2023
DDI
Negative
Recruitment DA › UQ › UQ – Recruitment High – 2NC
Winkie 6-2 [Davis; senior reporter covering the Army. Focuses on investigations, personnel concerns, and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill; 6-2-2023; "More recruits eligible for Army pre-boot camp study, fitness courses"; Army Times; https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/06/02/more-recruits-eligible-for-army-pre-boot-camp-study-fitness-courses/;]//LASA-بيلال
A wider range of hopeful soldiers can now enlist into the Army’s basic training preparatory course, service officials announced Friday.
The move expands eligibility for the Future Soldier Preparatory Course, the Army’s ambitious experiment to improve recruit fitness and test scores before they go to basic training. Now applicants who need to improve in both areas may enroll, and a new pilot program will admit a limited number of applicants with lower test scores than those previously required for the course.
2023
DDI
Negative
Recruitment DA › UQ › UQ – Recruitment High – 2NC
Beynon 6-5 [Steve; reporter for Military.com based in Washington D.C. He specializes in covering ground combat. An Afghanistan war veteran, serving over a decade as a cavalry scout, he currently serves as a non-commissioned officer in the National Guard. 6-5-2023; "2023 Ain't 2022: More Americans Signing Up with Army Guard, Internal Docs Show"; Military; https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/06/05/army-national-guard-recruiting-numbers-looking-better-after-horrendous-year.html;]//LASA-بيلال
The Army National Guard is behind on its recruiting goals for this year but is bringing more people into the ranks compared to last year, the worst recruiting year since the military went to an all-volunteer force.
The service component has come up about 10% short of its goals on recruits for each month between October and February, according to internal documents reviewed by Military.com. That's a big improvement compared to the same time frame last year in which the Army Guard came up 40% short, on average. October is the start of the military's fiscal year.
2023
DDI
Negative
Recruitment DA › UQ › UQ – Recruitment High – 2NC
South 3-4 [Todd; as written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Marine veteran of the Iraq War. 3-4-2023; "The Army keeps getting smaller"; Army Times; https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/03/13/the-army-keeps-getting-smaller/;]//LASA-بيلال
But last year, senior leaders promised to put the Army on a path to increase its forces back to 485,000 active duty soldiers, though it didn’t provide a timeline.
Current projections would begin adding 4,000 more troops per year in the next fiscal year’s request. That would mean a 485,000-soldier Army sometime in the early 2030s.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › IL
Kim et. al, 16 --- Young Eun Kim is an economist at The World Bank. Norman Loayza is an economist at the World Bank - Research Department. Claudia Maria Meza Cuadra Balcazar is an economist at the World Bank. (Young Eun Kim, Norman Loayza, Claudia Maria Meza Cuadra Balcazar, "Productivity as the Key to Economic Growth and Development", 8-1-2016, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249552)//EG
One of the most important lessons in economics is that productivity is key to economic growth. Productivity was a main concern of the fathers of modern economics, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in the eighteenth century, as they considered the advantages of specialization and trade. In the twentieth century, John Hicks and Joseph Schumpeter empha- sized productivity in a context in which developed countries were in the “Great Depression” (Hicks 1939; Schumpeter 1942). Recently, productivity has been a focus of economists concerned about developing countries in their search for sustained growth. For example, a study based on a large sample of countries by William Easterly and Ross Levine (2001) shows that economic growth is mainly explained by productiv- ity growth. Our analysis across 132 countries also shows that the growth of GDP per capita at the global level is highly corre- lated with the growth of productivity over the period 1960– 2014 (with a correlation coefficient of 0.86). Moreover, around half the variance of GDP per capita across these countries for the same period is explained by the variance of productivity (full results available upon request). What is Productivity? Productivity is defined in economic theory as the ratio of output over input. This translates into how efficiently input resources such as capital and labor are used to produce economic output. Productivity is mainly driven by four compo- nents: innovation, including the creation of new technologies; education to spread these new technologies and develop the capacity of the workforce; efficiency to promote the effective and flexible allocation of resources for production in various sectors; and infrastructure, both physical (transports, energy supply, and telecommunication systems) and intangible (public institutions and macroeconomic environment), to support private activity (figure 1). These four components are interre- lated and influence one another. The rest of this Research Policy Brief discusses each compo- nent and illustrates them by analyzing six countries in Asia and Latin America: Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, and Chile, Mexico, and Peru. These six countries are members of a free trade agreement recently signed on February 2016, the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP).
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › L
Triggs, 20 --- Adam Triggs is a Director within Accenture Strategy, a Visiting Fellow in the Crawford School at the Australian National University, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution. (Administrator, "Modern Monetary Theory: a solution in search of a problem", 8/31/20, Inside Story, https://insidestory.org.au/modern-monetary-theory-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/)//EG
For the sake of argument, though, let’s assume that this new system works perfectly. A much bigger problem remains: MMT is a solution in search of a problem. To see why, consider two situations: where the economy is at full employment and where the economy is not at full employment. If the economy is at full employment, any additional government spending will be inflationary and MMT has nothing to add. To reduce the number of jobless people during a period of full employment would require supply-side reforms to boost productivity — things like competition reform and capital and labour-market reforms. MMT does nothing to solve the myriad supply-side challenges facing the world. If anything, MMT would reduce productivity by having the government allocate labour and control wages through a job guarantee and the financial repression of keeping interest rates low. Nor is MMT helpful if the economy isn’t at full employment, as is likely in the post-Covid world. A big increase in government spending, financed by the central bank, would boost growth, boost job creation, boost wages and get inflation back up to where we need it. These are all wonderful outcomes. The problem is that exactly the same results could be achieved through the existing framework.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › L
Gulker, 18 --- Max Gulker, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow American Institute for Economic Research (No Author, " The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis", 2018, No Publication, https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf)//EG
We must approach any discussion of the impact of a federal job guarantee on the wider economy with an abundance of caution. Our sample size for evaluating a program that the Levy report’s authors term a “radical transformation of the labor market” is zero. Even countries with much larger public sectors do not operate under the mandated system of a job guarantee. However, economic theory and lessons from history can inform our understanding of the likely impacts of a federal job guarantee. Both reports’ authors are confident that in addition to benefiting program enrollees, a federal job guarantee would be an unequivocal positive for the larger economy, offering macroeconomic stabilizers and perhaps even paying for itself. Neither report concerns itself with the potential negative consequences that flow from basic economics, issues ranging from large distortions in the information and incentives provided by markets to opportunities for special interests to manipulate the programs to their advantage. Each of these issues could potentially result in substantial net harms to all Americans, including program participants. In appendix 2, we briefly evaluate the claims both reports make of benefits to the economy beyond the program enrollees themselves. The CBPP report touts some benefits but is short on details, while the Levy report makes highly problematic use of macroeconometric forecasting models. The remainder of this section focuses on the potential economic harms of a job guarantee. 6.1 Labor Market Disruptions Both reports’ authors treat the ten million or more enrollees in a federal job guarantee as somehow cloistered from the labor market at large (which includes both private and government employers). The Levy report envisions a “buffer stock” of job-guarantee workers that will grow in times of downturns and shrink as more workers rejoin the traditional labor market in better times. One does not have to go deep into economic theory to see how this purportedly clean flow of workers would break down. Neither report takes account of harm to the private sector caused by their proposals. In addition to the de facto minimum wage and benefits set by a job guarantee, one must consider the contraction in private labor supply that would result if a sizable fraction of the many millions of currently employed workers at the lower end of the wage distribution chose to leave their jobs and enroll in the federal program. The immediate result of more pay and benefits for the working poor is something everyone would like to see, all else equal. But the process would divert workers from the places in the economy where they are most productive to a labyrinthine bureaucracy, where even finding enough work to assign would be a challenge. This could greatly weaken the productivity of the overall economy, potentially leading to declines in output and even greater job loss. Contrary to the stated goal of not competing with the private sector, some industries could become entirely nationalized. For example, 875,000 home health aides and 1.3 million teachers’ aides currently employed by the private and public sectors earn less on average than proposed job guarantee wages. One might myopically say these workers deserve a raise, but turning these industries from conventional jobs into tasks assigned on demand would almost certainly result in poorer service to the young and elderly. 6.2 Impact on Worker Incentives Neither the CBPP nor Levy report has established how the work under a federal job guarantee would help build the workers’ human capital. In fact, the very existence of the program might strongly disincentivize workers from going out and acquiring the skills that lead to real, value-enhancing job creation in the labor market. By forcing workers mostly at the low end of the skills distribution to work by mandate and earn a fixed wage, a worker would have to derive enough value from education or other human capital acquisition to leapfrog ten million or more other workers. It would cost about $330 billion to send ten million workers currently counted among the U-6 unemployed for full trade school degrees, 27 a fraction of the cost of a single year of a federal job guarantee. While we do not support such blanket solutions of any kind, this number puts in perspective the benefits to investing in, rather than simply sustaining, people. 6.3 Rent-Seeking and Corruption A federal job guarantee, no matter how well intentioned, would also serve as a magnet for corruption and corporate influence peddling. Especially when administered on a local level, the opportunities for corruption become vast and difficult to monitor. For example, one need not be particularly imaginative to see opportunities for a local building contractor to get free labor by giving kickbacks to officials in charge of placing enrollees in jobs. Corporations and other interest groups do not have to resort to corruption per se to gain control of the millions of subsidized laborers in a job guarantee. Rent-seeking, where corporations or other incumbent interests compete for influence over government to further their own objectives, is a well-known phenomenon.28 For example, the regional manager for Walmart might get in touch with a local government about the condition of its store’s parking lot and the grounds around it. Sales have been falling, and this expense might tip the decision to move to a new location in the next town. Couldn’t the town provide some of its laborers to improve the look of the store’s grounds? Where there is free labor to be had, private businesses come knocking. Both with and without breaking the law, influence peddling would be an inevitable consequence of a job guarantee.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › L
Standing 18, Guy Standing is a British labour economist. He is a professor of development studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and a co-founder of the Basic Income Earth Network, May 2018, “Basic Income as Common Dividends: Piloting a Transformative Policy”, https://www.progressiveeconomyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PEF_Piloting_Basic_Income_Guy_Standing.pdf//JChu
A job guarantee would be a recipe for perpetuating low productivity. What would happen if a person in a guaranteed job performed poorly, perhaps because of limited ability or simply because they knew it was ‘guaranteed’? If you are guaranteed a job, why bother to work hard? If you are an employer and are given a subsidy to pay employees guaranteed a job, why bother to try to use labour efficiently? If subsidised through tax credits or a wage subsidy, a worker would need to produce only a little more value than the cost to the employer to make it profitable to retain him or her. This would cheapen low-productivity jobs relative to others and inhibit the higher productivity arising from labour-displacing technological change. If a job of a certain type is guaranteed, what happens if an employer wishes to invest in technology that would remove the need for such jobs? Those calling for a job guarantee also ignore the fact that any market economy requires some unemployment, as people need time to search for jobs they are prepared to accept, and firms must sift applicants for jobs they want to have done. To adopt a job guarantee policy would risk putting the economy in gridlock. Job guarantee advocates, such as Larry Summers, President Clinton’s former Treasury Secretary, argue that people without jobs ‘are much more likely to be dissatisfied with their lives’ and are more likely to be drug addicts and abusive than those with even low-wage jobs.135 This is bogus. I suggest there would be no correlation between life satisfaction and having a job if the comparison was made between those in lousy jobs and those with no job but an adequate income on which to live. Somebody facing a choice between penury and a lousy job will prefer the job. But that does not mean they like or want it for itself. The polling company Gallup conducts regular State of the Global Workplace surveys in over 150 countries. In 2017, it found that globally only 15% of workers were engaged by their job, and in no country did the figure exceed 40%. One recent UK survey found that 37% of jobholders did not think their job made any significant contribution. Summers ends his article by equivocating – ‘the idea of a jobs guarantee should be taken seriously but not literally’. He seems to mean government should try to promote more employment, through ‘wage subsidies, targeted government spending, support for workers with dependants, and more training and job-matching programmes’. In other words, he reverts to the standard social democratic package that has not done very well in the past three decades.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › Productivity DA – 1NC
Sprague, 21 --- Shawn Sprague is an economist in the Office of Productivity and Technology, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Sprague,Shawn, "The U.S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry-level analysis : Monthly Labor Review: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics", 4-6-2021, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2021/article/the-us-productivity-slowdown-the-economy-wide-and-industry-level-analysis.htm)//EG
Decomposition of labor productivity growth Labor productivity is a measure of economic performance that compares the amount of goods and services produced (output) with the number of labor hours used in producing those goods and services. It is defined mathematically as output per hour of work, and growth occurs when output increases faster than labor hours. For example, if output is rising by 3 percent and hours are rising by 2 percent, then labor productivity is growing by 1 percent. Labor productivity growth is vitally important to present and future prospects for economic growth, because it represents the only path by which economic growth can rise above what would be possible by simply increasing labor hours (as, by definition, economic growth can only come from either hours growth or labor productivity growth). The economic gains brought about by labor productivity growth make it possible for an economy to achieve higher growth in labor income,5 profits and capital gains of businesses, and public sector revenue; these economic gains also hold the potential to lead to improved living standards for those participating in an economy, in the form of higher income, greater leisure time, or a mixture of both. In addition, as labor productivity rises, all of these factors may increase simultaneously, without gains in one coming at the cost of one of the others. Given the importance of labor productivity growth, it is worth delving into the measure in more detail to see what underlying factors are making this growth possible. As such, in addition to labor productivity growth being defined as a residual—the difference between output growth and hours growth—we can also analyze it as a sum, built up from the contributions of its three component series.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Productivity DA › Productivity DA – 1NC
Smith, 19 --- Noah Smith has his PhD in Economics from the University of Michigan Ann Arbor and was an opinion columnist for Bloomberg. (Noah Smith, "U.S. Economy: Federal Job Guarantee Would Hurt Private Employers", 3-11-2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2019-03-11/u-s-economy-federal-job-guarantee-would-hurt-private-employers#xj4y7vzkg )//EG
I was once very supportive of the idea of a federal job guarantee, but I’ve changed my mind. Although the economics of the idea are sound, the implementation of the program matters crucially. And it’s becoming clearer that the politics surrounding the job guarantee would lead to significant problems. The basic idea of having the federal government act as the country’s employer of last resort is a good one. Although the economy occasionally puts the entire labor force to work, regular recessions mean that there are usually lots of people who want to find jobs but can’t. This can be seen by looking at a broad measure of unemployment: The wasted labor of these unemployed and underemployed people represents a real resource that could be put to work for the economy. Even if government jobs fixing sidewalks, cleaning public spaces and making art were only marginally productive, that would still be better than having people sit at home playing video games as their skills and work ethic steadily deteriorate. During the Great Depression, the New Deal had success with a raft of programs designed to give jobs to the unemployed -- the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works Administration. Furthermore, there’s a good chance that a job guarantee would provide people with more dignity than programs that just give people cash. As long as the jobs weren’t obviously pure make-work, they could allow people to feel more valuable to society. But there’s a very good chance that the politics of the modern day would turn a job guarantee into something very different from the New Deal -- and make it much less beneficial for the economy. First, there’s the question of whether people could be fired from the new program. It’s easy to imagine good reasons to fire someone from a government job -- starting fights, for example, engaging in criminal activities or simply refusing to work. Even if a job guarantee allowed workers to be fired for egregious offenses, there would doubtless be intense public scrutiny of firing decisions, especially on social media. That would put immense pressure on the administrators of the federal jobs program to avoid firing even those who deserved to be fired. The likely results would be a drop in productivity as some people realized they didn’t have to work to collect paychecks, increased resentment among those who felt morally obligated to put in a hard day’s labor, and disruption of the workplace due to toleration of disruptive or criminal behavior that would never be permitted at private companies. Even more troubling, there’s the possibility that the guaranteed federal jobs could cannibalize the private sector and make the economy less productive. The New Deal jobs programs were undertaken at a time when the economy had a huge amount of unemployment, and there was little chance that workers with private sector jobs would jump ship. But in the absence of very high unemployment like that of the Great Depression, a job guarantee will compete with private companies. And the job guarantee would often win that competition. Modern proposals would require that the federally guaranteed jobs be good jobs, with good pay and benefits. For example, here is the relevant text from the Green New Deal resolution recently introduced by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States This sounds better than many of today's low-wage jobs. Competition from these government-sponsored jobs would have an initially healthy result. It would force private companies to raise wages and increase benefits in order to keep up with the government. But as private-sector jobs improved, activists’ notion of what constitutes a good job would increase, and they would call for steadily higher wages and benefits for government work. Eventually this would exceed private companies’ ability to pay, so the job guarantee would come to represent the benchmark in the labor market and make up an ever-larger slice of the economy. This would reduce productivity, since government jobs would likely generate less real value than private-sector jobs. Economists have found evidence that the beneficiaries of short-term government jobs tend not to go on to find work in the private sector after the programs end, suggesting that guaranteed jobs would be low-productivity work. As activists forced government wages and benefits higher, the private sector would find itself deprived of cooks, janitors, housekeepers, cashiers and the other people who make a modern economy run. In a worst-case scenario, this would be a one-way ratchet to a peculiarly dysfunctional form of communism. So although a job guarantee could potentially be a good thing, politics seem likely to make it bad. A better idea is to use private-sector employment subsidies to encourage companies to hire more unemployed and underemployed workers -- an approach that the data suggests is much more effective in terms of building long-term worker skills. Additionally, a combination of wage subsidies, minimum wages and increased worker bargaining power could help private-sector workers capture a bigger share of the value they create.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › Turns Case
Maye, 19 --- Adewale Maye is a Policy Analyst for CLASP’s Education, Labor, and Worker Justice team. He provides research support and analysis on policy solutions that improve job quality for workers, strengthen worker protections, and increase economic security for low-income working families. (Adewale Maye, "How Inflation Reinforces Economic Disparities", 11/7/19, CLASP, https://www.clasp.org/blog/how-inflation-reinforces-economic-disparities/)//EG
Economic inequality comes in all shapes and sizes in the United States. Wealth and income disparities specifically plague many middle- and low-income people, pushing them further into poverty. These inequalities stem from our economy’s structural and systemic barriers that limit access to socioeconomic mobility. Low-wage jobs, inadequate worker benefits, unpredictable scheduling for low-wage hourly workers, and insufficient opportunities for career advancement and growth all exacerbate the divide between wealthier Americans and middle- and low-income households. We see the impact of these disparities more acutely across gender, racial, and ethnic lines. Despite wide understanding that economic justice is stymied by income and wealth disparities, inequality pervades all facets of the economy. We are constantly learning more about how economic inequality ensures that the wealthy maintain their wealth and prevents many low-income households from attaining economic prosperity. And in a recent study, there is a growing concern for a new and burgeoning form of economic inequality described as inflation inequality. Inflation is defined as the increase in prices of goods and services over time. People with higher incomes can offset rising inflation with rising incomes. Sadly, though, income inequality and rising inflation can entrap lower-income households in poverty. In addition, research has shown that prices may rise more quickly for those who have lower incomes, a phenomenon called inflation inequality. The study illustrates how the changes in income distribution affect differences in product innovations. In other words, a rise in income for wealthy households spurs innovation in products that high-income households buy. This innovation is measured by the entry of new products that wealthy households consume such as craft beer, organic foods, and branded drugs. With an increase in a variety of goods, or an increase in competition, businesses often set lower prices so their goods are more competitive. The paper concluded that because high-income consumers see more innovative products targeted at them and buy a larger variety of products, businesses lower their prices. However, businesses offer less variety and innovation in low-cost goods, and these goods saw higher prices over time thus producing inflation inequality. This research shows how inflation inequality is magnified due to income inequality. As high-income households get richer, firms offer new products at a lower inflation rate to cater to these consumers’ preferences. On the other hand, lower-income households see higher inflation rates and less variety with low-cost goods like generic, non-branded paid medication and non-organic, low cost groceries. With higher inflation in goods like non-branded medication and inexpensive groceries that are relatively cheaper and more accessible to low-income households, low-income people may not be able to afford goods that are critical to their health needs or the needs of their families. This cycle is just another way to keep low-income households impoverished and economic opportunity inaccessible. Now more than ever, low-income households need equitable solutions to combat economic inequality, address their socioeconomic needs, and lift them out of poverty. For low-wage workers specifically, an investment in federal policies such as the Healthy Families Act, Family and Medical Insurance Leave (FAMILY) Act, Schedules that Work Act, and Raise the Wage Act—along with ensuring that quality labor standards are enforced—can help low-income workers and their families become more economically secure and create pathways to an economy that works for all. As policymakers, researchers, and advocates working together to address growing inequality, we must recognize how economic inequality has transformed over time, especially through inflation, to keep low-income people economically marginalized. We must also push to enact policy proposals that combat inequality.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › Turns Case
Gill and Nagle, 22 --- Indermit Gill is a nonresident senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution. He is also chief economist and senior vice president for development economics at the World Bank and a visiting professor at the Kautilya School of Public Policy in Hyderabad, India. Peter Nagle is a senior economist with the World Bank’s Prospects Group. He works on a wide range of topics with a focus on commodity markets and debt crises. (Indermit Gill and Peter Nagle, "Inflation could wreak vengeance on the world’s poor", 3-18-2022, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/inflation-could-wreak-vengeance-on-the-worlds-poor/)//EG
With the war in Ukraine, matters are going quickly from bad to horrid. Food and fuel prices have spiked, as Russia and Ukraine are big exporters of many commodities including gas, oil, coal, fertilizers, wheat, corn, and seed oil. Several economies in Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are almost entirely dependent on Russia and Ukraine for wheat imports. For lower-income countries, disruption to supplies as well as higher prices could cause increased hunger and food insecurity. And disruption to supply chains could broadly intensify inflation pressures. For many households across the world, rising inflation poses a significant challenge. Higher prices can erode the value of real wages and savings, leaving households poorer. But these effects are not felt equally: Low- and middle-income households tend to be more vulnerable to high inflation than wealthier households. That reflects the composition of their income, assets, and consumption baskets. Inflation may affect the very poorest households living below the global poverty line less directly, however. That’s because the poorest households have minimal wage incomes or assets and tend to rely on nonmonetary income, such as subsistence farming or barter, which may be less vulnerable to inflation. Composition of income In advanced economies, low- and middle-income households tend to rely more heavily on wage income and transfer payments than wealthier households (Figure 2). Price inflation often outstrips growth in wages and transfers, while self-employment income and investment income may be more likely to keep pace with inflation. As such, inflation can reduce the incomes of poorer households relative to those of the richest. Among emerging market and developing economies, the picture is similar. In Brazil, for example, self-employment and investment income account for a larger share of income in high-income households than in low- and middle-income households. However, the very poorest households also rely on nonmonetary income. Composition of financial assets Poorer households often lack access to financial products that can protect them against inflation, because these products can have upfront or ongoing costs and therefore be unaffordable. In the United States, for example, almost all households have a transaction or checking account at a financial institution. However, far fewer households have savings or investment products. The distribution, moreover, is highly skewed: The wealthiest quartile of U.S. households is five times as likely as the poorest to hold certificates of deposit, six times as likely to hold savings bonds, and 12 times more likely to hold investment funds. High inflation, in short, tends to worsen inequality or poverty because it hits income and savings harder for poorer or middle-income households than for wealthy households. Households that have recently escaped poverty could be pushed back into it by rising inflation. Composition of consumption baskets Poorer households may actually experience higher rates of inflation than wealthy households. Consumer-price inflation measures are calculated using a basket of goods that is representative of the average consumer. But the actual composition of spending varies significantly by income group. For example, the lowest-income households in emerging and developing economies spend roughly 50 percent of their income on food. For the highest-income households, the amount is just 20 percent (Figure 3). The recent increase in food and energy prices could disproportionately impact the poorest households. High-income households can easily switch from higher-quality goods to lower-quality goods in times of economic crisis. They can also take greater advantage of discounts on bulk purchases and sales. Poor households ordinarily don’t have those options. In some emerging and developing economies, rising food prices do hold the potential to benefit a sizeable segment of the poor. In the average developing economy, more than one-fifth of households around or below the poverty line are net food sellers, so higher food prices could be good for them. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the poor in developing economies remain net buyers of food, so food-price spikes tend to increase poverty overall.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › Turns Case
Wimer et. al, 19 --- Christopher Wimer is co-Director of the Center on Poverty and Social Policy (CPSP) at Columbia University. He conducts research on the measurement of poverty and disadvantage in both local and national contexts, as well as historical trends in poverty and the impacts of social policies on the poverty rate. Sophie Collyer is a Research Analyst at the Center on Poverty and Social Policy (CPSP) at Columbia University. Her work evaluates the impacts of national and local anti-poverty policies, with a particular focus on reforms to the tax code. Xavier Jaravel is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics. Prior to joining the LSE he was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University and obtained his PhD from Harvard University (Christopher Wimer, Sophie Collyer, Xavier Jaravel , " THE COSTS OF BEING POOR: INFLATION INEQUALITY LEADS TO THREE MILLION MORE PEOPLE IN POVERTY ", 2019, Center on Poverty and Social Policy, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/610831a16c95260dbd68934a/t/61154aaa50053703a8898e64/1628785323000/The-Costs-of-Being-Poor-CPSP-Groundwork-Collaborative-2019.pdf)//EG
We begin by examining how recent trends in poverty would differ if more accurate measures of inflation were used. The poverty line, or threshold, was developed in the 1960s and was based, at the time, on the cost of food as a proportion of family budgets. Since then, the poverty line has been updated each year for inflation using the CPI. In 2018, the poverty line for a family of four is just over $25,000. A single individual is not considered poor if they make just a bit over $12,000. By most domestic standards, these are very low levels of need. So, when eligibility for important government benefits is tied to these poverty lines (for example, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program and Medicaid), small changes to how those lines are calculated can make a big difference. To measure the implications of utilizing an inflation measure based on the price increases faced by the lowest income individuals, we use Jaravel’s data and apply to the poverty threshold an inflation index that adjusts for inequality across the income distribution. Figure 1 shows the number of individuals in poverty under the official measure and according to our adjusted measure. With the adjusted CPI, the number of people in poverty in 2018 is about 8 percent larger than under the official measure, which corresponds to an increase in the poverty rate of approximately 1.0 percentage point. This is a large difference. Using the adjusted CPI translates into over 3.2 million more people classified as living in poverty, or about the population of the entire state of Iowa.2 This means that millions of people who might reasonably qualify for benefits like food and housing assistance from antipoverty programs that could help them and their families, do not qualify. It also means that we have a too-optimistic portrait of the number of families who are struggling to make ends meet. Keep in mind as well that this divergence in poverty rates is apparent just when using a relatively narrow thirteen-year window. Over a longer time period, this divergence is likely to compound further. We can also break out poverty changes by various demographic subgroups. Tables 5-8 in the Appendix provide the number of individuals in each subgroup newly classified as poor if we considered Jaravel’s income specific inflation rates as the relevant measure. Child poverty rates would be 1.5 percentage points higher in 2018, corresponding to 1.1 million additional children in poverty in that year. We see similar trends for women-headed households with children, by race and ethnicity, and by gender respectively. 1.2 million more individuals in women-headed households would be newly counted as poor. This is especially significant given that mothers are now the breadwinners in 40 percent of all households .3 Furthermore, 1.2 million more white non-Hispanic individuals would be newly counted as poor when using the updated inflation measures, increasing the white poverty rate by 0.6 percentage points to 8.7 percent in 2018. In addition, 650,000 more Black non-Hispanic individuals would fall under the poverty line increasing the Black poverty by rate by 1.6 percentage points to 22.7 percent in 2018. The Latinx/Hispanic poverty rate would increase by 1.8 percentage points to 19.4 percent in 2018, meaning 1.1 million more Latinx/Hispanic individuals in poverty. Additionally, 1.7 million women, and 1.5 million men would be newly counted as poor. We repeat the analysis using the deep poverty rate, with deep poverty defined as living below half the poverty line. Since the poverty line for a family of four is only about $25,000, this is a marker of fairly severe deprivation. Again, we see greater deep poverty over time when using a more accurate measure of the prices that low-income families pay. By 2018, this means over 800,000 more people would be classified as living in deep poverty relative to the standard, official measure of poverty. (see table 3 in Appendix for more details.) It is clear that relying on a population-wide measure of inflation when calculating the poverty rate understates the deprivation faced by the most vulnerable adults, children, and families. To develop policies that improve the economic well-being of low-income individuals, we must first accurately measure their well-being. That should start with an accurate understanding of the prices they pay for the goods and services they consume. HOUSEHOLD INCOME We can also use updated inflation measures to reassess recent trends in the divergence of household incomes. Every year, the Census Bureau publishes statistics on household income changes, again adjusted using a version of the CPI. It is now widely recognized that income inequality has skyrocketed in recent decades due to extreme growth in in come at the top of the distribution. Incomes at the bottom have stagnated, unless you count the resources families receive from government income-support programs that try to compensate for low market incomes. There is a large and growing gap between the incomes of the top quintile of households and the bottom quintile between 2004 and 2018, the period of our study. When we apply inflation corrections to household incomes during this period, we see that this gap is growing even more over time than one finds using the CPI alone. Figure 2 reports changes in income across quintiles of the income distribution, using the conventional CPI and our adjusted inflation rates. All figures are adjusted for household size before dividing households into quintiles. Using conventional estimates based on the CPI, we see that income in the top fifth of the distribution grew by 16.6 percent between 2004 and 2018. Concurrently, income at the bottom fell by about one percentage point. Thus, income inequality between the top and bottom quintiles widened by more than 17 percentage points over the period (2004-2018) using conventional measures of inflation. If, instead, we use our adjusted inflation measure, we find that incomes in the bottom quintile actually declined by 6.7 percent.4 Put another way, according to our adjusted measure purchasing power fell significantly at the bottom of the distribution, which the conventional CPI largely misses. Using the adjusted inflation measure, income inequality between the top and bottom quintiles widened by about 23 percentage points, or about 33 percent more than with the conventional measure of inflation (17.6 vs. 23.4 percentage points). CONCLUSION In sum, our results show that if we take seriously the idea that inflation varies across different points in the income distribution, a different picture of the economic health of those with low incomes emerges. Jaravel’s research shows that, at least in recent years, inflation is steeper at the bottom of the income distribution. If we apply this steeper inflation to the poverty threshold, we see that millions more people would be classified as living in poverty. The divergence in household incomes that has been underway for decades is also notably larger than we thought. Despite this evidence, which shows that our current practice of using aggregate inflation measures significantly understates income inequality and poverty, recent proposals by the Trump administration seek to use smaller inflation rates to adjust the poverty threshold. Doing so would result in a lower poverty line and lower official poverty rates over time. This would, in turn, mean that fewer and fewer low-income Americans would find themselves eligible for federal benefits, which have been shown to reduce the poverty level substantially. Taking seriously the actual inflation rates faced by those at the bottom of the income distribution indicates that we currently have a too-rosy view of the actual levels of deprivation faced by those at the bottom of the income distribution. We should be doing more, not less, to help them make ends meet.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Triggs 20 (Adam Triggs – a Director within Accenture Strategy, a Visiting Fellow in the Crawford School at the Australian National University, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Is a job guarantee the answer?”, https://insidestory.org.au/is-a-job-guarantee-the-answer/)
But a job guarantee has bigger problems — macroeconomic, operational, political and the existence of a more effective alternative — that make it a poor choice. The macroeconomic problem is that a job guarantee can’t guarantee a job for everyone. Unemployment has a “natural rate,” estimated at between 4 and 5 per cent in pre-Covid Australia. If unemployment falls below this rate, inflation increases and interest rates rise, hurting investment and consumption and bringing unemployment back up to this natural rate. Arguments that we can defy that kind of economic gravity are unconvincing, with big trade-offs. They usually rely, among other things, on having the government set or heavily influence wages, which would kill more jobs than it creates. The better approach is to get the natural rate of unemployment lower (which can only be done through productivity-enhancing reform) while stimulating demand. Governments could do both, but don’t. A job guarantee faces more daunting operational challenges. The Australian Bureau of Statistics shows that the long-term unemployed often face complex and self-reinforcing challenges, ranging from insufficient skills and training to poor physical and mental health, limited social capital and higher rates of drug and alcohol abuse. The long-term unemployed need more than just a job.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Tymoigne 13 (Eric Tymoigne - an assistant professor of economics at Lewis and Clark College, as well as a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute, “Job Guarantee and Its Critiques – Insights from the New Deal Experience”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24696550.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Afffbd17fd9f3ccf6ac09f8aa3fa08a18&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)
Since the JG has been studied more carefully, a number of mostly skeptical evaluations have been done by Aspromourgos (2000), Kadmos and O'Hara (2000), King (2001), Sawyer (2003), and Seccareccia (2004). In relation to the New Deal work programs, Jensen ( 1989) and Margo ( 1991 ) made similar critiques that broadly range from the limited capacity to deal with structural unemployment and labor market distortions, to high cost and inflationary tendencies. Probably the most common critique is that JG is not able to deal with structural unemployment. Solving structural unemployment requires retraining, whereas JG does not provide training and there are only limited learning opportunities on the job because most JG occupations involve low or common skills. Worse, JG may weaken skills by assigning individuals to tasks that do not fit their skills. In terms of market distortions, a JG would likely compete with existing public and private sector activities unless it is involved in a very narrow set of activities with limited relevance. In addition, JG may decrease the supply of work to the private sector because JG workers may have fewer incentives to look for private jobs if the JG provides better working conditions. Finally, according to critics, like the New Deal work programs, the JG is likely to have a bad reputation and so send a negative signal to potential employers. JG critics are skeptical of the cost estimates provided by JG proponents and argue that the benefits produced would not match the cost. The administrative cost of a JG would be substantial and would require a massive reorganization of the current government administration in charge of helping the unemployed. Not only would the cost of a JG be higher than estimated, but also the benefits would be limit because of the limited usefulness of the JG activities. The private or public sect already cover most of the useful activities. Finally, JG critics think that the claims about the stabilizing effects of a JG are overstated or not accurate. Some authors argue that a JG would create addition demand while putting the economy at full employment, thereby leading to t same demand-pull inflation as in the typical Keynesian fiscal policy. Others have doubted the capacity of the buffer program to stabilize wages significantly because contrary to agricultural commodities or bank reserves, labor is not a homogenous commodity. In addition, the level at which the JG wage is set is important to determine the cost, benefits, and potential inflationary dynamics, and JG proponent have not spent enough time looking at this issue carefully.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Palley 18 (Thomas Palley – an independent economist and founder of Economics for Democratic & Open Societies, “Job Guarantee Programs: Careful What You Wish For”, https://www.socialeurope.eu/job-guarantee-programs-careful-what-you-wish-for)
A second macroeconomic issue concerns financing and policy trade-offs. If government is financially constrained, policy must operate in a realm of trade-offs. Consequently, adopting a JGP may require giving up other desirable policy proposals such as increased public infrastructure investment, expanded subsidized healthcare, covering the shortfall in Social Security via general revenues, free tertiary education at public universities, elimination of student debt, or a universal basic income (UBI). This effect of financial constraints on government explains why discussion of a JGP tends to quickly spill over into a broader discussion about the macroeconomics of public finance. JGP proponents tend to believe government is financially unconstrained and can pay for everything by printing money. After the fact, government can then readily withdraw the money it has printed by raising taxes. All of this can be done without causing financial, economic, or political disruptions or distortions. That view is identified with modern money theory (MMT), which dismisses financial constraints on policy and argues the only constraint is availability of real resources (i.e. unemployed workers or under-utilised capital). In contrast, more conventional public finance macroeconomics argues that history, economic situation, markets, and political process impose financial, economic, and political constraints on governments that are difficult to thread. Though government has the technical ability to pay for everything owing to its power to issue money, doing so in excessive fashion will provoke disruptive and distorting financial, economic, and political reactions. The possibility of such reactions renders government’s technical ability to pay for everything an economic will-o-the-wisp. A government with a short time horizon can use its printing power to finance all its policy desires, but subsequent market reactions to budget excess will impose costs and may make the policies unsustainable. Alternatively, a government with a longer time horizon takes such future reactions into account when setting current policy, making it de facto financially constrained despite the appearance of being unconstrained. A third macroeconomic concern is inflation. The JGP wage is a real wage, which means the JGP nominal wage must be tied to inflation. Private sector nominal wages may then likely be tied to the JGP nominal wage to maintain an appropriate wage differential. Consequently, the JGP nominal wage could start to act as a form of economy-wide nominal wage indexation. Such indexation could potentially generate an unstable wage – price spiral, particularly if the existence of a JGP aggravates distributional conflict by increasing private sector wage demands. Raising the private sector wage share may be a desirable feature, but it points to the need for additional macroeconomic stabilisation policy tools. That requirement is either ignored or denied by JGP proponents.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Tymoigne 13, (Eric Tymoigne is Assistant Professor of Economics at California State University Fresno) “Job Guarantee and Its Critiques: Insights from the New Deal Experience”, “International Journal of Political Economy”, Summer 2013, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24696550 // EE
In terms of market distortions, a JG would likely compete with existing public and private sector activities unless it is involved in a very narrow set of activities with limited relevance. In addition, JG may decrease the supply of work to the private sector because JG workers may have fewer incentives to look for private jobs if the JG provides better working conditions. Finally, according to critics, like the New Deal work programs, the JG is likely to have a bad reputation and so send a negative signal to potential employers.
JG critics are skeptical of the cost estimates provided by JG proponents and argue that the benefits produced would not match the cost. The administrative cost of a JG would be substantial and would require a massive reorganization of the current government administration in charge of helping the unemployed. Not only would the cost of a JG be higher than estimated, but also the benefits would be limited because of the limited usefulness of the JG activities. The private or public sect already cover most of the useful activities.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Bhandari 19, (Ryan Bhandari is a PHD student and former Senior Policy Advisor for Third Way), “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”, “Third Way”, 3/25/19, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it // EE
#4: Inflation would rise. A sudden increase in the cost of labor for businesses will lead to inflation throughout the economy because of higher business costs that will need to be passed on to consumers. In addition, when only those at the bottom of the income distribution get a defacto raise to $15, there are upstream consequences. Workers who were making $15 an hour may demand $20 an hour now. Workers making $20 an hour might want $25 an hour and so on. This may seem like a benefit, but “this is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures,” warns progressive economist Dean Baker.5 We have been very fortunate that inflation has been well under control for the last few decades. A federal jobs guarantee could change that pretty quickly.
#5: It would be an administrative nightmare. Finally, matching millions of workers to the jobs envisioned under a jobs guarantee would be an administrative nightmare to implement. State and local governments will be tasked with finding the productive work to do, but how do we train millions of people to do these jobs? How does the Department of Labor oversee the millions of new jobs to make sure they’re legitimate? What are the qualifiers for the kind of work that’s eligible? What if a right-leaning state wants jobs done that a left-leaning federal government deems unproductive or socially unacceptable like building an oil pipeline or opening up a coal mine?
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Benson 21- Senior Economist at the United States Joint Economic Committee
Jackie Benson, "The Economics of Inflation and the Risks of Ballooning Government Spending," United States Joint Economic Committee, 10-06-2021, https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2021/10/the-economics-of-inflation-and-the-risks-of-ballooning-government-spending-- 嘉玮
What Causes Inflation?
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L – FJG
Bivens, 18 --- Josh Bivens is the chief economist at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). His areas of research include macroeconomics, inequality, social insurance, public investment, and the economics of globalization. (Josh Bivens, "How do our job creation recommendations stack up against a job guarantee?", 4-12-2018, Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/blog/how-do-our-job-creation-recommendations-stack-up-against-a-job-guarantee/)//EG
Further agreement between our recommendations and the job guarantee is that the ambition of job creation strategies should go beyond hitting the target of macroeconomic full employment at the national level—even if people committed to pushing the lower bounds of unemployment are defining this target. That is, there is almost surely some national unemployment rate (4 percent? 3 percent? lower?) at which further stimulus to aggregate demand could lead to accelerating inflation. Should we just stop there (what I’m calling macroeconomic full employment) and declare concern about jobs addressed? Definitely not. Instead, by deploying public investments strategically, we should be able to lean harder on (targeted) fiscal stimulus and less hard on (across-the-board) monetary stimulus to make sure that national full employment is spread more evenly across communities. If, for example, it turns out that macroeconomic full employment nationally is 3 percent (don’t laugh, it might be—and making sure we know how low it can sustainably go is a key part of our job creation recommendations), then it’s possible to hit this 3 percent rate nationally, but in a way where some communities are at more-than-full employment while other communities face substantially higher joblessness. To put it too simply, when we’ve hit the target national unemployment rate of (say) 3 percent, we’d like it to be 3 percent in both (say) Seattle and Detroit, rather than 2 percent in the Seattle and 4 percent in Detroit.
2023
DDI
Negative
OFF › Inflation DA › L - MMT
Ritz, 22 --- Ben Ritz is a contributor to Forbes and the Director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s Center for Funding America’s Future, which works to promote a fiscally responsible public investment agenda that fosters robust and inclusive economic growth. (Ben Ritz, "MMT Isn’t Taking A Victory Lap – It’s On Its Last Legs", 2-10-2022, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/benritz/2022/02/10/mmt-isnt-taking-a-victory-lap--its-on-its-last-legs/?sh=3726fb862ad5)//EG
In recent years, politicians on the far left have leaned on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) to justify offering increasingly exorbitant spending proposals without plans to pay for them. Then roughly $6 trillion in deficit-financed stimulus approved by Congress in 2020 and 2021 provided policymakers a natural experiment to evaluate the claims proponents of MMT made. The results exposed the critical flaws in their approach, and rather than being able to take a victory lap, MMT is now on its last legs. The idea that government should use deficit spending to support an economy in crisis is not unique to MMT – economists across the political spectrum supported an aggressive fiscal response in 2020. The core tenet of MMT is that a monetarily sovereign nation, like the United States, can always simply print however much currency it needs to buy whatever goods and services programs require. This is the lens through which proponents of MMT have argued that the only constraint on deficit spending should be inflation that materializes when the economy is utilizing all available resources. A new paper published by Dr. Eric Leeper for the Progressive Policy Institute deconstructs the problems with this approach. Leeper writes that the modern financial system rests upon certain norms, namely that 1) government spending is financed by either collecting taxes or debt that will be repaid with revenue from future tax collections and 2) the Federal Reserve will operate independently to fulfill a dual mandate of full employment and price stability. Adherence to these norms is what has allowed to United States to enjoy low borrowing costs, a reliable currency, and robust economic growth. Proponents of MMT want to turn the system over by having Congress use fiscal policy to achieve inflation and employment goals while monetary policy simply plays a supporting role. In other words, the Fed will keep interest rates low to enable Congress to run large deficits indefinitely – at least, until inflation materializes. In her book “The Deficit Myth,” Dr. Stephanie Kelton, one of the thought leaders behind MMT, writes, “for evidence of overspending, look to inflation.” She goes on to say that below-desired inflation signals insufficient spending while above-desired inflation signals excess spending. But as Leeper explains, MMT has no comprehensive theory of what determines the inflation rate when the economy operates below its resource limit (as it usually does) nor do its advocates have any actionable proposals for managing inflation that has already materialized. It’s telling that, after a year in which prices rose nearly 7 percent for the first time in decades, no prominent MMT advocates are calling for deficit-reducing tax increases. Perhaps it is because they know that elected officials are loathe to enact the measures needed to rapidly reduce deficits at a time when workers are already seeing their hard-earned wages eroded by inflation. Kelton has in recent days compared tax increases to “a helmet” – a proactive tool that would prevent inflation from happening, but would have little benefit once inflation has already materialized (without ever producing a model that would plausibly justify the distinction). In a New York Times profile published last weekend, Kelton says that the Congressional Budget Office should “analyze possible inflation ahead of time” and then lawmakers should try to offset the impact of inflation with tax increases. How useful is an economic theory that tells us how to avoid inflation, but has no credible recommendations for reducing inflation once it’s higher than desired? There is also no reason to believe that advocates of MMT would support such precautionary fiscal restraint. CBO did produce an estimate of the gap between projected and potential economic output in 2021, and it was just one fifth of the size of the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan enacted last March. Yet at no point did Kelton or other leading advocates of MMT join the calls of other economists to shrink the bill or propose pairing it with tax increases. In fact, some argued the bill should be even bigger – and they did so without producing any alternative model to suggest CBO was underestimating potential output. Leeper’s paper makes clear that the lack of testable models that can be analyzed and debated is a pervasive problem with MMT. We now have a scenario in which Congress approved enormous amounts of new spending that was not backed by tax revenues, the Fed supported this debt by creating new bank reserves and keeping interest rates low, and inflation soared as a result. Although most of this spending was essential for enabling the United States to experience a robust recovery from the 2020 recession, the excess came at a cost most Americans were unwilling to pay. Instead of acknowledging those tradeoffs and calling for monetary tightening, as conventional macroeconomists would suggest, or fiscal tightening that is the logical extension of their past statements, advocates of MMT are now proposing to control prices through central planning – an approach that didn’t work in the 1970s and won’t work today. These advocates have faced their first real test and failed miserably. Until its proponents specify the models underlying their rhetoric and resolve the myriad of practical questions about how to operationalize their proposals, MMT will remain what other critics have likened to “Calvinball” – an incoherent game in which the rules are constantly changing to ensure its creator wins. The past year has proven that policymakers who pursue the misguided prescriptions of MMT advocates without a plan for dealing with the consequences will be following a recipe for economic misery.