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2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: McCarthy DA

Appropriations bill comes loaded with extinction riders—that kills prairie chicken and sage grouse populations.

CBD ‘07/17 – The Center for Biological Diversity is a nonprofit membership organization known for its work protecting endangered species through legal action, scientific petitions, creative media and grassroots activism. “House ‘Extinction Rider’ Seeks to Gut Imperiled Birds’ Protections: Legislation Would Harm Lesser Prairie Chickens, Sage Grouse”, Press Release, 07/17/2023; https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-releases/congressional-extinction-rider-seeks-to-gut-imperiled-birds-protections-2023-07-17/ Accessed 07/30/2023 | RN

WASHINGTON― U.S. Rep. Mike Simpson (R-ID) has introduced a must-pass Interior Department appropriations bill with riders that would gut Endangered Species Act protections for the lesser prairie chicken and imperiled populations of sage grouse. The birds all teeter on the brink of extinction.

The House Interior Department appropriations bill cuts funding for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service by $236 million below fiscal year 2023 levels. The House bill continues a long-standing rider preventing Endangered Species Act protections for the greater sage grouse and the Columbia basin distinct population segment of the greater sage-grouse. The bill also blocks the Interior secretary from using appropriated money to list the bi-state distinct population of greater sage grouse found in a small area of the Eastern Sierra of California and adjacent Nevada.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: McCarthy DA

Turn: the appropriations bill guts readiness—climate, civilian work, gutted military equality, and cost.

Kauffman ‘06/15 – Tim Kauffman, communications specialist with the American Federation of Government Employees and former Journalist. “House Defense Funding Bill Would Harm Readiness and National Security, AFGE Says”, Press Release, American Federation of Government Employees, 06/15/2023; https://www.afge.org/publication/house-defense-funding-bill-would-harm-readiness-and-national-security-afge-says/ Accessed 07/30/2023 | RN

The draft appropriations bill funding the Department of Defense for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1 would cut $1.1 billion from civilian personnel who are vital to military operations and another $714.8 million in programs targeting climate change, which the Pentagon has identified as a critical national security issue.

The bill removes a section from previously passed bills that prohibits across-the-board caps in civilian personnel and requires DoD to analyze the impact on military readiness, force structure, workload, lethality, stress on the force, and fully burdened costs before downsizing the civilian workforce. It also would limit how Pentagon leaders can manage their workforces by imposing restrictions on diversity initiatives, paid leave for service members obtaining reproductive health care, and a host of other issues that impact military readiness.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: McCarthy DA

Historical and state examples prove that appropriations delays are routine and auto-CR doesn’t impact spending, minimizes cost, is quickly resolved, and is key to government functioning.

CRFB ‘20 – The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget is a nonpartisan, non-profit organization committed to educating the public on issues with significant fiscal policy impact. “Better Budget Process Initiative: Automatic CRs Can Improve the Appropriations Process”, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 09/17/2020; https://www.crfb.org/papers/better-budget-process-initiative-automatic-crs-can-improve-appropriations-process Accessed 07/30/2023 | RN

Unfortunately this end-of-fiscal-year impasse is not unusual. Congress has only passed all appropriations bills on time 3 of the last 44 fiscal years. And in several instances – most recently between December 22, 2018, and January 25, 2019 – failure to reach agreement has resulted in a full or partial government shutdown.

Fortunately, we can avoid such disruptions. In the wake of the U.S. government’s most recent shutdown, bipartisan support surged for legislation to provide for automatic continuing resolutions (auto-CRs). Under current law, if Congress fails to pass new appropriations bills or a CR before the prior funding expires, parts of the government cease operations. Auto-CRs ensure that funding for programs will continue, thereby preventing such government shutdowns.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: McCarthy DA

This DA is terrible: bills passing now means UBI isn’t enough to thump, extensions prevent shutdown, there’s bipartisan commitment, and the main controversy is from within the Republican camp—McCarthy’s PC for passing a single of 12 bills isn’t sapped by a Democrat UBI.

Morgan and Walker ‘07/27 – David Morgan, Politics Reporter for Thomson Reuters and Josephine Walker, National Politics Reporter at Reuters. “US House approves first 2024 spending bill, delays a second”, Reuters, 07/27/2023; https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-votes-approve-first-2024-spending-bill-2023-07-27/ Accessed 07/30/2023 | RN

WASHINGTON, July 27 (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday passed the first of 12 fiscal 2024 spending measures that Congress must enact by Sept. 30 or risk a government shutdown, but Republican infighting over spending levels clouded the path ahead for the other bills.

The House voted 219-211 to approve the $155.7 billion military construction and veterans affairs bill, forwarding it to the Democratic-led Senate, which has already crafted its own version of the legislation.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Farm Bill DA

Turn – too many resources lead to conflict means we gotta obliterate them, proves Bataille huling 19

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)//EKW

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Farm Bill DA

Farm bill can’t solve---immigration thumps, 1NC 3 is about UKRAINE which doesn’t solve.

Joby Young 23. Executive vice president at the American Farm Bureau Federation. "2022’s Top Ag Issues and A Look Ahead". American Farm Bureau Federation. 1-4-2023. https://www.fb.org/focus-on-agriculture/2022s-top-ag-issues-and-a-look-ahead

The lack of farmworkers continues to be U.S. agriculture’s most frustrating challenge. With rising wage rates and record usage of the H-2A visa program, labor shortages must be addressed. We spent a great deal of time trying to negotiate a bipartisan solution. Unfortunately, negotiators were unable to reach agreement. We are right back at the table with a new Congress as we work to make the H-2A program accessible and affordable.

Trade

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Farm Bill DA

Especially because the farm bill won’t be voted on for nearly a year.

Chase 7-12-23 (Spencer, is the managing editor for Agri-Pulse which is a trusted source in Washington, D.C., with the largest editorial team focused on food and farm policy coverage. 7-12-23 “Every farm bill is unique. So is the process to pass it.” https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/19614-every-farm-bill-is-unique-so-is-the-process-to-pass-it)//BH-NB//

Congress is taking so long to start writing a new farm bill that the legislation won't be enacted until well into 2024, or even later, if the timelines for the four most recent farm bills are any guide.  If President Joe Biden were to sign a farm bill by the end of this September — when authorization for many of the programs in the 2018 farm bill is set to expire — Congress would have achieved in less than 80 days what has previously taken an average of about 18 months. How Congress ultimately approaches the reauthorization of the 2018 farm bill is yet to be determined, but it's certainly not going to happen in 2023, based on how long the process has taken in the past.  “I don't know if I can compare [the current process] to anything else because I can't remember any of the farm bills that I've been involved with that we haven't done a markup in full committee — in either committee — before Labor Day,” Randy Russell, who has worked on farm bills as a congressional staffer, USDA official, and lobbyist over his four-decade-long tenure in farm policy, told Agri-Pulse. The last time a farm bill was enacted into law in an odd-numbered year — the first year of a new Congress — was 1985. The last time the farm bill passed without an extension — or following the expiration of many of its authorized programs, as was the case with the 2018 law — was in 2002. The reauthorization process for the last four farm bills has averaged just over 550 days from start to finish; the shortest of those timelines was the 252-day process for the 2018 bill.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Farm Bill DA

1NC 1 the Farm bill won’t pass due to thumpers and if it does the republicans will intervene anyways—your card just says they’re having “hearings and roundtables”

Jim Wiesemeyer 6-5. Washington analyst for Pro Farmer, previously a Washington editor with Doane’s Agricultural Report and Washington editor and managing editor of the Washington Farmletter. "3 Reasons the Farm Bill is Behind Schedule". Drovers. 6-5-2023. https://www.drovers.com/news/ag-policy/3-reasons-farm-bill-behind-schedule

The Senate and House Ag committees are facing delays in drafting the next farm bill, and it is expected to be the most expensive farm bill to date, clocking in at around $1.5 trillion.

The process is “behind schedule” judging by past experiences with previous farm bills. Neither of the committees have established a timeline for crafting the legislation, although whispers have a draft coming before the August recess, or no later than September.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Farm Bill DA

We indict the framing of this DA: politics subordinate humanity to productivity which, while claiming to represent the people

Pawlett ‘15 – William Pawlett is a senior lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society, “Chapter 3: Politics and Community”, published by Taylor & Francis, 07/24/2015, pg. 61-62 ID.ELC *bracketed for problematic language

Bataille’s publications on politics ridicule ethical and moral thinking as the props and alibis of liberal capitalist exploitation, stating that all thought that does not immediately challenge capitalism has a ‘demeanour of senile trickery and comical smugness’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 32). Mainstream political debate and ethical discussion is ruled by such trickery and smugness to this day. There has been absolutely no rejuvenation of political thought since Bataille’s day, indeed if the dominant liberal traditions were senile in Bataille’s age, they are zombified today, preserved in a media void, neither dead nor alive and leaving the majority utterly indifferent. Yet, Bataille’s position was an optimistic one: the ‘uprising of the lower classes’ promised a new society beyond bourgeois liberal capitalism. The agitation of the lower classes is analogous to the left pole of the sacred: they must bring down the elevated and powerful in order to rejuvenate the whole. Bataille finds in Nietzsche powerful support for his growing dis- trust of political organisation and action. For Bataille, politics (in the accepted or restricted sense) is always tied to temporality, to objects Politics and community 61 62 Politics and community and goals: it reflects on the past, finds it deficient and seeks improve- ments for the future. This is what enslaves [subordinates] politics to time or duration, just as it enslaves [subordinates] human beings to a condition of working for and anticipating ends and goals, and the elusive search for happiness. The present moment is denied or suppressed. Being is thus fragmented by role, career, position, place, time. For Bataille, the present – an eternal moment of infinite freedom, must not be denied. Given this constitutive fragmentation, politics, in the conventional sense, can only fail. It must fail because, in a sense, it is designed to fail, just as ethics always fails – neither really help the lowly or excluded. They fail because their purpose is to defuse the incendiary nature of being, to deny the scream of life, to prescribe a slow, torturous neutralisation of life mortgaged against the future. The future always belongs to those with power; it is the now which must be seized. Bataille’s ‘politics’ is a politics of community, of an ‘impossible’ community. Though Bataille rejects parliamentary democracy and its political systems, parties and organisations as barriers to freedom, along with all utopian attempts to reform or ameliorate the existing system, it does not follow that his thought is apolitical as some have charged. Bataille’s revolutionary thinking on the political envisages a different world, a fundamentally altered society, and an altered or ‘other’ commu- nism (Bataille, in Mitchell & Winfree, 2009, p. 205). Far from giving up on these hopes, Bataille turned to mysticism and to eroticism to deepen this search for revolutionary transformation. Mysticism and eroticism do indeed open new worlds, worlds radically other than that of productive, servile labour and the demands of capitalist accumulation.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Econ DA

UBI doesn’t cause any more inflation than anything else

360info 23 [360info, is an open access global information agency of journalists working with academics to address the world's biggest challenges and offer practical solutions, "Universal Basic Income does not cause inflation",4-10-2023, Newsroom, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/universal-basic-income-does-not-cause-inflation, 1LEE]

There is, however, widespread belief that any monetary intervention stimulates hyper-inflation of the form found in 1920s Germany, 1990s Argentina and 2000s Zimbabwe. This is because people believe giving consumers more money to spend leads to businesses charging higher prices to take advantage of increased purchasing power, creating a cycle in which employees demand higher wages to buy commodities, increasing the cost of production, cancelling out any benefit from the monetary intervention and actually reducing the standard of living overall.

UBI is a redistributive economic policy that can be funded by taxing those resources that contribute little to society: wealth and passive income from shares as well as income at the very top end of society

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Econ DA

Link turn – implementing UBI would generate strong a potential growth effect for permanent consumption and income.

Miller 21, (Joshua Z. Miller is a writer and research assistant for the UBI center.) “Universal basic income and inflation: reviewing theory and evidence” UBI Center, June 2021, https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=855089082102112067098098095081105113102082065014007039108087069002094126076005090111050117107034029039046028092029126117001105039086075069039068008115108028093096119020043021064094071091119021123028004012076117117088118122093070105085076117110104018027&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE// EE

The most important studies done in the realm of measuring the price effects of universal basic income have been two general equilibrium studies, one looking at transfers from the NGO GiveDirectly in Kenya25 and the other studying the Mexican food assistance program “Programa de Apoyo Alimentario”.26 Both studies evaluated transfer programs to very impoverished places and the latter to a relatively closed economy, so obviously we can expect discrepancies between the evidence and what would happen in reality given a universal basic income in North America. Egger et al. find that there was less than 1% price inflation on average as a result of the transfers. The greatest price effect is to housing, which the authors do not find statistically significant. There is a strong increase in consumption and firm profits, akin to an aggregate demand increase, with spillover effects, and little-to-positive labour hours change. The authors believe they found a transfer multiplier effect of over 2. Additionally, there was a formation of a strong potential growth effect in terms of permanent consumption and income as estimated by the authors. This overall aligns with my model; that is that is, cash transfers caused growth in both permanent output and output level and almost-nonexistent price change. This checks out intuitively: an increase in income resulted in more consumption and more output in an economy that has room to grow, so there will not be additional money-per-unit-of-output that ultimately underlies the Quantity Theory of Money. The Cunha, Georgi, and Jayachandra study finds again a neglible price inflation effect. However, they do find that in-kind transfers provide deflation compared to cash transfers in isolated villages. Isolated villages likely suffer from imperfect competion and aren’t factored in to the monetary partial equilibrium. In the more-developed world with stronger market institutions, we would likely see different. Unfortunately, data for programs like these in the developed world is scarce.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Econ DA

US economic growth is weakened – and its gonna stay that way for a minute.

Pan 6-14 [Jing Pan; Writer for Yahoo Finance; 6-14-2023; "World Bank Just Halved Its US Growth Forecast For 2024, Saying The Economy 'Is Likely To Remain Weak' — 3 Investment Strategies Tailored For A Sluggish Economy"; Yahoo Finance; https://finance.yahoo.com/news/world-bank-just-halved-us-183350526.html;]//LASA-بيلال

The World Bank just slashed its forecast for U.S. economic growth for 2024.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) in the country is now projected to grow by 0.8% in 2024, according to the international lending institution’s latest Global Economic Prospects report. Previously, its forecast was 1.6%.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Disads › AT: Econ DA

A Recession is expected

Jimenez 5-25 [Miguel Jiménez; 5-25-2023; "Interest rate hikes slow down US economic growth"; EL PAÍS English; https://english.elpais.com/economy-and-business/2023-05-25/interest-rate-hikes-slow-down-us-economic-growth.html;]//LASA-بيلال

From January to March, The increase in real GDP reflected increases in consumer spending, exports, federal government spending, state and local government spending, and non-residential fixed investment that were partly offset by decreases in private inventory investment and residential fixed investment. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased, said the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Interest rates are mostly holding back the construction sector, which is very sensitive to the price of money. Other sectors are seeing their activity slow down amid more restrictive financial conditions as well as inflation that is eroding consumers’ purchasing power. The labor market, however, remains very strong, with the unemployment rate at 3.4%, its lowest in more than half a century.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Kritiks › AT: Racial Cap K

This is a root cause debate— The Dutch East India Company set a racist standard.

Saldanha 13 Arun Saldanha is Associate Professor at the Department of Geography, Environment and Society at the University of Minnesota, USA Geographies of Race and Food Fields, Bodies, Markets.

Social scientists committed to anti-racism and anti-capitalism have long criticized the dominant Malthusian framework for understanding the unequal distribution of food. Following Marx’ critique, David Harvey (2001, chapter 3) observes that Malthusianism still drives powerful governments and international institutions. Malthus’ conception of the relationship between resources and population, conceived at the beginning of England’s industrial phase in colonialism, systematically neglects the historical debts Europe’s abundance owes to the rest of the world. This chapter joins the Marxist critiques, bringing into greater clarity the racializing repercussions of the utilitarian philosophy underpinning both Malthus and colonialism. Against Marx, however, I will conceive the expansion of food production and the transplanting of populations not as a rationally guided process at all, but with Georges Bataille, as soaked with ambiguous desires and outbursts of destructive and self-destructive animosity. The early Dutch efforts to monopolize the spice trade in the eastern Indonesian archipelago should be seen as the quintessential example of such irrational mercantile usurpation.

In the first decades of the seventeenth century there was a strong tendency in the Dutch East India Company towards a division of labor based on visible corporeal difference as well as prejudice and brutality against Indonesians, other Asians, and African slaves. It was not yet racism as we know it today, not yet based on delineated and essentialized ‘races’. We could call it ‘protoracism’ in analogy with J.M. Blaut’s concept of ‘protocapitalism’ (1993). As a complex assemblage spanning Europe and the West and East Indies, the colonial-racial system developing with mercantile capitalism would quite rapidly pitch white Europeans against brown and black non-Europeans. It is crucial to theorize this system as one involving new regimes of production, distribution, and consumption of food. Keeping in mind Sidney Mintz’ study of sugar (1986), it is not difficult to show that all exotic foodstuffs imported en masse into Europe also circulated racial stereotypes.

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Kritiks › AT: Racial Cap K

The Aff’s Emancipation from labor is key to creating value to life and new forms of politics which transcend the capitalist oppressive plane of utility.

Horizon ‘23 – Acid Horizon is a collective of Philosophers, Artists, and Writers. Their debut collection, Anti-Oculus: A Philosophy of Escape, releases in October from Repeater Books. “Lazy Politics: Lafargue, Nietzsche, and Bataille Against the Grind” [Transcript], Zer0 Books and Repeater Media, Video Released 07/25/2023, Transcript Released 07/27/2023; Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFq9qKRy5fQ Transcript: https://splitinfinities.substack.com/p/lazy-politics Accessed 07/29/2023 | RN *4pt text is a Nietzsche quote—you don’t know how sad I am I couldn’t include it

“A strange madness has taken hold of the working class in nations where capitalist civilization reigns…this madness is the love of work, the moribund passion for work, pushed to point where the vital forces of the individual and his progeny are exhausted.” These are the words of Paul Lafargue from “A Right to Be Lazy”, an anti-capitalist, anti-productivist, and anti-work tract published in 1883. “The Right to Be Lazy” was a piece of writing whose impact and influence in its day was practically on par with Marx and Engels “The Communist Manifesto”. Like the “Manifesto” this was not a work of high theory; Lafargue’s intention was to send a shockwave throughout the mass of workers, opening their eyes to the reality of the soul-crushing grind demanded by life under capitalism. In his work, Lafargue observes that societies in antiquity generally manifested an absolute hatred for work. He notes, for instance, that in Ancient Greece only it was the slaves who were permitted to work. However, in Lafargue’s view, the 19th century proletarian worker expressed a willingness to embrace the servile labor demanded by their capitalist masters. Lafargue writes that the proletariat has been “perverted by the dogma of work, tempted to abandon its historical mission to emancipate itself from the fetters of capitalism. He chastises the working class for allowing themselves to be infected with the oppressive moralism of the bourgeoisie. The European ruling class elevated the virtues of work to a kind of religion. Moreover, their de facto priesthood advocated for putting the poor and dispossessed into workhouses where they would suffer the humiliation of working 14-hour days. Those imprisoned in workhouses were enslaved under the pretense that poverty and the supposed idleness associated with being poor was a kind of moral illness. Lafargue also excoriates the bourgeois ideal of “Progress”. For Lafargue, “progress” was the capitalist’s empty promise, a chimera, as what actually “progressed” was the capitalist’s methods of exploitation and his grip on the means of production. Lafargue furthermore criticizes workers’ demands and organizing strategies amidst crises of industrial overproduction and ensuing work stoppages of his time. Massive surpluses of commodities would leave laborers out of work and without a wage. However, rather than demand equitable distributions of the excess and an extended break from the job, workers would pound on factory doors demanding more work. Meanwhile, their capitalist counterparts destroyed stores of surplus commodities, creating an artificial scarcity which in turn left the proletariat dependent upon wages for survival. Buying into the capitalist virtues of hard work and progress meant a kind of trade off for the working class. Rather than reclaiming time for leisure or asserting “the right to be lazy”, the workers enlisted to build the edifice of industrial capitalism remained enslaved to it. Lafargue finds an ally of sorts in philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, another figure who, well, understood the value of time spent not selling one’s labor. There’s a popular image of Nietzsche which is often used to prop up today’s grindset mentality: a poor conflation of the grindset mentality with Nietzsche’s übermensch, or Superman, a special individual whose pursuit of personal excellence means spending most of their waking moments involved in goal-oriented activities. This notion of the übermensch is grossly misunderstood against some of Nietzsche’s other ideas, namely his anti-utilitarianism as well as his broader critique of rationality. In Nietzsche’s work The Gay Science, he lambastes the bad conscience often expressed by those obsessed with work and progress. He witnesses a tendency among some people to feel guilty when they aren’t making moves or firing on all cylinders. Nietzsche also identifies the phenomenon we now call “fear of missing out” as a symptom of this particular form of bad conscience. Consider how the desire to always stay in sync with the times lures us onto the hamster wheel news feeds and social media. Nietzsche also takes aim at those devalue leisure by placing it firmly beneath the value of work. For those committed to an image of personal growth or development, recreation and relaxation are sometimes seen as just a necessary supplement to work--and some folks are even ashamed if they indulge in rest and repose. Once again, for Nietzsche, these are the pangs of bad conscience. Enjoyment becomes merely treated as a reward: “Hey, you’ve worked so hard! You owe it to yourself to take that vacation!” or “You deserve that drink—or that expensive purchase!” We buy back our enjoyment at the price of remaining servile to a principle of self-improvement. We can see the more extensive sociopolitical impact of these attitudes as they form a broader social circuitry of punishment and reward. The ruling class preys upon attitudes and behaviors which derive from the normalization of our collective reward schedules. But for Nietzsche, it’s not just about avoiding the horror of becoming a cog in machine: the material and psychological consequence of our obsession with work diminishes our capacity to savor the sublime and unique spirit of idleness. For example, I live in the woods, and sometimes there’s nothing more fulfilling to me than letting go, hitting the trail, and allowing my senses wander without purpose. I mean, for me, this is real juice! This is just about the best life has to offer! Lastly, Nietzsche has a specific message for philosophers, scholars, and just anyone who values the pleasure of contemplation. He writes in Human, All Too Human “…an indication that esteem for the meditative life has decreased is that scholars today compete with active men in a kind of hasty enjoyment, so that they seem to value this kind of enjoying more than the kind that actually befits them and, in fact, offers much more enjoyment. Scholars are ashamed of otium. But leisure and idleness are a noble thing. If idleness is really the beginning of all vices, it is at least located in the closest vicinity to all the virtues: the idle man is still a better man than the active man. You don't think that by leisure and idling I'm talking about you, do you, you lazybones?” Nietzsche might think that today’s academics would do well to detach from the apparatus of professionalization which honors the virtue of near-constant productivity. The challenge of engaging in thoughtful reflection today has been intensified by the speed and character of life under capitalism—so much so that those who enjoy the life of the mind become accustomed to a frenetic pace which undermines their enjoyment of contemplation. Finally, we come to writer and philosopher Georges Bataille. Bataille holds a view on laziness which casts it as a sort of metaphysical counterweight to the illusion of solidity that undergirds human goals and aspirations. Bataille regularly noticed within himself the onset of fatigue when in the final stretch of one of his writing projects. This fatigue induces a kind of stupor; maybe you’ve experienced something similar while trying to complete a long essay, record an intricate song, or finish up some similar creative task. In these moments, it’s almost as if we become detached from the project in a way that causes us to no longer identify with it. Bataille writes that being overcome by idleness opens us to an oceanic feeling marked by laziness, denial, forgetfulness, and languishing which drowns within it the more industrious and instrumentalized side of ourselves. Despite how detrimental this might be to our personal projects, it reveals a sublime aspect of idleness in its ability to estrange us from our work. For Bataille, there is a deep, abysmal formlessness which pulls upon everything that is formed—and this is true even for those things we hold closest to heart. However, Bataille suggests that laziness itself could be “used as an unbreakable energy”: that perhaps there was a way to engender the power of formless and the way its continuity prevails upon every intention. Coming full circle to Lafargue, we should raise the question of how “the unbreakable energy of laziness” might be utilized politically. What if we weren’t just unashamed of leisure and idleness, as Nietzsche suggests, but that affirming the virtue of idleness was itself an act of political resistance, a force angled against the notion of unlimited growth and progress? What if the workers of Lafargue’s day agitated more powerfully to claim their right to surpluses of commodities—not to mention their time? Could the capitalist system of the 19th century have been brought to a complete halt by a prolonged event of widespread refusal of work? How might the refusal of work lead to other interventions against the exploitation of capitalism and the state? Consider for a moment how even the brief blip in the normal flow of the labor-to-capital circuit during the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic brought about a crisis which demanded the ruling class make immediate and drastic changes to preserve itself. How might the collective refusal of work and the affirmation of our “right to be lazy” serve as a step towards liberation? What do you think?

2023 DDI Affirmative
2AC › Kritiks › AT: Racial Cap K

Perm Do the Aff and Sacrifice the Bourgeoisie: the net benefit is that traditional Marxist movements fail to take religion into account in their analysis, which opens them to co-option by Fascist demagogues aiming to harness sacred energies—that’s 1AC Towsend and…

Pawlett ‘16 [William Pawlett is a senior lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. His main areas of research are social, cultural and media theory; continental philosophy; and the application of these to the issues of sexuality and consumerism, and to violence, hatred and 'otherness', Literature and Theology, vol. 30, no. 4, 2016, pp. 500–02. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44490863. Accessed 20 July 2023] EAY *4pt text is just a description of Bataille’s thoughts on the Sacred and the Profane—I would NEVER hide Aff cards

Bataille draws upon Marx as a resource against the surrealists and their ‘pretentious idealist aberrations’ (1985, p. 32). In a revealing statement Bataille declares: ‘It is of course difficult to avoid a feeling of contempt for revolutionaries to whom the revolution is not, before all else, the decisive phase of the class struggle’ (1985, p. 33, emphasis in original). Marxism, for Bataille, is the only revolutionary movement that has freed itself from idealism: it does not seek to raise or elevate all, but to overthrow those who have asserted an elevated position. Bataille contrasts idealist and imperialist revolutions, symbolised by the eagle which soars high and tears apart its victims with its sharp beak, to materialist revolutions which begin low down, in the earth. The materialist or ‘geological uprising’ is symbolised, for Bataille, by the ‘old mole’, a figure which appears in Marx and Engels’ The Commu- nist Manifesto (1967, originally published in 1848). Bataille often draws attention to human rootedness in dirt: the big toe of the human foot which enables the upright posture does so by pressing into the earth; the ‘dirty’ and ‘defiling’ menstrual blood and seminal fluids are the sub- stances through which humans come into being. Bataille notes: ‘man experiences, in contradiction to strict morality, urges that draw him to what is low, placing him in antagonism to all forms of spiritual eleva- tion’ (1985, p. 36). Just as human beings exist in contradiction, so too do societies, which are ‘universally divided into upper and lower classes’ (p. 36). The upper classes concern themselves with ideas. Even poor- quality ideas are given a high or elevated place by the institutions which the upper classes dominate: the church, the universities, parliaments. In contrast, the lower classes are ‘base materialist’ in the sense of being steeped in sweat and toil, ravaged by unfulfilled desires and boiling with ‘measureless agitation’ (p. 36). Yet Bataille’s position was never reducible to a Marxist revolutionary one, as religion, the sacred and sacrifice play an essential role. Bataille argues that secular thought, including Marxism and communism, is unable to conceive of either the ‘Very-High or the Very-Low’, concern- ing itself with a restricted, flattened and de-energised band of phenomena between (p. 35). Indeed, for Bataille, religion is inherently political – or rather, the sacred, particularly in its ‘pre-monotheist’ form, expressed a ‘revolt’ against politics and power such that they were forced to obey its rhythms. For many centuries the sacred resisted the emergence of a state and of the profane class hierarchies that the state maintains and protects from the periodic unleashing of sacred violence (Bataille, 1988a; see also Clastres, 1977). There can be no transcending of sacred violence: secular states direct their violence outward against external territorial enemies in war and conquest, and harness the sacred to the glorification of war (Bataille, 1989a, pp. 57–58). For Bataille, a new post-capitalist ‘impos- sible’ community would be a religious as well as political formation – or rather, it would dismantle the separation of social spheres embodied in the notions of ‘politics’, ‘religion’ and ‘economy’ as autonomous social institutions. It is instructive to compare Bataille’s axis of high and low with that of the left and right poles of the sacred. There are certainly parallels between the low or base and the left pole of the sacred: both are danger- ous, contagious, defiling; both are placed behind barriers or boundary lines; both threaten the established powers and authorities. However, these pairs of terms are by no means identical. The social poles of high and low exist in contradiction, but not in a dialectical relationship, how- ever: the only way that the contradiction can be resolved, for Bataille, is in the total destruction of the upper classes and of all bourgeois values; that is, Bataille does not seek a Hegelian-style synthesis or sublation of class differences (Bataille, 1985, p. 32). Indeed, the bourgeoisie should take the role of the sacrificial victims which found the new communist order, just as the French aristocracy were the sacrificial victims on whom the new bourgeois capitalist order was founded in 1789. Here, Bataille’s notion of the sacred and sacrifice burst the Hegelian dialectic, ‘burst’ in the sense that though these ideas can be figured within the dialectic as discursive constructs, their dramatic, material appearance and the con- tagious emotions they trigger have no place in the dialectic, no place in reason or reality as construed by Hegelianism. POLITICS AND HETEROLOGY With his 1929 paper, ‘The Use Value of D.A.F. De Sade (an open letter to my current comrades)’ Bataille moves away from, or seriously revises, his earlier position. Though addressed to current comrades, the letter reaches beyond them, anticipating future readers, defined as ‘masses’. Bataille begins his letter: ‘I need to have at least some witnesses to estab- lish so complete a defection’ (1985, p. 91). By witness Bataille signals his concern with the notion of friendship and community (discussed later), and by defection Bataille declares a powerful rejection of modernity, of ‘the prestige of industrial reality [and] material progress’. The gains and short-term satisfactions enabled by industrialisation must be rejected because they lead to stagnation and a terrible impoverishment of the human condition. They lead to a society of appropriation, one that cannot excrete, that cannot expel its waste, and so cannot renew itself. Industrial modernity is society without an anus, and societies that cannot shit will die – indeed, will turn into shit. As religion is the social institution which organises excretion, the modern curtailing of religion – in its reduction to moral and cultural code, the left pole of the sacred relegated to the profane – results in moribund societies becoming defenceless against the depredations of capitalist economy. Indeed, for Bataille, religious organ- isation ‘represents the freest opening for excremental collective impulses (orgiastic impulses) established in opposition to political, juridical, and economic institutions’ (p. 94). In this work Bataille again turns towards Durkheimian social anthro- pology to effect departure from established forms of revolutionary thinking. Appropriation and excretion are termed ‘social facts’, appar- ently following Durkheim’s The Rules Of Sociological Method (1982, originally published in 1895). Yet Bataille is clear that Durkheimianism itself is also insufficiently revolutionary because as a (social) science it follows ‘the tendency of science to posit a homogeneous representation in order to avoid the discernible presence of fundamentally heterogeneous elements’ (1985, p. 160, n. 4). With this statement Bataille ‘transgresses’ the notion of social facts defined by Durkheim and developed by Mauss, and the influence of phenomenology takes on an increasing importance, particularly during Bataille’s writing of the 1940s. For Bataille, eroticism, religious activity and the intimate bodily processes – defecation, urination, also laughter and sobbing – have a deep commonality in that the object of these activities is treated as a foreign body, as heterogeneous, meaning that it must be expelled in order for a closed or limited system to maintain itself. The sacred then is concerned with the movements, circulation and transmutation of foreign bodies. In contrast, appropriation is characterised by homogeneity and stagna- tion. This associating of the sacred with excretion and the profane with appropriation is sometimes hard to apply to traditional societies, Bataille acknowledges, yet this is part of his wider point: in traditional societ- ies there is dynamic or fluid movement between sacred and profane, yet, in industrial modernity, the profane realm achieves dominance and the appearance of stasis. The profane is widely taken to be ‘reality’, while the sacred is relegated to ‘unreality’. Bataille re-examines these themes in The Accursed Share, first published in 1949. Indeed, Bataille’s proj- ect in this work is as political as it is economic and philosophical. The notion that Bataille’s interest in politics waned after the end of the 1930s is mistaken, though influential thinkers such as Jean-Luc Nancy continue to make this claim (in Mitchell & Winfree, 2009, pp. 21–22). Bataille’s notion of ‘practical and theoretical heterology’, developed in the ‘Use Value’ and ‘The Notion of Expenditure’ essays, concerns politics as much as religion and philosophy. For Bataille, ‘Above all, heterology is opposed to any homogeneous representation of the world, in other words, to any philosophical system. The goal of such represen- tations is always the deprivation of our universe’s sources of excitation and the development of a servile human species’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 97). Practical heterology then is the ongoing process of challenging the political system which depends upon confining human beings in servile, productive positions. Bataille’s writings of the early 1940s, such as Inner Experience and Guilty, pursue this goal of undoing or ‘unworking’ the insidious structures of servility, utility and productivity. THE FASCIST THREAT Bataille prefaces his important work, ‘The Psychological Structure of Fascism’, first published in 1933, by declaring his proximity to Marxist critical thought, yet also noting Marxism’s inability to address society in a sufficiently holistic way, in particular by its failure to understand the intensities of religious sentiments. It isn’t possible to supplement these shortcomings in Marxist theory by adding religion to a list of topics to be examined because, for Bataille (following Durkheimian sociology) the nature of religious practice and belief conditions the entire social system, its forms of representation and symbolisation, its understanding of life and death. All attitudes, assumptions, taken-for-granted notions and ideas – scientific, cultural, economic, sexual – current in any society are linked to its moral and religious ideas (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 8–18; Durkheim & Mauss, 1961). Bataille develops further his distinction between the homogeneous ele- ments of society – where most economic activities are located – and the heterogeneous elements of society: ‘every useless element is excluded, not from all of society, but from its homogeneous part’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 138, emphasis in original). The homogeneous sphere reduces human being to a productive function, often measured numerically, such that all beings are, in a sense, interchangeable. For example, the market rate for a cleaner or a teacher is quite independent of the being who occupies these roles, and quite independent of their hopes, aspirations or financial needs. Homogeneous social structures exercise a deep coercion; however, these structures are, Bataille insists, also highly precarious and vulnerable to those aspects of society that are not reduced to homogeneity. Such ‘inter- nal’ threats include ‘mobs, the warrior, aristocratic and impoverished classes, different types of violent individuals or at least those who refuse the rule (madmen, leaders, poets, etc)’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 142). If we examine the political realm through the distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous elements, prophets, revolutionaries, heroes and heroines are decisively part of the heterogeneous realm: they do not serve an existing order but sacrifice themselves for a new future, fulfilling a tragic destiny. Unfortunately, in capitalist modernity, some fascist leaders also seem to possess or constitute heterogeneous force – in contrast to democratic politicians, who, with their vague and platitudinous slogans, tend to be situated exclusively within the homogeneous realm. This is not necessarily the case: Che Guavara and Nelson Mandela were both treated as heterological objects fit only for confinement or elimina- tion, and they continue to inspire the very passions Bataille associates with the heterogeneous – but there is a tendency in this direction. fascist leaders seem to possess ‘a force that disrupts the regular course of things’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 143), they generate an affective effervescence but not in an open, liberating or festive manner, rather they narrow, channel and concentrate these energies within their own position as leader or ‘head’. Fascism places authority above all instrumental or utilitarian concerns; it claims the values of superiority or ‘nobility’ and asserts the power to dominate others, not through rational criteria but due to the special nature or substance of the leader. Fascism is thereby highly dependent upon the operationalisation of myth to dramatise and condense a sense of superiority that has no rational basis; it is also highly dependent upon an army, dis- cussed later. Fascism, Bataille argues, seeks to ‘realise and idealise order’ and so is necessarily prone to sadistic and cruel treatments of peoples and things which seem to, or can be made to appear to, signify disorder. For Bataille, fascism emerges, historically, from monarchic sov- ereignty: both forms are dependent upon mastering, purifying and/or excluding what are seen as base or lower elements. Further, both fas- cism and royalty dependent upon a social ‘compromise’ as both seek a ‘connection with homogeneous forms at a certain level’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 146). This is an important point in Bataille’s argument: despite their posturing, fascist and monarchic leaders are not ‘pure’ heterogeneous energies; since they seek to establish and maintain control over the homogeneous sphere of society they must compromise their heteroge- neity to achieve this relationship of control and domination. Where the sacred, for Bataille, offers a moment of limitless heterogeneous experi- ence, organised social, religious and political movements must tread a careful path through the two worlds – a path which enables them to accu- mulate power where the sacred, in untrammelled form, can only give, excrete or expend without profit. Bataille is consistent in this differentia- tion between the heterogeneity of the sacred and fascism’s staged and scripted channelling of sacred myth. Fascism, like royalty, unites military and religious authority to effect a more total oppression of the people. Both systems strive for ‘a negation of humanity as a value that depends upon the play of internal opposi- tions’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 149). Monarchs, führers and generals assert a mythic, and rationally unwarrantable, individualisation of power, the reduction and concentration of social power within ‘a personal entity’ which denies the collective roots and sources of social power and wealth. Fascist leaders also depend, of course, upon a powerful army. The nature of armies and their social vocation of war-waging are under- stood by Bataille through the distinction between the heterogeneous and the homogeneous. His position is both fundamentally critical of the nature of armies and also enables an understanding of the undoubted glamour and attraction of them. The close proximity of these two elements of Bataille’s thought can result in misunderstandings. For Bataille, the chief or com- mander of the army effects a unification and concentration of the unruly and ‘base’ lower class elements that make up the fighting force of armies. The affective, mythical power of the commander – for example Hannibal, El Cid, or ‘Monty’ – provide a conduit ‘through which disgusting slaugh- ter is radically transformed into its opposite, glory – namely, into a pure and intense attraction. The glory of the chief essentially constitutes a sort of affective pole opposed to the nature of the soldiers . . . [the soldiers become] like a part of the chief himself’ (Bataille, 1985, pp. 150–151). The chief is much more than a symbol, figurehead or ideological device: he is akin to a sacred force, simultaneously the highest in rank, yet capable of triumphing amid the very lowest and vilest human carnage. The chief is a force of alternation and transformation: he presides over a universe were depraved acts of violence abhorred in peacetime are rewarded with medals and glory, where ragged, socially excluded and ‘vile’ young men are drilled and battered into a uniformed collective force in the service of monarchic power. Soldiers are not required to believe in the cause for which they are, officially, fighting; indeed such reflective thought is strongly discour- aged. Soldiers fight for their chief, and only secondarily for their fellow soldiers – and then only insofar as their comrades possess something of the force of the chief. A ‘cowardly’ or unreliable fellow soldier is vilified precisely because they do not possess the force of their chief. Power can endure only where protected by an army and, with Bataille’s theorisa- tion, the seductive, honourable élan of soldiers begins to be a little more comprehensible: The mode of heterogeneity explicitly undergoes a thorough alter- ation, completing the realisation of intense homogeneity without a decrease in the fundamental heterogeneity. In the midst of the population, the army retains the distinction of being wholly other, but with a sovereignty linked to domination, to the imperative and separate character that the chief transmits to his soldiers. (Bataille, 1985, p. 151, emphasis in original) Yet, for Bataille, religious power is more fundamental, older and more powerful than military force. The sacred can never be assimilated to, or supplanted by, the violence and horror of armies of war – this was Caillois’s suggestion in the preface to the second edition of his Man and the Sacred, and it was curtly rejected by Bataille: ‘This interpretation is shocking . . . it lacks understanding of both the sacred and war. And to be blunt it essentially lacks understanding of contemporary man’ (Bataille, 1987, cited in Bailey-Gill, 1995, p. 24). This is because, for Bataille, the source of the sacred is pure or undifferentiated heterogeneity, the force of that which transgresses all limits. Religious authority ‘con- fronts the bare and unlimited form of undifferentiated heterogeneity, before any of its perceptible elements (ones that can be made explicit) have been fixed by a still vague direction’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 152). Undifferentiated heterogeneity provokes dread, awe and horror. The earliest symbolic representations of the sacred or divine dramatised its ‘free and irresponsible violence’ (p. 152). The figure of Kali, as an example of such free and irresponsible violence, was discussed in the previous chapter. Where capitalist democracies have, by and large, been content to allow the erosion of religious power, whilst maintaining a hypocritical enhancement of military forces, fascist organisation has recognised the power inherent in religious and mythic sentiments. Indeed, fascism seeks to unite the heterogeneous energies of both religion and the military in the person of the leader. This has made it highly successful in responding to the crises generated by capitalist economics: Thus, qualities characteristic of the two dominations (internal and external, military and religious) are simultaneously implied: qualities derived from the introjected homogeneity, such as duty, discipline, and obedience; and qualities derived from the essential heterogeneity, imperative violence, and the positioning of the chief as a transcendent object of collective affectivity . . . the fascist uni- fication is not simply a uniting of powers from different origins and a symbolic uniting of classes: it is also the accomplished uniting of the heterogeneous elements with the homogeneous elements of sovereignty in the strictest sense with the State. (Bataille, 1985, pp. 154–155, emphasis in original) Collective affectivity can lead to revolutionary fervour and even to rad- ical democratisation, although there can be no guarantees of the direction or end result of collective fervour. Unlike monarchic rulers, fascist lead- ers unleash collective affectivity by uniting rather than dividing classes. The hardening of divisions between classes is also a weakness in most forms of socialism, Bataille suggests. Clearly, fascism does not ‘liberate’ working class people, indeed it unites them only by ‘the negation of their nature’ (Bataille, 1985, p. 154): they become nothing but the raw material to fill uniforms, wave flags, shoot guns and persecute the ‘enemies’ they have posited. Nevertheless, fascism succeeds in transforming the disper- sal, isolation and anomie characteristic of capitalist modernity into their opposites – unity and collective belonging – and in channelling the latent and largely unacknowledged violence of capitalist organisation into an active or manifest force. In short, fascism diverts the energy of internal revolution into external war and to ever-escalating internal persecution.

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Transgressing the political has a proper time and place—otherwise the alt collapses into chaos.

Miller ‘22 – Patrick Miller, Patrick Miller specializes in 20th century philosophy and social-political thought, with a focus on Georges Bataille, Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, and issues related to the self, community and the ethical limits of politics. “What is Fascism Without a State?:Countering Claims of Batille’s Left Fascism”. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14409917.2022.2104082?needAccess=true&role=button. Accessed 7/14/23 | RN

Exceeding the political through repressed affectivity need not result in a community of fierce beasts, especially when a “proper” Bataillean embrace of these affectivities must avoid authoritarian calcification. Thus, the vague similarities between Bataille and fascist thought should not lead one to reject his comments on fascism, the potential for vibrant communities, and subversion of the state. Bataille’s explanation for the development of fascism can inform our current situation: the decline in confidence of democratic systems and heads of state and the lower classes become more acclimated to nationalistic movements. Likewise, if we wish for a community that furthers the value of individuals outside of utilitarian concerns, then there is a time and place to push for subversion of the state structure that will resist sliding into totalitarianism.

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The alt is doomed to fail – it opens the door for domination of the vulnerable and drains trust in institutions

Erez 17 — [Lior Erez, University of Oxford, “Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Motivational Preconditions for Social Justice,” Social Theory and Practice, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26381163.pdf?casa_token=UpE6VPDmMzMAAAAA:gLfJQpSe6PuNKF-k8Vu-xFVoYHFRVRxp5B4-JI59lnLCcvVMX4pLIKdD35lCaUul8IpQCn12Gol9gX0RZZKpyx0cLqH-nAesiiVWIsK6dluTrWCBdzsl, accessed 7-13-2023; marlborough-mjen]

The first worry is that, absent a global political culture, a cosmopolitan ideal of social justice would require unrealistic levels of altruism. As Pettit writes in his “Republican Law of Peoples,” the cosmopolitan ideal would be utopian in the sense that states, in particular the richer representative states, would have to be saintly—in effect, they would have to be controlled by saintly peoples—in order to provide robustly for the satisfaction of the ideal. The world in which states operated like that would be a more perfect world than ours but psychological and institutional realities make it into a scenario we can hardly rely on being able to attain.*

Pettit does not specify here why cosmopolitan justice, but not social jus- tice within the state, would require unrealistic levels of altruism. In more re- cently published work, however, there are some clues that, importantly, point in the direction of the PMA. First, Pettit sees state sovereignty as a necessary condition for non-domination, as it reflects the self-determination of a demo- cratic people. Since trust is in short supply across cultural divides, there will be “less likelihood of establishing those important unelected authorities . . . who could credibly claim to make decisions in line with shared standards,” and thus “the cause of democracy, articulated in terms of freedom, argues for a world of many states.”® Following this thought, Pettit argues that states are obliged not to use their citizens’ tax revenue towards the needs of other people “except when those citizens explicitly or implicitly demand this, or support it as an implication of a separate demand.”' Given the motivational limits on social justice, the cosmopolitan ideal is realizable only if people become more other- regarding than they currently are—in other words, assuming away the stability problem—or if political institutions act against their people’s expressed will.

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Perm do both—otherwise fascists crack down on the alt.

On 20 [Bat-Ami Bar On is associate professor of philosophy and women's studies at Binghamton University in New York and author of Jewish Locations (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001)., “But Is It Fascism?,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 2020, https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64182439/ABO_2019_But_Is_It_Fascism-libre.pdf?1597433049=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DBUT_IS_IT_FASCISM.pdf&Expires=1690504064&Signature=bVU8E-XmBEA18o11L~QgasNeSYsd45zb22iP-0grNEp9Ai0XnT1TCxze2WexSNpzpAmJdngGMKPoZWVMh~CC2mEbZLUv-wkLHfJsm07rmqJq~2j4QVLY8ov303fEg9It9jTsWPPkj9C7A9p9cuVayGRNpuwH8qpns3UtrRob3XdeBWDgHTGxKdAYqL0l6wfcFHrP-bWGFAUNAHjbf8fjAkl4HiPQ7dnaaP2WCWquRR8h95XoVNMyNlH0xNoeYLw1tYJcytVVY4QU5AH-H-0DccgHDw28KtfYmKCMRvyxzYRdGJ05cEENIf2AUhEryY3U8pzJZsKw7I1RgUFh8H1LDw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 7-27-2023] EAY

The opposition of nationalism and cosmopolitanism seems logically evident. Nationalism, no matter how the nation is defined and even if like Lepore one takes it to be a historically contingent construction,22 is particularist, emphasizing something shared that is meaningful to people who take themselves as members of the nation and explains to them and others some of the normative expectations that they have of each other as members of the same nation and between them and what they take to be their nation (Miller 1997). Cosmopolitanism in contrast is not bounded. It is morally universalist (Appiah 2006) and politically international or transnational (Held 2010). Its moral version centers people as such and the normative expectations all people can have from each other. In its political version, its emphasis is on the need for and importance of international or transnational political institutions. The contrast between nationalism and cosmopolitanism builds on this logic and goes beyond it. The contrast is presented in the context of a choice that conceals the ubiquity of nationalism. Nationalism is weightier in people’s ordinary lives than cosmopolitanism because of the many ways nationalism is reproduced in everyday life (Billig 1995). It is not just national flags and the singing of national anthems before sport events that remind people of the existence of the nation and their relationship to it and to those who are the members of the nation. So does, for example, foreign intervention in elections (Lemond and Dessel 2019). The indignity expressed by U.S. Democrats over documented Russian efforts to sway the U.S. 2016 elections, Donald Trump’s inaction in the face of it and his invitation to China to investigate his Democratic opponents in an attempt to sway the 2020 elections, and Mitch McConnell’s refusal to bring election security bills to a vote, is an example of a political nationalist response. Political nationalism is inward-looking and emphasizes political independence and self-determination and expects them to be protected by the state against unwanted interventions and influences by foreign nations and nationals. U.S. Democrats, even if they are not sovereignists as many right-wing nationalists are, still share some political nationalist beliefs with them. Though political nationalism is different from economic nationalism, it tends to go hand in hand with economic nationalism with its emphasis on the national economy and its protection from unwanted interventions and influences by foreign nations and nationals by the state. It too surrounds people. Examples of its invocation abound during elections and even progressive candidates have economic nationalist promises. Thus, the Canadian New Democratic Party (N.d.) platform envisions a better economy for hard-working Canadians and Bernie Sanders (N.d.) envisions the creation of twenty million jobs for Americans. As Brexit demonstrates (Armstrong 2017), political nationalism, economic nationalism and cultural nationalism (a form of nationalism that looks to the state’s protection of a nation’s culture against unwanted interventions and influences by foreign nations and nationals) easily mix. It also demonstrates how simplified the notion of nationalism is when put in contrast with cosmopolitanism as if there were a stark choice to be made. In addition, it shows how the starkness hides the fact that the choice between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is a false choice. Yes, the umbrella terms “nationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” are analytically distinct from each other. But hybridity happens—that is, after all, what liberal or civic nationalism is, a hybrid of some form of nationalism and its implied particularism and normative requirements, along with both moral and political cosmopolitanism and their implied universal kind of requirements.23 However, for one kind of nationalism, the choice between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is stark and real—fascist nationalism. The simplified contrast and false choice between nationalism and cosmopolitanism also obscures the distinction between the nation and the state. The two are not the same. A nation is a group of people that claim or are claimed by a relation to each other through, for example, a shared culture. A state, at least under international law, has a more or less well-defined territory and population, a government, and a capacity to enter relations with other states. Many states contain more than one group of people that identify as a nation. Some nations exist in more than one state. On some occasions, nations, or groups claiming to represent nations, occupy states and form nation-states. The formation and long-term maintenance of a nation-state necessarily creates problems, such as majoritarianism, and majoritarian nation-states can be quite pernicious, which is what happens when the state is used for fascist nationalist purposes or the purposes of any nationalism with fascist tendencies. Fascist nationalism and a nationalism with fascist tendencies releases the members of the nation, and the nation itself, from normative requirements to people as such and from political requirements to support and participate in international institutions and conform to international standards. The outcome is extremism. Far-right and far-right-influenced violent incidents are suggestive of this kind of extremism.24 But they are less indicative of fascist nationalism’s extremism than the violence of governments exercised with impunity under domestic law. Nazi violence provides the clearest example. There was plenty of it prior to the electoral capture of the state by the Nazi Party, which claimed to represent the German people, and its quick consolidation of this capture. Once they controlled the state, the Nazis increased their use of violence manyfold. In 1933, they opened the first concentration camp in Dachau targeting their political enemies and people they deemed asocial. In 1939, they began a euthanasia program. In 1941, they began the massive killing of Jews, which they systematized starting in 1942. Starting in 1938 they projected military force in foreign affairs. WWII officially started in September 1939.25 At present a particularly interesting example of governments exercising violence with impunity under the protection of domestic law is the use of violence against migrants and refugees. Not only have migrant and refugee rights26 been eroding in industrialized countries; in addition, there has been a concurrent criminalization of and use of the state’s coercive apparatus against humanitarian NGOs that are trying to save and offer services to migrants and refugees (Reggio and Mittlestadt 2018). In most cases, the justification of migrant and refugee detention is a mix of political, economic, and cultural nationalisms, all summed up as contributing to the understanding of what is in the national interest. This is, for example, what the White House (N.d.) appeals to as a justification for holding more than 50,000 migrants and refugees in detention camps (Kassie 2019). According to the Trump White House, detention camps for migrants and raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents are an element of an immigration system “that serves the national interest.” The idea of a “national interest” is vague. Arendt’s critique of it ([1945] 2007; [1948] 2007; 1958; 1963) exposes this quite nicely. Arendt believes that people have needs and that interests are their stake in fulfilling these needs. Groups of people, some of these being nations, also have interests, according to Arendt, but in the best case a group’s interest is more like a contingent negotiated common concern, or a shared understanding of a collective action problem.27 Arendt believes that in both the case of individuals and groups, interests can frame and limit but cannot guide decisions or actions. Arendt’s analysis of interests points out that it is problematic to invoke the “national interest” as a justification without elaboration and specification. For Arendt, it is also problematic to rely on “the national interest” as a justification of state actions because through the justification the state is subordinated to the nation. This is especially problematic when a state is not at the outset already a nation-state. The United States is an example of a state that is not a nation-state, at least in terms of the kind of nation the Trump White House pictures, which is more like an ethnos with a shared religion or/and culture and language. By justifying state actions in the name of “the national interest,” the Trump White House subordinates the state to a faction. In the name of the faction it calls a nation it uses the coercive force of the state against refugees, migrants, and people whose cosmopolitan commitments motivate them to help refugees and migrants such as Scott Daniel Warren, who was arrested on 18 January 2018 for giving migrants food, water, and shelter.

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The Aff’s Emancipation from labor is key to creating value to life and new forms of politics which transcend the capitalist oppressive plane of utility.

Horizon ‘23 – Acid Horizon is a collective of Philosophers, Artists, and Writers. Their debut collection, Anti-Oculus: A Philosophy of Escape, releases in October from Repeater Books. “Lazy Politics: Lafargue, Nietzsche, and Bataille Against the Grind” [Transcript], Zer0 Books and Repeater Media, Video Released 07/25/2023, Transcript Released 07/27/2023; Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFq9qKRy5fQ Transcript: https://splitinfinities.substack.com/p/lazy-politics Accessed 07/29/2023 | RN *4pt text is a Nietzsche quote—you don’t know how sad I am I couldn’t include it

“A strange madness has taken hold of the working class in nations where capitalist civilization reigns…this madness is the love of work, the moribund passion for work, pushed to point where the vital forces of the individual and his progeny are exhausted.” These are the words of Paul Lafargue from “A Right to Be Lazy”, an anti-capitalist, anti-productivist, and anti-work tract published in 1883. “The Right to Be Lazy” was a piece of writing whose impact and influence in its day was practically on par with Marx and Engels “The Communist Manifesto”. Like the “Manifesto” this was not a work of high theory; Lafargue’s intention was to send a shockwave throughout the mass of workers, opening their eyes to the reality of the soul-crushing grind demanded by life under capitalism. In his work, Lafargue observes that societies in antiquity generally manifested an absolute hatred for work. He notes, for instance, that in Ancient Greece only it was the slaves who were permitted to work. However, in Lafargue’s view, the 19th century proletarian worker expressed a willingness to embrace the servile labor demanded by their capitalist masters. Lafargue writes that the proletariat has been “perverted by the dogma of work, tempted to abandon its historical mission to emancipate itself from the fetters of capitalism. He chastises the working class for allowing themselves to be infected with the oppressive moralism of the bourgeoisie. The European ruling class elevated the virtues of work to a kind of religion. Moreover, their de facto priesthood advocated for putting the poor and dispossessed into workhouses where they would suffer the humiliation of working 14-hour days. Those imprisoned in workhouses were enslaved under the pretense that poverty and the supposed idleness associated with being poor was a kind of moral illness.

Lafargue also excoriates the bourgeois ideal of “Progress”. For Lafargue, “progress” was the capitalist’s empty promise, a chimera, as what actually “progressed” was the capitalist’s methods of exploitation and his grip on the means of production. Lafargue furthermore criticizes workers’ demands and organizing strategies amidst crises of industrial overproduction and ensuing work stoppages of his time. Massive surpluses of commodities would leave laborers out of work and without a wage. However, rather than demand equitable distributions of the excess and an extended break from the job, workers would pound on factory doors demanding more work. Meanwhile, their capitalist counterparts destroyed stores of surplus commodities, creating an artificial scarcity which in turn left the proletariat dependent upon wages for survival. Buying into the capitalist virtues of hard work and progress meant a kind of trade off for the working class. Rather than reclaiming time for leisure or asserting “the right to be lazy”, the workers enlisted to build the edifice of industrial capitalism remained enslaved to it.