2023
DDI
Negative
DDI LS Bataille Neg 23 › Case › Bataille Wrong
McGoey ‘18 – Linsey McGoey is a Canadian sociologist and academic based in England. She is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. “Bataille and the Sociology of Abundance: Reassessing Gifts, Debt and Economic Excess” in Theory, Culture & Society: Special Issue: Bataille and Heterology, Vol. 35(4–5), 07/28/2017, pg. 81-84; DOI: 10.1177/0263276416637905 | RN
*Modified for problematic language
**4pt text is just a critique of certain readings of Mauss—no Neg cards hidden
What is less known today is that Mauss, like Keynes, was preoccupied with challenging the imposition of war reparations. He published numerous financial journalism articles underscoring the negative economic repercussions of debt repayment efforts. A recent body of scholarship has even suggested that Mauss may have written The Gift in order in part to emphasize the importance of debt forgiveness by sovereign states (see, in particular, Mallard, 2011).
Why is Mauss’s writing on debt relief largely overlooked today? The problem rests partly with Mauss. During his career, he endeavoured to keep his political and financial journalism separate from his anthropological writing. Keith Hart suggests that this separation has been entrenched and exaggerated by his followers since then, many of whom treat The Gift as a masterful synthesis of earlier ethnographic studies (Mauss himself did not conduct primary research for it), with much to say about the social implications of reciprocity as a means of exchange, but with less relevance for understanding the geopolitics of sovereign states (Hart, 2014: 34).
2023
DDI
Negative
DDI LS Bataille Neg 23 › Case › Bataille Wrong
Mann 99 [Paul Mann, 1999, “The Exquisite Corpse of Georges Bataille” in Masocriticism, p. 67-9]
I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.14 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take and even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, of the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or depensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of the theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.
2023
DDI
Negative
DDI LS Bataille Neg 23 › Case › Bataille Wrong
Yang 2000 (Mayfair Mei-hui, Professor of Anthropology at the University of California Santa Barbara, has held fellowships at the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan, the Chicago Humanities Institute, University of Chicago, and the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, “Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual Expenditure,” Current Anthropology, University of Chicago Journals)
Scholars such as Jean‐Joseph Goux () have pointed to a troubling overlap between Bataille’s views on luxury and sacrificial expenditure and postmodern consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is also predicated on massive consumption and waste rather than on the thrift, asceticism, and accumulation against which Bataille directed his theory of expenditure. It exhibits potlatch features in the tendency for businesses to give goods away in the hope that “supply creates its own demand”; it collapses the distinction between luxury and useful goods and between need and desire (Goux ). Unlike modernist capitalism, postmodern consumer capitalism is driven by consumption rather than production. Thus, Bataille’s vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism does not address this different phase of consumer capitalism, whose contours have only become clear since his death in 1962. It seems to me that despite their overt similarities, the principles of ritual consumption and those of consumer capitalism are basically incompatible. If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the service of production and productive accumulation, since every act of consumption in the world of leisure, entertainment, media, fashion, and home décor merely feeds back into the growth of the economy rather than leading to the finality and loss of truly nonproductive expenditure. Even much of modern warfare is no longer truly destructive but tied into the furthering of military‐industrial production. Nor, despite its economic excesses, does our consumer culture today challenge the basic economic logic of rational private accumulation as a self‐depleting archaic sacrificial economy does. Furthermore, capitalist consumption is very much an individual consumption rather than one involving the whole community or social order.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
Burns, 7/20 [Dan, writer for Left Minnesota, 7-20-2023, ‘Putting together the new Farm Bill plods along’, //alundy]
The existing one is set to expire on September 30. Many believe it will have to be extended, as the new one won’t get passed until early 2024. Whatever.
As always there are some interesting things happening. For example, from Tuesday:
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
Bolen, Ed, et al. 18 “House Farm Bill Would Increase Food Insecurity and Hardship.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 30 July 2018, .
On June 21, the House passed the Agriculture Committee’s (the Committee) farm bill,[1] which includes nutrition provisions that would increase food insecurity and hardship. By adopting harmful amendments during floor debate in May, the House made the bill that ultimately passed even worse than the version the Committee originally introduced (see Appendix I). The proposed changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) would end or cut benefits for a substantial number of low-income people. SNAP is the country’s most effective anti-hunger program, helping 1 in 8 Americans afford a basic diet, with most SNAP participants being children, seniors, or people with disabilities. Despite providing modest benefits — averaging about $1.40 per person per meal — the program combats food insecurity, alleviates poverty, and has long-term positive impacts on health as well as on children’s educational attainment. The bill would reduce SNAP’s effectiveness and put large numbers of families and individuals at increased risk of hardship. The bill contains changes that would cause more than 1 million low-income households with more than 2 million people — particularly low-income working families with children — to lose their benefits altogether or have them reduced. The House would use these benefit cuts, in part, to pay for a few modest benefit enhancements. But the net effect of all these provisions on SNAP benefits would still be a significant cut overall, and a substantial number of people would lose their SNAP benefits altogether. The remaining savings from the eligibility and benefit cuts would go to expanding state and federal bureaucracies and financing various grant programs outside of SNAP, at the expense of low-income families and individuals whose basic food assistance would end or shrink. In particular, the plan includes sweeping, aggressive new work requirements that would likely prove unworkable and do substantially more harm than good, fueling increases in hunger and poverty. These provisions would force states to develop large new bureaucracies, but research suggests that these requirements would do little to increase employment. This expensive and risky approach runs counter to evidence-based policy making, particularly since the results from work pilots for SNAP recipients that the 2014 farm bill established, which are well underway, aren’t yet available. Moreover, experience suggests that the bill’s proposed work requirements would leave substantial numbers of low-income people who have various barriers to employment — such as very limited skills or mental health issues like depression — with neither earnings nor food assistance. The plan would also impose significant new state mandates and roll back numerous areas of state flexibility that were designed on a bipartisan basis in prior farm bills to streamline and modernize program operations and make the program easier for states to administer and for eligible households, particularly working families, to navigate. [2] The American Public Human Services Administration has raised significant concerns with multiple provisions of the bill, including those that would reinstate a benefit cliff, limit state flexibility, and introduce significant administrative burden. The organization states, “[E]stimates [that] up to two million current individual SNAP recipients, many of them children, in one million mostly working SNAP households could either lose benefits or eligibility altogether under this bill because of often unwise policy proposals [are] disturbing to us.”[3]
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
ON DECEMBER 15, 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, issued a damning report on his visit to the United States. He cited data from the Stanford Center on Inequality and Poverty, which reports that “in terms of labor markets, poverty, safety net, wealth inequality, and economic mobility, the US comes in last of the top 10 most well-off countries, and 18th amongst the top 21.” Alston wrote that “the American Dream is rapidly becoming the American Illusion, as the US now has the lowest rate of social mobility of any of the rich countries.” Just a few days before, on December 11, The Boston Globe's Spotlight team ran a story showing that the median net worth of nonimmigrant African American households in the Boston area is $8, in contrast to the $247,500 net worth for white households in the Boston area.
Clearly income disparity is ripping the nation apart, and none of the efforts or programs seeking to address it seems to be working. I myself have been, for the past couple of years, engaged in a broad discussion about the future of work with some thoughtful tech leaders and representatives of the Catholic Church who have similar concerns, and the notion of a universal basic income (UBI) keeps coming up. Like many of my friends who fiddle with ideas about the future of work, I’ve avoided actually having a firm opinion about UBI for years. Now I have decided it’s time to get my head around it.
Touted as an elegant solution to the problem of poverty in America and the impending decimation of jobs by automation, UBI is a hot topic today in the “salons” hosted by tech and hedge-fund billionaires. The idea of UBI in fact is an old idea, older than me even: Either through direct cash payments or some sort of negative income tax, we should support people in need—or even everyone—to increase well-being and lift society overall.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
Schiller, 15 [Ben, Writer at Fast Company, reporter, 3-16-2015, ‘A Universal Basic Income Is The Bipartisan Solution to Poverty We’ve Been Waiting For’, Fast Company, //alundy]
The first is that work isn’t what it used to be. Many people now struggle through a 50-hour week and still don’t have enough to live on. There are many reasons for this–including the heartlessness of employers and the weakness of unions–but it’s a fact. Work no longer pays. The wages of most American workers have stagnated or declined since the 1970s. About 25% of workers (including 40% of those in restaurants and food service) now need public assistance to top up what they earn.
The second: it’s likely to get worse. Robots already do many menial tasks. In the future, they’ll do more sophisticated jobs as well. A study last year from Carl Frey and Michael Osborne at Oxford University found that 47% of jobs are at risk of computerization over the next two decades. That includes positions in transport and logistics, office and administration, sales and construction, and even law, financial services and medicine. Of course, it’s possible that people who lose their jobs will find others. But it’s also feasible we’re approaching an era when there will simply be less to do.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
Hill, 23 [Meredith Lee, food and agriculture policy reporter for POLITICO, ‘Far-right Republicans threaten to derail another house priority’, //alundy]
But after taking a beating over that deal with the White House, and straining to defuse the Freedom Caucus’ rebellion on the House floor last week, McCarthy has signaled it will likely be politically necessary to offer up some concessions to the hard right in the farm bill. In addition to further cuts to SNAP, GOP hardliners are targeting some of the farm safety net programs that are a third rail for the agriculture sector.
A House Republican, who spoke of the condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters, said any concessions from McCarthy to House GOP hardliners on the farm bill would be “a really dangerous pin to pull out of the grenade,” given the swift and bitter backlash it would stoke from the rest of the caucus.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Politics
Chase 7-12-23 (Spencer, is the managing editor for Agri-Pulse which is a trusted source in Washington, D.C., with the largest editorial team focused on food and farm policy coverage. 7-12-23 “Every farm bill is unique. So is the process to pass it.”
Congress is taking so long to start writing a new farm bill that the legislation won't be enacted until well into 2024, or even later, if the timelines for the four most recent farm bills are any guide. If President Joe Biden were to sign a farm bill by the end of this September — when authorization for many of the programs in the 2018 farm bill is set to expire — Congress would have achieved in less than 80 days what has previously taken an average of about 18 months. How Congress ultimately approaches the reauthorization of the 2018 farm bill is yet to be determined, but it's certainly not going to happen in 2023, based on how long the process has taken in the past. “I don't know if I can compare [the current process] to anything else because I can't remember any of the farm bills that I've been involved with that we haven't done a markup in full committee — in either committee — before Labor Day,” Randy Russell, who has worked on farm bills as a congressional staffer, USDA official, and lobbyist over his four-decade-long tenure in farm policy, told Agri-Pulse. The last time a farm bill was enacted into law in an odd-numbered year — the first year of a new Congress — was 1985. The last time the farm bill passed without an extension — or following the expiration of many of its authorized programs, as was the case with the 2018 law — was in 2002. The reauthorization process for the last four farm bills has averaged just over 550 days from start to finish; the shortest of those timelines was the 252-day process for the 2018 bill.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Econ › 2AC
Miller 21, (Joshua Z. Miller is a writer and research assistant for the UBI center.) “Universal basic income and inflation: reviewing theory and evidence” UBI Center, June 2021, https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=855089082102112067098098095081105113102082065014007039108087069002094126076005090111050117107034029039046028092029126117001105039086075069039068008115108028093096119020043021064094071091119021123028004012076117117088118122093070105085076117110104018027&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE// EE
The most important studies done in the realm of measuring the price effects of universal basic income have been two general equilibrium studies, one looking at transfers from the NGO GiveDirectly in Kenya25 and the other studying the Mexican food assistance program “Programa de Apoyo Alimentario”.26 Both studies evaluated transfer programs to very impoverished places and the latter to a relatively closed economy, so obviously we can expect discrepancies between the evidence and what would happen in reality given a universal basic income in North America. Egger et al. find that there was less than 1% price inflation on average as a result of the transfers. The greatest price effect is to housing, which the authors do not find statistically significant. There is a strong increase in consumption and firm profits, akin to an aggregate demand increase, with spillover effects, and little-to-positive labour hours change. The authors believe they found a transfer multiplier effect of over 2. Additionally, there was a formation of a strong potential growth effect in terms of permanent consumption and income as estimated by the authors. This overall aligns with my model; that is that is, cash transfers caused growth in both permanent output and output level and almost-nonexistent price change. This checks out intuitively: an increase in income resulted in more consumption and more output in an economy that has room to grow, so there will not be additional money-per-unit-of-output that ultimately underlies the Quantity Theory of Money. The Cunha, Georgi, and Jayachandra study finds again a neglible price inflation effect. However, they do find that in-kind transfers provide deflation compared to cash transfers in isolated villages. Isolated villages likely suffer from imperfect competion and aren’t factored in to the monetary partial equilibrium. In the more-developed world with stronger market institutions, we would likely see different. Unfortunately, data for programs like these in the developed world is scarce.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Econ › 2AC
Reed et. al, 4/10 --- Howard Reed, Elliott Johnson and Graham Stark are Senior Research Fellows and Matthew Johnson is Professor of Politics, at Northumbria University. They are currently examining the health, health economic and economic case for Universal Basic Incom (Howard Reed, Elliott Johnson and Graham Stark "Universal Basic Income does not cause inflation", 4-10-2023, Newsroom,
Opinion: We live in an age of crisis. The Global Financial Crisis, austerity measures, climate change, Covid-19 and war have all reduced people’s standard of living, wellbeing and predicted lifespan. It’s a dire outlook, made worse by a fast-evolving cost-of-living crisis. One way to ease the burden on people would be a Universal Basic Income (UBI). In our last age of crisis, during World War Two, Western governments took the momentous decision to tackle even more serious crises through massive state intervention. Governments rapidly committed themselves to costs with few precedents in creating social security and healthcare systems, nationalised industry and a range of other equality-promoting measures. At a time when countries could, apparently, least afford those policies, policymakers saw no alternative than to spend big. The consequence was three decades of growth, increased standards of living, increased life expectancy and unprecedented technological development, ended only by war-induced increases in energy prices that sent inflation spiralling. As the Financial Times recently noted, the policies adopted over the past four decades have left countries such as Britain poor, but with some very rich people. Universal Basic Income has been presented as a means of addressing this crisis. Giving people largely unconditional, predictable forms of income to satisfy their basic needs has been identified as a means of restoring social security, increasing equality and supporting growth in areas of countries that have been left behind by development and promoting public health overall. There is, however, widespread belief that any monetary intervention stimulates hyper-inflation of the form found in 1920s Germany, 1990s Argentina and 2000s Zimbabwe. This is because people believe giving consumers more money to spend leads to businesses charging higher prices to take advantage of increased purchasing power, creating a cycle in which employees demand higher wages to buy commodities, increasing the cost of production, cancelling out any benefit from the monetary intervention and actually reducing the standard of living overall. UBI is a redistributive economic policy that can be funded by taxing those resources that contribute little to society: wealth and passive income from shares as well as income at the very top end of society There is little evidence to support this view. UBI is no more or less inflationary than anything else that raises incomes – its impact would depend on whether the economy is at full employment, whether taxes are raised to pay for the scheme and various other factors. Where hyperinflation has occurred, it has been because essential goods are scarce, raising their value overall, and debt has been held in foreign currencies and paid in currencies declining in value by virtue of countries’ domestic production being disrupted or declining. Our current levels of inflation are caused by similar pressures as those in the 1970s: war leading to an increase in the cost of fossil fuels. If the logic behind objecting to a UBI on the basis of inflation were correct, then there ought to be absolutely no attempt to introduce new jobs or increase wages, as both increase purchasing power. If inflation is our sole concern, governments ought to slash wages and massively increase taxes. The point is that nobody wants either of those options because, even if they did reduce inflation, people would not want to have their wages reduced. UBI is a redistributive economic policy that can be funded by taxing those resources that contribute little to society: wealth and passive income from shares as well as income at the very top end of society. The resources of the rich are generally off-shored and contribute little to a country’s financial wellbeing. Analysis of the distributive impacts of UBI in the UK suggest its introduction would shift resources to those people and areas that need the investment most. That may increase the cost of housing and other goods in parts of countries that have been left behind, but this is a central means of enhancing community wealth and ‘Levelling Up’. It is also a means of developing entrepreneurship and production within areas that have been deindustrialised. This support for production is, again, an essential means of supporting a bulwark against hyperinflation. Given that we live in market societies, the fear this will lead to unchecked inflation is counterintuitive, as competition is supported by rising purchasing power and serves to check price increases. The alternative is simply to leave all but the metropolitan centres to wither away and to be dependent on the whims of finance. As our recent RSA report indicated, if governments are committed to resolving our age of crisis, they need to do as their predecessors did after World War Two: invest in transformative policies with expensive up-front costs to achieve the most significant social outcomes. Nothing is more expensive than undoing climate change, dealing with pandemics and repairing the damage of social decay. In that context, there is evidence a UBI is economically feasible and voters regard UBI as a necessary means of promoting social security.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › DA---Econ › 2AC
Pan 6-14 [Jing Pan; Writer for Yahoo Finance; 6-14-2023; "World Bank Just Halved Its US Growth Forecast For 2024, Saying The Economy 'Is Likely To Remain Weak' — 3 Investment Strategies Tailored For A Sluggish Economy"; Yahoo Finance; https://finance.yahoo.com/news/world-bank-just-halved-us-183350526.html;]//LASA-بيلال
The World Bank just slashed its forecast for U.S. economic growth for 2024.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) in the country is now projected to grow by 0.8% in 2024, according to the international lending institution’s latest Global Economic Prospects report. Previously, its forecast was 1.6%.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---Universality PIC › 2AC
Tedds et al 20’ [Lindsay M. Tedds: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Calgary; Ph.D. in Economics, McMaster University; MA, Department of Economics, University of Victoria; B.A., Economics, University of Victoria; B.A., Political Science, Carleton University. Daria Crisan: Research Associate at University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy, Gillian Petit: Research associate at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary University of Calgary. 12-1-20, “Basic Income in Canada: Principles and Design Features,” Tedds, Lindsay M. and Crisan, Daria and Petit, Gillian, Basic Income in Canada: Principles and Design Features (December 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3781834 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3781834]
There is a firmly held notion that receiving support through the existing income assistance system is shameful and demeaning. Stigma arises from negative social attitudes of others toward benefit recipients, and negative self-characterizations (i.e., feeling like a failure, shame) which, as a consequence, devalues recipients to a class lower than non-recipients, sometimes referred to as “the undeserving poor.” Stigma affects both the take-up of income assistance benefits and the mental and physical well-being of those who receive them (Friedrichsen et al., 2017; Geiger, 2015; Ribar, 2014). Sources of stigma are also inherent within the system itself in various aspects: individual attributions of responsibility for poverty, how the program is implemented, including wait times, and negative interactions with caseworkers (Stuber & Schlesinger, 2006). For example, a program that singles out low-income persons/households, such as a means-tested cash transfer, is more stigmatizing than a program that provides a cash transfer to nearly everyone (such as the Canada Child Benefit). Addressing stigma is important to achieving the goal of alleviating poverty: the higher the stigma associated with a program, the lower the take-up of benefits and the less effective the program is at achieving its goals, which may include the alleviation of poverty (Celhay et al., 2017; Friedrichsen et al., 2017; Geiger, 2015; Moffitt, 1983; Ribar, 2014). A basic income should reduce, if not eliminate, stigma—feelings of shame and the signalling out of a group that is perceived as “less than”—associated with traditional welfare programs and help bolster dignity by ensuring that people are not only treated with respect by the system but are also worthy of such respect. A key component of fostering respect is to ensure that people have autonomy over how they use the assistance provided. Economic Security Economic security is generally defined as the assurance of an adequate income (Rejda, 2012). Economic security depends on three things: financial security, financial stability, and financial continuity. Mapping this back to the definition of economic security, adequacy is achieved through both financial security and financial stability, while assurance is achieved through financial continuity. Financial security is the ability of a person/household to secure a basic quality of life. Financial stability is the ability of households to weather unexpected income shocks, such as unexpected expenses or declines in income. Financial continuity is a reasonable expectation that a base level of income will continue in both the near term and the future. Economic insecurity thus arises when people face limited financial resources, an inability to cover basic expenses, and/or uncertainty in income. The lack of economic security has significant effects on mental health, including fear, worry, anxiety, frustration, and depression. Dealing with economic instability requires constant juggling, which adversely affects decisionmaking. People who are distressed and distracted by their financial burdens may be more likely to err on the job, increasing their chances of being fired. Investing in human capital itself becomes more difficult: attending training programs requires overcoming the recurring inclination to skip a class as one deals with day-to-day struggles, like finding a babysitter or solving the challenges of long commutes. Even learning becomes more difficult when dealing with economic insecurity (Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). The current social assistance system does not support economic security. Social assistance often does not provide sufficient income to cover basic needs and earning additional income results in either a reduction in or revocation of benefits (or fear of the revocation). Many support programs also require individuals to deplete their assets and financial reserves in order to qualify for income support. Furthermore, few of the existing programs in the assistance system provide assurance of a permanent income. Support under many of these programs is neither guaranteed nor fully continuous. There are, however, programs that are continuous for a year, such as the Canada Child Benefit and the GST/HST tax credit—that is, once you are assessed as qualifying for the benefit, your benefit is guaranteed for the next 12 months. In addition, disability assistance can often be guaranteed for life depending on the nature of the disability. A basic income, instead, enhances economic security. A basic income helps cover basic needs and is generally an assured stream of income. Eligibility for a basic income does not require financial reserves to be depleted, which aids beneficiaries in weathering shocks; at minimum, a basic income does not make these shocks any harder to manage then they already are. This aspect of economic security, which is a key part of a basic income, is also essential to a person achieving autonomy. Autonomy occurs as economic security allows people more choices in how they lead their lives. Social Inclusion As outlined stated in United Nations (2016, p. 17) “social inclusion is the process of improving participation in society, particularly for people who are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, voice, and respect of rights.” Participation in society is limited when people lack access to material resources, including income and employment, or to services such as health care (United Nations, 2016). Poignantly, this recognizes that people are not able to fully participate in any given sphere without having autonomy to use these material resources to achieve social involvement. That is, social exclusion occurs when individuals face barriers to participating fully or effectively in society. Income poverty is one factor in social exclusion. The current social assistance system attempts to promote social inclusion mainly through paid work; however, this focus on paid work often does not take into account the wellbeing of the recipient. Beneficiaries are encouraged (and in some cases forced) to apply for and accept paid work as quickly as possible without consideration for the quality, sufficiency, or permanency of that paid work.3 Additionally, paid work is not the only path toward social inclusion and the focus on paid work could actually decrease participation in socially beneficial activities. For example, for recipients of social assistance, job search requirements (such as job training or monthly reporting) may reduce the recipient’s ability to pursue other activities that may be both personally and socially beneficial. These other activities may include volunteering, training, caregiving, and education. Comparatively, a basic income promotes opportunity, inclusion, and full participation in society. It does this by altering the choice set of those for whom participation in the formal labour market may not be optimal. For example, for a person considering whether to stay home and care for their young child or enter the labour force, basic income provides a value for the otherwise unpaid child-care option. This enhances social inclusion by valuing unpaid work and providing a source of income to those who choose to engage in unpaid work such as child care and volunteering, education, training, and entrepreneurship. The idea is not that people are unwilling to work, but rather that participation in the formal labour force may not be the optimal choice for all persons. Some advocates of a basic income argue that it should provide for absolute freedom in choosing how to participate, even if that activity is to stay home and bingewatch Netflix all day. However, which activities should be encouraged over others is a program design feature. For example, earnings supplements and earning exemptions that can be paired with basic income programs ensure that work pays, even the first dollar.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---Universality PIC › 2AC
Inglis et al. 22 [Greig, Lecturer in Psychology at the University of West Scotland, et al., “Poverty stigma, mental health, and well-being: A rapid review and synthesis of quantitative and qualitative research” 14 December 2022, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2677, Wiley Online Library. Accessed 12 July 2023]
Experiences of stigma are associated with a range of adverse mental health outcomes (Schmitt et al., 2014). Stigma affects health indirectly through several structural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal pathways (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). At a structural level, stigma inhibits individuals' access to social and economic resources that support health, including power and social capital (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). At an interpersonal level, stigmatised individuals may become socially isolated and withdraw from others to avoid discrimination (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013; Pachankis, 2007). Intrapersonally, experiences of stigma are associated with negative emotion regulation strategies, which may in turn lead to psychological distress (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2013). Importantly, it is not only overt forms of discrimination that harm health, as both perceived and anticipated stigma can also affect health through social identity threat processes (Major & Schmader, 2018). For example, anticipated discrimination from others leads to an increase in threat-related cognitions, as well as heightened physiological stress responses (Sawyer et al., 2012).
Poverty stigma can be conceptualised as a broad construct that includes experiences of stigma attributed to living in poverty generally, as well as more specific variants of stigma relating to individuals' use of particular services designed to assist low-income groups (e.g., social security). Several international studies have documented how individuals living on low incomes experience poverty stigma (e.g., Inglis et al., 2019; Reutter et al., 2009), and one study led by individuals who have experience of poverty in the United Kingdom stated that “the impact of stigma and negative judgement is a particularly painful part of poverty” (ATD Fourth World, 2019, p. 39). It is important to note here that these experiences do not occur by chance, and that the underlying processes that generate poverty stigma are instead socially motivated. From a sociological perspective, poverty stigma can be considered a form of social power that allows relatively powerful groups in society to achieve certain aims, including the exploitation and control of disadvantaged groups (Link & Phelan, 2014; Tyler & Slater, 2018). From a social identity perspective, poverty stigma may also be generated by individuals categorising themselves and others according to income, which in turn leads to greater group-based stereotyping (Jetten et al., 2017).
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---Universality PIC › 2AC
Lansley 20 [Stewart Lansley is the co-author, with Howard Reed, of Basic Income for All: From Desirability to Feasibility, Compass, 2019, and of Breadline Britain, The Rise of Mass Poverty, Oneworld, 2015, “MEETING THE ECONOMIC AND LIVELIHOOD CRISIS: From a recovery basic income to a permanent income floor,” April 2020, https://www.compassonline.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/BasicIncomeFloor_SL_FINAL.pdf]
A key reason for the new momentum behind BI has been the pandemic’s exposure of the multiple weaknesses of the existing system of social security, which is simply not up to the task of providing vital social protection with mass falls in household incomes.
Despite the promises of the post-war years, Britain has never come close to creating an income floor, and even before Covid-19, millions fell through what is an imperfect, mean and patchy safety net. Across rich nations, Britain has at best a middling social security system, one further weakened by a decade of austerity. Most benefit levels have been falling over recent decades as a ratio of typical earnings. The main adult unemployment payment – at 15 per cent of average earnings – is worth less proportionately than at any time since 1948. In an economy where work is increasingly low paid and precarious there are too many holes for too many people in the ‘safety net’.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---States › 2AC---Federalism NB
Tom Ginsburg, Faculty Director, Malyi Center for the Study of Institutional and Legal Integrity, Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, Professor of Political Science, Mila Versteeg, Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation Professor of Law Director, Human Rights Program Senior Fellow, Miller Center, “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?” University of Virginia School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, September 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319363
Constitutional review has spread around the world in recent decades, and various theories have arisen to account for this development. We have canvassed several different types of theories: (1) ideational theories which view constitutional review adoption as a product of a growing consciousness of the rule-of-law and protection of individual liberties; (2) coordination and commitment theories that draw on functional political logics of federalism and economic growth; (3) electoral market theories that hold that constitutional review is adopted when constitutionmakers envision themselves out of power after the adoption of the constitution; and (4) diffusion theories that posit that constitutional review is adopted in response to international audiences and constitutional developments in foreign states. Drawing on a new and unique quantitative dataset that documents the development of this institution across the globe since 1781, we used a fixed effects spatial lag model to develop the most extensive empirical test so far of these alternative accounts. Our results provide strong support for the insurance-based theory, and less support for the alternative accounts. The adoption of constitutional review is above all a response to domestic political incentives, rather than ideas, the demands of federalism, or diffusion pressures. The lack of support for diffusion-based accounts is particularly important, given that other work has demonstrated the role of diffusion with regard to constitutional provisions on human rights. We suggest that this reflects the relatively low cost of adopting rights provisions relative to institutional structures in national constitutions. Rights may represent “cheap talk,” while institutions are likely to develop a self-enforcing quality so that constitutional designers must treat them as involving higher stakes.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---States › 2AC---Federalism NB
Kirk J. Stark, 04, the Barrall Family Professor of Tax Law and Policy. “Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Distribution?” 51 UCLA Law Review 1389 (2004). https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/41_51UCLALRev13892003-2004.pdf
B. Which Level of Government Should Redistribute Wealth? Working from the core insights of the Tiebout hypothesis, public finance economists have traditionally asserted that all redistributive policies should be concentrated at the most centralized level of government.7 The reasons behind this central canon of fiscal federalism are straightforward. One concern is that redistribution undertaken by state and local governments creates pecuniary incentives for strategic migration. Where state and local governments redistribute wealth, there is a fear that both the rich and the poor will relocate to escape or take advantage of redistribution. From an efficiency perspective, the costs incurred in these movements represent a deadweight loss. 2 Another concern is that relying on subnational governments to redistribute wealth will result in too little redistribution. In effect, redistributive policies undertaken by state or local governments are likely to create spillover benefits for other jurisdictions, causing the redistributing jurisdiction, which is unable to internalize all of the policy's benefits, to provide too little redistribution. 3 These problems may be avoided by centralizing redistributive policies at the highest level of government. This federal assumption of redistributive policies, centralists argue, would not only avoid the pitfalls described above but would also help to foster a more efficient provision of local public goods.
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---States › 2AC---Federalism NB
Bradbury 23 - distinguished fellow at The Heritage Foundation (Steven Bradbury, “Biden’s California waiver: An assault on federalism”, Washington Times, January 25, 2023, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jan/25/joe-bidens-california-waiver-assault-federalism/)//TMMS
Congress singled out California for special treatment because of its history of smog, particularly in the Los Angeles region. The Biden administration has now employed this waiver authority to greenlight Mr. Newsom’s radical climate mandates for the auto industry, even though those mandates are motivated by a desire to advance global climate goals, not to address air-quality conditions unique to California. In the American system of federalism, all 50 states are supposed to be equal in sovereignty and dignity. True federalism means that each state has an equal ability to experiment with different rules in its own local markets, and unless Congress prescribes a national solution, each state can choose to adopt rules that are stricter or looser than those that apply in other states. That’s not what’s happening here. Contrary to Congress’ judgment that the auto industry requires uniform federal standards, the Biden administration has used the Clean Air Act waiver process to empower one single state in the Union, California, to dictate a revolutionary new industrial policy for the people of every other state. And the policy mandates Mr. Newsom is handing down are far stricter than anything the residents in most states would find acceptable — if they ever got the chance to decide the question for themselves. What Mr. Biden has unleashed with his California climate waiver is the antithesis of true federalism
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---States › 2AC---States
Its unrealistic and not backed by the lit base – ruins research and limits the real world education we get from debates.
Clash - reading the state's cp prevents the neg from actually engaging with our case. means we aren’t getting in-depth clash and leads to low-quality debates
2023
DDI
Affirmative
2AC Off-Case › CP---States › 2AC---States
Adelman, Lynn. 2008 (Adelman earned his Artium Baccalaureus degree from Princeton University and a Bachelor of Law from Columbia University.)"Laundering Racism Through the Courts: The Scandal of States' Rights." Dissent 65, no. 3 (2018): 111-119. .
As it turned out, Justice Ginsburg’s concerns were entirely justified. Since the demise of the VRA’s formula, states and municipalities formerly covered by the law have implemented numerous discriminatory voting procedures. Within hours of the Supreme Court’s decision, Texas announced that its previously blocked discriminatory voter-identification law would immediately go into effect. Local governments in Texas also made many discriminatory changes. One city eliminated two city council seats in predominantly Hispanic districts and replaced them with at-large seats in majority-white districts. North Carolina also quickly got into the act, passing an omnibus law including a strict photo-ID requirement, elimination of same-day voter registration, a seven-day decrease in the early voting period, and invalidation of provisional ballots cast at the wrong polling station. North Carolina municipalities quickly followed suit, as did other Southern states, including Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Arizona, Arkansas, and Alabama as well as numerous local governments in these states. They joined Indiana, Kansas, and Wisconsin, where statehouses, exempt from preclearance and dominated by political conservatives, had begun passing strict voter-ID laws as early as 2005. Voter-ID laws did not originate with Shelby County, in other words, but the decision opened the floodgates, enabling states and local governments with the most egregious histories of discriminating against the voting rights of minorities to start discriminating all over again It was utterly predictable that, freed from the requirement of preclearance, the Southern states and municipalities would once again enact antidemocratic laws designed to suppress or devalue minority votes. The Court had only to pay attention to the evidence compiled by Congress as well as the long-standing connection between federalism and race, especially in the South. The U.S. government had to intervene in the South both to eliminate slavery and, a hundred years later, to eliminate Jim Crow. Further, there is substantial evidence that not much has changed, even when the discussion is confined to voting rights alone. In the twenty-four years prior to Congress’s reauthorization of the VRA in 2006, the Department of Justice or a three-judge court blocked more than 600 discriminatory changes to voting laws in covered states and municipalities. In short, it would have been obvious to any reasonably well-informed observer that striking down the preclearance rule would do great harm to the voting rights of African Americans in the South and to democracy itself. Nevertheless, the Court forged ahead, not only exalting the notion of state sovereignty but also reviving the equal dignity of states argument that arose out of the long-disgraced Dred Scott decision and that it had explicitly rejected in South Carolina’s 1966 challenge to the VRA. As legal scholar Joseph Fishkin explains, Americans have been fighting since the Civil War and Reconstruction about the structural implications of the events of 1861– 1870 for the sovereignty, dignity, and equality of the states—especially the Southern states. The implications of adopting the “equal dignity” of the states of the former Confederacy, as a constraint on Congress’s Reconstruction Power, are profoundly troubling.