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Michael Fakhri, Special Rapporteur on the right to food, said his report was on conflict and violence in food systems.  Conflict and violence were the primary causes of hunger, malnutrition, and famine.  Hunger and famine did not arise because there was not enough food to go around; they were caused by political failures, meaning that hunger and famine could only be addressed through political action.  Without international cooperation on recovering from the pandemic and tackling the food crisis, every national plan would fail to address rising rates of hunger, malnutrition, and famine. 

In the discussion on the right to food, some speakers said they were deeply concerned about the increasing impact of violence in food systems, crops and livelihoods.  Conflict remained a key driver for food insecurity and malnutrition, and represented one of the main hindrances for the fulfillment of the right to food.  Conflict negatively affected entire food systems and exacerbated the unaffordability of healthy diets.  Around 345 million people were projected to be food-insecure in 2023 – more than twice the number than in 2020.

It would be unwise, however, to assume that the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea, attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to probe and test U.S. and allied resolve, provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate. Current U.S. strategic thinking could trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to spiral out of control. That is the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen again.

War games seem to confirm these historic lessons. One of us has taken part in numerous simulations over the last five years asking seasoned experts and officials to role-play how Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and American leaders might respond to crises in the South and East China Seas. The results are typically sobering. Some end in a rapid Chinese fait accompli, such as the seizure of a disputed island with minimal cost, while U.S. and allied leaders dither. This type of scenario would lead to considerable damage to international norms, U.S. alliances, and American national security.

A war involving the U.S. and China could not easily be contained. Warned the Brookings Institution’s : “Neither Beijing nor Washington would accept defeat in a limited engagement. Instead, the conflict probably would expand horizontally to other regions and vertically, perhaps even to include nuclear weapons threats — or their actual use. It literally could become the worst catastrophe in the history of warfare.”

Also offering a sober judgment , both with the American Enterprise Institute:

Global economic growth is peaking and vulnerable to a trade war

A trade war, initiated by the United States, would do serious damage to the global economy as protectionist actions escalate. Countries imposing tariffs and countries subject to tariffs would experience losses in economic welfare, while countries on the sidelines would experience collateral damage. If tariffs remain in place, losses in economic output would be permanent, as distorted price signals would prevent the specialization that maximizes global productivity.

Through his LinkedIn profile, Dalio  focusing on the "great power conflict" and what’s going on with China. He claimed the piece is informed by two recent visits to Beijing where he spent a total of 13 days.

"The United States and China are on the brink of war and are beyond the ability to talk," Dalio wrote. "I want to emphasize that by saying that they are on the brink, I don’t mean to say that they will necessarily go over the brink. I mean to say that they are very close to crossing red lines that, if crossed, will irrevocably push them over the brink into some type of war that damages these two countries and causes damage to the world order in severe and irrevocable ways — like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did for Russia and the world, just much bigger."

As China continues amassing economic and political clout and an American-led global order appears less sustainable, it becomes “frighteningly easy to develop scenarios in which American and Chinese soldiers are killing each other,” Allison warns. When there is mistrust at the top, when worldviews are irreconcilable and when each side regards its own leadership as preordained, any nudge will do. “Could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in Taiwan, jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live, instability in North Korea or even a spiraling economic dispute provide the spark to a war between China and the U.S. that neither wants?” he asks. (In “Destined for War,” this is a rhetorical question.)

First and most obviously, a carbon tariff would impose significant new costs on American consumers, companies, and workers. For example, recent U.S. tariffs on more than $350 billion worth of imports have been found to cost Americans over $50 billion per year. The PROVE IT Act targets over $600 billion worth of imports, suggesting the cost of carbon tariffs could be even higher than the Trump‐​Biden tariffs. Import taxes hurt Americans by increasing prices, particularly those in the lowest income brackets, and U.S. companies’ competitiveness by raising their production costs or insulating protected firms from market competition. For example, President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on imported steel inflicted significant damage on steel‐​consuming U.S. companies (like nail manufacturers)—the new taxes cost their workers directly through layoffs and the companies became less competitive as they were forced to either share the costs with their customers by raising prices, reduce production, or decrease investment. As a result, the tariffs did little to “level the playing field,” instead the President surrendered home‐​field advantage and gave the edge to foreign competition, who faced no such taxes.

Second, the history of U.S. tariff policy raises serious concerns that a carbon tariff would not be administered in a sound and impartial manner. Instead, these tariffs would simply be a vehicle for rote protectionism. A prime example of such protectionism is the steel tariffs imposed or maintained under the Bush II, Trump, and Biden administrations, which had political motivations far exceeding any economic ones. At the same time, U.S. trade remedies (antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/​CVDs)) law utilizes a process to calculate dumping or subsidization of imports that “injures” domestic industry but can be “remedied” by imposing duties (tariffs). Similar calculations are likely to be used for carbon intensity. However, AD/​CVDs law is notorious for being strongly biased against imports and American consumers. Even worse, in reality, the law is used as a way to deliver protectionist rents to a handful of well‐​connected companies (including, again, steel).

What are the impacts of carbon pricing and border adjustment mechanisms?

There are nearly 70  carbon pricing schemes globally – these capture the costs of emissions in terms of climate change-related loss and damage to human health, the environment, property and so on and tie it to their source through a price, e.g. by applying a tax. However, approaches to pricing vary, and methods to compare their equivalence are only beginning to take form. This has prompted some governments to consider carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs), which work by imposing a fee on carbon-intensive goods being imported from countries with less stringent climate policy. This can be a way to level the playing field among firms subject to different climate-related regulations and taxes and can disincentivise companies from shifting their production activities to locations where operating costs may be lower due to less stringent climate policies (causing so-called ‘carbon leakage’). However, even if aimed at addressing legitimate environmental concerns such as carbon leakage, such unilateral measures can generate trade tensions and create high administrative costs for firms and governments engaging in international trade. They can further affect trade patterns by incentivising re-shoring (the shifting of production back home to avoid imports) or short-circuiting of supply chains (where less efficient exporters are favoured).

“The two countries are now on a fast track of cooperation, even though neither side has announced it, internally, they are committed (to this),” Shen said, noting that it was likely both sides in the recent visits had listed out concerns for the other to consider while working toward the next round of exchange.

And despite tough talk from Chinese leaders like Wang Yi, Shen said Beijing was open to cooperate on issues where it was possible, like climate, even amid broader tensions.

“We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive,” said US Treasury Secretary  following a short trip to Beijing earlier this month. Her visit came just a few weeks after that of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who  of fruitful discussions regarding key priorities in the US-China relationship. US Climate Envoy John Kerry was also recently in Beijing and raised the possibility of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden meeting in  later this year. In May, Biden spoke of a coming diplomatic “” with Beijing, and all signs now seem to indicate that the US-China relationship is stabilizing—perhaps even improving.

Such progress is welcomed by some China watchers, given the undeniable need for cooperation between the two nations to address  such as climate change, drug trafficking, post-pandemic recovery, arms control, food security, and economic growth, even as some are wary of whether Beijing’s efforts on these issues are in good faith.

For many economists, however, the trade deficit has been scapegoated, and they argue that the trade deficit is not itself a problem for the U.S. economy. That’s because a larger trade deficit can be the result of a stronger economy, as consumers spend and import more while higher interest rates make foreign investors more eager to place their money in the United States.

CFR Distinguished Fellow Michael Froman, a former U.S. trade representative, pushes back on the Trump administration’s emphasis that “trade deficits mean you lose, and surpluses mean you win.” He says that Trump’s narrow focus on trade in goods, which disregards the services surplus, is particularly unhelpful. “Every legitimate economist states that measuring trade policy by the size of the goods deficit is probably not a passing grade in a basic economics class,” he said at a CFR trade symposium in October 2017.

Most economists do not see the trade gap as money “lost” to other countries, nor do they worry about trade deficits to a large degree. That’s because trade imbalances are affected by a host of macroeconomic factors, including the relative growth rates of countries, the value of their currencies, and their saving and investment rates. For instance, America’s trade deficit narrowed dramatically during the Great Recession, when national consumption faltered.

Mr. Trump has long argued that the trade deficit hinders economic growth, and that reducing it will accelerate American job creation. Even those who agree with that view say there are better ways to reduce the imbalance than through tariffs, which can backfire and further widen the trade deficit if other countries impose reciprocal tariffs.

But other countries whose exports get hit with the border taxes might not see it that way. China, for example, the U.S.’s number one trading partner and the world’s largest emitter, could bring complaints to the World Trade Organization, which prohibits protectionist tariffs and could authorize China to retaliate. (After Trump instituted heavy tariffs on foreign steel, China and the European Union launched WTO challenges and retaliatory taxes against many U.S. imports, including soybeans and bourbon.)

That’s the problem with a potential carbon border tax: At best, it could help protect critical industries during a difficult switch to green energy; at worst, it could spark a trade war that would slow efforts to cut emissions.

Border carbon adjustment (BCA), long avoided and dismissed as a policy instrument sure to trigger trade disputes and poison the atmosphere of multilateral climate negotiations, is now the subject of earnest discussion among trade and climate policy-makers, civil society, affected industries, research institutes, and inter-governmental organizations. But we’re not yet having the right kind of discussion.

Studies of carbon border adjustments are marked by divergent views on their effectiveness. Proponents of carbon border adjustments argue that they can enhance the global mitigation effort by generating revenues for sustainable development, incentivising efficiency, and encouraging recalcitrant parties to increase the domestic cost of emissions (Anouliès 2015, Balistreri et al 2018, Bullock 2018, Antón 2020). By contrast, other scholars take a more critical view and argue that carbon border adjustments will be abused for protectionist purposes, resulting in trade wars, generating little welfare and disrupting international cooperation on climate policy (Kuik and Hofkes 2010, Moore 2011, Antimiani et al 2013, 2016, Black 2017). Researchers have compared the effectiveness of carbon border adjustments with rebates for exporters (Fischer 2012, Jakob et al 2013, Böhringeret al 2017a), an international cap and trade system (Hecht and Peters 2019), shared responsibility (Chang 2013) and punitive tariffs (Irfanoglu et al 2015).

BCA proposals have been floated not only as a measure to combat leakage but also as a means to secure greater cooperation: to avoid tariffs, other nations could adopt equivalent emissions pricing73,74. The terms-of-trade effect establishes the economic rationale of BCA as a sanctioning instrument. Numerical simulation studies that incorporate the strategic behaviour of individual countries suggest that import adjustments could coerce a broader international cooperation in emissions pricing under certain conditions75–77. When cast more broadly as uniform percentage tariffs on the imports of outsiders, a carbon club may even induce a large, stable coalition with high levels of abatement78. In this vein, a climate club that combines emissions pricing with trade sanctions could be a game changer. However, such sanctions are more likely than BCA to conflict with WTO obligations and induce trade disputes. Recent economic analyses show that the additional consideration of retaliation significantly reduces the appeal of import adjustments as a means to expand climate coalitions and may even risk a detrimental trade war79,80

From a legal perspective, import charges in WTO-compatible BCAs may not be sufficient to bring many pollution-intensive countries into a carbon-pricing coalition51,78. Moreover, the use of BCA as leverage for country-specific actions, as opposed to leakage prevention, could violate common but differentiated responsibilities principles. In international climate negotiations, BCAs could lead countries to reduce their voluntary commitments under the Paris Agreement, which would undermine the strategic value of BCA as a sanctioning instrument. China, as a prime example, responded to the EU’s proposal for import adjustments by saying such a policy would seriously undermine international efforts to fight global warming; other large non-OECD countries, such as India, Indonesia and Thailand, share the view that BCA is a protectionist and discriminatory policy measure that they will oppose81.

It’s too early to call the start of deglobalisation, but far from business as usual

Overall, world merchant trade is still digesting the effects of two major shocks seen in recent years. The pandemic extremes caused a lot of problems related to supply being curbed and demand overheating, these issues seem to be easing rapidly at the moment and we don’t expect supply-chain issues on the same scale as that seen in recent years anytime soon.

By analyzing thousands of country pairs over several decades, many researchers have found that increasing trade between two countries lowers the risk of war between them. They have also found that countries that are more dependent on international trade have fewer conflicts than self‐​reliant ones, which provides us all with a security interest in other countries’ global integration as well.

It’s not just trade though; it’s free trade. A series of statistical analyses by the political scientist Patrick McDonald show that the level of free trade between two countries has a larger effect on peace. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to attack or be attacked than protectionist countries. Free trade removes the barriers and privileges that enhance the domestic power of groups that generally support authoritarian leaders and an aggressive foreign policy.

A trade war would do enormous damage. It could foster a resentful and aggressive China and lead to the situation foreseen by Mearsheimer (2001), where a declining America decides to halt China’s rise. Decisions for war or peace Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s China’s Search for Security (2012) is noteworthy for its systematic inclusion of economic factors in a security oriented analysis. The driver of China’s foreign policy is its search for security, the book claims. Where the offensive realist Mearsheimer sees regional hegemony and global power as means to acquire national security, the defensive realists Nathan and Scobell distinguish between security and hegemony: Beijing wants security but not global power. When Beijing says it wants peace it means stability so it can ‘concentrate on economic development’ (Nathan and Scobell, 2012: 28). A country’s foreign policy is driven by its factual interests, although the causal path from interest to policy may be distorted by misinformation, miscalculation, value commitments, institutional weaknesses or leadership shortcomings. Nathan and Scobell think China will remain a ‘status quo power in a system designed by the West’ but hold it possible that future Chinese leaders may challenge US pre-eminence if Washington does not keep up the economic foundation for US power (Nathan and Scobell, 2012: 13, 346, 357). What could unravel the global system would not be China’s rise but US decline. This is the main risk, as they see it. If ‘the West weakens itself to the point of creating a power vacuum’, then China will acquire bases around the world and replace the dollar with the renminbi in its foreign trade. The US would thus have to decide whether and when to resist, and this could lead to war. The recipe for peace is that the US maintains its strength and conducts a cautious foreign policy. China is likely to act rationally on the basis of its search for security (Nathan and Scobell, 2012: xi, 359). It follows from their reasoning that the risk of war will increase if China can no longer depend on the US for its economic development, while the US retains sufficient military power to believe it can win a war. Again it is seen that a politically motivated reduction in the Sino–US economic interdependence is a likely precursor to any crisis leading to war. If Nathan and Scobell’s reasoning is combined with Roach’s analysis of financial politics and Copeland’s ‘trade expectation’ argument it seems that the key to minimizing the risk of war is to rebalance the global economic system in a way allowing the major powers to remain codependent. A combination of mutual nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence is likely to preserve global peace as long as no major power expects to see a rapid decline in its relative power. Deterrence and inter-dependence are both, however, precarious. One depends on credibility, the other on the expectation that flows are kept open within a mutually beneficial financial and trading system.

This free-rider concern led Nordhaus (2015) to propose a climate club, whereby ambitious jurisdictions could group together and seek to prevent free-riding behavior by levying penalties on insufficiently ambitious jurisdictions. In theory, ambition need not take the form of a carbon price; other measures that reduce emissions could be considered equivalent. In practice, Nordhaus cautioned that relying on price mechanisms would make implementation far more straightforward. Otherwise, it would be difficult to measure the relative stringency of countries’ policies, and any such judgements could swiftly become contentious.

In a climate club, penalties against low-ambition countries could take the form of a broad tariff on all imports, which has advantages relative to a carbon border adjustment mechanism. It is administratively simpler, because there is no need to measure the carbon content of imports. It is also less prone to trade reshuffling in response, because all goods from non-club countries would face the tariff.