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Fiscal taxation for economic growth, implemented by tax neutrality as a guiding principle, has since the beginning of the 1980s, become a dominant view on tax sustainability. Fiscal is defined as efficiency in relation to optimal tax theory, which basically is to avoid distorting tax regulations that are regarded to cause unwanted excess burdens in the economy. This has been described as an ideological hegemony, which on a global scale has institutionalized a one-path model for taxing for economic growth in tax law design.8 The main features of these tax reforms can briefly be summarized as follows:

• Broader labour income tax bases but low progressivity;

Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015).

This paper focuses on the design of fiscal redistribution through income taxes and transfers in advanced and developing countries.3 In particular, it focuses on the growing debate on the relative merits of universal and targeted social assistance transfers in achieving income redistribution objectives (Atkinson, 2015; Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle, 2017; Gentilini et al., 2020). It argues that the fixation of the policy debate on the narrow targeting of transfers to lower-income groups (i.e., avoiding leakage of transfers to higher-income groups) in large part reflects an unbalanced framing of the issue with an undesirably narrow focus on the transfer side of fiscal redistribution neglecting the potential redistributive role of taxes. It also reflects an overly narrow focus on incentive (or efficiency) costs with insufficient attention to the administrative, social and political costs of targeting that in practice affect the feasible set of redistributive taxes and transfers available to governments and which need to be balanced against efficiency costs.

Finally, even if redistribution can be done more effectively and efficiently through direct fiscal means, and even if its overall goals are determined in the aggregate on the basis of some external principles of equity, one would still need to know how various legal rules and policies affect the different groups. Knowledge of their distributive effects is important so that the income tax system can be calibrated to achieve the desired level of redistribution and to correct for disproportionate benefits that some subgroups obtain elsewhere. Access justice is assumed to be egalitarian and even progressive, a substitute to direct fiscal redistribution, thus necessitating less, not more, corrective progressive taxation. But if the regressive effects were prevalent, the opposite would be true: redistributive taxes would be all the more necessary. In short, society cannot achieve its desired overall level of redistribution if it miscounts the effects of some access justice programs.

Fiscal redistribution is defined as the reduction in income inequality, brought about by government via taxes and transfers. Their findings indicate that only in countries characterized as young democracies do elections exert a positive impact on fiscal redistribution.

The aff violates. They do not tax to fund the plan. That’s bad –

Income Inequality and Government Redistribution: An Overview

We now describe our data, with a particular focus on changes since our dataset was last updated. As we have indicated, our complete 116-case dataset is available in an online appendix to our chapter.11 For ease of exposition, we begin our summary by focusing on national averages over multiple LIS waves for each of our twenty countries.

Therefore, this paper analyzes fiscal redistribution in Section III, but it should be noted that other policies could help reducing income inequality. In particular, adequate spending on education (a priority of the Bulgarian authorities) and health as well as appropriate labor-market regulations5 foster an environment for a less unequal distribution of market income in the future (Blanchet et al., 2019).

Gini Coefficient of Market and Disposable Incomes 1/

Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015)

The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).

The formation of ERC’s claims of fiscal exploitation and their degree of credibility also depend on other factors than just the existence of a fiscal deficit with the central administration. While the ‘adequate’ level of social redistribution is a political question that does not concern us here, what can be discussed from a technical perspective is whether there are major flaws in the system that might nourish discontent with concrete forms of social redistribution. Ways of looking at this include the evaluation of: overcompensation effects, considerations of efficiency and regional economic convergence, trends in taxation and public finances, and the overall evolution of the economy. A minimal definition of fiscal redistribution entails that regions should contribute in accordance with their income but receive equal per capita spending. Hence, those with a higher than average income should be net contributors and those with a lower one net recipients. Uriel and Barberan (2007, p. 412) show that, in the period 1991–2005, Catalonia’s position was in line with this assumption. Yet, there also are some overcompensation effects,6 although their precise size is unclear. Using data for 2005, Espasa and Bosch (2010) argued that Catalonia received between 12 per cent and 14 per cent less than the Spanish average. Yet, De la Fuente (2005) calculated the same amount at 6 per cent below the average for the period 1990–97. Furthermore, this has affected other contributory regions and not exclusively Catalonia (Tortella 2016, pp. 441–443). What, instead, seems to be uncontroversial is the disproportionately low amount of infrastructural investment received by Catalonia. De la Fuente – who has otherwise provided very conservative estimates of the fiscal deficit (e.g. De la Fuente 2001) – has pointed out that the Generalitat received less investment than all other autonomous communities during the 1990s. Such spending represents a small share of the deficit claimed by ERC, but it probably had a sizable negative impact on the development of the Catalan economy in recent years.

If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: Π [ ] RS = − ∫ L p L p dp XT X − 2 0 1 () () (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and L p xf x dx X y ( ) ( ) = ∫ µ 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (3) L p x t x f x dx t X T y − = − − ∫ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) µ( ) 1 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income ( x ) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income ( x tx − ( ) ), with: p : the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f x( ) : the density function of x F x( ) : the distribution function of x µ : mean income (pre tax) t x( ) : the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t : the average tax rate.

Including the most common pay allowances, the average total compensation for a Major General may range from $142,989.48 to $204,653.88 per year as of 2023.

If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: Π [ ] RS = − ∫ L p L p dp XT X − 2 0 1 () () (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and L p xf x dx X y ( ) ( ) = ∫ µ 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (3) L p x t x f x dx t X T y − = − − ∫ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) µ( ) 1 0 0 1 ≤≤ = p p Fy and ( ) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income ( x ) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income ( x tx − ( ) ), with: p : the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f x( ) : the density function of x F x( ) : the distribution function of x µ : mean income (pre tax) t x( ) : the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t : the average tax rate.

A new study by the political economists Dr Pantelis Kammas (University of Ioannin) and Dr Vassilis Sarantides (University of Sheffield) looks at the behaviour of incumbent governments in “new democracies”.

Previous research work tends to assume that these governments behave opportunistically around elections, adopting generous and expansionary fiscal policies in order to improve their chances of staying in office.

President Joe Biden has settled on a strategy for dealing with the Alabama senator who is causing chaos at the highest levels of the Pentagon: Leave it to Republicans to fix. Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville is single-handedly blocking more than 270 military promotions over the Pentagon’s policy of paying for service members to travel to seek abortions. The monthslong hold has already left the Marine Corps without a Senate-confirmed leader for the first time in 100 years; the Army, Navy and the Joint Chiefs will be in a similar position in a matter of weeks if the issue is not resolved. Biden weighed in on the controversy on Thursday, calling Tuberville’s actions “totally irresponsible” and the confusion surrounding the Joint Chiefs “bizarre.” But the onus is on Republicans to end the standoff, he added. “I would be willing to talk to him if I thought there was any chance of him changing this ridiculous position. I expect the Republican Party to stand up and do something about it. It’s within their power to do that,” Biden told reporters in Helsinki, Finland. “It’s totally irresponsible, in my view,” Biden said. “I just think that — I mean, I’m confident that the mainstream of the Republican Party no longer — does not support what he’s doing, but they got to stand up and be counted. That’s how it ends.” Biden made public what the administration has been saying behind the scenes: The White House and the Pentagon have no plans to concede to Tuberville’s demand that the administration scrap the policy unless it’s codified into law. Instead, Biden’s team is letting Senate Republicans take the heat for Tuberville’s stance, according to a Defense Department official and Democratic lawmakers. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke by phone with Tuberville about the hold Thursday afternoon, according to a spokesperson for the senator. Tuberville initially declined a request for the meeting from Austin’s office, saying he was too busy, according to the DOD official, who was granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue. “Coach said he’s grateful for the cordial and productive conversation and looks forward to continuing dialogue in the near future,” according to the spokesperson, Hannah Eddins, referring to Tuberville, a former coach at Auburn University. The hold has mushroomed into a major problem for Republicans, many of whom are facing tough reelections next year. Team Biden plans to tap into voters’ anger after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade in 2022, ending a constitutional right to the procedure. It was a major issue in the 2022 midterms and will be again next year, but Democrats have a strong edge over Republicans on which political party the public believes best represents their views on abortion, according to a KFF Health Tracking Poll. As Republican-held states pass restrictive measures, a variety of polls show growing public support for legalized abortion and dissatisfaction with new laws that restrict it. Three in 10 voters say they will only voted for a candidate who shares their views on abortion, and while 42 percent say the Democratic Party best represents their views on abortion, only about 26 percent say the Republican Party best represents their views. Democratic lawmakers, meanwhile, are using Tuberville’s move to challenge Republicans’ reputation as strong on national defense as a parade of generals and admirals has testified that the procedural hold is hurting the nation. “The problem is a Republican problem. It’s up to Sen. Tuberville’s party to make clear that he is harming national security and needs to put a stop to this,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) told reporters Wednesday. “What Sen. Tuberville is doing undermines the defense of the United States of America. That is not a legitimate political back-and-forth. This is about our security, and we cannot afford this kind of hostage-taking. Our government cannot function.” Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and 21-year veteran of the Senate, said the issue is a political winner for Democrats. “It’s an insult to the military that [Tuberville] claims to love, and it raises the specter of abortion once again, which is proven to be a politically a loser for moderate Republicans,” he said. “This is going to be the gift that keeps on giving. To be clear, Democrats would like to figure out a way to get these nominees confirmed, but you can’t reward a hostage taker like this by giving into his demands.” The DOD official said Pentagon leaders are continuing to meet with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle about the travel policy and Tuberville’s hold. But at this point, the person said, it’s up to the Senate “to decide the path forward.” Tuberville also said he’s not budging. His position is that the administration policy violates the law, and he won’t relent until the Pentagon ends the policy or Democrats codify it.

The Tuberville hold, over Pentagon abortion policies, is showing no signs of letting up as the chamber prepares to come back for its July session. And another run at a rules change is not in the cards. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said in an interview with Burgess last week that he wants the GOP to handle the issue – while building a bit of a pressure campaign on Senate Republicans.

“The pressure mounts each day. And I’m waiting for the Republicans to tell him,” Schumer explained. “Mitch McConnell said something negative about it. I’m hoping the pressure will mount. It’s a loser for them. It’s a loser on both fronts. It’s a loser on women’s right to choose. And it’s a loser on national security.”

The recent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases have refocused attention on the threat posed by unvaccinated and undervaccinated individuals.1 Governments around the world have responded by strengthening laws and policies directed at increasing vaccination rates. The standard menu of options includes education and information initiatives, incentives, and mandates; these may be directed at the general public, health care organizations, or practitioners.

The term mandate is somewhat misleading, because there are exceptions —always on medical grounds, frequently on religious grounds, and sometimes on philosophical grounds. Moreover, the thrust of mandates is not to forcibly require vaccination but to predicate eligibility for a service or benefit on adherence to the recommended immunization schedule of vaccination. In the United States, every state requires proof of immunization for entry into public schools, and some states also have similar requirements for entry into daycare facilities and private schools. These requirements can seem coercive to families who do not have other feasible schooling or child care options. However, the logic and acceptability of these requirements are rooted in the fact that the risks posed by clusters of nonimmunized children are heightened in these very settings.

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID 19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about the dangers of human extinction through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID 19 pandemic is now being controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics and vaccines, it became clear that our current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term. We now have to start thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race? The answer is unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses of bats, pangolins and other exotic animals that live in remote forests in order to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that the human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses which are capable of affecting the function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, heart etc. It is possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to contagious viruses which can cause pandemics, leading to destruction of vital organs, causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart and kidney failures. These diseases could result n the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably the extinction of human race. In this essay, I will first provide a few independent pieces of scientific facts and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all) hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction. I hope that these scary scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes.

WASHINGTON—Congress is grappling with whether lawmakers should be among the first to receive the coronavirus vaccine, which the Food and Drug Administration is expected to approve on an emergency basis in coming days.

The authorization is expected to lead to distribution by year’s end to limited groups such as health-care workers and the elderly, with several months until the general public is able to get vaccinated. Now policy makers face the question of whether lawmakers should receive priority as important elected officials and to give the public confidence in the vaccine—or whether they should wait in line with their constituents.

WASHINGTON (AP) — By the thousands, U.S. service members are refusing or putting off the COVID-19 vaccine as frustrated commanders scramble to knock down internet rumors and find the right pitch that will persuade troops to get the shot.

Some Army units are seeing as few as one-third agree to the vaccine. Military leaders searching for answers believe they have identified one potential convincer: an imminent deployment. Navy sailors on ships heading out to sea last week, for example, were choosing to take the shot at rates exceeding 80% to 90%.

Several reports have described interventions to increase COVID-19 vaccine uptake among military personnel. Segal and colleagues described a series of initiatives in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to foster vaccine uptake, including early vaccination of commanding officers and elite military units to set an example, sharing reliable information on the vaccine via social media, holding group counseling sessions led by medical officers, personally meeting with personnel who refused vaccination, requiring that personnel refusing vaccination accompany other service members to the vaccination sites, and requiring a unit-wide vaccination rate of 85% to ease restrictions on social activities and spaces.4 Talmy and colleagues also reported that individual consultation with a primary care physician increased vaccine uptake rates beyond unit-wide interventions in a single IDF unit.20 Many of these approaches were used by the command from which our data was drawn and may validate this approach as vaccine uptake was rapid.