Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Global Credibility

US has no global credibility, the aff won’t change that.

Grenville Cross 23. Senior counsel, law professor and criminal justice analyst, and was previously the director of public prosecutions of the Hong Kong SAR.” US hypocrisy: serial rules-breaker forfeits global credibility.” Pearls and Irritations. April 23, 2023. https://johnmenadue.com/us-hypocrisy-serial-rules-breaker-forfeits-global-credibility/)

Then, on May 26, 2022, he followed this up by saying the US would not block China from growing its economy, but wanted it to adhere to international rules.

And when, on Jan 11, 2023, Blinken praised Japan for agreeing to double its defence spending by 2027, he deprecated threats to the “international rules-based order”.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › MMT Bad

Empirics Prove that MMT practices lead to devastating hyperinflation that worsens poverty

Talgo, 21 --- Chris Talgo is senior editor at The Heartland Institute. (Chris Talgo, "The false promise of modern monetary theory", 3-30-2021, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/545502-the-false-promise-of-modern-monetary-theory/)//EG

Once upon a time, not that long ago actually, the federal deficit and national debt mattered. In 2008, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama said, “We’re just taking out a credit card from the Bank of China, essentially. We’re borrowing that money. And we’ve added $4 trillion worth of debt since George Bush took office. Keep in mind, just to give you some perspective, the first 42 presidents amassed $5 trillion worth of debt.” During his two terms, Obama added $8.6 trillion to the national debt — more than double his predecessor. President Trump added $6.7 trillion. In one term. As of this writing, the U.S. national debt stands at $28.1 trillion. In 1960, the U.S. national debt was $286 billion. In 1980, it increased to $908 billion. By 2000, it grew to $5.6 trillion. In 2010, it ballooned to $13.5 trillion. Just seven years later, it crossed the $20 trillion threshold. America’s debt-to-GDP ratio is also on an unsustainable trajectory. In 1960, it was 53 percent. In 1980, it decreased to 34 percent. In 2000, it ticked up to 58 percent. As of 2020, it had skyrocketed to 129 percent — exceeding the previous high of 118 percent, set at the end of World War II. This is significant. And ominous. We can blame our debt debacle on many things: decades of out-of-control entitlement spending, the pandemic, costly wars in the Middle East, to name a few. However, let’s not overlook the meteoric rise of modern monetary theory (MMT). For those unaccustomed with MMT, in essence it states that the U.S. government can print and spend money limitlessly. Deficits don’t matter. Neither does the national debt. MMT has several high-profile adherents, from Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) to Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.). Many books have been written on MMT, most famously “The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy,” by Stephanie Kelton. In a nutshell, MMT true believers claim that age-old economic dogma is backwards. MMT turns traditional economic theory on its head. According to Investopedia, “The central idea of MMT is that governments with a fiat currency system under their control can and should print (or create with a few keystrokes in today’s digital age) as much money as they need to spend because they cannot go broke.” Actually, governments can and do go broke when they defy the rules of commonsense economics. However, MMT advocates claim they have the secret recipe to avoid the pitfalls of currency debasement and mountains of debt. Once again, as Investopedia explains, “[A]ccording to MMT, large government debt isn’t the precursor to collapse we have been led to believe it is, countries like the U.S. can sustain much greater deficits without cause for concern, and a small deficit or surplus can be extremely harmful and cause a recession since deficit spending is what builds people’s savings. … MMT theorists explain that debt is simply money the government put into the economy and didn’t tax back.” This is ludicrous. Government deficit spending is not an economic boon. It is a hindrance to economic growth that impoverishes future generations. Furthermore, despite what MMT supporters claim, printing huge sums of money will cause inflation. As Jonathan Hartley writes that the claim “ignores the dark history of debt monetization leading to hyperinflation … printing money and monetizing debt — even when that debt was partly denominated in local currency — led to devastating inflation in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Weimar Germany during the first half of the 20th century.” The same thing has occurred more recently in Brazil, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Modern monetary theory is far from groundbreaking, let alone modern. It is simply a failed idea that has been tried many times and has led to economic destruction in every case. Although MMT proponents would like us to believe that it is a contemporary economic breakthrough, don’t believe the hype. Commonsense refutes MMT on its face.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › MMT Bad

Historic evidence proves that printing more money will cause devastating hyperinflation that impacts low income families the hardest – turns solvency

Hartley, 20 --- Jonathan Hartley is a visiting fellow at the Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity and a master’s in public policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. (Jonathan Hartley, "The Weakness of Modern Monetary Theory", 2020, National Affairs, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-weakness-of-modern-monetary-theory)//EG

MONEY PRINTING AND INFLATION MMT proponents argue that central banks can print money without triggering dangerous levels of inflation. This claim not only overlooks the theoretical considerations outlined above, it also ignores the dark history of debt monetization leading to hyperinflation. As Thomas Sargent famously documented in his 1982 classic, The Ends of Four Big Inflations, printing money and monetizing debt — even when that debt was partly denominated in local currency — led to devastating inflation in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Weimar Germany during the first half of the 20th century. Austria and Hungary — two states formed through the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — found themselves greatly diminished in both size and power following WWI. Since Austria-Hungary was deemed an aggressor of the war, its successor states owed the Allies substantial amounts in war reparations. To pay off the reparations while alleviating large-scale food shortages and unemployment, the Austrian government ran significant deficits — which it financed by selling treasury bills to the Austrian section of the liquidated Austro-Hungarian bank. At the same time in Hungary, political turmoil led to considerable budget shortfalls, which the government financed by borrowing heavily from the Hungarian section of the bank and increasing the volume of low-interest loans issued to private entities. As a result, both the Austrian crown and the Hungarian krone depreciated rapidly while domestic prices rose. This led to flight from each currency by domestic actors and foreign investors alike and, ultimately, to hyperinflation in both countries. Poland, meanwhile, emerged from WWI as an independent nation after over a century of foreign rule. Cobbled together from portions of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, Poland inherited inflated currencies from these three partitioning powers — each of which had financed their respective participation in WWI through the printing press — and an empty treasury. The fighting in Poland did not end in 1918, either, as the nation found itself in a second war with Soviet Russia that lasted until the fall of 1920. In order to settle this and other border disputes, and to rebuild after the devastating WWI occupation, Poland amassed substantial debt. Like both Austria and Hungary, Poland financed its deficit spending by printing massive amounts of currency. In 1918, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to nine Polish marks; by the end of 1923, that same dollar was worth 6,375,000 Polish marks. Of the four post-WWI cases of hyperinflation Sargent covers, none looms larger in the historical imagination than that of Weimar Germany. Germany had financed its war effort through deficit spending and suspension of the gold standard, believing that it would be able to achieve a swift, decisive victory and pay off its debt by annexing wealthier territories and imposing reparations on its defeated enemies. What occurred was very much the opposite: Over four long years of fighting, Germany accumulated considerable war debt while significantly devaluing its currency, the German mark. And since Germany was on the losing side of the war, instead of being paid reparations, it owed staggering levels of reparations to the Allies at the war's end. Making matters worse, the Reparations Commission demanded Germany pay 132 billion gold marks as part of the London Payment Plan. The German government responded by printing more German marks to pay what it owed, which only devalued its currency further. In 1922, Germany failed to pay an installment it owed to France, which prompted the French occupation of Germany's primary industrial region to ensure repayment. The German government responded by calling for what amounted to a strike, then offered the workers financial support — again, financed by printing more currency and issuing loans at interest rates far below the rate of inflation. By 1923, German currency was worthless: One U.S. dollar at the time was equivalent to 4,210,500,000,000 German marks. But hyperinflation is not just a phenomenon of the distant past. In fact, instances of hyperinflation have occurred over recent decades in countries like Brazil, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela. Brazil experienced hyperinflation in the final decades of the 20th century. This resulted from its decision to pay down high external debt but avoid raising taxes. Instead, the country turned to printing money. By 1990, inflation reached a monthly rate as high as 82.4%. Hyperinflation in Brazil was only resolved when it created a separate unit of account, the Unidade Real de Valor, or URV, to exist parallel to its existing currency, the cruzeiro. Ultimately, this new unit of account became the Brazilian real, replacing the cruzeiro and quashing the inflationary spiral. For Zimbabwe, the trouble began in the late 1990s, when the government adopted several spending plans — including the compulsory government purchase of white-owned commercial farms and generous pension plans for veterans of the country's war of independence — without budgeting for them. This triggered panic among foreign investors, who pulled capital from the Zimbabwean markets, thereby causing a crash of the country's currency. Subsequent unwise military ventures drove Zimbabwe further into debt. Meanwhile, the forced seizure of farmland and resulting violence nearly halted all agricultural production. Since the Zimbabwean economy was too fragile to grow its way out of debt, and imposing new taxes to raise revenue was a political non-starter, monetary and fiscal authorities began to monetize the country's debt by printing more money. This ultimately led to hyperinflation so extreme — at an estimated 79,000,000,000% per month in November 2008 — that Zimbabwe was effectively forced to substitute its own currency with the U.S. dollar shortly thereafter through a process economists call "dollarization." The seeds of Venezuela's ongoing struggles with hyperinflation were sown in the early 2000s, when the nation's economy and the value of its currency, the bolívar, became heavily dependent on revenues from oil exports. The rise in oil prices that largely coincided with President Hugo Chávez's term in office — from 1998 until his death in 2013 — ensured a steady stream of foreign revenue into government coffers. This allowed the Chávez regime to increase deficit spending in pursuit of its socialist policy agenda. Then in 2014 — a year after Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, took office — the global price of oil collapsed, leading to a steep decline in government revenues. Foreign demand for the bolívar to purchase Venezuelan oil fell, contributing to a decline in the currency's value. The Venezuelan economy was already in recession at the time, but instead of pulling back on Chávez's generous social-welfare programs or increasing taxes, Maduro's regime responded by ramping up deficit spending and printing more currency to finance the government's debts. By 2016, hyperinflation had set in. At the end of 2018, inflation rates in Venezuela reached an estimated 80,000% per year. As these examples demonstrate, the correlation between currency printing and hyperinflation is undeniable, the causal relationship intuitive. Yet MMT proponents continue to contest it. In their canonical MMT textbook Macroeconomics, William Mitchell, L. Randall Wray, and Martin Watts state that "[n]o simple proportionate relationship exists between rises in the money supply and rises in the general price level." Wray, a Bard College professor and one of MMT's key proponents in academia, has gone on to say "there is no empirical evidence to support the belief that raising interest rates fights inflation." Stephanie Kelton, author of The Deficit Myth and former advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders's presidential campaign, argues that inflation is the result, not of monetary policy, but of "overspending" — spending beyond what it takes for an economy to reach "full employment" (which she defines not according to the mainstream economic concept of "natural rate of unemployment," but as the 0% unemployment rate that would occur under a government jobs guarantee). Such claims fly in the face of both historical evidence and traditional macroeconomic theory. And it's worth remembering, too, that hyperinflation often hurts the poor the most, since consumption makes up a greater fraction of their incomes.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › MMT Bad

The response to the pandemic and subsequent inflation proves the failure of MMT to better the economy

Smith, 22 – Karl W. Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. Previously, he was vice president for federal policy at the Tax Foundation and assistant professor of economics at the University of North Carolina. (Karl Smith, “No, This Isn’t Modern Monetary Theory’s Moment”, 3/8/22, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-08/high-u-s-inflation-shows-flaw-of-modern-monetary-theory#xj4y7vzkg)//EG

Americans are not happy with the economy, and inflation is their No. 1 concern. It’s odd, then, that proponents of Modern Monetary Theory — a school of economics that advocates the kind of policy that has brought the U.S. economy to this point — are claiming this moment as vindication. To the contrary, the current state of the economy shows that MMT, as it’s known, is less a theory than a disposition. And to the extent it is a theory, it is proving every bit as impractical as its critics charge. Some background: Virtually all economists agree that productive government investments in infrastructure or scientific research can help economic growth. Mainstream economists still debate whether stimulus spending during a recession can be a net boost to the economy, even if it doesn’t pass a traditional cost-benefit analysis. Proponents of MMT go beyond that. They argue the government can spend as much as it wants, whenever it wants, without worrying about the fiscal cost. What matters, they argue, are so-called real resource constraints — a shortage of building materials, for example. When pressed on how those constraints would be managed in practice, proponents of MMT admit that, in theory, too much government spending could lead to inflation. But they quickly add that inflation is unlikely to be truly problematic — and if it is, the government could just stop spending. Granted, the mere mention of unchecked government spending sets some economists’ hair ablaze, and there have been a lot of rash complaints about MMT. But there are also more considered critiques. One is that MMT assumes that central banks such as the Federal Reserve would behave in ways the Fed would never behave. In the real world, these critics said, the Fed would raise interest rates in response to rising inflation — thereby increasing the amount the government had to spend to balance its books. Another critique is that popularly elected governments are not especially well equipped to predict how their spending will affect inflation, nor are they disciplined enough to tailor their budgets to keep inflation in check. Indeed, this lack of expertise and discipline is one of the reasons for central banks in first place. All of which brings us to the present day. In response to Covid, the federal government spent trillions of dollars on relief, and the Fed pushed interest rates to zero. The idea was that these policies would be short-lived. But as the pandemic wore on, they were kept in place. In effect, America was putting MMT into practice. Congress borrowed and spent with little concern for long-term limits, and the Fed supported that borrowing by keeping interest rates at zero. As a result, MMT proponents are fond of pointing out, the U.S. economy bounced back stronger than any of its peer nations. Yes, they admit, the U.S. has also had stronger inflation. But MMT proponents note that they had always acknowledged that possibility, and that inflation was more a result of the unusual circumstances of a pandemic than of any particular aspect of MMT. Both of these answers are unsatisfying. In truth, MMT is failing precisely as its more sanguine critics predicted. First, it’s worth noting that, had the U.S. government adopted some of the policies that MMT proponents favor, inflation would probably be a lot higher. Among other things, they envisioned giving a $15-per-hour government job to anyone who wanted one. If that made it difficult for the private sector to attract talent, then it could just raise wages (and presumably prices). This is a more extreme version of what employers faced when Congress temporarily added a bonus to unemployment insurance. One result was widespread labor shortages and a rise in costs for retailers. The inability of the White House to admit that it might have gone overboard is precisely what critics meant when they accused MMT of being “delusional.” It’s not that there is something particularly dishonest about this administration; it’s that any administration would find it hard to tell its most ardent supporters that their most wished-for programs are wrecking the economy. The best it can do is wait inflation out — which is precisely what President Joe Biden’s administration is doing. Second, the Fed is now planning to raise interest rates, perhaps quite aggressively. This means that consumers and businesses will soon face rising costs of investment, while the federal government will find it more expensive to finance its debt. If Congress raises taxes, that will exacerbate the difficulties facing families and businesses. If the government borrows more money, that will exacerbate the spending problem — which led to inflation in the first place. In other words: Congress can’t easily stop spending too much, and the Fed can’t easily accommodate its failure to do so. The bottom line is that, even in extraordinary circumstances like a pandemic, the government has to be mindful of the consequences of excess public spending. The idea that it could disregard such consequences was always dubious as a theory, and now it has been discredited as a practice.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Addressing CC can’t prevent extinction

Apocalyptic rhetoric is false – Climate Change won’t cause the end of our species unlike habitat destruction

Shellenberger, 19 --- (Michael Shellenberger, "Why Apocalyptic Claims About Climate Change Are Wrong", 11-25-2019, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/11/25/why-everything-they-say-about-climate-change-is-wrong/?sh=75952ff12d6a)//EG

Environmental journalists and advocates have in recent weeks made a number of apocalyptic predictions about the impact of climate change. Bill McKibben suggested climate-driven fires in Australia had made koalas “functionally extinct.” Extinction Rebellion said “Billions will die” and “Life on Earth is dying.” Vice claimed the “collapse of civilization may have already begun.” Few have underscored the threat more than student climate activist Greta Thunberg and Green New Deal sponsor Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The latter said, “The world is going to end in 12 years if we don't address climate change.” Says Thunberg in her new book, “Around 2030 we will be in a position to set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human control that will lead to the end of our civilization as we know it.” Sometimes, scientists themselves make apocalyptic claims. “It’s difficult to see how we could accommodate a billion people or even half of that,” if Earth warms four degrees, said one earlier this year. “The potential for multi-breadbasket failure is increasing,” said another. If sea levels rise as much as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts, another scientist said, “It will be an unmanageable problem.” Apocalyptic statements like these have real-world impacts. In September, a group of British psychologists said children are increasingly suffering from anxiety from the frightening discourse around climate change. In October, an activist with Extinction Rebellion (”XR”) — an environmental group founded in 2018 to commit civil disobedience to draw awareness to the threat its founders and supporters say climate change poses to human existence — and a videographer, were kicked and beaten in a London Tube station by angry commuters. And last week, an XR co-founder said a genocide like the Holocaust was “happening again, on a far greater scale, and in plain sight” from climate change. Climate change is an issue I care passionately about and have dedicated a significant portion of my life to addressing. I have been politically active on the issue for over 20 years and have researched and written about it for 17 years. Over the last four years, my organization, Environmental Progress, has worked with some of the world’s leading climate scientists to prevent carbon emissions from rising. So far, we’ve helped prevent emissions increasing the equivalent of adding 24 million cars to the road. I also care about getting the facts and science right and have in recent months corrected inaccurate and apocalyptic news media coverage of fires in the Amazon and fires in California, both of which have been improperly presented as resulting primarily from climate change. Journalists and activists alike have an obligation to describe environmental problems honestly and accurately, even if they fear doing so will reduce their news value or salience with the public. There is good evidence that the catastrophist framing of climate change is self-defeating because it alienates and polarizes many people. And exaggerating climate change risks distracting us from other important issues including ones we might have more near-term control over. I feel the need to say this up-front because I want the issues I’m about to raise to be taken seriously and not dismissed by those who label as “climate deniers” or “climate delayers” anyone who pushes back against exaggeration. With that out of the way, let’s look whether the science supports what’s being said. First, no credible scientific body has ever said climate change threatens the collapse of civilization much less the extinction of the human species. “‘Our children are going to die in the next 10 to 20 years.’ What’s the scientific basis for these claims?” BBC’s Andrew Neil asked a visibly uncomfortable XR spokesperson last month. “These claims have been disputed, admittedly,” she said. “There are some scientists who are agreeing and some who are saying it’s not true. But the overall issue is that these deaths are going to happen.” “But most scientists don’t agree with this,” said Neil. “I looked through IPCC reports and see no reference to billions of people going to die, or children in 20 years. How would they die?” “Mass migration around the world already taking place due to prolonged drought in countries, particularly in South Asia. There are wildfires in Indonesia, the Amazon rainforest, Siberia, the Arctic,” she said. But in saying so, the XR spokesperson had grossly misrepresented the science. “There is robust evidence of disasters displacing people worldwide,” notes IPCC, “but limited evidence that climate change or sea-level rise is the direct cause” What about “mass migration”? “The majority of resultant population movements tend to occur within the borders of affected countries," says IPCC. It’s not like climate doesn’t matter. It’s that climate change is outweighed by other factors. Earlier this year, researchers found that climate “has affected organized armed conflict within countries. However, other drivers, such as low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state, are judged to be substantially more influential.” Last January, after climate scientists criticized Rep. Ocasio-Cortez for saying the world would end in 12 years, her spokesperson said "We can quibble about the phraseology, whether it's existential or cataclysmic.” He added, “We're seeing lots of [climate change-related] problems that are already impacting lives." That last part may be true, but it’s also true that economic development has made us less vulnerable, which is why there was a 99.7% decline in the death toll from natural disasters since its peak in 1931. In 1931, 3.7 million people died from natural disasters. In 2018, just 11,000 did. And that decline occurred over a period when the global population quadrupled. What about sea level rise? IPCC estimates sea level could rise two feet (0.6 meters) by 2100. Does that sound apocalyptic or even “unmanageable”? Consider that one-third of the Netherlands is below sea level, and some areas are seven meters below sea level. You might object that Netherlands is rich while Bangladesh is poor. But the Netherlands adapted to living below sea level 400 years ago. Technology has improved a bit since then. What about claims of crop failure, famine, and mass death? That’s science fiction, not science. Humans today produce enough food for 10 billion people, or 25% more than we need, and scientific bodies predict increases in that share, not declines. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) forecasts crop yields increasing 30% by 2050. And the poorest parts of the world, like sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to see increases of 80 to 90%. Nobody is suggesting climate change won’t negatively impact crop yields. It could. But such declines should be put in perspective. Wheat yields increased 100 to 300% around the world since the 1960s, while a study of 30 models found that yields would decline by 6% for every one degree Celsius increase in temperature. Rates of future yield growth depend far more on whether poor nations get access to tractors, irrigation, and fertilizer than on climate change, says FAO. All of this helps explain why IPCC anticipates climate change will have a modest impact on economic growth. By 2100, IPCC projects the global economy will be 300 to 500% larger than it is today. Both IPCC and the Nobel-winning Yale economist, William Nordhaus, predict that warming of 2.5°C and 4°C would reduce gross domestic product (GDP) by 2% and 5% over that same period. Does this mean we shouldn’t worry about climate change? Not at all. One of the reasons I work on climate change is because I worry about the impact it could have on endangered species. Climate change may threaten one million species globally and half of all mammals, reptiles, and amphibians in diverse places like the Albertine Rift in central Africa, home to the endangered mountain gorilla. But it’s not the case that “we’re putting our own survival in danger” through extinctions, as Elizabeth Kolbert claimed in her book, Sixth Extinction. As tragic as animal extinctions are, they do not threaten human civilization. If we want to save endangered species, we need to do so because we care about wildlife for spiritual, ethical, or aesthetic reasons, not survival ones. And exaggerating the risk, and suggesting climate change is more important than things like habitat destruction, are counterproductive. For example, Australia’s fires are not driving koalas extinct, as Bill McKibben suggested. The main scientific body that tracks the species, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, or IUCN, labels the koala “vulnerable,” which is one level less threatened than “endangered,” two levels less than “critically endangered,” and three less than “extinct” in the wild. Should we worry about koalas? Absolutely! They are amazing animals and their numbers have declined to around 300,000. But they face far bigger threats such as the destruction of habitat, disease, bushfires, and invasive species. Think of it this way. The climate could change dramatically — and we could still save koalas. Conversely, the climate could change only modestly — and koalas could still go extinct. The monomaniacal focus on climate distracts our attention from other threats to koalas and opportunities for protecting them, like protecting and expanding their habitat. As for fire, one of Australia’s leading scientists on the issue says, “Bushfire losses can be explained by the increasing exposure of dwellings to fire-prone bushlands. No other influences need be invoked. So even if climate change had played some small role in modulating recent bushfires, and we cannot rule this out, any such effects on risk to property are clearly swamped by the changes in exposure.” Nor are the fires solely due to drought, which is common in Australia, and exceptional this year. “Climate change is playing its role here,” said Richard Thornton of the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre in Australia, “but it's not the cause of these fires." The same is true for fires in the United States. In 2017, scientists modeled 37 different regions and found “humans may not only influence fire regimes but their presence can actually override, or swamp out, the effects of climate.” Of the 10 variables that influence fire, “none were as significant… as the anthropogenic variables,” such as building homes near, and managing fires and wood fuel growth within, forests. Climate scientists are starting to push back against exaggerations by activists, journalists, and other scientists. “While many species are threatened with extinction,” said Stanford’s Ken Caldeira, “climate change does not threaten human extinction... I would not like to see us motivating people to do the right thing by making them believe something that is false.” I asked the Australian climate scientist Tom Wigley what he thought of the claim that climate change threatens civilization. “It really does bother me because it’s wrong,” he said. “All these young people have been misinformed. And partly it’s Greta Thunberg’s fault. Not deliberately. But she’s wrong.” But don’t scientists and activists need to exaggerate in order to get the public’s attention? “I’m reminded of what [late Stanford University climate scientist] Steve Schneider used to say,” Wigley replied. “He used to say that as a scientist, we shouldn’t really be concerned about the way we slant things in communicating with people out on the street who might need a little push in a certain direction to realize that this is a serious problem. Steve didn’t have any qualms about speaking in that biased way. I don’t quite agree with that.” Wigley started working on climate science full-time in 1975 and created one of the first climate models (MAGICC) in 1987. It remains one of the main climate models in use today. “When I talk to the general public,” he said, “I point out some of the things that might make projections of warming less and the things that might make them more. I always try to present both sides.” Part of what bothers me about the apocalyptic rhetoric by climate activists is that it is often accompanied by demands that poor nations be denied the cheap sources of energy they need to develop. I have found that many scientists share my concerns. “If you want to minimize carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in 2070 you might want to accelerate the burning of coal in India today,” MIT climate scientist Kerry Emanuel said. “It doesn’t sound like it makes sense. Coal is terrible for carbon. But it’s by burning a lot of coal that they make themselves wealthier, and by making themselves wealthier they have fewer children, and you don’t have as many people burning carbon, you might be better off in 2070.” Emanuel and Wigley say the extreme rhetoric is making political agreement on climate change harder. “You’ve got to come up with some kind of middle ground where you do reasonable things to mitigate the risk and try at the same time to lift people out of poverty and make them more resilient,” said Emanuel. “We shouldn’t be forced to choose between lifting people out of poverty and doing something for the climate.” Happily, there is a plenty of middle ground between climate apocalypse and climate denial.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Addressing CC can’t prevent extinction

The aff only targets one symptom of the bigger crisis of ecological overshoot – shifting to renewables and creating new infrastructure only worsens the crisis and guarantees extinction

Ketcham 22, -- Christopher Ketcham is a journalist who for his journalism nonprofit, Denatured and has published in Harper’s, CounterPunch, National Geographic, Hustler, Penthouse, the New York Times, Pacific Standard, Sierra, Earth Island Journal, Vanity Fair, The New Republic, Rolling Stone, Mother Jones, Salon. (Christopher Ketcham, “Addressing Climate Change Will Not “Save the Planet””, 12/3/22, The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2022/12/03/climate-biodiversity-green-energy/)//EG

CONSERVATION BIOLOGY FINDS itself in a terrifying place today, witness to mass extinction, helpless to stop the march of industrial Homo sapiens, the pillage of habitat, the loss of wildlands, and the impoverishment of ecosystems. Many of its leading figures are in despair. “I’m 40 years into conservation biology and I can tell you we are losing badly, getting our asses kicked,” Dan Ashe, director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under President Barack Obama, told me recently. “There are almost no reasons to be optimistic.” This might explain the discipline’s desperate hitching of its wagon to the climate movement. Climate, after all, is the environmental cause du jour, eclipsing all other sustainability concerns, increasingly attractive as a rallying cry for a public that has canonized it as one of the major political, social, and economic issues of our time. Mainstream climate activism of the Bill McKibben variety points toward a grandly hopeful end within the confines of acceptable capitalist discourse: decarbonization of the global economy, with technologies driven by profit-seeking corporations subsidized by governments. Taking up this banner of optimistic can-do-ism, the environmental movement has convinced itself, and sought to convince the public, that with a worldwide build-out of renewable energy systems, humanity will power its dynamic industrial civilization with jobs-producing green machines while also — somehow — rescuing countless species from the brink. “But this happens to be a lie,” Ashe told me. “The lie is that if we address the climate crisis, we will also solve the biodiversity crisis.” “The lie is that if we address the climate crisis, we will also solve the biodiversity crisis.” A group of conservationists took up the question of climate and extinctions last year in the journal Conservation Letters, warning that “threats to biodiversity are increasingly seen through the single myopic lens of climate change.” The authors, who titled their article “An inconvenient misconception: Climate change is not the principal driver of biodiversity loss,” included Joel Berger, a wildlife biologist at Colorado State University; evolutionary biologist Andrew Dobson, who teaches at Princeton; and Tim Caro, an evolutionary ecologist at the University of California, Davis. “There is an assumption,” they observed, “that climate change is now the most important ‘horseman of the biodiversity apocalypse’” — despite this being “at best premature.” When it comes to effects on wildlife, climate change is more like a mule, slow and plodding. Yes, a warmed atmosphere is projected to be a significant factor in the extinction crisis in future decades, but what’s destroying species today is habitat fragmentation and loss, overhunting and overexploitation, agricultural expansion, pollution, and industrial development. It isn’t climate change that caused a 69 percent loss in total wildlife populations between 1970 and 2018, according to a World Wildlife Fund study published this year. The cause is too many people demanding too much from ecosystems, or human overshoot of the biophysical carrying capacity of the Earth. Overshoot is a product of both excessive numbers and rising affluence. Access to the things that create what we call quality of life, like indoor lighting and temperature controls, especially air conditioning; more diverse dietary choices, especially meat; and greater access to transportation, especially air travel — all signs of rising affluence, all delightful if you are a human, yet all demand more energy and material inputs that involve scouring and denuding more wildlands and animal habitat to feed, clothe, house, and energize burgeoning humanity. According to the co-authors of the Conservation Letters piece, we are “dangerously ignoring” this reality and instead doubling down on the “distortion” that climate mitigation is all that matters to protecting wildlife. Over the last 30 years, the proportion of scientific papers closely tying climate change and global warming to changes in patterns of biodiversity has “steadily increased,” according to their analysis. Media coverage of climate change in relation to biodiversity has followed suit, repeating and compounding the error. The net result of this “misguided focus on climate change” has been the undermining of conservation science “as an evidence-based scientific discipline.” As Dobson put it to me, “If conservation biologists don’t take a balanced look at the evidence, they can’t claim to be evidence-based.” The crux of the problem is that mainstream environmentalists have siloed climate change as a phenomenon apart from the broad human ecological footprint, separate from deforestation, overgrazing of livestock, megafauna kill-off, collapsing fisheries, desertification, depleted freshwater, soil degradation, oceanic garbage gyres, toxification of rainfall with microplastics, and on and on — the myriad biospheric effects of breakneck growth. Climate change is “but one symptom of an environmentally dysfunctional system of constant growth of economies and populations,” ecologist William Rees, professor emeritus at the University of British Columbia, told me. “The meta-problem that we need to keep our eyes on,” Rees said, is ecological overshoot. Modern techno-industrial culture, he writes, “is systematically — even enthusiastically — consuming the biophysical basis of its own existence.” Rees describes this as a malignant process, humanity as cancer. Rees is hardly alone in his stark assessments of the status quo. In the most recent letter of “world scientists’ warning,” a semiannual notice to the public, 12 experts in life sciences, global system dynamics, and ecology noted that “most planetary boundaries that regulate the state of the Earth are beyond their safe space. Therefore, climate change is not a stand-alone issue. It is part of a larger systemic problem of ecological overshoot.” The authors added the commonsense observation that humanity “cannot sustain unlimited growth in a finite world,” a physical law of life on Earth that we ignore at our peril. IT MAY BE that solving the climate crisis, because we will solve it with bold technologies to maintain ourselves in overshoot — as opposed to practicing humility and restraint with an eye toward contraction of the human enterprise — will accelerate extinctions, due to the demands for space and minerals to drive the technologies. To generate solar and wind power on the scale necessary to decarbonize the U.S. utility and transportation sectors, for example, requires land use on a massive scale. Solar and wind occupy much larger acreage than oil and gas, requiring networks of roads and utility corridors, transportation and transmission capacity that doesn’t exist today. Environmental lawyer Michael Gerrard, founder and director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, estimates that the U.S. needs a tripling or even quadrupling of transmission capacity — up from the 160,000 miles of high-voltage power lines now in operation — to move all the new green energy to consumers, who are mostly in cities, from the remote places where it’s harvested. A report for the Brookings Institution states that wind and solar require 10 times more land per unit of power produced than coal- or natural gas-fired power plants, a figure that takes into account the land torn up and habitat destroyed in order to drill out, pump, and transport fossil fuels. “Renewable power production,” the report states matter-of-factly, “will take place in areas that have not seen energy development.” There is also the global scale of mining needed to extract and process the lithium, nickel, cobalt, rare earths, and other necessities for renewables infrastructure. The net result: Decarbonizing will likely lead to huge fragmentation of land, in the U.S. and overseas, particularly in minerals-rich China and the “global south.” And not just wildlife will be affected: The “death villages” around the Bayan Obo mine in China, source of 70 percent of the world’s rare earths, are testament to the health cost of green-tech mining, which is only going to accelerate in pace and scale. Consider the green destruction of habitat now unfolding in the Mojave Desert across California and Nevada, where the rush to build industrial solar is catastrophic for native flora and fauna. “Utility-scale solar is just as bad as urbanization and development,” said Patrick Donnelly, who works at the Center for Biological Diversity investigating the environmental effects of the renewable energy rush in the American West. “The result is that the Mojave is in big trouble.” Start with site-specific Mojave plant species such as the tricorner milkvetch and the white-margined beardtongue, lovely rare flowers endemic only to certain valleys and basins. They are goners under the solar regime. From there the picture only gets uglier, with the likely wiping out of huge stretches of habitat for the broad suite of Mojave fauna: foxes, hawks, badgers, rabbits, and, most prominently, the desert tortoise, the keystone species of the Mojave, whose construction of extensive burrows provides homes for at least a dozen other species. “If there were no desert tortoises to dig new burrows,” states a Fish and Wildlife Service manual about the species, it would lead to “the demise of the ecosystem.” “The worst thing these massive solar projects do is cause direct habitat loss for the tortoise and friends,” Donnelly told me. The grim future that rampant solar development promises for Mojave wildlife is already in evidence where migratory passages for tortoises have been compromised by existing solar. Climate change modeling tells us the optimal temperature range for the tortoise is moving steadily northward, and so the tortoise will seek the path north to survive. Critical passages for this expected migration have been cut off. Ivanpah Valley, a bottleneck between the east Mojave and the north Mojave, is now severed by solar. Pahrump Valley, another passage to the north, is slated for solar that will have a similar blockading effect. There are tens of thousands of acres in the Mojave Desert containing what the U.S. Bureau of Land Management calls “high density populations” of desert tortoise that are now being developed for solar, with the expected result, according to Donnelly and other watchdogs, that tortoises there will wink out. Some 60,000 acres of BLM land adjacent to near-pristine Death Valley National Park have been proposed for industrial solar. One of the sites is Sarcobatus Flat, a wild place mostly empty of human habitation, which is a value in itself, as wildlife needs big open spaces free of the meddling of Homo sapiens. Situated in the Great Basin-Mojave transition zone, Sarcobatus is a vast valley of Joshua trees, greasewood, and blackbrush. The Joshua tree, which the Fish and Wildlife Service is considering for protection under the Endangered Species Act, is on a path to extinction, Joshua tree woodlands being one of the most imperiled ecosystems in the American West. The solar project at Sarcobatus Flat would kill, bulldoze, and stack in cordwood piles between 50,000 and 70,000 of the trees, according to a field estimate by the nonprofit Basin and Range Watch. The Great Basin Desert to the north, meanwhile, remains mostly free of the techno-industrial regime. But that’s ending with the advent of new electrical transmission projects into these remotest parts of Nevada, a project called Greenlink that electricity and natural gas provider Nevada Energy is funding. Greenlink North, pending approval, is planned to run along Highway 50, the famous Loneliest Road in America, from Reno to Ely, through some of the wildest parcels of public land in the state — and prime habitat of the endangered greater sage-grouse. This ground-nesting bird, like the desert tortoise, is an indicator species of landscape health. The purpose of the transmission line, as Nevada Energy has made clear, is to render solar economically feasible in those remote sun-rich landscapes. Greenlink North, along with the associated solar fields it will make possible, is expected to devastate some of the last strongholds of sage-grouse in north-central Nevada, as the birds are exquisitely sensitive to the light and noise of development. We will be a kind of gleaming metallic Noah’s Ark that carries few animals, only lots of people. It may be that global society can achieve a measure of sustainability in climate terms — but on a planet that has been stripped of creatures like the tortoise and the sage-grouse, shorn of natural agency, reduced to a biological pauper, its last wildernesses occupied for the greater good of the industrial juggernaut. We will be a kind of gleaming metallic Noah’s Ark that carries few animals, only lots of people. Pondering these matters, Dan Ashe had arrived at a revelation that amounted to a conservation biologist’s worst nightmare. “I’ve come around to the idea that a lot of the diversity of life on Earth may be incompatible with human ambitions and aspirations. On the other hand,” he told me, “I can be very optimistic about climate because ultimately humanity is going to deal with carbon pollution. It’s an issue for our well-being. We can solve it by building machines and making money. That’s obvious in the Inflation Reduction Act. … But with the biodiversity crisis, you can’t solve it with machines, and it involves constraints on our making money. And history shows we aren’t very good at constraint.” Ashe suggests that conservation biologists cease the empty claims about “saving the planet” with climate mitigation and start speaking truth: There is at present no plan, in any country, anywhere, on a global or national scale, to address extinctions, biodiversity crash, and habitat loss. The dismal reality is that with a green build-out, we will be saving not the complex web of life on Earth but the particular way of life of one privileged domineering species that depends for its success on a nature-ravaging network of technological marvels. Only once this truth is understood can honest decisions be made about what kind of world humanity wishes to inhabit in the age of ecological disorder.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Too late to solve CC

According the ICCP its too late to prevent irreversible damage to the planet and any climate action would need to change private policies

Atkins, 21 --- C.J. Atkins is the managing editor at People's World. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from York University in Toronto and has a research and teaching background in political economy and the politics and ideas of the American left. (C.J. Atkins, "Already too late: IPCC report says global warming consequences now unavoidable", 8-9-2021, People's World, https://peoplesworld.org/article/already-too-late-ipcc-report-says-global-warming-consequences-now-unavoidable/)//EG

It’s too late to reverse the massive damage humanity has done to the Earth’s climate, and deadly weather is already baked into our future. That’s the conclusion from a depressing new report issued Monday morning by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a United Nations body that forecasts the effects of human activity on the climate. The grim assessment was confirmed by Linda Mearns, senior climate scientist at the U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research. “It’s just guaranteed that it’s going to get worse,” she told the press. “Nowhere to run, nowhere to hide.” The IPCC’s latest report—its sixth—estimates that Earth has gotten so warm to date that the planet’s temperature will likely race past the restrictions the Paris Climate Accord had recommended. That agreement set a goal of limiting the average global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels in order to prevent irreversible climate damage. Essentially, the IPCC says stopping that from happening is now impossible; Earth will hit the Paris agreement’s redline by 2040, perhaps sooner. And it will probably blow through a 2 degrees Celsius rise sometime by 2100. The inescapable reality communicated by the report is that we are already living through the effects of climate change—they’re not something looming in the future. Also, it is clear that current emissions pledges made by governments are nowhere near enough and that big business isn’t going to lead the way toward change. The IPCC doesn’t pander to any climate denialism, stating that it is “unequivocal” that human activity is responsible for the crisis we face. “Many changes due to past and future greenhouse gas emissions are irreversible for centuries to millennia,” the authors write. That means there’s no way to avoid some of the consequences brought on by uncontrolled environmental abuse over the last couple hundred years. The scientists behind the report list all the evidence we’re already seeing around the globe: extreme heatwaves, flood-inducing precipitation in many areas, extended droughts in others, violent tropical cyclones and hurricanes, the disappearance of sea ice and snow cover, and the melting of permafrost. The vanishing of Arctic sea ice is a particularly dire indicator of the trouble we’re in. Ice levels in the region vary throughout the year, but summertime retreats are now at their lowest levels in a thousand years. Even in its most optimistic scenario, the IPCC says the ice will disappear during summer at least once between now and 2050. This melting creates a feedback loop: Ice cover reflects solar radiation back outward, but darker bare water absorbs it, causing further warming. All of these trends will get unavoidably worse, and the 3,000-plus-page report doesn’t rule out the catastrophic possibilities of a total collapse of the Arctic ice sheet or abrupt changes in the circulation of ocean waters—events which would trigger rapid and massive swings in global weather. Regardless, the world is already “locked in” to between 6 and 12 inches of sea level rise over the next 25 years. The developments forecast in the report will contribute to a trend of not just more extreme weather but the likelihood of experiencing multiple climate disasters simultaneously, such as what’s happening now with heatwaves, drought, and uncontrollable fires all at the same time in the Western U.S., Greece, Turkey, and Russia. In addition to carbon dioxide, long known to be a driver of global warming, the IPCC said that advances in science have also allowed for more precise measurements of methane and its role in short-term warming. Much of it is released into the atmosphere from natural gas leaks and livestock operations. Though it highlights the irreversible destruction already caused or on the way, the report doesn’t completely throw up the white flag of surrender. There are still multiple scenarios open to the planet, ranging from less bad to total catastrophe, which can be pursued. But achieving them will mean reining in the fossil fuel industry and its paid army of lobbyists that corrupt the democratic process. (It’s no coincidence that a lot of them have been involved in funneling money to the same right-wing lawmakers who tried to overturn the 2020 election during the January Trump coup.) And doing that will require people power to force governments and regulators to stop the greenwashing of business as usual. UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who called the report a “code red for humanity,” said as much: “This report must sound a death knell for coal and fossil fuels before they destroy our planet. If we combine forces now, we can avert climate catastrophe. But, as the report makes clear, there is no time for delay and no room for excuses.” Data from the Climate Accountability Institute released in 2019 found that since 1965 some twenty companies contributed over a third of emissions of the most dangerous greenhouse gases. Leading the pack were capitalist energy giants like Chevron, Exxon, BP, and Shell and state-owned companies like Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and Russia’s Gazprom.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Private Sector Emissions

The Private sector is the biggest contributor of GHG emissions – without private action efforts are ineffective

KÖRmendi, 3/22 --- Thomas Körmendi is CEO of Elopak — a global supplier of sustainable packaging solutions and a graduate of Copenhagen business school. (Thomas KÖRmendi, "Net-Zero Targets Are a Bare Minimum for the Private Sector", 3/22/23, Sustainable Brands, https://sustainablebrands.com/read/walking-the-talk/net-zero-targets-are-a-bare-minimum-for-the-private-sector)//EG

This week, European Council leaders meet in Brussels for their regular council session. High on their agenda will be the Green Deal Industrial Plan — a raft of funding incentives and deregulation proposals designed to ensure that the bloc does not lose ground to the US or China in the cleantech race. The plan was unveiled by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her speech to the World Economic Forum in January. It followed hot on the heels of President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, which similarly introduced incentives for companies manufacturing or investing in green technology. While it is great to see the EU adopting more of a US-style, carrot approach to environmental innovation — rather than its traditional stick of heavy regulation — the focus on cleantech firms arguably distracts from the hard yards the rest of the private sector has to cover to effectively decarbonise and support the EU’s ambitions to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) by 2050. The private sector has an overwhelming responsibility for global emissions, being the largest contributor in terms of both direct GHG emissions and emissions from energy usage. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2017 65 percent of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion came from the industrial and energy sectors. Government support for clean, renewable technologies is a fantastic boost in the race towards net zero; but it is ultimately incumbent on private-sector companies to step up and embrace these technologies. Based on current climate actions, the planet is predicted to be about 2.7°C warmer than pre-industrial levels by 2100. If temperature rises are to be kept below the disaster threshold of 2.0°C — let alone the ambitious 1.5°C target set out in the Paris Agreement — then companies will need to set actionable net-zero targets. These targets should not be viewed as simply window dressing, but rather an essential part of doing business, — like a pension plan or health and safety policy. In 2022 Elopak, the company where I serve as CEO, set ambitious emission-reduction targets — approved by the Science-Based Targets initiative — with the ultimate aim of becoming a net-zero company by 2050. As part of this, we have committed to a 42 percent reduction in direct emissions by 2030 and a 90 percent reduction across all the board by the middle of this century. Reaching these targets will not be easy — particularly as they involve a significant reduction in scope 3 emissions, which we have little control over. This includes emissions related to the extraction and production of raw materials for our cartons, third-party transport, and other purchased goods and services. Although challenging, it is precisely this kind of all-encompassing approach that companies will need to take if we are to live up to the ambitions of legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act or the Green Deal Industrial Plan. I of course urge all companies to follow us in setting science-based, net-zero targets as an absolute minimum. However, where possible, we can and should go further. In an ideal world, companies would be reaching net-zero emissions sooner than 2050 and actively working to eliminate emissions throughout their value chains and beyond to become climate positive. The old-fashioned stick of regulation can be helpful in this sense, with larger companies being required by law to justify decisions — for example, sourcing non-renewable energy at a factory — that do not support their net-zero targets. Such firms would then be required to spell out their justification for this decision, as well as plans for remedying it in the future. This is partially covered by current EU taxonomy; but regulators could be bolder in forcing companies to admit to their environmental shortcomings. However, I would prefer to see the kind of juicy, carrot-based approach currently being dangled in front of green tech firms; for example, governments could offer incentives to firms that have actionable net-zero policies and can prove substantial reductions in emissions. This could include preferential access to public tenders, tax breaks and subsidised support from experts to help them reach their goals as quickly as possible. Ultimately though, it is down to individual companies to step up and make this happen. Net-zero targets should become standard across all industries and investors should view a holistic plan for net zero as an indication of a company’s long-term financial viability. This week’s focus on clean technologies is laudable; but we cannot ignore the work that needs to be done by less glamorous industries to meet our climate change goals. It’s time for industry to pick up the pace.

Private industry is on of the polluters in the US due to fossil fuel consumption, electricity, and more

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Private Sector Emissions

Absent private sector action federal policies will be insufficient and counteracted

IEG, 22 --- (IEG, " Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to Creating an Enabling Environment for Private Sector Participation in Climate Action, Fiscal Years 2013–22",11/4/23 , IEG World Bank Group, https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_private-sector-participation-in-climate-action.pdf)//EG

The private sector’s economic activities are a main contributor to GHG emissions globally. The private sector contributes to emissions primarily through energy, industry, transportation, agriculture, forestry, and land use change. Collectively, private sector activities are responsible for the major share of GHG emissions, though emissions from 2 state-owned enterprises also play an important role in many emerging and developing countries. Historically, most private sector emissions came from industrial countries, 5 but the share of emissions from emerging and developing countries is increasing (Lamb et al. 2021).6 However, globally poor people and those in low- and lower-middle-income countries often suffer the most from climate change impacts, and so these countries will have the greatest need for adaptation to grow in a climate resilient way. The private sector is a critical stakeholder in fighting climate change. It can play a leading role in climate change mitigation by reducing the GHG emissions of its operations by adopting existing low- or zero-GHG-emitting processes and technologies. It can play an important role in innovating and developing new low- or zero-GHGemitting products, services, and technologies for the private and public sectors. Likewise, the private sector can play a role in climate change adaptation by building climate resilience into its business plans and investments. Both large and small companies have a vital role to play in climate change adaptation. Regulations that require banks to assess their exposures to climate-related risks may lead the corporate sector to invest in resilient infrastructure. In addition, requirements for resilience embedded in contracts enabled by public-private partnership frameworks may help channel private sector resources into resilient public infrastructure in several sectors. Finally, the private sector can innovate and develop new climate adaptation infrastructure, processes, goods, and services and provide them to private and public actors. The private sector can also provide the finance to support investments in mitigation and adaptation; for example, through loans from the banking sector or through capital markets, including the issuance of green or climate bonds (World Bank Group 2021a). 7 1.5 Investments in mitigation and adaptation need to increase by more than ten times by 2030 to reach US$5 trillion a year and need to flow increasingly into emerging economies and developing countries. To satisfy the global investment needs in mitigation and adaptation, recent assessments suggest that total climate finance flows need to reach at least US$5 trillion per year by 2030 and be sustained at this level through 2050 (IEA 2021; IPCC 2018; OECD 2017b; UNEP 2016, 2021a). According to the Climate Policy Initiative, total global climate finance flows reached only US$640 billion in 2020. 8 Therefore, global climate finance would need to increase nearly eightfold to reach US$5 trillion per year by 2030. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimate, private sector finance is critical to meeting these trillions in investment needs, particularly given constraints on public sector financing in the context of the global pandemic. This increase in private investments will require scaling up by more than 10 times by 2030 because contributions from the private sector have been very low to date (US$340 billion in 2020; CPI 2021). Furthermore, private climate finance mainly reaches advanced economies such as the United States (where 95 percent of climate finance comes from private sources and only 5 percent from public sources) or Western Europe (60 percent from private sources compared with 40 percent from public sources). Policies are therefore needed to enable private sector investments. This is increasingly also the case in emerging economies and developing countries that have had to source their climate investments primarily from public sources, with limited contributions from the private sector (36 percent on average). 9 1.6 Despite efforts by national governments and the international development community, including the Bank Group, most countries lack a conducive enabling environment for the private sector to engage in climate mitigation and adaptation. The private sector operates in a context influenced by the public sector through policies, regulations, and incentives, and changes in these are necessary to catalyze and increase private sector participation in climate action. The current regulatory and legal frameworks of many countries fail to address the market failure that disincentivizes climate mitigation measures: 10 new technologies that emit lower levels of GHGs (“lowcarbon” technologies) are competing with cheaper incumbent technologies that tend to produce higher GHG emissions (“high-carbon” technologies). Regulations that correct price externalities would address the market failure and signal to private investors that adopting low-carbon solutions would yield a sufficient return (BCG and GFMA 2020; Bhattacharya et al. 2020; Boehm et al. 2021; Kivimaa and Kern 2016; OECD 2017a; Rosenbloom, Meadowcroft, and Cashore 2019). This market failure can result in the perpetuated use of fossil fuels or other high-carbon technologies and prevent the emergence of low-carbon alternatives—a phenomenon referred to as “carbon lock-in” (Sato, Elliott, and Schumer 2021). 11 In terms of adaptation, the market failure that prevents private sector investors from engaging is that investors are not rewarded for the positive social externalities of many adaptation measures in financial terms (for example, enhanced resilience against the flooding of infrastructure), even though society does benefit. This results in low perceived or actual returns on investment for many adaptation measures, which often lack a ring-fenced cash flow. In addition to a lack of incentives, barriers to private sector adaptation include (i) a lack of information about climate risks and opportunities and (ii) policies that do not encourage adaptation or that even promote actions that increase climate change vulnerability (IFC 2013). An enabling environment for private participation in climate action influences the private sector to undertake such action. This evaluation defines the private sector enabling environment for climate action as the set of policies (laws and regulations), incentives, standards, information, and institutions that encourage or facilitate the private sector to invest or behave in ways that reduce GHG emissions or adapt to the current or anticipated impacts of climate change. A private sector enabling environment for climate action exists in the contexts of country macroeconomic conditions and broader private sector enabling environments, which may also constrain private investment in climate action. 1.8 An enabling environment for private participation in climate adaptation requires strong incentives, availability of climate risk and vulnerability data, and institutional capacity to guide investment decisions. Although ensuring that investments are climate resilient offers private returns to investors and makes projects more viable, many adaptation investments lack adequate returns for the private sector because they also provide public goods—for example, the fortification of physical infrastructure, such as utility networks, so they can withstand extreme weather events. Reaching sufficient adaptation investments, therefore, requires creating appropriate regulatory mechanisms or financial incentives such as blended finance, credit enhancement, and other targeted risk reduction or revenue boosting measures. Supporting adaptation also requires developing information services or platforms that provide localized climate risk and vulnerability data so they can be embedded in investment planning and guide investment decision-making. In addition, it necessitates effective institutional arrangements for multisector adaptation planning to identify where the private sector should focus its adaptation actions (World Bank Group 2021a). 1.9 The COVID-19 pandemic has made private sector action on climate change more important and urgent. Developing economies have suffered significant revenue losses during the COVID-19 pandemic, compounded by the fiscal drain of pandemic response measures, with knock-on effects on their fiscal and debt positions. The pandemic has also exacerbated the public debt pressures on many middle-income countries, leaving limited funding for climate mitigation and adaptation (Kharas and Dooley 2020; UNEP 2021a). Because public sector resources for climate change have decreased, involving the private sector has become even more essential and time sensitive.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › JG Fails

FGJ is an unrealistic imagination

Max Gulker 18, PhD Senior Research Fellow American Institute for Economic Research"," 10-2018, https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf

An employer normally pays an employee because the latter is doing something of value. Under a federal job guarantee, that logic is reversed: the government must find something for ten million or more workers to do because they are being paid. The difference is of great importance. The work handed out under a job guarantee is subject to complex criteria. In the view of the Levy report, these jobs must • Be able to “quickly accommodate new entrants into the program and let them go without disruption should they find alternative employment” • Help low-skilled workers build human capital to “enhance their chances to obtain work outside the program. They will gain work experience as well as on-the-job training.” • In every community, “provide visible benefits, meeting specific local needs” • Put millions to work “without competing for employees or displacing private sector undertakings” or “conventional public-sector work” These points, taken together, are astonishing.14 The work given to enrollees must teach valuable skills, but not so valuable that someone securely employed in the private sector would want to enroll. And while the work needs to result in “visible benefits,” these benefits should not be so great that any firm or government agency would be willing on its own to pay a wage of fifteen dollars per hour.15 The Levy report’s authors see concerns about finding such work as a failure of imagination: Is there really a dearth of useful things that might be done by our unemployed workers? Have we become so blind that we cannot see our failing infrastructure, our understaffed parks with their closed swimming pools and unkempt trails, the unmet needs of our seniors and our children, our polluted ponds and streams that require cleanup, and our low-income housing that would benefit from repairs and insulation? Are we really so unimaginative that we cannot think of a way to match our jobless with paid work tackling the unmet tasks surrounding us? Beyond examples such as these, both reports leave the job guarantee’s implementation, and its feasibility, to the reader’s imagination. The remainder of this section will consider the logistical details of finding and assigning work to over ten million people without the aid of the market, while also meeting the above criteria. While largescale, centralized proposals can sound good in the abstract, even scratching the surface of the logistics involved shows how they quickly break down, sometimes catastrophically.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › JG Fails

FJG would create more displacement of the working class

Standing 18, Guy Standing is a British labour economist. He is a professor of development studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and a co-founder of the Basic Income Earth Network, May 2018, “Basic Income as Common Dividends: Piloting a Transformative Policy”, https://www.progressiveeconomyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PEF_Piloting_Basic_Income_Guy_Standing.pdf//JChu

Besides being a recipe for labour inefficiency and labour market distortions, tending to displace workers employed in the ‘free’ labour market and to depress their wages, the job guarantee proposal fails to recognise that today’s crisis is structural and requires transformative policies. Tax credits, job guarantees and statutory minimum wages would barely touch the precariat’s existential insecurity that is at the heart of the social and economic crisis, let alone address the aspirations of the progressive and growing part of the precariat for an ecologically grounded Good Society.136 The emphasis on jobs is non-ecological, since it is tied to the constant pursuit of economic growth. There are many instances, support for fracking and for the third runway at Heathrow airport being recent examples, where the promise of more jobs has trumped costs to health and the environment. And a job guarantee policy could have a strong appeal to the political right as a way to dismantle the welfare state. Why pay unemployment benefits if everybody has a guaranteed job? In the USA, one 75 conservative commentator chortled that ‘over 100 federal welfare programs would be replaced with a single job guarantee program.’137 Finally, there is what this writer regards as the policy’s worst feature. It would reinforce twentieth-century labourism, by failing to make the distinction between work and labour. Those who back guaranteed jobs typically ignore all forms of work that are not paid labour. A really progressive agenda would strengthen the values of work over the dictates of labour. It would seek to enable more people to develop their own sense of occupation.138 A job is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Economists tend to be inconsistent in this respect. In the textbooks, labour has ‘disutility’; it is negative for the worker. Yet many economists who use or write these textbooks then advocate putting everybody in jobs. Why make a fetish of ‘jobs’? A job is doing ‘labour’ for others. What about all the forms of work that we do for those we love or for our community or for ourselves? Many forms of work that are not labour are more rewarding psychologically and socially. A regime of putting everybody into jobs, in unchosen activities, would be orchestrated alienation. Surely a progressive should want to minimise the time we spend in stultifying and subordinated jobs, so that we can increase the time and energy for forms of work and leisure that are self-chosen and oriented to personal and community development. There is one last point, to do with the claim that a job guarantee would be politically popular. Much is made of a US poll which asked people whether they would support a scheme to guarantee a job for anybody ‘who can’t find employment in the private sector’, if paid from a 5% tax on those earning over $200,000. The result was 52% in favour. Supporters thought this was ‘stunning’.139 With such a loaded question, one should be stunned by the bare-majority support. After all, most respondents were being told they would not have to pay, and that there were no alternative jobs available, an unlikely scenario. Rather than jobs per se, the primary challenge is to build a new income distribution system, recognising that the old one has broken down irretrievably. The rentiers are running away with all the revenue thrown up by rentier capitalism, and real wages will continue to lag. Putting people into static low-wage jobs is no response.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › JG Fails

A FJG would guarantee crowd out by providing benefits that business will never be able to match

Ozimek 18, -- Economist and former contributor to Forbes (Adam Ozimek, “Yes, Job Gaurantee is Absurd”, 4/24/18, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2018/04/24/yes-the-jobs-guarantee-is-absurd/?sh=6a6dcd5eafd0) //EG

I gather from my last post that people want me to say more about why a jobs guarantee program is absurd. I've written about this before (here, here, and here), and my main point in that post was really just to be clear about how ridiculous I thought the program was. But if readers want more they can have it. The jobs guarantees that are being proposed out there have two purposes: end involuntary unemployment and ending low wages. This is really important because some defenders of jobs guarantees simply focusing on their role in providing jobs for people who truly struggle to find work even in a healthy labor market, and for those who lose them for cyclical reasons. But the jobs guarantee proposals in both rhetoric and policy details are clear: these polices are meant to guarantee everyone a good job. In the CBPP proposal the authors list as one of the 3 main recommendations of their report "The elimination of poverty wages through the pay structure of the NIEC". Their goal is to create a floor in the labor market below which private employers will not go: "Since the job guarantee places a floor in the labor market, employers will likely have to offer compensation packages at least as desirable as those offered under the NIEC" In case there is any confusion, the authors don't mince words, warning readers that "Make no mistake, this is a policy to transform the U.S. labor market". And they're right! They recommend a minimum wage of $24,600 which they translate to a minimum hourly wage of $11.83. At a first pass, private employers simply won't be able to offer less than this if they want to hire anyone. But they also argue for inclusion of health benefits, and since this is a guaranteed job you presumably can't easily be fired from, it also includes the best job security you can get. What's more, that's just the minimum wage in this program, and they expect the average worker will make $32,500, which translates to a minimum hourly wage of $15,60. And that's just the average, not the peak! Despite these generous benefits, they estimate this program will only require hiring about 10 million workers, all of whom are currently unemployed. While they admit "the job guarantee may result in the displacement of some workers currently employed in the private sector, especially at the low end of the labor market", they minimize this risk by pointing to the minimum wage literature. As such, their cost estimates don't assume any crowd out of private employers. Does that sound reasonable to you? They believe their program will prompt tens of millions of employers to raise wages, but this won't cause any disemployment or crowd out at private employers. By their own estimate, their program "may result in a comparable change within the labor market" as a $15 minimum wage, which affects 41 million workers. To believe there would be no crowd out despite this massive change requires the assumption every low wage worker in this country has productivity high enough to justify a good paying job, but employers aren't paying it now. Usually, liberal commentators are quick to tell us how bad low wage jobs are in the U.S. not just by pay but by working conditions. Wage theft, unpredictable hours, abusive bosses, tenuous employment at will, lack of opportunities for advancement are all allegedly widespread features of the low-skilled labor market. Are we to believe that workers will not abandon these jobs in droves for guaranteed government employment with benefits, or that employers will change overnight? I think these criticisms of working conditions are often overblown, but at the very least you can certainly easily be fired from a private sector job and turnover is quite high, making a guaranteed job clearly nicer in that important regard. And yes, many low-skilled jobs are far from pleasant. The idea employers would and could universally raise wages, offer full benefits, and upgrade job quality to prevent crowd out strikes me as absurd. For many advocates I think this risk isn't worth worrying about because it's not much of a risk to them. If the job guarantee ends up with 20, 30, or 40 million instead of the 10 million they expect than that's not really a problem because massively expanding the size of government isn't really a big deal. But it would be. The first problem is you lose the output those workers were producing. In that sense, their production is nationalized quite like when the government takes over an industry, except in this case they are taking over the labor instead of the capital. What's more, when employers of low skilled workers go out of business this will also harm the high skilled workers they employ. The second problem is what this will do to the size of government. Right now there are about 21 million federal, state, and local government workers in the U.S. By the authors' calculations, the 10 million more jobs would increase government employment by a whopping 50%. If only 10 million private sector jobs are crowded out it would double the size of government. We are going to put to work 50% to 100% more government workers than we already do, and we should expect that the bill will approximately double as well. This brings me to the issue of what all of these people will do. It's alleged that there is a ton of work for government workers to do that isn't being done. Here is my challenge to the people who claim this: first have all the police officers, teachers, and other public sector workers who are allowed to retire at age 55 do this work instead of retiring. If the work is too strenuous for a 55 to 65 year old, then I'm going to question how realistic it is to guarantee that literally anyone can do it. If you say is impossible given political constraints from the power of government employees, then perhaps this is a reason to worry about drastically expanding the scope of government employment. When it comes to what work these people will do, read Matt Bruenig's criticisms of the alleged work that people in this program will do. Matt deserves praise for doing what I argued that more liberals should be doing: criticizing the absurdity of this program instead of trying to hold up a very watered down version of it that doesn't actually do what advocates and now politicians are actually proposing. It's not crazy for the government to want to improve job quality widely. It is crazy to say you are going to do that by the government directly offering everyone a good job. Tweak the program all you want, trying to make every job a good job via this mechanism is going to per se be a radical and massive undertaking and a bad idea. Policies should focus on subsidizing private employment of low-skilled workers and the government spending money on boosting wages directly. Honestly the idea is so bad I find the fact that we have to actually debate it far more interesting than actually debating it. It's a bad sign about the state of ideas on the left today.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › JG Fails

A FJG would divert workers from productive areas of the private sector resulting in economic decline and massive job loss

Gulker, 18 --- Max Gulker, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow American Institute for Economic Research (No Author, " The Job Guarantee: A Critical Analysis", 2018, No Publication, https://www.aier.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf)//EG

We must approach any discussion of the impact of a federal job guarantee on the wider economy with an abundance of caution. Our sample size for evaluating a program that the Levy report’s authors term a “radical transformation of the labor market” is zero. Even countries with much larger public sectors do not operate under the mandated system of a job guarantee. However, economic theory and lessons from history can inform our understanding of the likely impacts of a federal job guarantee. Both reports’ authors are confident that in addition to benefiting program enrollees, a federal job guarantee would be an unequivocal positive for the larger economy, offering macroeconomic stabilizers and perhaps even paying for itself. Neither report concerns itself with the potential negative consequences that flow from basic economics, issues ranging from large distortions in the information and incentives provided by markets to opportunities for special interests to manipulate the programs to their advantage. Each of these issues could potentially result in substantial net harms to all Americans, including program participants. In appendix 2, we briefly evaluate the claims both reports make of benefits to the economy beyond the program enrollees themselves. The CBPP report touts some benefits but is short on details, while the Levy report makes highly problematic use of macroeconometric forecasting models. The remainder of this section focuses on the potential economic harms of a job guarantee. 6.1 Labor Market Disruptions Both reports’ authors treat the ten million or more enrollees in a federal job guarantee as somehow cloistered from the labor market at large (which includes both private and government employers). The Levy report envisions a “buffer stock” of job-guarantee workers that will grow in times of downturns and shrink as more workers rejoin the traditional labor market in better times. One does not have to go deep into economic theory to see how this purportedly clean flow of workers would break down. Neither report takes account of harm to the private sector caused by their proposals. In addition to the de facto minimum wage and benefits set by a job guarantee, one must consider the contraction in private labor supply that would result if a sizable fraction of the many millions of currently employed workers at the lower end of the wage distribution chose to leave their jobs and enroll in the federal program. The immediate result of more pay and benefits for the working poor is something everyone would like to see, all else equal. But the process would divert workers from the places in the economy where they are most productive to a labyrinthine bureaucracy, where even finding enough work to assign would be a challenge. This could greatly weaken the productivity of the overall economy, potentially leading to declines in output and even greater job loss. Contrary to the stated goal of not competing with the private sector, some industries could become entirely nationalized. For example, 875,000 home health aides and 1.3 million teachers’ aides currently employed by the private and public sectors earn less on average than proposed job guarantee wages. One might myopically say these workers deserve a raise, but turning these industries from conventional jobs into tasks assigned on demand would almost certainly result in poorer service to the young and elderly. 6.2 Impact on Worker Incentives Neither the CBPP nor Levy report has established how the work under a federal job guarantee would help build the workers’ human capital. In fact, the very existence of the program might strongly disincentivize workers from going out and acquiring the skills that lead to real, value-enhancing job creation in the labor market. By forcing workers mostly at the low end of the skills distribution to work by mandate and earn a fixed wage, a worker would have to derive enough value from education or other human capital acquisition to leapfrog ten million or more other workers. It would cost about $330 billion to send ten million workers currently counted among the U-6 unemployed for full trade school degrees, 27 a fraction of the cost of a single year of a federal job guarantee. While we do not support such blanket solutions of any kind, this number puts in perspective the benefits to investing in, rather than simply sustaining, people. 6.3 Rent-Seeking and Corruption A federal job guarantee, no matter how well intentioned, would also serve as a magnet for corruption and corporate influence peddling. Especially when administered on a local level, the opportunities for corruption become vast and difficult to monitor. For example, one need not be particularly imaginative to see opportunities for a local building contractor to get free labor by giving kickbacks to officials in charge of placing enrollees in jobs. Corporations and other interest groups do not have to resort to corruption per se to gain control of the millions of subsidized laborers in a job guarantee. Rent-seeking, where corporations or other incumbent interests compete for influence over government to further their own objectives, is a well-known phenomenon.28 For example, the regional manager for Walmart might get in touch with a local government about the condition of its store’s parking lot and the grounds around it. Sales have been falling, and this expense might tip the decision to move to a new location in the next town. Couldn’t the town provide some of its laborers to improve the look of the store’s grounds? Where there is free labor to be had, private businesses come knocking. Both with and without breaking the law, influence peddling would be an inevitable consequence of a job guarantee.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › JG Fails

A FJG Fails – a guaranteed job means that workers can refuse to work which decks climate solvency AND bargaining will eventually crowd out the private sector

Smith, 19 --- Noah Smith has his PhD in Economics from the University of Michigan Ann Arbor and was an opinion columnist for Bloomberg. (Noah Smith, "U.S. Economy: Federal Job Guarantee Would Hurt Private Employers", 3-11-2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2019-03-11/u-s-economy-federal-job-guarantee-would-hurt-private-employers#xj4y7vzkg )//EG

I was once very supportive of the idea of a federal job guarantee, but I’ve changed my mind. Although the economics of the idea are sound, the implementation of the program matters crucially. And it’s becoming clearer that the politics surrounding the job guarantee would lead to significant problems. The basic idea of having the federal government act as the country’s employer of last resort is a good one. Although the economy occasionally puts the entire labor force to work, regular recessions mean that there are usually lots of people who want to find jobs but can’t. This can be seen by looking at a broad measure of unemployment: The wasted labor of these unemployed and underemployed people represents a real resource that could be put to work for the economy. Even if government jobs fixing sidewalks, cleaning public spaces and making art were only marginally productive, that would still be better than having people sit at home playing video games as their skills and work ethic steadily deteriorate. During the Great Depression, the New Deal had success with a raft of programs designed to give jobs to the unemployed -- the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works Administration. Furthermore, there’s a good chance that a job guarantee would provide people with more dignity than programs that just give people cash. As long as the jobs weren’t obviously pure make-work, they could allow people to feel more valuable to society. But there’s a very good chance that the politics of the modern day would turn a job guarantee into something very different from the New Deal -- and make it much less beneficial for the economy. First, there’s the question of whether people could be fired from the new program. It’s easy to imagine good reasons to fire someone from a government job -- starting fights, for example, engaging in criminal activities or simply refusing to work. Even if a job guarantee allowed workers to be fired for egregious offenses, there would doubtless be intense public scrutiny of firing decisions, especially on social media. That would put immense pressure on the administrators of the federal jobs program to avoid firing even those who deserved to be fired. The likely results would be a drop in productivity as some people realized they didn’t have to work to collect paychecks, increased resentment among those who felt morally obligated to put in a hard day’s labor, and disruption of the workplace due to toleration of disruptive or criminal behavior that would never be permitted at private companies. Even more troubling, there’s the possibility that the guaranteed federal jobs could cannibalize the private sector and make the economy less productive. The New Deal jobs programs were undertaken at a time when the economy had a huge amount of unemployment, and there was little chance that workers with private sector jobs would jump ship. But in the absence of very high unemployment like that of the Great Depression, a job guarantee will compete with private companies. And the job guarantee would often win that competition. Modern proposals would require that the federally guaranteed jobs be good jobs, with good pay and benefits. For example, here is the relevant text from the Green New Deal resolution recently introduced by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States This sounds better than many of today's low-wage jobs. Competition from these government-sponsored jobs would have an initially healthy result. It would force private companies to raise wages and increase benefits in order to keep up with the government. But as private-sector jobs improved, activists’ notion of what constitutes a good job would increase, and they would call for steadily higher wages and benefits for government work. Eventually this would exceed private companies’ ability to pay, so the job guarantee would come to represent the benchmark in the labor market and make up an ever-larger slice of the economy. This would reduce productivity, since government jobs would likely generate less real value than private-sector jobs. Economists have found evidence that the beneficiaries of short-term government jobs tend not to go on to find work in the private sector after the programs end, suggesting that guaranteed jobs would be low-productivity work. As activists forced government wages and benefits higher, the private sector would find itself deprived of cooks, janitors, housekeepers, cashiers and the other people who make a modern economy run. In a worst-case scenario, this would be a one-way ratchet to a peculiarly dysfunctional form of communism. So although a job guarantee could potentially be a good thing, politics seem likely to make it bad. A better idea is to use private-sector employment subsidies to encourage companies to hire more unemployed and underemployed workers -- an approach that the data suggests is much more effective in terms of building long-term worker skills. Additionally, a combination of wage subsidies, minimum wages and increased worker bargaining power could help private-sector workers capture a bigger share of the value they create.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › GND fails

The aff would devastate the labor market and won’t achieve 100% renewable use until after 2050

Senate RPC, 18 --- (Senate RPC, "GREEN NEW DEAL: A CRAZY, EXPENSIVE MESS", 12-11-2018, Senate RPC, https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/green-new-deal-a-crazy-expensive-mess)//EG

If enacted, the Democrats’ idea would require 100 percent renewable-sourced electricity along with changing transportation and industry to eliminate the burning of carbon. While Democrats have not released a cost estimate for their proposal, independent estimates suggest it would cost at least $7 trillion. Even with all that spending, the international nature of climate change means that the plan could fail to meaningfully affect global carbon dioxide emissions. Twenty-two House Democrats have endorsed the Green New Deal and they plan to create a select committee early next Congress to begin drafting legislation. IGNORING EMISSIONS TRENDS Even if the Green New Deal functioned exactly as Democrats are trying to sell it, the U.S. might spend $7 trillion only to find that climate change still got worse. Global emissions could rise because the Green New Deal ignores entirely the international aspect of climate change. The United States generates only around 15 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. Of the G-20 countries, the United States has the best recent record on carbon dioxide emissions reductions. The U.S. cut 862 million tons from 2005 to 2017, a 14 percent decline. Over the same period, the European Union reduced its emissions by just 771 million tons, and global emissions rose 26 percent. India increased its carbon dioxide emissions by 1.3 billion tons, and China increased its emissions by 4 billion tons—a 70 percent increase. Viewed from a global perspective, the Green New Deal is a colossal waste of money that misses the vast majority of the problem. RENEWABLES NOT YET UP TO THE TASK Producing 100 percent of electricity from renewable sources is a practical impossibility in the near future. Scientists doubt it would be achievable by 2050, let alone 2029, the deadline Democrats would set. Such a massive overhaul in power generation would require the closure and replacement of about 83 percent of U.S. electricity generation, including all coal, natural gas, and nuclear plants. While nuclear energy does not release carbon dioxide, it is not renewable and would not be allowed under the Green New Deal. Today, renewable electricity — mainly wind, solar, and hydroelectric — provides only 17 percent of American electricity. Because renewable energy sources are not as stable as traditional electricity sources, the entire grid would have to be revamped. Massive amounts of energy storage would be needed, requiring dramatic technological improvements. Vast new transmission networks would be needed to bring electricity to areas less conducive to solar or wind generation. New technologies would be needed to regulate electricity frequency, output fluctuations, demand response, and voltage management. Even mainstream left-leaning environmentalists have argued against a 100 percent renewable strategy because of unsolved technical problems and enormous expense relative to benefits. DEMOCRATS PROMISE FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE JOB GUARANTEE AND A GRAB-BAG OF OTHER LEFT POLICIES The Green New Deal also proposes a job guarantee for every American who wants one. Beyond promising a not-yet-defined living wage, the details are scarce. Other job guarantee proposals popular among Democrats generally promise federally subsidized jobs in fields such as infrastructure and public works, child care, and the environment, for anyone whether they are currently employed or unemployed. A job guarantee is deeply flawed policy. The only “guarantee” is a badly distorted labor market. First, it is doubtful the government could successfully implement such a huge program. Once underway, the damage to private businesses would be devastating. The effects would fall heavily on small businesses, which could be forced to shut down if they were unable to match the federal wage or because workers prefer one of the “guaranteed” jobs over their current one. It could effectively nationalize a huge portion of the economy. A job guarantee also would double down on Washington picking economic winners and losers. Finally, the cost would be enormous. The authors of one prominent proposal peg theirs at $543 billion annually. Democrats promise their Green New Deal will “mitigate deeply entrenched racial, regional, and gender-based inequalities in income and wealth.” They add the possibility of including basic income, universal health care, and the involvement of unions. House Democrats have yet to explain how these goals will be achieved through energy policy and how they relate to climate change.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › GND fails

The Green new deal would barely improve global temperatures and cause environmental damage while simultaneously putting the US and families into more debt

Heath, 21 --- Julia Heath is a guest writer for the Liberty Champion – the newspaper for Liberty Unity (Julia Heath, "The Green New Deal would harm Americans, not help them", 4-13-2021, Liberty Champion, https://www.liberty.edu/champion/2021/04/the-green-new-deal-would-harm-americans-not-help-them/)//EG

The Green New Deal (GND), a piece of legislation proposed by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, gained support from a large base of the younger generation. The Green New Deal’s goal is to solve America’s environmental issues. However, as a student and a young person who will receive the negative effects of this deal should it pass, I find this proposal concerning, as its main directive is to siege control and impose progressive laws override their desires to aid the “climate crises.” Many support the GND because they want to solve climate change, but multiple studies have shown it wouldn’t do much to help the issue. According to a study done by the American Enterprise Institute, the proposal would reduce global temperatures by “0.083 to 0.173 degrees,” a number “barely distinguishable from zero.” The GND would also be astronomically expensive. In a study reported by Bloomberg News, the proposal could cost up to $93 trillion over the span of 10 years, or $65,000 per family, per year. That’s more than three times the national debt. Between paying for my tuition and student loans, I can’t afford to take on more financial burden and neither can the majority of other college students. In addition, the Heritage Foundation reports that the GND would cause the average household’s electricity cost to increase by about 12-14%. Economic recession or not, this is an additional hardship that struggling Americans cannot afford. Another concern is that the initial goal of the GND was not to solve environmental issues, but rather to restructure the economy. Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s former chief of staff, Saikat Chakrabarti, even said, “The interesting thing about the Green New Deal is it wasn’t originally a climate thing at all,” and, “…we really think of it as a how-do-you-change-the-entire-economy thing,” according to the The Washington Post. This legislation seems to be a proposal for economic change camouflaged as a piece of environmental legislation. Environmental policies implemented by the government from the top-down, such as the GND, can lead to more pollution, which is contradictory to the solution this policy aims to provide. As reported by the journal Global Environmental Change, Russia (formerly the USSR when these policies were put into place) already implemented top-down policies like the GND, however, its air quality is 1.5 times dirtier than the USA’s per unit of GDP in the 1980s. The Green New Deal aims to restructure the economy under the guise of environmental solutions. Lastly, the GND would largely expand the use of wind and solar energy, but in order to make this work on a national, industrial scale, it would mean the clearing of hundreds of thousands of square miles of forest and habitat to make way for those facilities, according to the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow. In an effort to promote conservation, habitats for wildlife would be destroyed while making room for these facilities, such as solar panel farms. The Green New Deal is a harmful environmental policy that aims to implement faulty solutions to the environmental problem that would harm the American people more than it would help.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Econ/employment good now

Inflation and unemployment are cooling while demand is staying strong despite interest rates

Sheidlower, 6/17 --- Noah Sheidlower is the Economy Fellow with Insider. Before joining Insider, Noah received his Bachelor's in Sociology and English from Columbia University. (Noah Sheidlower, "It was a great week for the economy", 6-17-2023, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/inflation-cpi-data-fed-decision-good-week-for-the-economy-2023-6)//EG

This was a busy week for economic data, and it looks like the US may be on the right track. Americans are feeling good about the state of the economy heading into the summer as gas prices fall and inflation slows in other categories. As a result, plenty of Americans are still shopping, which means businesses can continue to hire. That's reflected in low unemployment and strong job growth at a time when hourly wages finally caught up to inflation. This also reflects rises in manufacturing, especially in motor vehicles, as the nation continues building factories at a very fast rate. All of this good news contributes to an economy that gave the Federal Reserve the confidence to skip its string of interest rate hikes this month. Let's take a closer look at the more encouraging numbers that came out in just the last week. Americans are still shopping Retail sales rose 0.3% from April to May, following a 0.4% jump from March to April, according to the Commerce Department. Consumers spent more across the board, including at the grocery store and car dealerships, with the exception of gasoline, indicative of falling gas prices. Overall retail spending for the last 12 months increased 1.6%, rising slower than price increases. The retail spending rise was closely comparable with inflation when taking out gasoline prices. According to the AAA on Friday, a gallon of regular gas averaged around $3.59, an elevated number compared with previous years but a major drop from a year ago when prices averaged around $5. As Americans prepare for summer travel, gasoline prices fell 5.6% in May – and have fallen 19.7% over the last year – while fuel oil prices dropped 7.7%, according to the May CPI report. CPI increased 4% from May 2022 to May 2023, the Labor Department said on Tuesday, the lowest year-over-year inflation rate since March 2021. This came in well under the year-over-year percent increase of 4.9% in April. CPI rose 0.1% month over month, per seasonally adjusted data, less than the 0.4% month-over-month growth in April. Core CPI, which excludes food and energy, increased 5.3% in May from a year earlier, which suggests consumers are still feeling the weight of somewhat easing price pressures. This included a 4.4% jump in used vehicle prices and a 0.6% increase in shelter prices, up from 0.4% for April 2023. Grocery inflation is also slowing, according to the Council of Economic Advisers. In May, grocery inflation on a three-month annualized basis fell 1.7%, a stark difference from the 15.7% rise in July 2022. This was driven in part by rapidly falling egg prices, which decreased 13.8% between April and May, as well as declines in produce prices. Inflation is slowing, while jobs and wages stay strong In a separate release Tuesday, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a 0.3% increase in average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, for May. Real earnings rose 0.2% annually after being negative for much of the inflation surge. US inflation also cooled below expectations on the wholesale level, according to Producer Price Index (PPI) data released Wednesday. These numbers were supplemented this week by data revealing the jobs market remains quite strong. The Labor Department on Thursday said new applications for unemployment benefits were steady last week, suggesting that layoffs remain low. Through May, employers have added around 1.6 million jobs in 2023. The rise in consumer spending and higher wages, which accounts for around two-thirds of economic output, suggests demand has remained steady even amid rising prices and interest rates that have stayed the same after Wednesday's Fed decision.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Econ/employment good now

Despite declining inflation and high GDP growth Americans continue with unwarranted panic about the economy

Sheidlower, 7/5 --- Noah Sheidlower is the Economy Fellow with Insider. Before joining Insider, Noah received his Bachelor's in Sociology and English from Columbia University. (Noah Sheidlower, "You probably think the economy is much worse off than it is", 7-5-2023, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-is-us-economy-recession-outlook-2023-6)//EG

Recent economic data is showing the US economy is doing quite well, but many Americans are not convinced. Why would they be when lots of available jobs and increased gross domestic product haven't often translated to paychecks that can keep up with rent and grocery prices? And when business leaders are crying recession. Some say the US is in a "vibecession," a disconnect between how the economy performs and how Americans feel about its performance. Still-rising prices, a correction from the unusual economic conditions of the coronavirus pandemic, and public conversation about a still-looming threat of a recession may have overshadowed healthy economic data. Even now, with slower inflation, paused interest-rate hikes, and a healthy job market, Americans can't give up the idea that the economy is in trouble. Public discourse about a looming recession and skepticism of progress Americans' views of the economy, as tracked in a long-running survey by the University of Michigan, were around the lowest they've been since 1980 last summer. Despite a small jump since July 2022, consumer sentiment fell between February and May, with an improvement in June, and these levels more or less match those of the Great Recession. Sentiment is expected to rise further over the next few months, Joanne Hsu, director of the Surveys of Consumers, told Insider. The sentiment crosses party lines. In a Pew Research survey conducted in late March and early April, a large majority of Republicans and Democrats alike still had a negative outlook on the economy. Democrats and Republicans surveyed by Pew have consistently rated the economy lower under President Joe Biden than they did during the Trump administration. This could be caused by pessimism carried over from the start of the pandemic, negative news headlines, and some very real data showing more Americans are experiencing homelessness and attending food banks. It could also be because of falling real wages, or pay when adjusted for the cost of inflation, compared with the past three years. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, real hourly compensation for all workers has fallen more since 2020 than at any time at least since World War II. For that reason, people could just be feeling the stark difference from when they were flush with cash early in the pandemic. After household savings reached a record high in early 2020, real disposable personal income — what Americans can spend after inflation and taxes — is now back to pre-pandemic levels. If you're comparing your financial situation with that of three years ago, you're likely to feel as if the economy has gotten worse, even though it's actually gotten better. "If unemployment falls but real wages do not rise, the public will not feel positively about the economy," Darren Grant, an associate professor of economics at Sam Houston State University, told Insider. "That's not vibes, it's common sense." And finally, it could also be attributed to what Kyla Scanlon, who founded the financial-education company Bread, calls the "Black Mirror-ification" of the economy, in which people become skeptical of improvements. Despite unemployment at historic lows, a large majority of people still report hearing news about heightened unemployment, Scanlon pointed out. The bank failures of this year have led some to believe a recession may be more likely. Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, told CNN in April that financial turmoil was "recessionary" though wouldn't "necessarily force a recession." The New York Fed puts the likelihood of a recession by May 2024 at just under 71%, while The Conference Board, a business membership and research organization, estimated earlier this year a 99% chance. Last month, Goldman Sachs lowered its prediction that a recession would occur to 25% after the debt-ceiling deal. But there are still many signs pointing away from a recession at all in 2023, including the Fed's rate-hike pause and job growth. The US has the lowest inflation and highest GDP growth since the pandemic's start of the G7 countries, an informal bloc of industrialized nations. While some economists may be cheering slowing inflation and a pause in interest-rate hikes, many Americans may have little interest, as prices are still up 15% since early 2021. With many Americans making similar to what they were pre-pandemic, a slight increase in food prices or a subtle drop in transportation costs may mean little if the prices of groceries and housing are still high.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Populism

Economic insecurity alone does not lead to support for populism

Diamond, 18 --- Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. His is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford.  (Larry Diamond, "Illiberal, Nativist Populism: Is Economic Insecurity the Cause?", 4-7-2018, https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/speeches/illiberal-nativist-populism-economic-insecurity-cause)//EG

I have two purposes in this paper. The first is conceptual. Nationalist and xenophobic sentiments—different versions of “America first” and “build a wall”— seem to be sweeping through the advanced industrial democracies. How should we define and think about these various political movements? I argue that they are best understood as expressions of nativist, illiberal populism, rather than nationalism per se, since they are often quite friendly to external actors, like Russia and China, who pose grave threats to the real national interest. Second, what is driving growing support for illiberal nativist parties and movements? My answer here will be somewhat speculative, but I do not believe the evidence supports a strictly economic interpretation of the causes. My argument is that these movements are best seen as opportunistic, demagogic efforts to exploit status and identity insecurities as well as a classic sociological cleavage between urban cosmopolitans and rural traditionalists. These anxieties often interact with economic insecurity, but economic insecurity alone is not sufficient to induce support for nativist populism. This requires an identity grievance that renders people ripe for the politics of nativist resentment.

2023 DDI Negative
CASE › Populism

The impact of economic insecurity on Populist support is minimal while resentment towards structural changes is massive

Margalit, 19 --- Professor, Department of Political Science Tel Aviv University (Yotam Margalit, "Economic causes of populism: Important, marginally important, or important on the margin", 12-20-2019, CEPR, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-causes-populism-important-marginally-important-or-important-margin)//EG

A populist wave is engulfing Western democracies. One would have to go back decades to find a comparable political wave affecting so many countries at the same time in such profound ways. Still in the throes of great political turbulence, making sense of this populist moment is of obvious import. Yet it is far from straightforward. While the term 'populism' has different definitions, it is first and foremost characterised by its claim to represent the will of the true people versus some ‘other’, commonly represented as a corrupt and self-serving elite. The Brexit vote in June 2016 and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election later that same year have perhaps received the most attention, but the populist phenomenon stretches across a wide range of countries and contexts. Its widespread and growing appeal has spawned intense debate over both its causes and consequences. A prominent set of studies centre on its economic antecedents (e.g. Autor 2016, Colantone and Stanig 2018, Fetzer 2019, Frey et al 2017, Dippel et al. 2015). Though they cite somewhat different causal factors, they share a similar storyline: a certain development – globalisation, automation, the financial crisis – had transformed labour markets and generated widespread dislocation and economic insecurity. These developments in turn eroded voters’ trust in the political system and led those on the losing side to opt for populist parties that represent a break from the status quo and offer seemingly appealing solutions to voters’ economic malaise – be it trade protectionism, building a border wall, or exiting the EU. The debate over the causes of populism has often been framed as pitting these economic-centric arguments against cultural explanations, which focus on structural social changes as the source of populist disaffection (more on which below). Sensibly, contributions to this Vox debate offer more nuanced accounts that assign importance to both sets of causes and note the ways in which they interact. Nonetheless, assigning importance to both sets of causes doesn’t address the question of just how important they are. The answer is not only pertinent for our understanding of the populist phenomenon; it also has considerable implications for the debate regarding how the populist tide may be countered. I contend that the economic-centric accounts, even in their more nuanced versions, tend to overstate the role of economic insecurity as an explanation of populism's electoral success. In a recent article (Margalit 2019) I discuss several reasons why the focus on economic causes deserves more critical assessment, but here I shall mention two. First, the claim that economic insecurity is important in understanding the electoral success of populism conflates what I define as ‘outcome significance’ and ‘explanatory significance’. Consider the Brexit vote, which was decided by a margin of less than four percentage points. Economic insecurity and displacement caused by globalisation may well have shifted the vote by a few points, enough to tip the referendum in favour of the ‘Leave’ camp. The outcome significance – transforming loss to victory – was therefore high. However, the overall phenomenon to be explained is why 52% of the electorate voted to leave the EU. The swing of a few percentage points hardly amounts to ‘explaining’ the phenomenon of the overall electoral backing for Brexit. Put differently, the explanatory significance of that factor is low. The broader point this example illustrates is that a certain factor can have major consequences for the phenomenon of interest, without being a major explanation for that phenomenon. Yet this distinction seems to get muddled in the debate over populism’s causes. This can also be seen with other examples commonly used to demonstrate the importance of economic factors in shaping the populist vote. In explaining Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, analysts have often cited his alleged appeal to globalisation’s losers, helping him crack the Democrats’ ‘blue wall’ in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Analysis by Autor et al. (2016) gives credence to this argument in terms of outcome significance, by finding that the adverse effects of the massive import shock from China accounted for a vote share of several percentage points, sizable enough to flip these states in favour of Trump. Their estimates indicate that if the import shock had been half of what it was, the margin in favour of the Republicans in Pennsylvania would have shrunk by 1.7 percentage points and the Democrats would have won the state by 0.5%. Likewise, the simulation indicates that the electoral impact would also have been sizable enough in Wisconsin and Michigan (2.2 and 1.8 points, respectively) to overturn the Electoral College results. It may therefore be correct that, without the impact of the China shock, Trump would have lost. But the magnitudes of the estimated effects indicate that we are dealing with fairly small additions to a much larger electoral phenomenon. Examination of the empirical evidence regarding an array of other European countries reveals a similar pattern: shocks that increase the economic insecurity of voters affect the electoral outcome on the margin, yet the overall explanatory significance for the level of support for populists is modest (e.g. Colantone and Stanig 2018a, 2018b, Dippel et al. 2015, Malgouyres 2017). In some instances, this effect is consequential in differentiating between loss and victory, but that is not always the case. For example, in proportional representation systems, support for populists – particularly far right parties – affects the distribution of votes within the ideological bloc, but has little bearing on the overall division of votes between the competing blocs. In ‘first past the post’ systems, where districts often lean heavily towards one party, support for the populists is too small to meaningfully affect the vote. Moreover, individual-level studies of the vote for populist parties consistently find that variables that capture labour market standing or economic insecurity explain only a small fraction of the variation of interest (Guiso et al 2017, Gidron and Hall 2017). While variables capturing these explanations are mostly statistically significant, one must not overlook the fact that their usefulness in accounting for the broader question of who supports the populists is, in fact, very limited. A second issue with attributing a central role for the economic causes has to do with immigration, often the most salient issue for populist parties and voters. In describing immigration as an ‘economic cause’ of populism, there is a need to distinguish between two questions: Is immigration in itself economic-driven? And are the economic effects of immigration – whether real or perceived – a major cause of the populist vote? On the first question, there is ample evidence that, indeed, immigration to the West is largely instigated by economic forces (poverty, lack of jobs opportunities, wage differentials). But on the second question, the weight of the evidence clearly indicates that Western voters' concerns regarding immigration have little to do with its impact on their material standing or level of economic insecurity. This conclusion comes up in both observational studies and studies employing a range of survey-experimental methods including list, vignette, and conjoint designs (e.g. Sniderman 2004, Janus 2010, Bansak et al. 2017; see Haimmueller and Hopkins 2014 for a review of the evidence). Even when examining cases where the labour market threat posed by immigrants is most direct, the effects on natives' attitudes are very limited (Hainmueller et al. 2015, Malhotra et al. 2013). Thus, while immigration is often a major concern of populist voters, treating it as an economic driver of populism in this latter sense seems misguided. What, then, explains the populist appeal? Out of space limit, I will note only that structural, long-term social changes strike me as central to understanding the resentment underlying much of its appeal. By this account, structural changes – such as increased access to higher education, urbanisation, and growing ethnic diversity – have led to significant progressive cultural shifts. These changes, and the perceived displacement of traditional social values, have caused a sense of resentment among segments of the population in the West, particularly among white men, older people, conservatives, and those with less formal qualifications (see Inglehart and Norris 2019 for an extensive exposition of this view). Increased exposure to foreign influences that comes with globalization and, even more so, the effects of waves of immigration have exacerbated the sense of a cultural and demographic threat. With gradual generational change, these formerly predominant majorities have increasingly felt their social standing erode, buying into the populist nostalgia for a ‘golden age’ when there was cultural homogeneity and traditional values and a strong national identity prevailed. They have also grown receptive to populist charges against a disconnected elite that has turned its back on them and the values they hold dear. There’s an obvious, and understandable, reluctance to accept such ‘soft’ explanations. Cultural explanations of populism can be harder to measure or identify causally. Yet that of course doesn’t mean that a cultural explanation is incorrect. One should be careful not to equate quantifiability with importance. Note, though, that the cultural account does not dismiss the role of economic factors. In addition to the electoral impact of the causes noted earlier (e.g. trade, automation), hard economic times also tend to undermine the perceived competence of the economic and political elites, and thus help fuel popular distrust in them. It is therefore likely that the financial crisis contributed to the populist wave, as some have suggested (Algan et al. 2017, Mian et al. 2014). But given the weak empirical association between measures of economic insecurity and support for populism, we should view the crisis as more of a trigger than a root cause of widespread populist support.