Fugitivity Negative Supplement v1 - Michigan 7 2024 BDKLS

Intellectual Fugitivity v1 Neg Supplement
Notes
This is a negative supplement to help answer v1 of the Intellectual Fugitivity aff from the CFMP lab. It contains some additional evidence that can be used to beat the case, as well as some K links or pics that apply. This should be used in conjunction with the already existing files, such as the K Aff Neg, the k answer updates, and any neg files already put out.
Thanks to Zoe, Sophia, Smaritha, Ryan, Julia, Hermes, Eric, Aidan, Abel, and Aaron for their help with the K neg supplement files.
Eurocentrism K
Eurocentrism K---1NC
The structuralist ontology of the aff represents the West and non-West as distinct essences. Regardless of intent, this Eurocentric discourse produces the West as a hyper-agent that built a singular modern world order.
John HOBSON Politics & IR @ Sheffield AND Alina SAJED Poli Sci @ McMaster ’17 “Navigating Beyond the Eurofetishist Frontier of Critical IR Theory: Exploring the Complex Landscapes of Non-Western Agency” Int’l Studies Review 19 p. 550-552
For the purposes of this article, we are focusing on three strands of critical IR theory: Marxist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial. We understand that some readers may see our grouping together these apparently incommensurable strands of critical theory within IR as problematic. Our defense of this grouping is twofold. First, we feel their incommensurability is unfairly emphasized, given that there are postcolonial scholars who are inspired by both poststructuralist and Marxist approaches (e.g., Inayatullah and Blaney 2004), or those who combine Marxism and postcolonialism (e.g., Pasha 2005; Persaud 2001, 2016; Matin 2013; Gruffydd Jones 2006; Seth 2013; Anievas and Nis¸ancioglu 2015), or those who combine postcolonial and poststructuralist/Foucauldian perspectives (e.g., Grovogui 2006; Jabri 2013). This in itself suggests that the “boundaries” between these critical approaches are fluid and shifting rather than being fixed and impermeable. Second, by grouping these three strands together, we do not imply that they are theoretically and politically equivalent. Rather, we are interested in dealing with two common overarching tendencies that link them up under the loosely defined umbrella of CIRT. First, they launch vehement critiques against the mainstream of the discipline, one of the core critiques being its enduring Westerncentric gaze and its omission of relations of inequality and domination between Western and non-Western worlds. Second, and related to the former, they indicate (in various forms, some more explicit than others) an interest in the agency or condition of the marginalized in world politics. We therefore attend here to the implications of their critiques insofar as they attempt to locate marginalized voices in world politics while also pointing to power asymmetries and relations of inequality between Western and non-Western actors.
We argue that much of Marxist IR frames its critique within a structuralist ontology, which invokes a substantialist conception of the West. As Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) points out, substantialism focuses on objects—for example, societies, nation-states, or civilizations—that are conceived as “preformed self-subsistent entities. While subsequent relations with other such objects are sometimes considered, nevertheless such interactions do not modify the preformed object and therefore do not affect its inner essential nature” (Emirbayer 1997, 282–83; and Jackson 1999; Qin 2010). In the “selfaction” variant, objects are understood “as acting under their own powers” (Dewey and Bentley 1949, 108) independently of all other entities, thereby implying selfgenerating, self-motivating, and self-directed activity. Specifically, a substantialist ontology underpins the top-down structuralist frameworks that large parts of Marxist CIRT deploy. In general, it speaks of Western structuralist logics of power: of men over women under capitalist patriarchy; capital over labor under global capitalism; White over non-White under imperialism/neo-imperialism. While revealing such global hierarchies must indeed constitute part of the antidote to Eurocentrism, nevertheless, when these are reified into ontological absolutes, the space for non- Western agency is necessarily squeezed out or evacuated.
Our argument is that the particular slice of CIRT on which we focus here operates within a highly limited vision of non-Western agency. While it has made important strides toward developing a relational ontology (especially poststructuralist and postcolonial IR), nevertheless we feel that only a fully relational conception that does not lapse into substantialism can promote the more complex understanding of non-Western subjectivities that we are interested in revealing and exploring. We suggest here that in a fully relational ontology, non-Western agents often engage and entwine with the West interstitially in network-type formations, sometimes dialectically and sometimes dialogically. Or, as various postcolonialists in IR and Sociology have argued, we need to move beyond substantialist conceptions of the West toward an IR of international or global interconnectedness and co-constitutivities between the Western and non- Western worlds—that is, the very language or grammar of non-Eurocentric relationalism (see Vasilaki 2012, 20–21; Bhambra 2010; Go 2013; Hobson 2004, 2011, 2012; Sajed 2015). Such a conception rejects the notion that the West is absolutely autonomous because it is, in so many ways, shaped and reshaped through its interactions with the non-Western world. In this way, we aim to puncture the twin Eurocentric optical illusions of a hyper-autonomous West alongside that of Western Empire’s representation of its Self as permanently omnipotent and universal, unified and self-directed.
At this point, however, two issues need to be dealt with, the first being that it would be problematic for readers to assume that our use of the terms “West” and “non-West” smacks of a substantialist, binary ontology in which these exist as autonomous and self-constituting entities and, therefore, leads our analysis back into the logocentric meta-geography of Eurocentrism. But our objective is precisely to show that West and non-West are not autonomous and separate but are mutually embedded and co-constitutive. That is, as a result of their constant interactions and relational interconnectivities, neither “West” nor “non-West” exist in pure form but are amalgams that comprise Western and non-Western elements. We separate them out only for heuristic purposes in order to pinpoint moments of agency, even if in the final analysis they are fundamentally relational in nature. All in all, therefore, while we retain a certain unease about deploying the bald categories of West and non-West, we ask readers to appreciate the wider non- Eurocentric theoretical and empirical context within which they are embedded. Second, we should clarify the point that we are not arguing that all non- Western perspectives are alike or that all non-Western ontologies are inherently relational. When we are distinguishing between substantialist and relational ontologies, we are referring to two different (methodological) approaches to the problem of power differentials between Western and non-Western actors and the dynamics they engender, not to mention the implications for theorizing such power differentials. Ultimately, our concern is with how to theorize power differentials and relations of domination without falling into reductionist-Manichean binaries of silence vs. resistance or an all-powerful West vs. a powerless non-West. Or, as Frederick Cooper (1994, 1517) puts it, concerning the colonial ideology of the civilized colonizer versus the primitive colonized, the “risk is that by exploring the colonial binarism one reproduces it, either by new [liberal] variations of the dichotomy (modern versus traditional) or by [critical] inversion (the destructive imperialist versus the sustaining community of the victims).”
Our project is guided by the spirit of E.P. Thompson’s ([1978] 1995) famous critique of Althusserian structuralism, which seeks to retrieve the agency of subordinate groups, thereby moving beyond seeing them as but mere trager—that is, as passive victims or bearers of exterior (Western) structures of power. For if we squeeze out the manifold conceptions of non-Western agency then, accordingly, these aforementioned hierarchies become reified, permanent, and intractable, such that all hope for emancipation becomes lost. We also draw inspiration from the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and the Subaltern Studies collective (see especially Guha 1982), by seeking to reinstate the agency and subjectivity of subaltern actors in their own terms rather than squeezing them into a prioristic Western categories. Overall, the key paradoxical problem is that CIRT’s pessimism and despair vis-a-vis the inevitability of the (tragic) triumph of the West risks mirroring the “celebratory Western triumphalism” of mainstream IR theory and its Eurocentric mantra that the Western telos marks the “end of history.” We thus invite critical IR scholars to consider the implications of our alternative critical emancipatory strategy: that rather than only revealing non-Western agents as overdetermined and repressed by exterior Western structures of power, we seek to highlight the multiple expressions of non-Western agency, albeit under structurally confined conditions.
Our aim, therefore, is to open up a debate or dialogue with critical theorists both in terms of our reading of their approaches as well as our proposed agenda to bring a more complex and consequential-constitutive conception of non- Western agency into the fold of CIRT. For it remains deeply perplexing to us that while the critique of Eurocentrism in IR is well under way, nevertheless CIRT has remained, most surprisingly, somewhat aloof from, if not largely indifferent to, this critique that has occasionally been levied at it (Sajed 2012; Pasha 2005; Shani 2008; Hobson 2012; Persaud 2016). One reason for this lack of engagement may be that many such scholars presume axiomatically that CIRT is anything but Eurocentric (for reasons that we explain in the next section). In addition, a key inter-linked debate that we think needs resolving is one that we begin in this piece, one that effectively contests both what Eurocentrism is and what the antidote to it comprises.
Revealing the Trap of Eurofetishism: “Western Supremacism” and
the Re-Inscription of Western Universal History
The nature of Eurocentrism that we identify within CIRT is rather different in some respects from that which underpins conventional IR. While orthodox/conventional IR theory advances various imperialist and anti-imperialist normative postures (Hobson 2012), nevertheless all of its variants converge on the propositions that the West exclusively made modern world politics and that the West is the civilized universal to which all inferior non-Western states should, or will in time, conform. By contrast, CIRT clearly provides robust critiques of the West and of Western imperialism/neo-imperialism. A further crucial difference is that conventional Eurocentric IR blames the current predicament of Third World “backwardness” on the internal nature of its constituent societies, focusing on their “internal blockages” and “regressive irrational” institutions. By contrast, many CIRT analyses assign the Third World’s current predicament largely to the effects of Western imperialism and neo-imperialism (see Wallerstein 1974; Cox 1987; Grovogui 1996; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Gruffydd Jones 2006; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Sajed 2013). In that vein, the wealth of the West today is attributed not to its inherently virtuous and exceptional properties but rather to its neo-imperialist exploitation of the Third World. Not surprisingly, the upshot of all of this is that most CIRT scholars presume that their approach is anything but Eurocentric. But we believe that the problem emerges when CIRT reifies or fetishizes the West as the hyper-agential actor in world politics while simultaneously eclipsing the existence or role of non-Western agency, hence our designation of it as Eurofetishism. And it is important to appreciate the paradox that Eurofetishism is a modus operandi evoked by many CIRT scholars, implicitly and occasionally explicitly, as they seek to provide a critique of the West and which they conceive, problematically in our view, as the antidote to conventional Eurocentric IR theory. This discussion enters the terrain of the aforementioned debate that we believe CIRT needs to engage.
The aff treats blackness as in but not of world order. They pose a structural conflict between ordering, sovereignty versus disordering, dispossession, and non-relationality. This narrative denies the world-making capacity of decolonization and the principle of self-determination.
Adom GETACHEW Poli Sci @ Chicago ’19 Worldmaking after Empire p. 14-18
Just three years after Ghana’s achievement of independence, seventeen African states joined the United Nations, marking the high point of decolonization in the Black Atlantic world. In what would come to be called the year of Africa, the newly constituted African bloc in the United Nations successfully led the effort to secure passage of General Assembly resolution 1514, titled “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” The declaration described foreign rule as a violation of human rights, reiterated the right to self-determination, and called for the immediate end of all forms of colonial rule.1 Resolution 1514 offered a complete repudiation of foreign rule and rejected any prerequisites for the attainment of independence. Soon after its passage, the resolution formed the basis of a new committee with broad powers to investigate colonial rule and hear petitions from colonial subjects, making colonial rule subject to international scrutiny and to the demands for self-determination. 2
While 1960 marked a radical rupture in the history of modern international society, it has largely been subsumed in a standard account of decolonization where the transition from empire to nation and the expansion of international society to include new states is a seamless and inevitable development. This account of decolonization is premised on the view that anticolonial nationalists appropriated the language of self-determination from the liberal internationalist tradition of Woodrow Wilson in order to secure independence from alien rule. In adopting the language of liberal self-determination, the nationalists of the colonized world are thought to have mimicked the existing institutional forms of the nation-state. And while decolonization is credited with universalizing this state system, its nationalist and statist premises are viewed as anachronistic in a postnational and increasingly cosmopolitan world order.
Recasting anticolonial nationalism as worldmaking disrupts the central assumptions of this standard account. First, it expands the account of empire beyond alien rule by illustrating the ways black anticolonial critics theorized empire as a structure of international racial hierarchy. Drawing on W.E.B. Du Bois’s famous diagnosis that the “problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line,” the central characters of this book drew critical attention to the enduring legacy of racial hierarchy and slavery in the making of modern international society. Second, in response to the political dilemmas international racial hierarchy posed, anticolonial nationalists in Africa and the Caribbean insisted that self-determination required a combination of nation-building and worldmaking. Their vision of a postimperial world order prompted nationalists to create international institutions that could secure the conditions of nondomination. This claim that national independence required international institutions was a key insight of the anticolonial account of self-determination. Finally, recovering their global aspirations highlights the persistence of international hierarchy and outlines new directions for contemporary debates about global political and economic justice. Together, the expanded account of empire, the rethinking of anticolonial nationalism, and the theorization of a postcolonial cosmopolitanism constitute elements of a political theory of decolonization.
Beyond Empire as Alien Rule
As postcolonial states worked to pass resolution 1514 in 1960, historians, philosophers, and political scientists offered their first interpretations of the unprecedented process of decolonization. That same year, the Oxford philosopher John Plamenatz published On Alien Rule and Self-Government, while, across the Atlantic, the Harvard political scientist Rupert Emerson published From Empire to Nation.3 Emerson and Plamenatz sought to explain how “alien rule” suddenly became illegitimate in the twentieth century, and they found their answer in the global diffusion of Western ideals. The delegitimation of alien rule in the mid-twentieth century, Plamenatz argued, was itself a product of the gradual Westernization of the world. European imperial expansion fueled the spread of principles like self-determination, democracy, and freedom and made possible anticolonial nationalists’ critique of alien rule.4 Emerson concurred, arguing that “through global conquest the dominant Western powers worked to reshape the world in their own image and thus roused against themselves the forces of nationalism which are both the bitterest enemies of imperialism and, perversely, its finest fruit.”5
Key tenets of these early interpretations—the emphasis on alien rule, the inattention to the international conditions and context of imperialism, the identification of decolonization with the globalization of the nation-state, and the expansion of international society—continue to shape our understanding of the collapse of territorial empires. From international relations to normative political theory, the recurring emphasis on alien rule conceives of empire as a bilateral relationship between metropole and colony. On this view, empire is a “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, subordinate periphery.”6 Involuntary subjection, nonreciprocity, and inequality characterize this relationship between the colonized and colonizer. 7 The international component to alien rule is understood as exclusion of the colony from international society.8 Such exclusion differentiates alien rule from other forms of international hegemony that emerge within a rule-bound international order.9 As a result, the international order is conceived as a dual structure that grants metropolitan states membership as sovereign equals and excludes colonies outside of its boundaries. With this bilateral account of imperial domination and a bifurcated view of international society, the alien rule thesis understands self-determination as a double move of overcoming alien rule and achieving inclusion in international society. Empire comes to an end when formerly excluded colonies enter international society as full members, and central to this inclusion is the universalization of the nation-state as the accepted institutional form of self-determination. 10 Twentieth-century decolonization is thus viewed as the culmination of a long history in which the nation-state is progressively globalized and becomes the counterpoint to empire.11
While the empire-to- nation narrative appears to capture the transformations of the international order in the mid-twentieth century, this account of decolonization also obscures the more far-reaching efforts to remake rather than expand int

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