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Ultimately, the proposal for degrowth as proposed by the Degrowth movement turns out, much like that of green growth, not to be a solution. Most importantly, degrowth has been criticised that its proposal to reduce the GDP of advanced economies will have no significant impact on reducing the world’s Material Footprint (MF), or carbon emissions, significantly enough to avoid an ecological overshoot. This is because most (63%) of current carbon emissions come from developing countries - where it will only continue to increase in the foreseeable future. The 2022 Emissions Gap Report notes UNEP (2022, p. 67) that “virtually the entire future increase in global primary energy demand is expected to occur in these [developing] economies.” And after the GDP of rich economies are downsized - say by a significant 40%, there would still remain a footprint of 60% and 60% of their economies to de-carbonise (Hickel and Hallegatte, 2022). van den Bergh (2011, p.885) concluded that “Even if we would manage to ‘scale the economy down’ to 50% [....] we still only would have reduced the size of the environmental problems by half. But this is by far insufficient for most environmental problems.” It is clearly insufficient to halt the growth in material footprints and carbon emissions and not reduce these “tout court.” Phillips (2019) uses the example of the successful reduction in the hole in the ozone layer to illustrate the shortcoming of the Degrowth proposal, explaining that: “we embraced degrowth with respect to ozone depletion by attempting to arrest growth in, say, the number of fridges in the world—or even reduce the total number—instead of regulation to enforce technology-switching, disaster would have befallen us. Saying ”this many fridges and no more” would only have arrested the growth in emissions, not emissions tout court” (Phillips, 2019). Moreover, even if the GDP growth of all countries, not only that of the developed countries, could be curtailed, it may still not be effective to reduce carbon emissions and MF sufficiently to achieve climate goals. This can easily be seen using the so-called IPAT identity, used to gauge the drivers of the environmental impact of the economy (Bretschger, 2021; Stijn, 2021). The IPAT identity decomposes the environmental impact (I) of an economy into the consequences of population (P), affluence (A) and technology (T) (Holdren, 1993). It can be written as follows (where a ‘hat’ over a variable indicates a rate of change): I = Pˆ + Aˆ P + Tˆ A (1) If affluence (A) - say measured in GDP - is reduced as per degrowthers’ proposal, it will lead to a reduction in impact (I ). This is the basis of degrowth. However, if Pˆ continues to grow, and if technological innovation (Tˆ) declines or remain slow, then the reduction in impact caused by GDP degrowth would be offset. The important point to note is that both of these offset mechanism are more likely to apply at lower levels of GDP. Furthermore, if reduced GDP lead to a reduction in technological innovation in the richer countries, the environmental impact may be even worse. Holdren (1993, p.5) shows in this regard that “a change for the worse in the technology of production is more serious environmentally if it occurs in a populous, affluent society than if it occurs in a small, poor one” - which are the type of the societies that the Degrowth movement want to downsize. Worse even, not only is downsizing the economies of rich countries not likely to be effective, but it may worsen ecological overshoot in several ways. “degrowth might turn out to be dirty” (van den Bergh, 2011, p.882). One is that countries will have less resources to invest in climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies, and hence they will be more vulnerable to the impacts of ecological deterioration (Phillips, 2019). A second is that firms may substitute more expensive cleaner production techniques for cheaper, but more polluting, technologies. Third, government revenues will drop - an inevitable consequence of economic shrinkage. Governments would not be able to borrow further to spend on social and basic needs or environmental protection. They would need to repay their existing debt - in the EU, the rule that government debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP implies that, if GDP declined, debt would also need to fall (Stijn, 2021). Fourth, poorer households in (degrowthed) rich countries are likely to revert to deforestation30 and environmental destruction - as they did during the 2021/2022 winters in Europe when faced with rising energy prices following the Ukraine war (Moloney, 2022; Rankin, 2021; Kauppi et al., 2006). A further shortcoming of degrowth is that if one considers degrowth as a method to decreasing carbon emissions, it is a much more expensive method than any currently comparable technological investments as green growth is pushing for. According to calculations by Jakob and Edenhofer (2014) if the world shrinks GDP per capita by 10% (around US$7,000 billion), it will reduce carbon emissions by about 3.3 gigatons, meaning a cost of US$ 2,100 per ton of emissions. In comparison, the social cost of carbon dioxide (SC-CO2) has been estimated at US$ 185 per ton of emissions (Rennert et al., 2022). In additionn to being likely ineffective, to worsen the environmental challenge, and a very expensive way to reduce carbon emissions, degrowth may disproportionately hurt the poorest of the poor - and make global inequality worse. One mechanism through which this could occur is that degrowth in the Global North will severely curtail development in the Global South because of the intertwined nature of the global economy (and there is no time for the Global South to successfully “decouple” if at all that is possible). The COVID-19 crisis emphasized this inter-dependency - poverty rose more sharply in the Global South than the Global North - and indicated how difficult it would be for the Global South to decouple from the Global North. Hence it may be indeed the case that, ”the degrowth people are living a fantasy where they assume that if you bake a smaller cake, then for some reason, the poorest will get a bigger share of it [. . . .] that has never happened in history” (Horowitz, 2022).Ultimately, degrowth will make global inequality worse because it will be the poor will pay the price, and not the rich, who has the means and connections to find shelter31 - and who has arguably the most wasteful consumption. Hence, “Degrowth is, in essence, a form of ecological austerity for working-class people” (Chambers, 2021). Finally, in the words of Stijn (2021) degrowth is not only ineffective, likely to worsen the environment, very expensive and a form of austerity for the working class, but redundant: “Economic degrowth is not necessary, because it targets the wrong enemy. GDP is not the enemy; environmental impact is the enemy. Environmental scientists are able to determine upper bounds on environmental impacts such as pollution. For example, climatologists have determined the carbon budget: how much greenhouse gases can still be emitted that keep the atmospheric temperature increase below 1,5°C. But GDP is measured in dollars, a totally different quantity than kg CO2. Hence, none of the economic degrowthers are able to say what is the upper bound or true limit on affluence. There are no scientific studies that estimate the maximum level of GDP that is still permissible.”

Earth Overshoot Day, "when humanity has used all the biological resources that the Earth regenerates during the entire year", fell on 28 July 2022. In 1971, it fell on 25 December. This acceleration in using biological resources means that humanity is overshooting planetary boundaries. Our ecological crisis is an overshoot crisis, of which anthropogenic climate change and biodiversity losses are symptoms. The full scale "of the threats to the biosphere and all its lifeforms - including humanity - is so great that it is difficult to grasp for even well-informed experts." We face a “ghastly future.” To avoid this, the degrowth movement is calling for an end to economic growth (as measured by GDP) and shrinkage of the economies of developed countries. Developing countries should use this space in world GDP created by the contraction of developed economies to develop - freed from the unequal and exploitative restrictions imposed by global capitalism. Degrowth advocates do not believe in green growth, the compatibility of continued GDP growth within planetary boundaries, or that technological solutions exist - they reject techno-optimism or any possibility of decoupling between growth and the material footprint of nations. Limitations of Degrowth Degrowthers diagnose a real problem. Unfortunately, the downsizing of western economies is not a solution. At least seven reasons can be highlighted why degrowth is insufficient. Degrowth will not decrease decarbonization Most (63%) of current carbon emissions come from developing countries - where it will only continue to increase in the foreseeable future. The 2022 Emissions Gap Report notes (p. 67) that “virtually the entire future increase in global primary energy demand is expected to occur in these [developing] economies.” Even if western economies are shrunk, they would still be extensive and emit significant carbon. Degrowth will make matters worse Degrowth may be dirty. Global redistribution, as degrowthers envisage, will increase aggregate consumption through a well-known "growth through redistribution" effect. Inequality reduces economic growth, hence the opposite will raise growth. Businesses may substitute more expensive cleaner production techniques for cheaper but more polluting technologies. Governments would also not be able to borrow further to spend on social and basic needs or environmental protection. Degrowth is politically infeasible Because of the endowment effect, people would be unlikely to vote for politicians who propose lowering their levels of GDP per capita, especially in certain countries, at least if it is to fight climate change. A 2022 poll found that only 1% of USA voters listed climate change as the most crucial challenge. And politicians, being generally subject to a status quo bias, would be reluctant to propose such a radical policy. As proponents acknowledge “political parties that have put forward degrowth ideas have received limited support in elections.” Degrowth is expensive Degrowth is not only politically infeasible because voters would not give up their incomes but also because it is a costly way to tackle the ecological crisis. It has been calculated that if the world shrinks GDP per capita by 10% (around US$7,000 billion), it will reduce carbon emissions by about 3.3 gigatons, meaning a cost of US$2,100 per ton of emissions. A recent study published in Nature put the social cost of carbon dioxide (SC-CO2) at US$185 per ton of emissions. Degrowthers want us to pay more than ten times the price. Degrowth policies are disappointing A recent inventory of degrowth policies identified 530 proposals associated with the movement. This proliferation is because the degrowth movement is “multi-faceted". It has become a rally-cry for anyone with a societal and environmental grievance, whether against capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy, or utilitarianism. Because of the confusion this proliferation creates, a recent paper prioritized these into an “Iceberg model of degrowth policy proposals." At the top of the iceberg, prominent policies are universal basic income, work-time reductions, job guarantees, maximum income caps, non-for-profit cooperation, eco-villages, and housing cooperatives. None of these are novel and most are, or have already been, implemented - most extensively in market economies. Furthermore, there is no attempt to link these policy proposals to decoupling - how many carbon emissions would they eliminate? How fast? No evidence is provided. Degrowth is irresponsible The lack of evidence on the carbon reduction that the iceberg model of policies will achieve - and achieve soon, as the matter is pressing - is a concern. We would not imagine subjecting human populations to potentially dangerous experimental drugs without rigorously testing their efficacy. Why embrace the "medicine" prescribed by the degrowth movement? Olivier Simar-Casanova described this ethical and moral problem with degrowth clearly: “Global warming is a serious issue, and claiming to respond to it with solutions of uncertain carbon efficiency, which we do not know how to implement in practice, is irresponsible.” The dangers of shackling economies without any evidence as to the likely outcome are that it would leave the world much more exposed and vulnerable to shocks, make the adjustment to a zero-carbon-emitting economy more costly, and raise the risk of conflict by turning the economy into a zero-sum game. Degrowth is hypocritical Degrowth is no solution to the ecological crisis because it is, at its roots, hypocritical. As one commentator put it: “It is one thing to advocate the end of economic growth if you have no actual fear of poverty. If you are struggling to keep yourself warm and fed, on the other hand, the idea of self-denial – still less of shrinking the economy – will have rather less appeal. Degrowth is a middle–class luxury, an indulgence to be conducted from the comfort of your sofa with its electronic foot-raiser […] People who express disgust with consumerism have a tendency to disapprove of other people’s while overlooking their own.” Conclusion Neither degrowth nor the more mainstream green growth approach offer viable solutions for the ecological crisis. Worse, a recent editorial in Nature magazine pointed out that the disagreement between degrowth and green growth “is impeding action. It’s time for researchers to end their debate. The world needs them to focus on the greater goals of stopping catastrophic environmental destruction and improving well-being.” This is a distraction that cannot be afforded because GDP growth and population growth are, in any case, in decline. We do not need a degrowth experiment to slow it down. We live in the Great Stagnation. Society is gradually ossifying, and with it, its supply of innovative science and ideas, which remain, however remotely, our only chance of avoiding the premature curtailment of humanity’s potential.

What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs.

Creating a safe, inclusive work environment that is free of harassment and microaggressions is critical to maintaining a strong business and retaining employees of color. Voluntary DEI training, rather than mandatory programming, can be a more effective tool in helping employees improve their understanding and skills, no matter their starting point. Voluntary diversity training can take many forms. In our experience, focusing the content of voluntary trainings on history, facts, and tangible actions is the most productive form. Trainings should include education on the causes and effects of systemic racism and other types of discrimination, how to identify and mitigate them in the workplace, and how intentionally inclusive employment practices and workplace behaviors can help to reverse them. Research shows that voluntary DEI training improves racial and ethnic representation within companies, leading to 9% to 13% increases in Black men, Hispanic men, and Asian American men and women in management after five years. This is in contrast to mandatory training, which has been proven to backfire. Compulsory programs can have harmful effects on the retention and advancement of underrepresented groups: Five years after instituting required training, companies found there was no improvement in the proportion of white women, Black men, or Hispanic people in management. Furthermore, the share of Black women managers plummeted by 9%.

One of the most disturbing trends in recent economic thought is the view that green energy should be viewed as a source of good jobs. Such attitudes are bad for our polity and for our economy.

To be clear, the need for greener energy policies is imperative. Honest observers may disagree about the best paths forward, but a simple example illustrates the point about jobs.

Green New Dealers are trying to sell their policies in the name of economic security and justice. However, policies that take away affordable, reliable power from American families are highly regressive. Higher energy costs hit low-income households hardest, because they spend a higher percentage of their budget on energy. The higher these costs climb, the more they are forced to make difficult choices between keeping the heat on or providing food for their family or perhaps going to the doctor. Higher energy prices mean more than just having less money available for other necessities. It means having to spend more for all of the goods and services you purchase. That’s because energy is a critical component of manufacturing, communications and transportation—all of which are involved in getting goods and services to your household. The Green New Deal doesn’t lead to more economic security and justice. It leads to greater economic strain, with low-income families being stressed the most. And where’s the justice in cronyism and corporate welfare. The Green New Deal would open the floodgates of both. Ocasio-Cortez rightly blasted New York’s special tax breaks for Amazon’s proposed HQ2. Offering up billions in state and city special tax breaks left a sour taste in many peoples’ mouths. Cronyism works for big companies because they can offer a lot: investment, jobs and prosperity. But it is not a strategy for long-term economic success because it comes at the expense of other investments and opportunities. The investments will come when there’s an attractive, level-playing field for all companies to compete. The Green New Deal would introduce significantly higher level of cronyism because Ocasio-Cortez wants the federal government (i.e., American taxpayers) to pay for the whole thing. Remember Solyndra, the half-billion dollar solar boondoggle that went belly up? That’s just a small taste of things to come under a Green New Deal that puts potentially trillions of dollars up for grabs. As was the case with Solyndra, when the feds start picking energy technologies and companies to fund, they are essentially gambling with other peoples’ money. And there is never a guarantee the bet will pay off. Solyndra is merely one example of a failed company that could not survive even with the federal government’s help. And there are many other examples of green cronyism that even more closely parallel New York’s erstwhile deal with Amazon, which Ocasio-Cortez found so distasteful. Taxpayers gave money or government-backed loans to companies that already enjoyed large market capitalization and/or substantial private investors. Federal “investment” wasn’t needed. But, hey, who’s gonna turn down free money? The economic pain of green cronyism cuts deeper than wasted taxpayer money. When Washington steers money to — or away from — “favored” businesses or technologies, private-sector investment follow. This not only stifles competition and innovation, it also centralizes control in the hands of politicians, elites and lobbyists.

To assess the economic effects of such a scheme, we started by looking at a carbon tax – the most popular recommendation of those asking government to "nudge" us off of fossil fuels. Using the Energy Information Administration's model, we tested to see how high a carbon tax would have to go to meet the Green New Deal's emission targets. We ratcheted the tax up to $300 per ton, which dropped emissions 58% below 2010 levels – but not until 2050. That left us far short of reaching the deal's targets, but when we tried to push the tax higher, the model crashed. Clearly, the Green New Deal's emission targets are unrealistic. Yet the danger they pose to the economy are far too real. Before the model's lights went out, we found that a $300 per ton carbon tax and associated regulations would cost a family of four nearly $8,000 per year in income lost to higher energy costs, consumer prices and foregone wages. The 20-year cost totals $165,000. During that same 20-year period, the tax would siphon off an average of 1.1 million jobs per year and diminish GDP by a total of more than $15 trillion. That's a hefty price to pay for getting barely halfway to the net-zero emissions goal. Is it worth it? After all, proponents of eliminating conventional fuels argue that the cost of climate change dwarfs the cost of climate policy. However, it terms of "climate insurance," eliminating greenhouse gas emissions doesn't get you very far. To see if this is true, we turned to another tool: the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC). Developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, this model assesses how much increases and decreases in greenhouse gas trajectories will affect global temperatures and sea levels. Running this model, we found that overhauling America's economy – as envisioned in the Green New Deal – would abate global warming by approximately 0.2 degree Celsius by the year 2100. The reduction in sea-level rise would be less than 2 centimeters. In other words, the Green New Deal offers minimal climate improvement at impossibly high prices.

The results of the analysis are typically based on a range of factors that are considered important for achieving sustainable development. Thus, the results of the fuzzy AHP analysis indicate that research and development (GEP2) was found to be the most important policy option (alternative) for transitioning to a sustainable energy future and addressing climate change, followed by carbon pricing (GEP3), RE targets (GEP1), circular economy (GEP6), energy access (GEP4), and green jobs creation (GEP6). The final ranking of different policy options for transitioning to a sustainable energy future and addressing climate change is presented in Table 5.

The fuzzy AHP analysis is a sophisticated decision-making instrument that assists in determining and prioritizing crucial policy alternatives for transitioning to a GE and promoting a sustainable energy future. Consequently, the results indicate that a multifaceted approach, encompassing R&D, carbon pricing, and renewable energy goals, may be necessary to effectively move towards a sustainable energy future and address the challenges of climate change.

In reality, the fiscal costs are likely to be much, much higher, and the economic welfare losses even more significant, because in the labor market and broader economy, a public jobs guarantee program would significantly crowd out productive private sector activity. This type of policy will radically alter behavior of both workers and businesses, and so the supply and demand for labor. The Census shows that, among those who worked in 2016, 70+ million Americans earned under $32,500 (the full‐​time job guarantee salary would be $31,200). Yes, not all of these would seek out positions on the jobs guarantee program. But a large proportion would, especially those employed in uncertain roles with low levels of job security. In fact, some even paid more than $31,200 might consider leaving their jobs to pursue guaranteed roles if they perceive better working conditions or an easier worklife (asked under what conditions someone would be fired from such a role, the Levy Institute paper suggests that you would be sacked for failing to go to work, but that your performance would not be judged by “private sector ‘efficiency criteria’”, for example.) It’s not inconceivable then that over 25 percent of the labor force could find itself part of the scheme. This crowd‐​out is likely to be particularly acute in low productivity regions, and (ironically) after economic downturns. A nationwide jobs guarantee program paying $15 an hour will be particularly attractive to workers in low wage regions, and by setting a de facto wage floor the program will prevent private investment in regions on the basis of cheap labor. Though no doubt there would be some demand spillovers from well‐​paid jobs, the net consequence is highly likely to be weaker private sector job creation in poor regions, which has been the experience of countries such as Britain with a nationwide minimum wages and public sector national pay bargaining. Proponents of the scheme see “higher labor standards” as a good thing, but absent productivity improvements, policies which raise labor costs significantly will reduce the quantity of workers demanded. There’s good reason to expect the policy will reduce the efficiency and productive potential of the economy too. Taxes will eventually need to be raised to cover the net cost of the program. In infrastructure and care giving provision, costs will rise – because nobody would now work in these directly substitutable sectors for less than the wage and conditions offered in the job guarantee program. This will waste resources, and there’s highly likely to be overinvestment in lots of relatively low value ventures and programs to ensure workers are employed, especially given the explicit aim is to provide employment rather than deliver projects at low cost. Throwing resources at regions with higher levels of unemployment and after recessions too will work directly against market signals and deter the mobility of labor (in geographic and industrial terms) and capital to its most productive uses given prevailing market conditions. This is important: yes, employment is highly likely to have some positive externalities; but the real driver of better living standards over time are productivity improvements, discovered by market‐​based activity. Proponents of this policy seem to put an enormous weight on the idea that time out of the labor market has huge scarring consequences which could be ameliorated by any type of temporary employment. But the literature on this shows that temporary jobs do not provide the workers with skills to improve longer‐​term labor market outcomes.

There is substantial variation in whether workplace training and mentorship programs are voluntary or mandatory. When programs are voluntary, many workers do not participate. We conducted a natural field experiment on a mentorship program in a sales call center where in one treatment arm, labeled the Mandatory-Condition, all subjects were either randomly assigned a mentor or not. A second treatment arm, labeled the Voluntary-Condition, required subjects to opt into the program before randomization into receiving a mentor. In the Mandatory-Condition, the mentorship treatment raised workers’ daily revenue by 17% in their first two months of tenure. In the Voluntary-Condition, those who opted out of the program were substantially less productive than those who opted in, and treatment gains conditional on program participation were negligible. Comparing the conditions indicates that treatment effects are largest for workers who are most likely to opt out of participating in the program. We conclude that workplace programs can raise the productivity of lower performing employees but these workers may require inducements or mandates to participate.

Voluntary training is typically a part of a company’s strategy to improve employee knowledge, skills, and job performance. However, it can be difficult to get employees to participate in these programs because they are voluntary. Increasing participation in these training programs not only increases organizational effectiveness, but also is of benefit to the individual employee. Voluntary training can be a win-win situation. Also, if the company infrastructure for web-based training is present (networks, computers, learning management system, etc.), the cost of providing the training opportunity is relatively low. Problem Statement Problem: Companies desire to increase employee and organizational capabilities via voluntary trainining, but in many cases and for various reasons employees do not participate.

The last problem I will discuss here is the problem of coming up with suitable jobs. This to me remains the biggest challenge that is really not satisfactorily answered in JG programs. Hugh Sturgess has provided the most eloquent articulation of this problem I’ve seen so far. Sturgess argues that JG job ideas, justifications, and criteria combine to form an “impossible quadrilateral:”

[I]t is not possible for JG jobs to display all of the following qualities: requiring only basic skills (needed for universal eligibility); socially beneficial; indifferent to time (as JG work is countercyclical); and distinct from the rest of the public sector. Any attempt to achieve one criterion requires abandoning another.

Particular importance is to be assigned to social policy measures, investments in education and the promotion of green jobs. Generally speaking, a green job contributes to preserve or restore the quality of the environment within the economic sectors, by cutting the consumption of energy and raw materials and by reducing greenhouse emissions. In so doing, the companies and the population involved become more environmentally sustainable, as they limit the risk of environmental pollution and desertification (Bowen, 2012, pp. 3 ff.). It is difficult to provide a clear definition for the term “green job” because specific green products or services are not necessarily derived from green production processes (UNEP, ILO, IOE, ITUC 2008, p. 3 and pp. 35-37; ILO, 2012, p. 7). Improving green jobs is important not only from the quantitative point of view – sustainable agriculture is projected to create additional employment (over 200 million full time jobs in 2050) – but also from the qualitative one, because it means bettering the work quality, improving decent work. We can define decent work as employment «under conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity, in which rights are protected and adequate remuneration and social coverage is provided» (UNEP, ILO, IOE, ITUC, 2008, pp. 278 ff.). Consequently, it can help rural populations to benefit from a long-term income. Employment growth would include more labor intensive green farming practices operations, management and preservation of ecosystems, research and development and training of rural populations in the use of green agriculture technologies (UNEP, ILO, IOE, ITUC, 2008; World Bank, 2008).

Promoting green jobs implies taking action into several dimensions. The first one is taking into account that working in agriculture is extremely risky. Therefore, measures are needed to ensure safety and security in the workplace. Moreover, agriculture is a labour intensive sector and specific measures shall be put in place, including the implementation of social security actions (like insurance coverage for natural disasters), ones that prevent rural families/communities from falling into poverty.

Global and national food and nutrition security are facing critical challenges in the decades ahead. It is expected that global food demand will increase by nearly 70% by 2050. This increased demand will be driven by population growth, changing dietary demands of a more affluent and increasingly urban population, and increased competition for resources between food, feed, fiber and biofuel feedstock production. Prospects for achieving these increases in agricultural output will be impaired by deteriorating soil quality, decreasing availability of fresh water, and industrial farming’s high dependence on fossil energy sources for mechanization, pesticides and fertilizers (IAASTD, 2009). The agriculture sector will need to affordably nourish nine billion people worldwide by 2050.

There is evidence suggesting that a successful green transformation of the agricultural sector could meet global food needs while also contributing to the mitigation of GHG, improving the conservation of biodiversity, water and land resources, slowing the pace of rural to urban migration and improving farmers’ adaptation to climate change impacts (Pretty et al., 2006). The transition to more sustainable agriculture practices is needed to support our growing population and should also serve as an economic development engine to create jobs and prosperity in the now impoverished and depopulating rural areas.

“The Green Jobs Advantage: How Climate Friendly Investments are Better Job Creators.” Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. October 2021. https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.20.00142. Accessed 7/13/23)

Clean energy industries are labor intensive. Activities like installing solar panels or retrofitting homes to be more energy efficient are difficult to automate or outsource. By contrast, the fossil fuel industry is highly automated. In the United States, for example, the number of coal workers needed per ton of coal has fallen to one-fifth what it was 60 years ago (Kolstad 2017). Clean energy industries are also experiencing automation and labor efficiency gains, but as of yet not to the same extent as fossil fuel industries.5

Efforts must be made to incorporate changes into training practices, revise training programmes and introduce new ones so as to ensure the employability of workers in a rapidly changing world. The green transition is generating far more demand for upgraded skills in established occupations than it is creating brand new occupations (ILO et al., 2013). In both cases, as green markets evolve and mature, there is an increasing tendency for the related jobs to require more specialized and better-skilled personnel, preferably with formal qualifications. While the initial training system has a role in bringing in a new generation of professionals well prepared for the opportunities and challenges of the twenty first century, continuing training is essential to ensure that those already in work adjust to the rapidly evolving and urgent demands of the green economy. The timeliness or the lack thereof with which TVET systems respond to sustainability concerns and the demand for related skills can put these systems in a virtuous cycle of interaction with the labour market, or alternatively widen the disconnect between the demand for and the supply of skills. A demand-driven approach to greening skills is therefore necessary: the needs of the economic market in terms of jobs and skills must be identified and then answered through appropriate training offers, with the final aim being to ensure the employability of professionals and future professionals in the green economy. However, despite recent changes, many employers still have a lack of knowledge on sustainability related skills and do not explicitly demand such skills or qualifications from their employees (Strietska-Ilina et al., 2011). This is why the TVET system should not be limited to being a mere supplier satisfying economic demands. It also has a responsibility and opportunity to help generate a new generation of workers and entrepreneurs willing and able to frame an economic model adhering to the principles of sustainable development, in a way that fits the national political orientation (Majumdar, 2010). Moving towards sustainability while improving the quality and status of TVET requires innovative and transformational leaders in all policy, economic and educational spheres who can seize the opportunities to create a new vision for twenty-first century skills, jobs, economies and societies.

Challenge 1: Skill shortages are already hampering the transition to greener economies. A lack of the skills needed to meet the requirements of changing and newly emerging occupations impedes green investment and hinders green economic development. This equally applies to skills of established occupations for which demand is growing. Shortages generally reflect underestimates of growth and labour demand, particularly in technology-driven green sectors. In green building, for instance, skills shortages frequently arise when projects are undertaken without sufficient provision for skills development. Similarly, a lack of efficient coordination between investment in a green economy and investment in skills can lead to shortages of relevant green job skills. Many countries lack sufficient teachers and trainers in environmental awareness and specialist areas such as renewable energy.

Challenge 2: Skills and environmental policies need to come together. While most countries have drawn up some environmental policies, few have put in place the skills development strategies needed to implement them (see figure 1). Without coherence between skills and environmental policies, skills bottlenecks may well impede the successful transition to greener production and consumption. European countries are taking a lead in this area, notably France (see box 3). Outside Europe, the United States and Australia stand out in terms of their training response to the challenges posed by greening. In the least developed countries, skills development strategies are rarely included in national climate change adaptation plans. The reasons for this include weak coordination between national planning and labour ministries, and a lack of adequate resources and institutional capacity to implement such strategies. Coordination within individual sectors is also important. In the case of renewable energies, for example, policy coordination and planning are needed to smooth the pace of investment over time so as to provide stable employment for workers, avoid periods of serious skill shortages, and make future demand for skills more predictable, both for providers of training and education and for their students.

The transition to the green economy requires the education and the development of new skills needed for new jobs. The training programs for green jobs can be included in formal and informal education systems.

2. Green economy

68. The development of a dynamic, greener economy will hinge on the availability of skilled and trained people to fill the emerging green jobs. As the UNEP notes, ―shortages of skilled labour could put the brakes on green expansion... it is important both to prepare the workforce at large for the skills requirements inherent in green jobs and to ensure that green industries and workplaces do not face a shortage of adequately skilled workers (UNEP, 2008). Cities are well placed to facilitate this transition of the labour force.

69. There is evidence that skill shortages already exist in certain green sectors around the world. In Germany, employers report a lack of skilled solar photovoltaic (PV) technicians, while smart grid design engineers are in short supply in the United Kingdom. Solar technology installers and renewable energy technology project managers are needed in Spain and Denmark, respectively (CEDEFOP and ILO, 2010). It is difficult, however, to assess the severity of these green skills shortages. According to UNEP (2008), almost all energy subsectors lack skilled workers with the most pronounced shortages found in the hydro, biogas and biomass sectors. Skill gaps are also pressing for manufacturing in the renewable energy industry, particularly for engineers, operation and maintenance staff and site management.

Green HRM practices develop the knowledge of employees towards the environment while encouraging them to use this knowledge to achieve organisational goals, which, in turn, leads to performing environmentally friendly behaviour at the workplace. Indeed, employees are known to avoid behaviours for which they lack sufficient knowledge to engage in (Chan et al., 2014). Thus, the role of green HRM practices is to boost the environmental knowledge of employees, so that they can execute EGB at the workplace without hesitation. Several studies argue that for green HRM to be an effective force in creating EGB in the workplace, organisations should have recruiting strategies targeted at hiring and retaining workers possessing environmental beliefs and values like motivation. Therefore, organisations that consider employee environmental performance and effective training programs, as well as provide employees with the opportunity to get involved and participate help to improve the environmental awareness, behaviours, skills and knowledge of their employees (Dumont et al., 2016; Renwick et al., 2013).

When green valued employees are recruited into an organisation, they provide no opposition to environmental sustainability initiatives, and, instead, these employees are passionate about contributing to environmental management initiatives (Jia et al., 2018). When employees are trained, they become more knowledgeable about what and how to mitigate environmental degradation, consequently becoming green champions. The proper and transparent compensation of employees based on their environmental performance enhances the desire of employees to learn more and find more ways to protect the environment (Ren et al., 2018). Finally, the involvement of the employees in decision making through feedback and suggestions reassures employees in their confidence of organisational support for the environment and increases their concern about the environment. Simultaneously, this involvement enhances their commitment to the environment through knowledge sharing (Saeed et al., 2019). When employees are more knowledgeable about the environment, then they will be committed and compelled towards performing EGB.