Ruism Kritik - Michigan 2024 HHIRS

Ruism K
Notes
Notes
FAQ
-What is Ruism?
Ruism, or Confucianism, is a branch of Chinese philosophy first developed by the philosopher Kongzi (Confucius) during the Warring States period. It seeks to improve society by establishing social harmony through the implementation and observation of Rituals (Li). After Kongzi, there were many different philosophers that sought to expand the school of thought—most important the philosophers Mengzi and Xunzi (the one who much of the k discusses). In the twelfth century, the school of Neo-Confucianism further developed the school of thought, mostly by expanding its metaphysics. In the mid-to-late 20th century, a new school of philosophy called New Confucianism was developed in China, which sought to modernize aspects of Ruist thought and compare it with western thought.
-Why Ruism?
Ruism comes from the Chinese word Rujia (lit. “The school of Ru”). Many sinologists prefer to use this term since the word “Confucianism” has considerable colonial background behind it. Don’t worry about using Ruism and Confucianism interchangeably though.
-Is this Buddhism?
No.
K Strategy
Here are some thoughts of mine:
-framework is always the best option for a k.
-the links to AI are actually quite good in my opinion, so if the aff has an AI advantage, this might be a good strat.
-there are extinction impacts that you can read, so going for the k + impact defense is always possible but not particularly recommended. (if you do go for this strategy, make sure you don’t read the util links)
-if you read the cap link, the aff team will probably ask, “do you overthrow capitalism?”, the answer will not be yes. Simply say that it reforms it to alleviate the negative effects of it.
-there is a very interesting kvk debate to be had here, so consider throwing in the 1nc shell to mix it up a little and maybe throw the other team for a loop.
-a lot of the stuff in this file may sound complicated, especially if you’ve never studied Chinese philosophy before. There will be a glossary down below with some of the key terms, I suggest that you at least read the top of it.
-if you’re the aff, just go for framework or something. Cross-apply other files.
˚୨୧⋆｡˚ ⋆ …and, most importantly, HAVE FUN!! ⋆ ˚｡⋆୨୧˚
--Zachary Rubin, Fox Chapel ˚ ༘♡ ⋆｡˚
Glossary
You in no way have to memorize all this stuff, but it would be generally wise to skim through it so you understand what some of these cards are talking about and so you can answer cross ex questions.
Important Terms:
Rujia (儒家)—Ruism, the school of Ru, Confucianism
Li (礼)—Rituals, societal and cultural rites, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_(Confucianism), make sure you understand this term
Ren (仁)—“Humaneness”, the virtue of altruism and benevolence
Yi (义)—Righteousness, the moral disposition to be benevolent
Dao (道)—The Way, the proper way to act and to follow in Ruism
Fa (法)—The rule of law, legal rules
Xin (心)—the “heart-mind”, the site of cognition and emotion in classical Chinese thought
Datong (大同)—“Grand harmony”, the Ruist conception of a harmonious society
Zhengming (正名)—“The rectification of names”, a central Ruist concept which entails making things accord to their “names”
Junzi (君子)—A Righteous person, a person who is moral and sagely
Lunyu (論語)—“The Analects”, the book that records the sayings and philosophy of Kongzi, mostly composed during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
Yijing (易經)—“The Book of Changes”, AKA the I Ching, an ancient Chinese text from the Western Zhou period (1000-750 BCE) centered around cosmology
Xicizhuan (繫辭傳)—“The Ten Wings”, a commentary on the Yijing attributed to Kongzi
Daxue (大学)—“The Great Learning”, A book attributed to Kongzi’s disciple Zengzi which details aspects of Ruist thought
Mengzi (孟子)—“The Book of Mengzi”, AKA Mencius, the book written by the Ruist philosopher Mengzi
Xunzi (荀子)—“The Book of Xunzi”, the book written by the Ruist philosopher Xunzi
The Four Books (四书)—Four books that Zhu Xi selected to represent the core ideas of Ruism, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects, and Mencius
The Five Classics (五经)—Five classic works of Chinese literature that Kongzi cites as crucial to learn, The Classic of Poetry, The Book of Documents, The Book of Rites, The Yijing, and The Spring and Autumn Annals
New Confucianism—the philosophical, social, and political movement for Confucian revival that started in the 20th century, originally headed by Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan
Important people:
This is good to know, also please make sure you pronounce these names correctly
Kongzi (pron. Kong-tsuh)—AKA Confucius, the first Ruist philosopher, lived during the Spring and Autumn period, Minister of Crime of the state of Lu
Mozi (pron. Mo-tsuh)—A philosopher who broke off of the central Ruist tradition and formed his own philosophy called Mohism, going on to critique Ruism, lived during the Warring States Period
Mengzi (pron. Meng-tsuh)—AKA Mencius, a Ruist philosopher, part of Confucius's fourth generation of disciples, lived during the Warring States Period, thought by some to be the true evolution of Ruism, disagreed heavily with Xunzi
Xunzi (pron. Shoon-tsuh)—A Ruist philosopher, part of Confucius's fourth generation of disciples, lived during the Warring States Period, worked to defend Ruism against critiques from Mohism and Daoism, disagreed heavily with Mengzi
Han Fei—The founder of Fajia philosophy (Legalism), originally studied under Xunzi, lived during the Warring States Period before helping the state of Qin become the first empire of China
Zhu Xi—Developer of neo-confucianism in the 12th century, compiled the Four Books
Prominent people in contemporary Ruism:
(these are by far less important to learn but may be interesting to some if they want more context)
Xiong Shili—20th century philosopher who significantly influenced the development of New Confucianism with his works on metaphysics and epistemology, first generation New Confucian
Mou Zongsan—20th century philosopher and a major figure in New Confucianism, known best for his development of Confucian democracy and writings on Kant, second generation New Confucian
Tang Juyi—20th century philosopher and a major figure in New Confucianism, known for his efforts to synthesize traditional Chinese thought with modern Western philosophy, second generation New Confucian
Xu Fuguan—20th century philosopher and historian, known for his contributions to New Confucianism and his studies on Chinese aesthetics and culture, second generation New Confucian
Tu Weiming—contemporary philosopher and advocate of Confucian humanism, focusing on the relevance of Confucianism in the modern world, particularly in a global context.
Li Zehou—contemporary philosopher and scholar noted for his works on aesthetics and merging Marxist and Confucian ideas, died in 2021, RIP king
Jiang Qing—contemporary Chinese Confucian scholar who advocates for the political application of Confucian principles in modern governance
Daniel A. Bell—political theorist known for his work on Confucianism and its role in contemporary East Asian politics and ethics
Roger T. Ames—philosopher, sinologist, and translator who has contributed significantly to the understanding of Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism and Daoism
Bryan Van Norden—THE GOAT, #VANNORDENNATION, sinologist, translator, and scholar specializing in Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy, with a focus on Confucianism, Daoism, and the history of Chinese thought
Chris Fraser—sinologist who studies epistemology and ontology, most prominent for his (amazing) works on the Zhuangzi
Jana S. Rošker—Slovenian sinologist who mainly studies epistemology in Chinese philosophy
1NC
1NC---Policy
Desire is the nexus point of chaos and violence—it is only ritual that is able to nourish desire and contain its destructive potential in order to create social harmony and cooperation, sustaining the creation of meaning and transformation.
Tang 17 [Siufu Tang, Associate Professor, Program Director of MACHS & UG Program Coordinator of CHC, The University of Hong Kong, BA (CUHK), MPhil (CUHK), PhD (Oxon), Springer Nature, 2017, Reconceptualizing Confucian Philosophy in the 21st Century, “A Contemporary Interpretation of Confucian Ritual in the Writings of Xunzi”, ISBN 978-981-10-3998-0, //zrubin]
Xunzi discusses the origin of rituals, and says that they are meant to nourish desire: From what did rituals arise? I say: human beings are born with desires. If what they desire is not obtained, they cannot but seek for it. If there are no measures and limits on their seeking, then they will inevitably fight with each other. Fighting leads to disorder, disorder leads to destitution. The Ancient Kings disliked such disorder, so they designed rituals and righteousness to make differentiations, so as to nurture people’s desires, and to provide for their seeking. They saw to it that desires never wanted for goods and goods were never exhausted by desires. Desires and goods were sustained by each other and developed. This is the origin of rituals. Thus rituals are nourishment. (Lau 1996, 19.90.3–6; Knoblock 1988–1994, 19.1a–1b) People are born with desires and inevitably they seek the satisfaction of their desires. Without proper measures and limits, this seeking will lead to fighting, disorder and destitution. Rituals were instituted by the ancient kings to prevent this bleak situation. Rituals impose a structure on people’s lives within which desires can safely be satisfied. It is important to note that rituals do not satisfy desires as they naturally arise; rather, rituals nourish desires in such a way that they develop and are expressed in more cultured forms. “Nourishment” 養 (yang) does not merely keep something alive, but, more importantly, helps it grow in a healthy way. Three times Xunzi uses the two characters, “nourish” (yang) and “develop” 長 (zhang), to describe the proper way of watching over an infant (Lau 1996, 10.46.21–22, 11.55.25, 15.73.17; Knoblock 1988–1994, 10.10, 11.12, 15.5). Clearly the right way to care for an infant is to nourish him/her in such a way that the infant grows and develops properly. It is also not a coincidence that in these three passages, Xunzi uses the analogy of watching over an infant to describe the way the Sage-King cares for the people. After elucidating the nature of nourishment, and immediately following the quoted passage on the origin of rituals, Xunzi lists examples of nourishment. One example is how the meat of “pastured and grain-fed animals,” as well as “rice and millet” 芻豢稻梁 (chu huan dao liang) can nourish the mouth (Lau 1996, 19.90.6; Knoblock 1988–1994, 19.1b). At the time of Xunzi, rice, millet and the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals were regarded as high-quality foods. In another passage Xunzi contrasts high-quality foods like the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals, rice and millet with low-quality foods like “beans, coarse greens, dregs and husks” 菽藿糟糠 (shu huo zao kang). Xunzi suggests that low-quality foods represent the chaotic way practiced by the petty person, while high-quality foods represent the rituals and the righteous way propagated by the Sage-King (Lau 1996, 4.15.14–21; Knoblock 1988–1994, 4.10). The same contrast between high and low quality foods is likely intended by Xunzi when he suggests that the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals, rice and millet can nourish the mouth. If such an interpretation is reasonable, that is, if it matters that nourishment is of high quality, then we have a strong piece of evidence that nourishment is more than the simple satisfaction of desire. Rather, genuine nourishment can only be obtained when desire is developed and enhanced and therefore able to be satisfied in cultured forms through rituals. Rituals arise not only from the need to satisfy desires but also from the need to prevent chaos and conflict. Xunzi points out that rituals and right behavior enable people to live a communal life wherein they can protect and assist each other.3 In other words, rituals impose culturally approved limitations on desire so that we can live a civilized life in a harmonious community. It might also be suggested that rituals are constructed through an interpretative understanding of our nature. But what is the justification for one interpretation of our nature over another? And why is the satisfaction of desire through rituals the best way to keep desire under control and allow the community based on rituals to flourish? Xunzi asserts that co-operation is needed to sustain people’s life. This is so because a person cannot be good at every skill and cannot assume all roles by him or herself. If people do not help one another there will be destitution. While co-operation and a communal life are essential, distinctions are also required to maintain proper social order (Lau 1996, 10.42.16–7; Knoblock 1988–1994, 10.1). If we judge only from this passage, we might think that Xunzi is chiefly concerned with the problems of practical life. We might think of distinctions among individuals as simply the principle upon which the distribution of goods in a cooperative society depends. Xunzi would not deny that one important function of distinctions is to organize the distribution of resources among social members; however, it is unlikely that he would take this as the only function of distinctions, and even less would he think that the only purpose of the community is to better fulfill its members’ practical needs. Xunzi uses examples like the affection between father and son and the division between males and females as illustrations of differentiation 辨 (bian) which pertain to distinctions and rituals. Xunzi suggests that in contrast to human beings, animals have parents and offspring, males and females, but not a corresponding differentiation. Differentiation in this human sense is not the same as natural difference. Rather, differentiation represents both the recognition of difference and the understanding of the significance of this difference. The community, as an assembly of people ordered by differentiation and distinctions, is not just a structured group but also a group with intrinsic meaning and significance. What does this mean? Because our nature is originally without a normative framework and has a natural tendency to dominate the heart-mind, we can be led to bad judgments and bad behavior (Lau 1996, 4.15.14–17; Knoblock 1988–1994, 4.10). Consequently our nature might be regarded as bad in a fundamental sense, a sense which goes beyond “badness” that is due to external factors such as a lack of resources. According to Xunzi, even if we have unlimited resources, we could not live a good life if our nature is not transformed. Indeed, Xunzi points out that the inadequacy of resources is not the universal predicament of the world; that comes rather from the harm brought about by chaos and disorder. Xunzi is of the opinion that the natural world does contain enough resources for all people; however, if we do not properly manage these natural resources, and manage the social world as well, we cannot have a prosperous and flourishing life (Lau 1996, 10.44.20–45.14; Knoblock 1988– 1994, 10.8). The same is true of individual human beings. Xunzi once described a person who possessed all the beautiful things of the world but had no enjoyment from them because he did not comply with proper principles and consequently could not have an ordered life (Lau 1996, 22.112.9–16; Knoblock 1988–1994, 22.6d). Proper principles are precisely contained in Confucian rituals. Rituals transform our nature and enable us to live fully as a person. Thus, rituals are not merely a regulating mechanism like traffic regulations which are normative only conditionally and contingently. Rituals are, rather, constitutive norms that structure our life and the selves we are. In Xunzi’s eyes, a community is an assembly of people structured by rituals. It follows, therefore, that community is also constitutive of our life and not merely a better means to satisfy our desires. If I take the community merely as an external means by which to attain my individual ends, then, to better fulfill my ends independent of the community, there would be no reason for me either to enter into or stay within the community. Yet the community, as an assembly with differentiation, could not be merely an external means. Xunzi would suggest that living outside the community is living without differentiation, and thus living like birds and beasts. A life outside the community, if it is possible at all, is fundamentally different from a life within the community. The community does not just better sustain the natural biological life with which we are born; it makes possible and is also constitutive of a new kind of life, a life which is culturally meaningful and individually transformative. Certainly some people live in solitude, but very often they maintain a link, however minimal, with other people and the community, who carry with them the culture and the traditions of the community. Even though they might be physically cut off from the community, mentally and spiritually they are still nurtured by it. What is so important about the community is then not primarily the physical assembly of people, but its embodiment of culture and tradition in the communal life. Differentiation, distinctions and rituals represent precisely Confucian culture and tradition.
The move to protect intellectual property sacrifices innovative flows of creativity that arise outside of the standard IP framework and drives social division along the lines of capital that harms creative labor and the citizenry as a whole.
Liao 06 [Han-Teng Liao, director of the undergraduate program of Internet and New Media at Nanfang College of Sun Yat-sen University, UNU-CS (Computing and Society) Research Fellow, Doctoral Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 2006, “Towards creative da-tong: An alternative notion of creative industries for China”, DOI: 10.1177/1367877906066885, //zrubin]
One interpretation comes from ‘innovator’s dilemma’ – a concept popularized by Clayton Christensen in business strategy and management. Companies, as innovators, need to establish a balance between ‘exploration of new possibilities’ and ‘exploitation of old certainties’ (March, 1991: 71). Intellectual property rights are designed for companies to explore the new while exploiting the old (the past, in Lessig’s terms). These rights are usually short-term scope-limited monopolies granted by governments. Such mechanisms are intended to ensure that companies can allocate enough resources to innovation. However, too much monopoly can make companies too comfortable. In exploiting the past, they become lazy in terms of future innovation. Companies might choose efficient exploitation instead of risky exploration. The innovator’s dilemma explains the inherent contradiction: how this tension, which exists within and among companies, impedes competition, flow-on innovation and large-scale industrial progress. The ethos of ‘the more, the merrier’, which, according to Cukier, leads to an intellectual property ‘arms race’ and ‘mutually assured destructions’, echoes such creativity-restraining issues (2005: 1–14). Intellectual property currently contributes more to monopoly power of the establishment or exploitation of old certainties. In other words, it ‘propertizes’, rather than exploring new possibilities that ‘produce’ (in Chinese, chan). To tackle such creativity-restraining problems, several movements have adopted newer notions of property rights in order to limit the power of the past, and to emerge out of the détente of the ‘arms race’. The Free Software movement, through its copyleft licences, which are adopted voluntarily by individual programmers, creates collaborative communities. Incorporating similar sharing and public domain concepts, Creative Co

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