2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Ptx
Porter 21 (Eduardo, is an economics reporter for the business section of The New York Times. 02-18-2021 “Should the Feds Guarantee You a Job?” https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/business/economy/job-guarantee.html)//BH-NB//
On the surface, the politics seem as stuck as ever. Senator Cory Booker, the New Jersey Democrat, introduced bills in 2018 and 2019 to set up pilot programs in 15 cities and regions that would offer training and a guaranteed job to all who sought one, at federal expense. Both efforts failed.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Ptx
Palley 18 (Thomas, is an American economist who has served as the chief economist for the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 09-14-2018 “Job Guarantee Programs: Careful What You Wish For” https://www.socialeurope.eu/job-guarantee-programs-careful-what-you-wish-for)//BH-NB//
In sum, the debate over JGPs is fraught. Even those who support the aims of a JGP, and are favourably inclined to activist public policy, may still be wary of a JGP for economic and political economy reasons. Implementing a JGP will require political capital and the right political conditions. It might be better to use that favorable moment to introduce new policies (e.g. a UBI) and upgrade a collection of existing different policy modalities that together deliver the same or more benefits without the political economy risks.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Ptx
Gustafson et al. 19 [Abel; Scientist and a co-founder of XandY Analytics – PhD - Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; ; 11-18-2019; "The development of partisan polarization over the Green New Deal"; Nature; https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0621-7;]//LASA-بيلال
In early 2019, a US climate change and economic renewal policy proposal called the Green New Deal (GND)1 rose from obscurity to national prominence in just four months. This situation created a natural field experiment in which to study the emergence of partisan polarization. Here, we report findings from two nationally representative surveys of registered US voters that measured familiarity with and support for the GND shortly before and after the issue entered the national spotlight. Initially, there was low public awareness of the GND but majority support for it across party lines. Four months later, voters had become much more familiar with the GND and partisan polarization had increased significantly due to a sharp decrease in support among Republicans. In fact, Republicans who had heard the most about the GND were the least likely to support it. In contrast, support for the GND remained high among Democrats, and did not vary substantially across degrees of familiarity. We also identify a likely mechanism: a ‘Fox News effect’. That is, among Republicans, Fox News viewing was a significant predictor of both familiarity with the GND and opposition to it, even when controlling for alternative explanations. Climate change requires solutions that match the scale of the threat. In late 2018, one proposed large-scale solution called the Green New Deal (GND) entered the US political conversation, propelled by a wave of grassroots activism, Representative Alexandria OcasioCortez (Democrat from New York) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat from Massachusetts). The scope of the GND is expansive, including but not limited to a transition to 100% clean, renewable electricity, ‘green’ jobs and job-training guarantees, investments in ‘green’ technology research and development, improvements in sustainable infrastructure, and clean air and water guarantees1 . Public opinion of the GND is important because in democratic societies public policymaking is expected to be responsive to the citizens’ preferences. To date, research has found bipartisan support for some of the individual components of the GND, such as a transition to 100% renewable energy and regulating CO2 as a pollutant2–4 . However, bipartisan support can fracture into partisan polarization if the public is exposed to elite cues that associate support or opposition with their respective partisan loyalties or values . Opinion polarization between partisan groups is a dependable effect of partisan media, due to phenomena such as selective exposure and motivated reasoning that drive strong partisans to more extreme opinions8,9 . Some experiments suggest compelling ‘party over policy’ effects: people tend to favour a policy proposed by their own political party, but they reject the same policy when proposed by an opposing party10,11. Such experiments demonstrate polarization effects in response to partisan cues, but they do not gauge the nature of real-world phenomena because they are conducted in artificial settings and with single messages. While survey research often tracks partisan opinion trends on social issues over time12, it usually investigates issues that have already attained broad recognition. In contrast, this study uses a sequence of representative surveys to assess the polarization that developed over time and at scale shortly before and after US voters first became widely aware of a nascent climate change and economic renewal policy proposal. We first measured familiarity with and support for the GND in a nationally representative survey of registered voters in the United States (N=966) at Time 1 (T1) in early December of 2018. At that time, the GND did not yet have widespread name recognition, and partisan framing by political and media elites had not yet permeated the national conversation. At Time 2 (T2) in early April 2019, we repeated the questions in a second survey with a new nationally representative sample (N=1,097). In the four months between T1 and T2, the GND was discussed extensively in the national news, including coverage of its evolving policy framework, grassroots activism, controversies, the formal Congressional Resolution, and the subsequent Senate vote on that resolution13–16. For example, in the week after the resolution was introduced, cable television outlets CNN, MSNBC and Fox News aired a combined total of 45 prime-time segments discussing the GND. In the week preceding the Senate vote, those three outlets aired a combined total of 41 prime-time segments. Our measurements provide estimates of how awareness of and support for the GND changed over these four months and how these changes differed by political party. We also present evidence supporting a likely mechanism: a strong, negative ‘Fox News effect’ on Republicans’ support for the GND. From T1 to T2, the proportion of registered voters who had heard at least “a little” about the GND tripled from 17% to 59%. This increase extrapolates to an estimate that 63million registered voters (of the 153million registered voters17) became aware of the GND over those four months. The proportion of registered voters who had heard “nothing at all” decreased by half from 82% to 41%. Interestingly, familiarity with the GND increased most among conservative Republicans (Fig. 1). By T2, about twice as many conservative Republicans (38%) as liberal Democrats (17%) had heard “a lot” about the GND. Our survey data indicate the magnitude of partisan polarization that developed over just four months as US voters became increasingly familiar with the GND. At T1, after being given a description of the basic components of the GND (Methods), 81% of registered voters
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Ptx
Alexander 20 [Brentan; Chief Investment Officer at Synonym and a Founder at Tuatara Development Capital; 11-8-2020; "The Green New Deal Is Dead In A Republican Senate, But Biden Has Options To Fight Climate Change"; Forbes; https://www.forbes.com/sites/brentanalexander/2020/11/08/the-green-new-deal-is-dead-in-a-republican-senate-but-biden-has-options-to-fight-climate-change/?sh=1f5182b212dd;]//LASA-بيلال
But despite the win at the top of the ticket, the promised “Blue Wave” in down-ballot races failed to materialize. Barring an unlikely double sweep of the runoff elections in Georgia, Democrats will find themselves with a minority position in the Senate, unable to advance their most ambitious policy goals. Many went from dreams of passing the green new deal to fears of passing nothing at all. This skepticism is well warranted: the green new deal is dead-on-arrival in Mitch McConnell’s Senate and forceful action is now off the table. But that doesn’t mean Biden won’t have options, and progress on a green agenda is still possible, even if that progress is more incremental than hoped.
The lowest hanging fruit revolves around undoing the series of executive orders and regulatory rewrites that the Trump Administration used to ease pollution requirements and ignore climate change. Top of the list is rejoining the Paris Agreement. Biden has already pledged this action and implementation is easy: just 30 days are needed to fully rejoin. More options abound from there: restoring regulations on power sector emissions under the Clean Air Act; increasing federal fuel-efficiency standards for cars and trucks; restricting fracking on federal lands. If some of these sound familiar, it’s because they resemble actions that Obama took under his presidency and which squarely fall within the executive mandate.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Inflation
Hartley, 20 --- Jonathan Hartley is a visiting fellow at the Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity and a master’s in public policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. (Jonathan Hartley, "The Weakness of Modern Monetary Theory", 2020, National Affairs, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-weakness-of-modern-monetary-theory)//EG
MONEY PRINTING AND INFLATION MMT proponents argue that central banks can print money without triggering dangerous levels of inflation. This claim not only overlooks the theoretical considerations outlined above, it also ignores the dark history of debt monetization leading to hyperinflation. As Thomas Sargent famously documented in his 1982 classic, The Ends of Four Big Inflations, printing money and monetizing debt — even when that debt was partly denominated in local currency — led to devastating inflation in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Weimar Germany during the first half of the 20th century. Austria and Hungary — two states formed through the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — found themselves greatly diminished in both size and power following WWI. Since Austria-Hungary was deemed an aggressor of the war, its successor states owed the Allies substantial amounts in war reparations. To pay off the reparations while alleviating large-scale food shortages and unemployment, the Austrian government ran significant deficits — which it financed by selling treasury bills to the Austrian section of the liquidated Austro-Hungarian bank. At the same time in Hungary, political turmoil led to considerable budget shortfalls, which the government financed by borrowing heavily from the Hungarian section of the bank and increasing the volume of low-interest loans issued to private entities. As a result, both the Austrian crown and the Hungarian krone depreciated rapidly while domestic prices rose. This led to flight from each currency by domestic actors and foreign investors alike and, ultimately, to hyperinflation in both countries. Poland, meanwhile, emerged from WWI as an independent nation after over a century of foreign rule. Cobbled together from portions of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, Poland inherited inflated currencies from these three partitioning powers — each of which had financed their respective participation in WWI through the printing press — and an empty treasury. The fighting in Poland did not end in 1918, either, as the nation found itself in a second war with Soviet Russia that lasted until the fall of 1920. In order to settle this and other border disputes, and to rebuild after the devastating WWI occupation, Poland amassed substantial debt. Like both Austria and Hungary, Poland financed its deficit spending by printing massive amounts of currency. In 1918, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to nine Polish marks; by the end of 1923, that same dollar was worth 6,375,000 Polish marks. Of the four post-WWI cases of hyperinflation Sargent covers, none looms larger in the historical imagination than that of Weimar Germany. Germany had financed its war effort through deficit spending and suspension of the gold standard, believing that it would be able to achieve a swift, decisive victory and pay off its debt by annexing wealthier territories and imposing reparations on its defeated enemies. What occurred was very much the opposite: Over four long years of fighting, Germany accumulated considerable war debt while significantly devaluing its currency, the German mark. And since Germany was on the losing side of the war, instead of being paid reparations, it owed staggering levels of reparations to the Allies at the war's end. Making matters worse, the Reparations Commission demanded Germany pay 132 billion gold marks as part of the London Payment Plan. The German government responded by printing more German marks to pay what it owed, which only devalued its currency further. In 1922, Germany failed to pay an installment it owed to France, which prompted the French occupation of Germany's primary industrial region to ensure repayment. The German government responded by calling for what amounted to a strike, then offered the workers financial support — again, financed by printing more currency and issuing loans at interest rates far below the rate of inflation. By 1923, German currency was worthless: One U.S. dollar at the time was equivalent to 4,210,500,000,000 German marks. But hyperinflation is not just a phenomenon of the distant past. In fact, instances of hyperinflation have occurred over recent decades in countries like Brazil, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela. Brazil experienced hyperinflation in the final decades of the 20th century. This resulted from its decision to pay down high external debt but avoid raising taxes. Instead, the country turned to printing money. By 1990, inflation reached a monthly rate as high as 82.4%. Hyperinflation in Brazil was only resolved when it created a separate unit of account, the Unidade Real de Valor, or URV, to exist parallel to its existing currency, the cruzeiro. Ultimately, this new unit of account became the Brazilian real, replacing the cruzeiro and quashing the inflationary spiral. For Zimbabwe, the trouble began in the late 1990s, when the government adopted several spending plans — including the compulsory government purchase of white-owned commercial farms and generous pension plans for veterans of the country's war of independence — without budgeting for them. This triggered panic among foreign investors, who pulled capital from the Zimbabwean markets, thereby causing a crash of the country's currency. Subsequent unwise military ventures drove Zimbabwe further into debt. Meanwhile, the forced seizure of farmland and resulting violence nearly halted all agricultural production. Since the Zimbabwean economy was too fragile to grow its way out of debt, and imposing new taxes to raise revenue was a political non-starter, monetary and fiscal authorities began to monetize the country's debt by printing more money. This ultimately led to hyperinflation so extreme — at an estimated 79,000,000,000% per month in November 2008 — that Zimbabwe was effectively forced to substitute its own currency with the U.S. dollar shortly thereafter through a process economists call "dollarization." The seeds of Venezuela's ongoing struggles with hyperinflation were sown in the early 2000s, when the nation's economy and the value of its currency, the bolívar, became heavily dependent on revenues from oil exports. The rise in oil prices that largely coincided with President Hugo Chávez's term in office — from 1998 until his death in 2013 — ensured a steady stream of foreign revenue into government coffers. This allowed the Chávez regime to increase deficit spending in pursuit of its socialist policy agenda. Then in 2014 — a year after Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, took office — the global price of oil collapsed, leading to a steep decline in government revenues. Foreign demand for the bolívar to purchase Venezuelan oil fell, contributing to a decline in the currency's value. The Venezuelan economy was already in recession at the time, but instead of pulling back on Chávez's generous social-welfare programs or increasing taxes, Maduro's regime responded by ramping up deficit spending and printing more currency to finance the government's debts. By 2016, hyperinflation had set in. At the end of 2018, inflation rates in Venezuela reached an estimated 80,000% per year. As these examples demonstrate, the correlation between currency printing and hyperinflation is undeniable, the causal relationship intuitive. Yet MMT proponents continue to contest it. In their canonical MMT textbook Macroeconomics, William Mitchell, L. Randall Wray, and Martin Watts state that "[n]o simple proportionate relationship exists between rises in the money supply and rises in the general price level." Wray, a Bard College professor and one of MMT's key proponents in academia, has gone on to say "there is no empirical evidence to support the belief that raising interest rates fights inflation." Stephanie Kelton, author of The Deficit Myth and former advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders's presidential campaign, argues that inflation is the result, not of monetary policy, but of "overspending" — spending beyond what it takes for an economy to reach "full employment" (which she defines not according to the mainstream economic concept of "natural rate of unemployment," but as the 0% unemployment rate that would occur under a government jobs guarantee). Such claims fly in the face of both historical evidence and traditional macroeconomic theory. And it's worth remembering, too, that hyperinflation often hurts the poor the most, since consumption makes up a greater fraction of their incomes.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Inflation
Talgo, 21 --- Chris Talgo is senior editor at The Heartland Institute. (Chris Talgo, "The false promise of modern monetary theory", 3-30-2021, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/545502-the-false-promise-of-modern-monetary-theory/)//EG
Once upon a time, not that long ago actually, the federal deficit and national debt mattered. In 2008, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama said, “We’re just taking out a credit card from the Bank of China, essentially. We’re borrowing that money. And we’ve added $4 trillion worth of debt since George Bush took office. Keep in mind, just to give you some perspective, the first 42 presidents amassed $5 trillion worth of debt.” During his two terms, Obama added $8.6 trillion to the national debt — more than double his predecessor. President Trump added $6.7 trillion. In one term. As of this writing, the U.S. national debt stands at $28.1 trillion. In 1960, the U.S. national debt was $286 billion. In 1980, it increased to $908 billion. By 2000, it grew to $5.6 trillion. In 2010, it ballooned to $13.5 trillion. Just seven years later, it crossed the $20 trillion threshold. America’s debt-to-GDP ratio is also on an unsustainable trajectory. In 1960, it was 53 percent. In 1980, it decreased to 34 percent. In 2000, it ticked up to 58 percent. As of 2020, it had skyrocketed to 129 percent — exceeding the previous high of 118 percent, set at the end of World War II. This is significant. And ominous. We can blame our debt debacle on many things: decades of out-of-control entitlement spending, the pandemic, costly wars in the Middle East, to name a few. However, let’s not overlook the meteoric rise of modern monetary theory (MMT). For those unaccustomed with MMT, in essence it states that the U.S. government can print and spend money limitlessly. Deficits don’t matter. Neither does the national debt. MMT has several high-profile adherents, from Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) to Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.). Many books have been written on MMT, most famously “The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy,” by Stephanie Kelton. In a nutshell, MMT true believers claim that age-old economic dogma is backwards. MMT turns traditional economic theory on its head. According to Investopedia, “The central idea of MMT is that governments with a fiat currency system under their control can and should print (or create with a few keystrokes in today’s digital age) as much money as they need to spend because they cannot go broke.” Actually, governments can and do go broke when they defy the rules of commonsense economics. However, MMT advocates claim they have the secret recipe to avoid the pitfalls of currency debasement and mountains of debt. Once again, as Investopedia explains, “[A]ccording to MMT, large government debt isn’t the precursor to collapse we have been led to believe it is, countries like the U.S. can sustain much greater deficits without cause for concern, and a small deficit or surplus can be extremely harmful and cause a recession since deficit spending is what builds people’s savings. … MMT theorists explain that debt is simply money the government put into the economy and didn’t tax back.” This is ludicrous. Government deficit spending is not an economic boon. It is a hindrance to economic growth that impoverishes future generations. Furthermore, despite what MMT supporters claim, printing huge sums of money will cause inflation. As Jonathan Hartley writes that the claim “ignores the dark history of debt monetization leading to hyperinflation … printing money and monetizing debt — even when that debt was partly denominated in local currency — led to devastating inflation in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Weimar Germany during the first half of the 20th century.” The same thing has occurred more recently in Brazil, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Modern monetary theory is far from groundbreaking, let alone modern. It is simply a failed idea that has been tried many times and has led to economic destruction in every case. Although MMT proponents would like us to believe that it is a contemporary economic breakthrough, don’t believe the hype. Commonsense refutes MMT on its face.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Inflation
Smith, 22 – Karl W. Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. Previously, he was vice president for federal policy at the Tax Foundation and assistant professor of economics at the University of North Carolina. (Karl Smith, “No, This Isn’t Modern Monetary Theory’s Moment”, 3/8/22, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-08/high-u-s-inflation-shows-flaw-of-modern-monetary-theory#xj4y7vzkg)//EG
Americans are not happy with the economy, and inflation is their No. 1 concern. It’s odd, then, that proponents of Modern Monetary Theory — a school of economics that advocates the kind of policy that has brought the U.S. economy to this point — are claiming this moment as vindication. To the contrary, the current state of the economy shows that MMT, as it’s known, is less a theory than a disposition. And to the extent it is a theory, it is proving every bit as impractical as its critics charge. Some background: Virtually all economists agree that productive government investments in infrastructure or scientific research can help economic growth. Mainstream economists still debate whether stimulus spending during a recession can be a net boost to the economy, even if it doesn’t pass a traditional cost-benefit analysis. Proponents of MMT go beyond that. They argue the government can spend as much as it wants, whenever it wants, without worrying about the fiscal cost. What matters, they argue, are so-called real resource constraints — a shortage of building materials, for example. When pressed on how those constraints would be managed in practice, proponents of MMT admit that, in theory, too much government spending could lead to inflation. But they quickly add that inflation is unlikely to be truly problematic — and if it is, the government could just stop spending. Granted, the mere mention of unchecked government spending sets some economists’ hair ablaze, and there have been a lot of rash complaints about MMT. But there are also more considered critiques. One is that MMT assumes that central banks such as the Federal Reserve would behave in ways the Fed would never behave. In the real world, these critics said, the Fed would raise interest rates in response to rising inflation — thereby increasing the amount the government had to spend to balance its books. Another critique is that popularly elected governments are not especially well equipped to predict how their spending will affect inflation, nor are they disciplined enough to tailor their budgets to keep inflation in check. Indeed, this lack of expertise and discipline is one of the reasons for central banks in first place. All of which brings us to the present day. In response to Covid, the federal government spent trillions of dollars on relief, and the Fed pushed interest rates to zero. The idea was that these policies would be short-lived. But as the pandemic wore on, they were kept in place. In effect, America was putting MMT into practice. Congress borrowed and spent with little concern for long-term limits, and the Fed supported that borrowing by keeping interest rates at zero. As a result, MMT proponents are fond of pointing out, the U.S. economy bounced back stronger than any of its peer nations. Yes, they admit, the U.S. has also had stronger inflation. But MMT proponents note that they had always acknowledged that possibility, and that inflation was more a result of the unusual circumstances of a pandemic than of any particular aspect of MMT. Both of these answers are unsatisfying. In truth, MMT is failing precisely as its more sanguine critics predicted. First, it’s worth noting that, had the U.S. government adopted some of the policies that MMT proponents favor, inflation would probably be a lot higher. Among other things, they envisioned giving a $15-per-hour government job to anyone who wanted one. If that made it difficult for the private sector to attract talent, then it could just raise wages (and presumably prices). This is a more extreme version of what employers faced when Congress temporarily added a bonus to unemployment insurance. One result was widespread labor shortages and a rise in costs for retailers. The inability of the White House to admit that it might have gone overboard is precisely what critics meant when they accused MMT of being “delusional.” It’s not that there is something particularly dishonest about this administration; it’s that any administration would find it hard to tell its most ardent supporters that their most wished-for programs are wrecking the economy. The best it can do is wait inflation out — which is precisely what President Joe Biden’s administration is doing. Second, the Fed is now planning to raise interest rates, perhaps quite aggressively. This means that consumers and businesses will soon face rising costs of investment, while the federal government will find it more expensive to finance its debt. If Congress raises taxes, that will exacerbate the difficulties facing families and businesses. If the government borrows more money, that will exacerbate the spending problem — which led to inflation in the first place. In other words: Congress can’t easily stop spending too much, and the Fed can’t easily accommodate its failure to do so. The bottom line is that, even in extraordinary circumstances like a pandemic, the government has to be mindful of the consequences of excess public spending. The idea that it could disregard such consequences was always dubious as a theory, and now it has been discredited as a practice.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Gulker 18(Max Gulker is a Senior research fellow at the AEIR, “The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis” 11-18-2018 https://www.aier.org/article/the-job-guarantee-a-critical-analysis-executive-summary/#:~:text=A%20federal%20job%20guarantee%20would%20be%20monumentally%20expensive%2C,for%20economic%20growth%20and%20the%20private%20labor%20market.) [CT]
A federal job guarantee would be monumentally expensive, return only limited value from the participants’ work, entail administrative challenges nearly impossible to solve, and be potentially disastrous for economic growth and the private labor market.
Relying on rigorous but basic economics and data analysis, we find the following:
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Bhandari 19 (Ryan Bhanadari is the former senior policy advisor of the economics program at Third Way, “What Is the ‘Federal Jobs Guarantee’ and What Are People Saying About It?” Third Way 3-25-2019 https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it) [CT]
#3: It could crowd out tens of millions of private sector jobs. There are currently 54 million people who earn $15 an hour or less. When they find out the federal government is offering $15 an hour plus benefits and permanent job security, many of those workers would quit their current job and join the federal workforce.3 Companies that could afford to would raise wages to keep some of these workers; other companies would simply go out of business. The labor markets would be controlled by the government in ways never seen before in America. And even if just half of low-wage private sector workers quit, the number of federal employees would rise by between 35 and 40 million.4 Costs to the government would then rise to anywhere from $1.6 trillion to $2.24 trillion per year, and the private sector would see massive repercussions.
#4: Inflation would rise. A sudden increase in the cost of labor for businesses will lead to inflation throughout the economy because of higher business costs that will need to be passed on to consumers. In addition, when only those at the bottom of the income distribution get a defacto raise to $15, there are upstream consequences. Workers who were making $15 an hour may demand $20 an hour now. Workers making $20 an hour might want $25 an hour and so on. This may seem like a benefit, but “this is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures,” warns progressive economist Dean Baker.5 We have been very fortunate that inflation has been well under control for the last few decades. A federal jobs guarantee could change that pretty quickly.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
McArdle ‘18 – Megan McArdle is a columnist for The Washington Post about economics, finance, and government policy. “Bernie Sanders wants you to have a good job. But there’s a catch.”, The Washington Post, 04/24/2018; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bernie-sanders-wants-you-to-have-a-good-job-but-theres-a-catch/2018/04/24/b67a7a56-47ef-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html Accessed 04/29/2018 [via Wayback Machine] | RN
Sanders wants the government to provide guaranteed jobs at $15 an hour, plus benefits. His office did not, a representative demurely told Post reporter Jeff Stein, yet have cost estimates for this proposal.
Perhaps we can help the senator out. With two weeks of paid vacation, each worker would make roughly $31,000 a year. Add, conservatively, about $10,000 for benefits, and the total cost would be about $40,000.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Summers ‘18 – Lawrence “Larry” H. Summers is an economist. He doesn’t really do much. “Jobs for all? Take the idea seriously but not literally.”, The Washington Post, 07/02/2018; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jobs-for-all-take-the-idea-seriously-but-not-literally/2018/07/02/32a93c12-7dfa-11e8-bb6b-c1cb691f1402_story.html Accessed 07/03/2018 [via Wayback Machine] | RN
A first question is how much to pay. A program of last-resort employment could likely provide the minimum wage and low benefits. But that will not help those laid off from highly paid manufacturing jobs or those who expect to earn wages well above the poverty line. While such a proposal could help many young people, it is far from clear that it would connect with the principal concerns of Rust Belt adults.
On the other hand, if the guaranteed jobs paid premium wages, say double the $7.25 per hour national minimum wage, they would be an attractive alternative for a quarter or more of the workforce, raising questions of cost and economic disruption.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Earle ‘18 – Peter C. Earle is an economist and Financial markets professional. “‘Federal Jobs Guarantee’ Idea Is Costly, Misguided, And Increasingly Popular With Democrats”, Investor’s Business Daily, 11/19/2018; https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/federal-jobs-guarantee-democrats/ Accessed 07/11/2023 | RN
The costs, too, are daunting. Both the CBPP and LEI reports project costs ranging from $450 billion to more than $600 billion, which put the proposed programs in the same league with the Pentagon in terms of discretionary spending.
And while it is true that the cost of any of the federal jobs guarantee programs would be offset by savings in current unemployment insurance and poverty mitigation programs, neither of the estimates include costs of designing, staffing, and managing the proposed agency.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Ozimek 18, -- Economist and former contributor to Forbes (Adam Ozimek, “Yes, Job Gaurantee is Absurd”, 4/24/18, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2018/04/24/yes-the-jobs-guarantee-is-absurd/?sh=6a6dcd5eafd0) //EG
I gather from my last post that people want me to say more about why a jobs guarantee program is absurd. I've written about this before (here, here, and here), and my main point in that post was really just to be clear about how ridiculous I thought the program was. But if readers want more they can have it. The jobs guarantees that are being proposed out there have two purposes: end involuntary unemployment and ending low wages. This is really important because some defenders of jobs guarantees simply focusing on their role in providing jobs for people who truly struggle to find work even in a healthy labor market, and for those who lose them for cyclical reasons. But the jobs guarantee proposals in both rhetoric and policy details are clear: these polices are meant to guarantee everyone a good job. In the CBPP proposal the authors list as one of the 3 main recommendations of their report "The elimination of poverty wages through the pay structure of the NIEC". Their goal is to create a floor in the labor market below which private employers will not go: "Since the job guarantee places a floor in the labor market, employers will likely have to offer compensation packages at least as desirable as those offered under the NIEC" In case there is any confusion, the authors don't mince words, warning readers that "Make no mistake, this is a policy to transform the U.S. labor market". And they're right! They recommend a minimum wage of $24,600 which they translate to a minimum hourly wage of $11.83. At a first pass, private employers simply won't be able to offer less than this if they want to hire anyone. But they also argue for inclusion of health benefits, and since this is a guaranteed job you presumably can't easily be fired from, it also includes the best job security you can get. What's more, that's just the minimum wage in this program, and they expect the average worker will make $32,500, which translates to a minimum hourly wage of $15,60. And that's just the average, not the peak! Despite these generous benefits, they estimate this program will only require hiring about 10 million workers, all of whom are currently unemployed. While they admit "the job guarantee may result in the displacement of some workers currently employed in the private sector, especially at the low end of the labor market", they minimize this risk by pointing to the minimum wage literature. As such, their cost estimates don't assume any crowd out of private employers. Does that sound reasonable to you? They believe their program will prompt tens of millions of employers to raise wages, but this won't cause any disemployment or crowd out at private employers. By their own estimate, their program "may result in a comparable change within the labor market" as a $15 minimum wage, which affects 41 million workers. To believe there would be no crowd out despite this massive change requires the assumption every low wage worker in this country has productivity high enough to justify a good paying job, but employers aren't paying it now. Usually, liberal commentators are quick to tell us how bad low wage jobs are in the U.S. not just by pay but by working conditions. Wage theft, unpredictable hours, abusive bosses, tenuous employment at will, lack of opportunities for advancement are all allegedly widespread features of the low-skilled labor market. Are we to believe that workers will not abandon these jobs in droves for guaranteed government employment with benefits, or that employers will change overnight? I think these criticisms of working conditions are often overblown, but at the very least you can certainly easily be fired from a private sector job and turnover is quite high, making a guaranteed job clearly nicer in that important regard. And yes, many low-skilled jobs are far from pleasant. The idea employers would and could universally raise wages, offer full benefits, and upgrade job quality to prevent crowd out strikes me as absurd. For many advocates I think this risk isn't worth worrying about because it's not much of a risk to them. If the job guarantee ends up with 20, 30, or 40 million instead of the 10 million they expect than that's not really a problem because massively expanding the size of government isn't really a big deal. But it would be. The first problem is you lose the output those workers were producing. In that sense, their production is nationalized quite like when the government takes over an industry, except in this case they are taking over the labor instead of the capital. What's more, when employers of low skilled workers go out of business this will also harm the high skilled workers they employ. The second problem is what this will do to the size of government. Right now there are about 21 million federal, state, and local government workers in the U.S. By the authors' calculations, the 10 million more jobs would increase government employment by a whopping 50%. If only 10 million private sector jobs are crowded out it would double the size of government. We are going to put to work 50% to 100% more government workers than we already do, and we should expect that the bill will approximately double as well. This brings me to the issue of what all of these people will do. It's alleged that there is a ton of work for government workers to do that isn't being done. Here is my challenge to the people who claim this: first have all the police officers, teachers, and other public sector workers who are allowed to retire at age 55 do this work instead of retiring. If the work is too strenuous for a 55 to 65 year old, then I'm going to question how realistic it is to guarantee that literally anyone can do it. If you say is impossible given political constraints from the power of government employees, then perhaps this is a reason to worry about drastically expanding the scope of government employment. When it comes to what work these people will do, read Matt Bruenig's criticisms of the alleged work that people in this program will do. Matt deserves praise for doing what I argued that more liberals should be doing: criticizing the absurdity of this program instead of trying to hold up a very watered down version of it that doesn't actually do what advocates and now politicians are actually proposing. It's not crazy for the government to want to improve job quality widely. It is crazy to say you are going to do that by the government directly offering everyone a good job. Tweak the program all you want, trying to make every job a good job via this mechanism is going to per se be a radical and massive undertaking and a bad idea. Policies should focus on subsidizing private employment of low-skilled workers and the government spending money on boosting wages directly. Honestly the idea is so bad I find the fact that we have to actually debate it far more interesting than actually debating it. It's a bad sign about the state of ideas on the left today.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Gulker, 18 --- Max Gulker, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow American Institute for Economic Research (No Author, " The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis", 2018, No Publication, https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf)//EG
We must approach any discussion of the impact of a federal job guarantee on the wider economy with an abundance of caution. Our sample size for evaluating a program that the Levy report’s authors term a “radical transformation of the labor market” is zero. Even countries with much larger public sectors do not operate under the mandated system of a job guarantee. However, economic theory and lessons from history can inform our understanding of the likely impacts of a federal job guarantee. Both reports’ authors are confident that in addition to benefiting program enrollees, a federal job guarantee would be an unequivocal positive for the larger economy, offering macroeconomic stabilizers and perhaps even paying for itself. Neither report concerns itself with the potential negative consequences that flow from basic economics, issues ranging from large distortions in the information and incentives provided by markets to opportunities for special interests to manipulate the programs to their advantage. Each of these issues could potentially result in substantial net harms to all Americans, including program participants. In appendix 2, we briefly evaluate the claims both reports make of benefits to the economy beyond the program enrollees themselves. The CBPP report touts some benefits but is short on details, while the Levy report makes highly problematic use of macroeconometric forecasting models. The remainder of this section focuses on the potential economic harms of a job guarantee. 6.1 Labor Market Disruptions Both reports’ authors treat the ten million or more enrollees in a federal job guarantee as somehow cloistered from the labor market at large (which includes both private and government employers). The Levy report envisions a “buffer stock” of job-guarantee workers that will grow in times of downturns and shrink as more workers rejoin the traditional labor market in better times. One does not have to go deep into economic theory to see how this purportedly clean flow of workers would break down. Neither report takes account of harm to the private sector caused by their proposals. In addition to the de facto minimum wage and benefits set by a job guarantee, one must consider the contraction in private labor supply that would result if a sizable fraction of the many millions of currently employed workers at the lower end of the wage distribution chose to leave their jobs and enroll in the federal program. The immediate result of more pay and benefits for the working poor is something everyone would like to see, all else equal. But the process would divert workers from the places in the economy where they are most productive to a labyrinthine bureaucracy, where even finding enough work to assign would be a challenge. This could greatly weaken the productivity of the overall economy, potentially leading to declines in output and even greater job loss. Contrary to the stated goal of not competing with the private sector, some industries could become entirely nationalized. For example, 875,000 home health aides and 1.3 million teachers’ aides currently employed by the private and public sectors earn less on average than proposed job guarantee wages. One might myopically say these workers deserve a raise, but turning these industries from conventional jobs into tasks assigned on demand would almost certainly result in poorer service to the young and elderly. 6.2 Impact on Worker Incentives Neither the CBPP nor Levy report has established how the work under a federal job guarantee would help build the workers’ human capital. In fact, the very existence of the program might strongly disincentivize workers from going out and acquiring the skills that lead to real, value-enhancing job creation in the labor market. By forcing workers mostly at the low end of the skills distribution to work by mandate and earn a fixed wage, a worker would have to derive enough value from education or other human capital acquisition to leapfrog ten million or more other workers. It would cost about $330 billion to send ten million workers currently counted among the U-6 unemployed for full trade school degrees, 27 a fraction of the cost of a single year of a federal job guarantee. While we do not support such blanket solutions of any kind, this number puts in perspective the benefits to investing in, rather than simply sustaining, people. 6.3 Rent-Seeking and Corruption A federal job guarantee, no matter how well intentioned, would also serve as a magnet for corruption and corporate influence peddling. Especially when administered on a local level, the opportunities for corruption become vast and difficult to monitor. For example, one need not be particularly imaginative to see opportunities for a local building contractor to get free labor by giving kickbacks to officials in charge of placing enrollees in jobs. Corporations and other interest groups do not have to resort to corruption per se to gain control of the millions of subsidized laborers in a job guarantee. Rent-seeking, where corporations or other incumbent interests compete for influence over government to further their own objectives, is a well-known phenomenon.28 For example, the regional manager for Walmart might get in touch with a local government about the condition of its store’s parking lot and the grounds around it. Sales have been falling, and this expense might tip the decision to move to a new location in the next town. Couldn’t the town provide some of its laborers to improve the look of the store’s grounds? Where there is free labor to be had, private businesses come knocking. Both with and without breaking the law, influence peddling would be an inevitable consequence of a job guarantee.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Crowd out
Smith 22, (Noah Smith is an American blogger, journalist, and commentator on economics and current events. Smith obtained his doctorate in Economics from the University of Michigan in 2012 and was an assistant professor of Behavioral Finance at Stony Brook University.), “A Federal Job Guarantee Is Asking for Trouble”, Bloomberg, 3/11/19, https://archive.ph/v3VIW#selection-4411.0-4414.0 // EE
But there’s a very good chance that the politics of the modern day would turn a job guarantee into something very different from the New Deal -- and make it much less beneficial for the economy.
First, there’s the question of whether people could be fired from the new program. It’s easy to imagine good reasons to fire someone from a government job -- starting fights, for example, engaging in criminal activities or simply refusing to work. Even if a job guarantee allowed workers to be fired for egregious offenses, there would doubtless be intense public scrutiny of firing decisions, especially on social media. That would put immense pressure on the administrators of the federal jobs program to avoid firing even those who deserved to be fired.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes
Triggs 20 (Adam Triggs – a Director within Accenture Strategy, a Visiting Fellow in the Crawford School at the Australian National University, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Is a job guarantee the answer?”, https://insidestory.org.au/is-a-job-guarantee-the-answer/)
But a job guarantee has bigger problems — macroeconomic, operational, political and the existence of a more effective alternative — that make it a poor choice. The macroeconomic problem is that a job guarantee can’t guarantee a job for everyone. Unemployment has a “natural rate,” estimated at between 4 and 5 per cent in pre-Covid Australia. If unemployment falls below this rate, inflation increases and interest rates rise, hurting investment and consumption and bringing unemployment back up to this natural rate. Arguments that we can defy that kind of economic gravity are unconvincing, with big trade-offs. They usually rely, among other things, on having the government set or heavily influence wages, which would kill more jobs than it creates. The better approach is to get the natural rate of unemployment lower (which can only be done through productivity-enhancing reform) while stimulating demand. Governments could do both, but don’t. A job guarantee faces more daunting operational challenges. The Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that the long-term unemployed often face complex and self-reinforcing challenges, ranging from insufficient skills and training to poor physical and mental health, limited social capital and higher rates of drug and alcohol abuse. The long-term unemployed need more than just a job.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes
Tymoigne 13 (Eric Tymoigne - an assistant professor of economics at Lewis and Clark College, as well as a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute, “Job Guarantee and Its Critiques – Insights from the New Deal Experience”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24696550.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afffbd17fd9f3ccf6ac09f8aa3fa08a18&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)
Since the JG has been studied more carefully, a number of mostly skeptical evaluations have been done by Aspromourgos (2000), Kadmos and O'Hara (2000), King (2001), Sawyer (2003), and Seccareccia (2004). In relation to the New Deal work programs, Jensen ( 1989) and Margo ( 1991 ) made similar critiques that broadly range from the limited capacity to deal with structural unemployment and labor market distortions, to high cost and inflationary tendencies. Probably the most common critique is that JG is not able to deal with structural unemployment. Solving structural unemployment requires retraining, whereas JG does not provide training and there are only limited learning opportunities on the job because most JG occupations involve low or common skills. Worse, JG may weaken skills by assigning individuals to tasks that do not fit their skills. In terms of market distortions, a JG would likely compete with existing public and private sector activities unless it is involved in a very narrow set of activities with limited relevance. In addition, JG may decrease the supply of work to the private sector because JG workers may have fewer incentives to look for private jobs if the JG provides better working conditions. Finally, according to critics, like the New Deal work programs, the JG is likely to have a bad reputation and so send a negative signal to potential employers. JG critics are skeptical of the cost estimates provided by JG proponents and argue that the benefits produced would not match the cost. The administrative cost of a JG would be substantial and would require a massive reorganization of the current government administration in charge of helping the unemployed. Not only would the cost of a JG be higher than estimated, but also the benefits would be limit because of the limited usefulness of the JG activities. The private or public sect already cover most of the useful activities. Finally, JG critics think that the claims about the stabilizing effects of a JG are overstated or not accurate. Some authors argue that a JG would create addition demand while putting the economy at full employment, thereby leading to t same demand-pull inflation as in the typical Keynesian fiscal policy. Others have doubted the capacity of the buffer program to stabilize wages significantly because contrary to agricultural commodities or bank reserves, labor is not a homogenous commodity. In addition, the level at which the JG wage is set is important to determine the cost, benefits, and potential inflationary dynamics, and JG proponent have not spent enough time looking at this issue carefully.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes
Palley 18 (Thomas Palley – an independent economist and founder of Economics for Democratic & Open Societies, “Job Guarantee Programs: Careful What You Wish For”, https://www.socialeurope.eu/job-guarantee-programs-careful-what-you-wish-for)
A second macroeconomic issue concerns financing and policy trade-offs. If government is financially constrained, policy must operate in a realm of trade-offs. Consequently, adopting a JGP may require giving up other desirable policy proposals such as increased public infrastructure investment, expanded subsidized healthcare, covering the shortfall in Social Security via general revenues, free tertiary education at public universities, elimination of student debt, or a universal basic income (UBI). This effect of financial constraints on government explains why discussion of a JGP tends to quickly spill over into a broader discussion about the macroeconomics of public finance. JGP proponents tend to believe government is financially unconstrained and can pay for everything by printing money. After the fact, government can then readily withdraw the money it has printed by raising taxes. All of this can be done without causing financial, economic, or political disruptions or distortions. That view is identified with modern money theory (MMT), which dismisses financial constraints on policy and argues the only constraint is availability of real resources (i.e. unemployed workers or under-utilised capital). In contrast, more conventional public finance macroeconomics argues that history, economic situation, markets, and political process impose financial, economic, and political constraints on governments that are difficult to thread. Though government has the technical ability to pay for everything owing to its power to issue money, doing so in excessive fashion will provoke disruptive and distorting financial, economic, and political reactions. The possibility of such reactions renders government’s technical ability to pay for everything an economic will-o-the-wisp. A government with a short time horizon can use its printing power to finance all its policy desires, but subsequent market reactions to budget excess will impose costs and may make the policies unsustainable. Alternatively, a government with a longer time horizon takes such future reactions into account when setting current policy, making it de facto financially constrained despite the appearance of being unconstrained. A third macroeconomic concern is inflation. The JGP wage is a real wage, which means the JGP nominal wage must be tied to inflation. Private sector nominal wages may then likely be tied to the JGP nominal wage to maintain an appropriate wage differential. Consequently, the JGP nominal wage could start to act as a form of economy-wide nominal wage indexation. Such indexation could potentially generate an unstable wage – price spiral, particularly if the existence of a JGP aggravates distributional conflict by increasing private sector wage demands. Raising the private sector wage share may be a desirable feature, but it points to the need for additional macroeconomic stabilisation policy tools. That requirement is either ignored or denied by JGP proponents.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes
Tymoigne 13, (Eric Tymoigne is Assistant Professor of Economics at California State University Fresno) “Job Guarantee and Its Critiques: Insights from the New Deal Experience”, “International Journal of Political Economy”, Summer 2013, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24696550 // EE
In terms of market distortions, a JG would likely compete with existing public and private sector activities unless it is involved in a very narrow set of activities with limited relevance. In addition, JG may decrease the supply of work to the private sector because JG workers may have fewer incentives to look for private jobs if the JG provides better working conditions. Finally, according to critics, like the New Deal work programs, the JG is likely to have a bad reputation and so send a negative signal to potential employers.
JG critics are skeptical of the cost estimates provided by JG proponents and argue that the benefits produced would not match the cost. The administrative cost of a JG would be substantial and would require a massive reorganization of the current government administration in charge of helping the unemployed. Not only would the cost of a JG be higher than estimated, but also the benefits would be limited because of the limited usefulness of the JG activities. The private or public sect already cover most of the useful activities.
2023
DDI
Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes
Bhandari 19, (Ryan Bhandari is a PHD student and former Senior Policy Advisor for Third Way), “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”, “Third Way”, 3/25/19, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it // EE
#4: Inflation would rise. A sudden increase in the cost of labor for businesses will lead to inflation throughout the economy because of higher business costs that will need to be passed on to consumers. In addition, when only those at the bottom of the income distribution get a defacto raise to $15, there are upstream consequences. Workers who were making $15 an hour may demand $20 an hour now. Workers making $20 an hour might want $25 an hour and so on. This may seem like a benefit, but “this is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures,” warns progressive economist Dean Baker.5 We have been very fortunate that inflation has been well under control for the last few decades. A federal jobs guarantee could change that pretty quickly.
#5: It would be an administrative nightmare. Finally, matching millions of workers to the jobs envisioned under a jobs guarantee would be an administrative nightmare to implement. State and local governments will be tasked with finding the productive work to do, but how do we train millions of people to do these jobs? How does the Department of Labor oversee the millions of new jobs to make sure they’re legitimate? What are the qualifiers for the kind of work that’s eligible? What if a right-leaning state wants jobs done that a left-leaning federal government deems unproductive or socially unacceptable like building an oil pipeline or opening up a coal mine?