Miscellaneous Supplement 1 - Michigan 2024 BEJJKP

Camp File Rebalancing Doc
Water War Impact D
No Impact---Water Wars---2AC
No water wars – adaptation, cooperation, no incentive and globalization
Dell’Angelo 18, Jampel Dell’Angelo, Paolo d’Odorico, Maria Cristina Rulli, Associate Professor of Water Governance and Politics, Progessor of Hydrology and Social Resources @ Berkeley, Professor of Water and Food Security, “The neglected costs of water peace,” 10/11/18, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wat2.1316 //cc
The first argument that “interstate cooperation on freshwater resources prevails over conflict” is supported by historical evidence. While there are some analyses indicating that sharing of international rivers might increase the probability of militarized disputes (Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre, 2000) it has been shown that the majority of water-related interstate conflicts have been resolved in a cooperative way (Wolf, 2007). The cost of warfare by far would hardly be justified by the appropriation of a resource that does not directly lead to high profits such as water (Selby, 2005). A systematic search for a water war with interstate violence produced only one result, pointing at the military conflict of the city-states of Umma and Lagash over the use of the Tigris river in 2,500 BCE, as the only water war that has ever happened (Gleick, 1993). The solid presence of cooperative interactions and the clear absence of formal wars over freshwater resources are also supported by the analysis of contemporary times. The relatively large number of water treaties among countries sharing water bodies can be considered as a compelling evidence of cooperation (Wolf, 1998). An exhaustive dataset on interactions between two or more states on water resources in the second half of the 20th century reveals that out of 1,831 interactions, conflictive or cooperative, ~67% were cooperative. Of the 507 more conflictive events, only 43 cases were associated with military acts while 414 were limited to verbal hostility. No events were categorized as formal war (Wolf, Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003). The second argument that can be described as a form of “technological optimism,” stems from the belief that the development of new technologies, the adoption of modern agricultural techniques, and the use of science-based methods of crop distribution will increase freshwater availability or enhance water use efficiency in agriculture, mining or other industries, thereby reducing competition for water and conflict. Although not explicitly formulated as an argument to dismiss the emergence of water wars, this confidence in future technological and science-based solutions to produce more with less, is motivated by research on the development of new cultivars that are more drought-adapted or have higher water use efficiency (“more crop per drop,”, see Falkenmark & Rockström, 2004), the adoption of agricultural techniques that reduce nonproductive water consumption associated with soil evaporation and inefficient irrigation technology (e.g., Jägermeyr et al., 2016), the selection of crops that are more suitable to the local hydroclimatic conditions (Davis, Rulli, Seveso & D'Odorico, 2017) and the reliance on strategies and technologies for waste reduction and reuse (Kummu et al., 2012). Technological advancements ranging from large-scale desalinization to new local systems of water purification have led to a widespread trust in techno fixes that can also improve drinking water availability. Collectively, technological advances can reduce the competition for water resources, however, some of these fixes may have detrimental environmental and social costs (D'Odorico et al., 2018; Palmer et al., 2015). The third argument, describes how the anatomic differences between water and oil as strategic economic resources, are explicative of the fact that water, differently from oil, does not justify interstate military intervention. It is clear that oil is prevalently at the center of contemporary geopolitical tensions, violence, conflicts and interstate wars. Oil is associated with civil conflicts and can be a major cause of regional interstate conflicts. Water instead, while being increasingly associated with local violent conflicts in the global South, has practically never been systemically associated with interstate conflicts nor wars (Selby, 2005). The political economy of these resources is essentially different because of several intrinsic characteristics. Oil, for example, is a motor of industrial production while water is more of a key input for biological processes, including agricultural production; oil is geographically unevenly distributed and nonrenewable while water is a renewable and relatively widely distributed resource; oil leads to very high profits and tends to be oligopolistically organized, while water tends to be a public or common-pool resource which does not directly lead to high profits (Selby, 2005). The last argument is about the strategic power of virtual water. Central to this argument is the work of Allan (1996, 1998, 2002) which elaborates on how water resources can be appropriated through the transnational trade of agricultural commodities. The adjective “virtual” is used to stress that such water is not physically present in the commodities that are traded. Some regions of the world, such as the Middle East, do not have enough water to produce all the food required to feed their populations. This situation could be expected to lead social tensions. However, according to Allan, reliance on international trade has allowed these countries to circumvent their chronic water scarcity and meet their needs. In this light, trade can be explicitly considered as a mechanism that has a water-saving function (Hoekstra & Chapagain, 2008; Konar, Hussein, Hanasaki, Mauzerall & Rodriguez-Iturbe, 2013). Allan (1998) noted that the importation of agricultural commodities and other goods is associated with the virtual transfer of the water resources used to produce those goods. More specifically, his work (Allan, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005) described how countries' dependence on water for agriculture, which on average accounts for 70% of the entire global water consumption (Richter, 2014), is often satisfied by the import of agricultural commodities. He demonstrates his argument relying also on historical evidence. In the case of the Middle East and North Africa, Allan (1998) estimates that virtual water flows associated with the importation of grains from North America exceeds the actual water flows in the Nile River. It is by analyzing the virtual water trade phenomenon that Allan comes to the conclusion that it is much more logical and convenient to trade with foreign countries and import virtual water from them rather than going at war with them. Despite some analytical criticism (Ansink, 2010), virtual water trade remains at the basis of one of the key arguments used to refute the “water leads to war” thesis. Other studies, mostly on the industrial sector, are also supporting the view that trade reduces the likelihood of conflict, though their focus is neither on water resources nor on virtual water trade (De Angelis, Metulini, Bove, Ricaboni, 2017; Dorussen, 2006; Hegre, Oneal, Russett, 2010). The counterargument, could be that trade has sustained population growth in importing countries, thereby enhancing water scarcity, trade dependence and consequently increasing in the long run the risk of instability while reducing societal resilience (D'Odorico, Laio & Ridolfi, 2010; Suweis et al., 2013). According to these four arguments and other, not less important, analytical contributions, there is consensus that water wars should be considered a dispelled myth (Barnaby, 2009). Practically nonexistent instead are recent scholarly contributions that actively support the water leads to war thesis. Gleick (1993) is often referred to in the context of water violence history. However, Gleick's accounts of water-related conflicts are not at the state level and, when organized national warfare happens, it is for water as a military strategic target, never for water as the primary cause of military intervention (Wolf, 1998, 2007). Also in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation over water in the West Bank, there have been many instances of conflicts but none that can be formally considered a water war (Zeitoun, 2007) as water, rather than being the reason for the conflict, is described as a strategic tool used for military purposes (Selby, 2003).
No water wars – predictions are too simplistic and ignore empirics.
Warner and Vij 22 – PhD Disaster Studies, Wageningen, MSc International Relations, Amsterdam; PhD from the Wageningen University and Research
Jeroen Warner & Sumit Vij, “No, There Will Not Be a War for Water,” New Security Beat, January 10, 2022, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2022/01/no-war-water/
Defense ministers, military generals, NGOs, UN Secretaries-General and environment-focused academics all repeat the misguided hypothesis that increasing resource scarcity leads to conflict. Since Al Gore’s Inconvenient Truth movie, the narrative keeps expanding to include climate-induced mass migration, climate disasters, and even climate wars.
Indian geostrategist Brahma Chellaney has recently argued that water is the new oil and claims that water will be the centerpiece of power struggle in Asia. This year, tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over filling the enormous Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River has also refueled water war theories. After the summer floods in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, European Commissioner Frans Timmermans repeatedly predicted that there will be future wars over food and water unless there are 55 percent reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2030. Military analysts such as retired Dutch General Tom Middendorp, chairman of the International Military Council on Climate and Security, has repeatedly aligned himself with the water wars (and climate-induced mass migration) discourse. The Water, Peace, and Security Partnership was set up by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Agency for International Cooperation and a consortium of six partners to forecast and understand water-related conflicts and organized violence.
Climate change will intensify weather extremes, but extremes alone do not cause violent conflict. As Dr. Clionadh Raleigh of Sussex University said, “It’s just a simplistic, nonsense narrative that the climate makes people violent.” Violence is only one, rarely used coping strategy for stress and sudden change. Multiple factors have to interact in complex ways before they create an escalating crisis. And even then, as Professor Aaron Wolf’s extensive Oregon State University database shows, states have not gone to war over water only. As Naho Mirumachi has shown, a mix of conflict and cooperation is more likely.
Heg Good Updates
No Impact---Iran War---2AC
No US-Iran war---cost, low risk of miscalc, and leaders want to stay in power.
Michael Horowitz 20---Professor of Political Science and Interim Director, Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania. January 10 2020, “War with Iran is still less likely than you think”, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/war-with-iran-is-still-less-likely-than-you-think/ //AN
In the wake of the U.S. attack that killed Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, many are concerned yet again about the potential for escalation between the United States and Iran to a general war.
In June, after tensions spiked following attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman that the United States blamed on Iran, we laid out the case for why the two countries were unlikely to fight a general war. We drew on similar arguments in 2018, when we explained why war between the United States and North Korea was unlikely despite the fears of many analysts at the time.
The killing of Soleimani was different
The U.S. killing of Soleimani, an attack on a high-ranking government official, is different from previous moments of international tension during the Trump administration. Soleimani was an important military officer in a sovereign state, rather than the leader of a stateless terrorist organization, like Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In last summer’s oil tanker and drone-downing episodes, the stakes were lower, and there were elements of deniability or ambiguity that were not feasible in the case of killing Soleimani.
The direct strike on one of Iran’s top military leaders has led many to conclude that Iran will strike back, possibly against U.S. targets in the Middle East. Such retaliation would be potentially costly, even if it does not lead to a general war.
But as other analysts have noted, fears of World War III are overblown. Even after this escalatory move, many factors that made war between the United States and Iran unlikely in June remain unchanged. There will no doubt be consequences — but general war remains unlikely.
But could the United States and Iran stumble into war?
Although the killing of Soleimani was a deliberate act by the United States, much fear about escalation between the United States and Iran surrounds the potential for a conflict spiral through miscalculation.
Fortunately, this type of escalation is rare. As Dan Reiter explained here at The Monkey Cage during a spike in tensions with North Korea two years ago, “powder kegs” rarely explode into war by accident.
Those worried about accidental war may also point to reports that the Trump administration developed the plan to kill Soleimani in haste, suggesting there was insufficient effort to think about how Iran might respond.
But if and when it does respond, Iran’s action is likely to be highly considered. This may be worrisome — but it’s not war by accident or miscalculation. If Iran’s leaders take an action in response that triggers a general war, it will probably be because they decided it was a risk worth taking.
Retaliation by Iran is not the same as war
It’s important not to move the goal posts for how we define war. At the same time, it’s also key to distinguish tit for tat between the United States and Iran from a general war involving ground troops.
This is not to deny the risk of a damaging retaliatory move from Iran that may result in American casualties and lead to long-term complications for the United States in the region.
But even retaliation may not come right away. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution argues that Iran is likely to “bide its time” despite anti-American protests in Iran during the widespread mourning for Soleimani.
Domestic politics still act as a brake — in both the United States and Iran
As Monkey Cage editor Michael Tesler wrote over the weekend, war with Iran is unpopular in the United States and is unlikely to help Trump win reelection. And Trump has long said he doesn’t want a Middle East war.
Similarly, despite short-term domestic pressures to retaliate, Iran’s leaders want to stay in power and do not want to risk their regime in a costly war — and war between the United States and Iran would probably be very costly.
So how did we get here, and what happens next?
Back in June, we wrote about one risk that could increase the odds of war: “if Trump’s hawkish advisers present an option that seems like it could be kept limited, but actually carries a strong likelihood of escalation.” According to news reports, Trump chose the option to kill Soleimani on short notice, surprising even some of his advisers and setting off a planning scramble.
But we also noted that Trump has backed away from tough stances before. If the past is any guide, having now looked tough, Trump may seek an off-ramp. And as Sarah Croco, Jared McDonald and Candace Turitto have pointed out here at TMC, Trump is unlikely to be punished if he flip-flops and backs down.
And even if Iran strikes back — as it says it will — it is also likely to try to avoid escalating the conflict significantly. Finding such a finely calibrated option is, of course, a difficult problem, but neither miscalculation nor domestic politics are the most likely drivers of further escalation in this case.
What might prevent the two sides from finding the off-ramps? One factor is if the administration, with Mike Pompeo at the understaffed State Department leading the hawkish charge, does not fully consider diplomatic options or engage in a robust set of invisible, back-channel consultations that would produce such options.
The stakes are high
Another concern is that this crisis has higher stakes for Iran than last summer’s tanker or drone encounters. We know that war can occur even if both sides don’t want it when one side doesn’t believe the other’s commitment not to attack in the future. If Iran doesn’t believe the United States will really leave its regime alone, it might frame the stakes of the Soleimani killing in the strongest possible terms, planning for significant escalation.
But that seems unlikely, given that the United States is far more powerful than Iran and a general war would probably mean the end of Iran’s regime. And Iran’s leaders might alternatively believe Trump does not want a war, especially given his publicly stated interest in reducing the U.S. military’s footprint in the Middle East. Indeed, a challenge for Iran’s leaders is that they may agree with commentators who have noted that Trump has not made clear what he wants.
It’s low-level at worst.
Seth Frantzman 21---executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis. A former assistant professor of American Studies at Al-Quds University, he covers the Middle East for The Jerusalem Post and is a Ginsburg/Milstein writing fellow at the Middle East Forum. November 8 2021, “Why Iran can’t risk war”, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/580385-why-iran-cant-risk-war/ //AN
While Israel has indicated there are “red lines” regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the question that should be asked is whether Iran would ever risk a war with the United States or Israel. So far, the evidence indicates that Iran prefers the kind of propaganda stunts the IRGC carried out in the Gulf of Oman — hijacking a tanker, but not fighting the U.S. Fifth Fleet. This is because Iran can’t risk a real, conventional war. Iran hasn’t fought a major war since the 1980s when it fought Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Iran’s government is poor and its regime is relatively weak under sanctions. The only real card that it holds is its nuclear blackmail, which it uses to score points diplomatically. It also arms dangerous proxies around the Middle East, in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.
Iran’s real strength, therefore, lies with its proxies, the militias that receive Iranian drones and missiles. Iran has used drones to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria and targeted a tanker off the coast of Oman in July. These types of attacks give Iran plausible deniability. It never says it carried out the drone attacks. The U.S. has shown evidence of Iran’s role in Yemen, but trafficking parts for missiles or gyroscopes for drones isn’t exactly how a country prepares for a major conventional war.
Iran’s navy is small and its ships keep catching fire and sinking. Its infrastructure is beset by problems and its IRGC tends to do the job that the Iranian army should be doing. In short, Iran has outsourced war-making powers to the IRGC and proxies, none of whom are prepared for a major conflict. If Iran can’t afford a major conflict, then the chances that the lack of an Iranian nuclear deal could lead to “war” are reduced. What might happen is that absence of a deal would mean continued tensions in the region.
However, after the previous Iranian deal in 2015, there was increased Iranian involvement in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The Houthis pushed to take over swaths of Yemen in 2015 and Iranian-backed militias in I

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