected by this formatting process.
Food prices are a national security issue
Let us get to more concrete matters.
1. Food will be the most critical reason for conflict – and in fact war – in 2022. The greed of rich countries, their preparations for the future will drive some countries to famine and poverty. Thus, this will pose both an internal and foreign threat to some countries.
2. Turkey must take very strict measures to protect its food resources. It must increase its reserves and prepare for the future.
3. If necessary, it must determine very strict principles regarding food prices. Regulations regarding producers, suppliers, and grocery stores must be made a national security issue.
The Ministry of Agriculture must take action like the defense industry
An emergency process must be launched in terms of utilizing agricultural areas. Even the tiniest parcel of land must be put to use. It must become obligatory through tight control to process agricultural areas.
4. Strong incentives, measures, and control must be introduced to individual and corporate production. Special regulations and facilitations should be introduced for countries involved in agricultural activities.
5. The Agriculture Ministry should declare mobilization. Revolutionary regulations should be introduced to guarantee the next decades of our country.
6. The great breakthroughs made in the defense industry are necessary in agriculture as well. The next new leap after defense and technology must take place in this field.
7. The food issue should not be perceived as limited to trade and economy alone. It should be considered as the defense of a nation, its survival, as well as internal and external security.
Food requires the same alarm as our fight against terrorism
Food and agriculture require the same struggle we are putting up against terrorism. It requires the same determination, the same state of alarm.
Just as we are fighting to keep the economy upright and protecting our borders and seas, we must make the same extraordinary preparations in agriculture and food.
The world is being driven into extremely critical food crises and conflicts, and in fact wars. This is not a trivial concern. Countries will be divided, regions will be driven into chaos, and maps will change.
Nuclear powers of the future
Countries that have their bases covered in the fields of agriculture and food will become the nuclear powers of the future.
Impact---Monocultures/Small Farms---1NC
That ensures monoculture spread AND weakens small farms.
Robert Sparrow et al 22. Professor of philosophy, a School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia. “Managing the Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Agriculture.” 02-24-22. NJAS: Impact in Agricultural and Life Sciences, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 172-96. gautam
3.3. Concentration of ownership
Another risk, which is relatively pronounced in the agricultural sector, if not unique to it, is that AI, and especially the “big data” on which it relies, will lead to increased concentration of ownership of land and capital (Fleming et al., Citation2018; Wolfert et al., Citation2017).
As with the introduction of any new technology, AI has implications for power relations between individuals and within organisations. While, in theory, AI systems might be designed to flatten hierarchies and empower individuals, in practice these systems tend to centralise political power by making it easier to surveil a wider number of locations and persons and also by establishing incentive structures that effectively require individuals and organisations to “sign on” or risk missing out on opportunities associated with participation (Campolo et al., Citation2017; Holt et al., Citation2017; Prainsack, Citation2019). Network effects are very powerful when it comes to AI. Larger enterprises are better placed to take advantage of AI both because they can better afford to invest in it and also because, by virtue of being larger, they generate more data upon which the AI can operate, theoretically leading to more powerful AI. Indeed, AI risks establishing and exacerbating a “big data divide” between data rich and data poor individuals, organisations, and nations (Andrejevic, Citation2014; Boyd & Crawford, Citation2012; Rotz et al., Citation2019). Sometimes this is a matter of there simply being less data where there are fewer sensors or means of gathering it. Sometimes it is a matter of there being different sorts of data about rich and poor (Eubanks, Citation2018). However, whatever its origins, differences in the data about different groups will lead to them being differently served by AI. Thus, as an early discussion of the implications of big data had it, ‘big data has power effects of its own, which privilege large government and corporate entities at the expense of ordinary individuals’ (Richards & King, Citation2013). That the use of big data might privilege some actors over others is a significant risk in the context of agriculture, where the agricultural sectors of some nations are much more highly industrialised than others. A related issue, which seems to have received less attention, is the possibility that the introduction of AI into farming will lead to the intrusion of more claims about intellectual property in methods of farming and food processing, which in turn might exacerbate inequalities between wealthier and poorer enterprises (Carbonell, Citation2016; Kamilaris et al., Citation2017).
Thus, while, in theory, early adoption and aggressive use of AI might allow smaller farms to develop a competitive advantage over larger concerns, which are likely to be less agile adopters, in the longer term it seems unlikely that AI will buck the larger historical trend of new agricultural technologies favouring consolidation. If it has any impact on the size of farms or production facilities, then, it seems more likely that AI will allow larger enterprises to outcompete and then absorb smaller enterprises, leading to higher levels of concentration in the sector (Fleming et al., Citation2018; Wolfert et al., Citation2017). Although such consolidation is associated with, and helps generate, various efficiencies in production, we believe that it should be counted as a risk, given the threat that industrialised agriculture poses to biodiversity (Foley et al., Citation2011; Raven & Wagner, Citation2021) and – especially in the context of climate change – food security (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) et al., Citation2015).
3.4. Exploitation and surveillance
There are also significant concerns about the ownership of the data generated, and relied upon, by AI systems and the possibility that this will be used to monitor the activity of farmers, either for the purposes of regulating compliance with policy, or in order to secure a bargaining advantage over them in the context of commercial arrangements (Wolfert et al., Citation2017). If data is the “new oil” then it is little surprise that those who gather and/or create it may wish to exploit it or sell it on or otherwise extract value from it (Economist, Citation2017). Some of these uses will inevitably be controversial. For instance, a company that leases out tractors that contain soil sensors might use the data gathered by those sensors to inform its speculations in the agricultural futures markets or sell it to other interested parties who might then use it to extract concessions from the farmers: if a company selling water has access to data about soil moisture content gathered by a farmer’s tractors or drones, they may be able to raise prices in circumstances where the farmer might otherwise have been able to bluff about their willingness to walk away from a sale. More generally, the rise of AI and big data may lead to a substantial loss of autonomy by farmers and their subjugation to a network of commercial and institutional demands that are imposed and enforced by machines (Fleming et al., Citation2018).Footnote6 AI systems will also tend to place workers in the agriculture sector under more surveillance as the data generated by these systems will also function to track and monitor those who work with them (De Stefano, Citation2018).
3.5. Vulnerability to hacking
Adoption of AI, as with other forms of information and computing technology, renders users vulnerable to hacking and other cyber-attacks by malicious actors, which must be counted as a risk in agriculture as elsewhere. While this may seem speculative, so called “ransomware” attacks are increasingly common in industry more generally, with some attacks having caused millions of dollars of damage (Greenberg, Citation2018). The impacts of such cybercrime, where it does occur, are likely to increase with concentration of ownership (and thus electronic infrastructure) in the agricultural sector. If AI comes to be sufficiently widespread and play a sufficiently important role in agriculture, this may even render industrialised nations’ agricultural sectors vulnerable to cyber-attack during, or prior to, war (Clarke & Knake, Citation2010). For instance, a software exploit that caused autonomous tractors to plant seed too deep, or to under-water crops, or that simply “bricked” them when they were most needed, might cut a nation’s agricultural output by an appreciable amount, which in turn might have broader, even catastrophic impacts on food security and, therefore, social order.
3.6. Bias
Because the quality of the outputs of machine learning systems is highly dependent upon the quality of the data on which they have been trained, “bias” in the data m

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