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2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Case › Agriculture Alt Cause

Alt causes --- methane emissions from agriculture are underestimated.

Jeff McMahon 19. [Energy and environment reporter, teaches journalism, argument and scientific writing at the University of Chicago. "Why Agriculture’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are Almost Always Underestimated". Forbes. 12-2-2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/12/02/5-reasons-agricultures-greenhouse-gas-emissions-are-usually-underestimated/?sh=4fbdf6f06ac8 accessed 7-20-2023]

Agriculture’s contribution to the climate crisis is typically underestimated, according to experts, because of numerous emission sources that are routinely overlooked. “The classic EPA chart suggested Agriculture is 9 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. This number’s almost certainly significantly quite low,” said Peter Lehner, managing attorney for EarthJustice, a non-profit environmental law firm. “Most other studies, including by the UN and others, say that agriculture contributes much closer to 15 or 20 percent or more of world greenhouse gas emissions.” Even those estimates may be low, Lehner argued in a Washington D.C. briefing hosted by the Environmental and Energy Study Institute, because most assessments don’t include these five sources of agricultural emissions: 1. Soil Carbon When experts assess emissions from agriculture, they rarely consider the carbon emitted by soil disturbance. “Good healthy soil has a lot of carbon in it,” Lehner said, “and when you dig it up you lose all that carbon. It merges with the air and becomes carbon dioxide…. As you continue to convert land—as some programs have incentivized—you continue to lose carbon dioxide carbon stored in the soil.” 2. Lost Sequestration Most estimates don’t include the carbon sequestration that would be occurring on land had it not been converted to agricultural use. “It doesn't include all the legacy, that lost carbon sequestration, all the land that used to be sequestering carbon but now has been deforested or has been tilled and is no longer sequestering carbon.” 3. Input Footprints Most estimates neglect to consider the carbon footprint of products consumed by agriculture. “It doesn't include the manufacture of a lot of the input such as fertilizer, which is highly energy intensive.” 4. Difficult Measurements “It's tougher to measure because unlike burning a gallon of gas or a lump of fossil fuel, agriculture are living biological systems, and so often the measurement of the carbon of the greenhouse-gas impact is just much less certain than with the other sectors of the economy.” 5. Potent Gases The focus on carbon dioxide, however warranted, neglects more powerful gases emitted in agriculture. “Much of the greenhouse gas effect of agriculture is methane, which is coming from the ruminant emissions of cows. Their stomachs churn away and emit methane. Their waste on the ground converts into methane. Another major source is nitrous oxide. When you put too much fertilizer on the ground, on a field, that which is not taken up by the plants can either run off and cause water pollution or because of microbial action be converted to nitrous oxide, which is 300 times more potent than carbon dioxide.” Lehner’s list is more modest than one assembled a decade ago by the Worldwatch Institute, which also included livestock respiration in an audit of UN estimates. The Worldwatch Institute included agriculture’s supply chain as well, and it concluded that livestock agriculture is responsible for 51 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Case › Dedev

Science proves green growth is unsustainable and impossible

Naude 23 [Wim Naude is a in Technology, Innovation, Marketing and Entrepreneurship at RWTH Aachen University, Germany and at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He is also of the African Studies Centre at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands; at the International Security and Development Center, Berlin, Germany, and at the IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Germany., 5-2023, Institute of Labor Economics, ] VL

The fundamental criticism against green growth that emerges from the preceding discussion is that green growth has not yet, and also does not seem able in future to achieve absolute decoupling between GDP growth and material inputs (resource uses) and carbon emissions (growth impacts). It will therefore not able to prevent, or roll back, the overshooting of planetary systems. Relative decoupling is possible, can extend the availability of resources, and reduce the impact of emissions by a small magnitude, but even these efficiency gains may end up increase total energy use due to rebound (Jevons Paradox) effects. In addition to this devastating criticism, there are also other criticisms of green growth. These will be briefly introduced. One further criticism is that green growth is economically costly, and may make poverty reduction more difficult (Resnick et al., 2012; Dercon, 2014). This has raised the issue of climate justice as a ancillary to global green growth initiatives, reflecting concerns that developing countries who may suffer the worse impacts of climate change, have contributed the least to the current stocks of human emitted CO2 in the atmosphere. In exchange for subscribing to green growth, developing countries are therefore demanding substantial financial24 and know-how transfers from advanced economies - who have pledged US$ 100 billion in financial resources for developing countries to fight climate change, but has failed to live up to this commitment (Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019; Ehresman and Okereke, 2015; Robinson and Shine, 2018; Timperley, 2021). Another criticism of green growth is that green growth places undue hope in the energy transition, i.e. the phasing out of fossil fuels, and replacing these with renewable energy sources. The first problem is that replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy is not feasible: all renewable energy technologies need fossil fuel energy to be manufactured and renewable energy systems need back-up from fossil fuel or nuclear energy (Hagens, 2020; Rees, 2021). And second problem is that promotion of renewable energy will stimulate the re-materialization of world production - due to the need for various mineral resources as inputs for renewable energy systems. Bleischwitz (2010) and Zeihan (2022) lists some of the critical mineral resources needed for renewable energies, which include copper, lithium, gallium, aluminium, tantalum, nickel, cobalt, silicon, chromium, graphite, zinc, manganese, molybdenum, gold, silver and platinum. In addition to the re-materialization of the world economy that this would stimulate, many of these minerals are found in countries with poor institutional development, meaning that the exploitation of these resources could lead to significant human rights abuses.25 Kara (2023) documents such human rights abuses, which he calls a human rights and environmental catastrophe, in cobalt26 mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A final and also devastating criticism of the hope that green economic growth is possible, and could moreover be sustained indefinitely, is provided by the laws of physics. This suggest that even if in a science fiction world full absolute decoupling from physical inputs could be obtained, then there would still be the waste heat, an outcome of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, that will eventually stop growth. For instance, If the world GDP continues to expand at its current rate of around 2% per annum, it will double every 35 years in size. By 2037 the world GDP would be US$500 trillion after which it “explodes” to $30.7 quadrillion in 2046 and to $1.9 quintillion a year later (Roodman, 2020). In just over 8,000 years it would be 3 × 1070 its current size, which would be a physical impossibility(Karnofsky, 2021c). Even if growth slowed and the world economy doubled in size only every 100 years, then after a million years (a very brief period on cosmic timescale) the economy would be 103010 times larger, which implies that if there are around 1080 atoms in the galaxy27, that “each atom would have to support an average of around 102950 people” (Hanson, 2009). One particular constraint which would limit growth long before these time scales is that even if the global economy would be able to increase energy efficiency and be able to decouple much growth from physical resources, it would still need significant amounts of energy to run its soft-and-hardware. The share of the economy that can be non-physical (and that can thus be de-materialized) is ultimately bounded. The economic growth implied in Figure 1 has been due to an annual average growth in energy consumption of around 2,3% per annum (Murphy, 2022b). If one assumes that a Cornucopian economy would eventually be able to generate economic growth which doubles the world economy every month as discussed in the section 2.2 (see also Hanson (2018)) but with such energy efficiency that energy use continues to grow at only 2,3% then energy use on the planet will grow from its current (2019) level of 18 Terawatt (TW) to 100 TW in 2100 and 1,000 TW in 2200. Murphy (2022b) calculates that at such a rate the economy would use up all the solar power that reaches the earth in 400 years and in 1700 years all of the energy of the sun. The use of so much energy would generate tremendous waste heat independent of any future smart green-energy technology. It would be so hot as to boil the surface of the Earth in about 400 years (Murphy, 2022b). The upshot is that even if the optimistic Cornucopian green economy scenarios could be realised, any acceleration in economic growth will ultimately be a transient event - if it ever happens. As Murphy (2022b, p.847) has warned, “we would be wise to plan for a post-growth world.”

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Case › Dedev

Sustainable Growth Impossible – laundry list

Alevgul H. Sorman 23 {Ikerbasque Research Fellow at the Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3). } - ("Deceitful Decoupling: Misconceptions of a Persistent Myth," SpringerLink, published 3-1-2023, accessed 7-12-2023,

In 1987, the UN World Commission on Development and the Environment presented the report Our Common Future, better known as the Brundtland report, coining the concept of ‘sustainable development‘, then launching it at the Rio Summit on Environment and Development in 1992 – Principle 12 of the Declaration. Within such a framing, the push towards growth and economic liberalization was taken further at subsequent global events relating to sustainable development, though partially concealed behind the rhetoric of environmental sustainability. Compared to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Stockholm 1972, the later conferences involved reframing both the diagnosis and prognosis in relation to the ecological crisis. The focus supposedly became poverty in developing countries, instead of affuence in developed countries, along the lines of the post-materialist thesis of Inglehart. This idea that ‘you frst need to be rich, in order to be an environmentalist’ has been critiqued by Martinez-Alier with his famous concept of environmentalism of the poor (Inglehart, 1990). Economic growth was freed of stigma and redefned as a necessary step towards the solution of environmental problems. (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015) This watering down of the initial debates of the 1970s infuenced by the Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972) constitutes the core of the ‘green economy’, a kind of Green Keynesianism with reformist new millennium proposals, such as a Green New Deal, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. At the UN Conference for Sustainable Development in 2012, the so-called Rio + 20 Summit, the ‘green economy’ concept played a key role as the guiding framework of the multilateral discussions, although resistance from many southern nations meant it was not as central as its proponents may have wished. In preparation for the summit, The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) published a report on ‘green economy’, defning it ‘as one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while signifcantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ (UNEP, 2011). In consonance with the pro-growth approach of sustainable development, the report bypassed any trade-off between economic growth and environmental conservation and conceptualized ‘nature‘as natural capital, a ‘critical economic asset’ opening the doors for commodifcation. In fact, it clearly stated that ‘the key aim for a transition to a green economy is to enable economic growth and investment while increasing environmental quality and social inclusiveness (UNEP, 2011).’ 6 Post-development: From the Critique of Development to a Pluriverse of Alternatives 64 This environmental economics approach is based on neoclassical economic theory and a belief that economic growth will de-link or decouple itself from its environmental base through dematerialization and de-pollution because of the improvement in eco-effciency, viz. increased resource productivity and decreased pollution. In this conceptual framework, market prices are considered the appropriate means for solving environmental issues and exogenous rates of technological progress are expected to counterbalance the effects of resource exhaustion. However, the confict between a growth-dominated economy and environmental protection cannot be solved with appeals to ‘sustainable development‘, ‘eco-effciency’, ‘ecological modernisation’, ‘geo-engineering’, ‘smart agricultures’ or ‘cities’, ‘circular’ or ‘green economy’. These are false solutions. The sustainable development approach remains fundamentally fawed on a number of counts. For instance, the fnal objective for a New Green Deal is the creation of ‘resilient low carbon economies, rich in jobs and based on independent sources of energy supply’ (UNEP, 2011; NEF, 2008). While on this end there might general agreement, the controversy remains on the means. Among the flaws or weaknesses of the sustainable development approach as articulated thus far in various UN-sponsored documents, including the declaration Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, (UNEP, 2011; United Nations, 2013; SDSN, 2013; United Nations, 2015; United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, 2012) are the following (Kothari, 2013): 1. ‘Absence of an analysis of the historical and structural roots of poverty, hunger, unsustainability and inequities, which include centralization of state power and capitalist monopolies; 2. Inadequate focus on direct democratic governance (decision-making by citizens and communities in face-to-face settings), beyond the stress on accountability and transparency; 3. Inability to recognize the biophysical limits to economic growth; 4. Continued subservience to private capital, and inability or unwillingness to democratise the economy; 5. Modern science and technology held up as panacea, ignoring their limits and marginalising other forms of knowledge; 6. Culture, ethics and spirituality side-lined; 7. Unbridled consumerism not tackled head-on; 8. Global relations built on localization and self-reliance missing; and, 9. No new architecture of global governance, with a continued reliance on the centrality of nation-states, denying true democratisation’.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Case › Dedev

Green Growth Fails – resource depletion, jevon’s paradox, and unreliable ‘green’ tech.

Richard Smith 7-4 { chair of the UK Health Alliance on Climate Change (UKHACC). } - ("Perhaps only degrowth can save us," BMJ, published 7-4-2023, accessed 7-11-2023, https://www.bmj.com/content/382/bmj.p1545)//marlborough-HL

Hickel identifies the four major problems with green growth. Firstly, despite huge and admirable progress with renewable energy we can never keep up with a growing economy, meaning we will continue to depend on fossil fuels. Secondly, solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric cars depend on metals and rare earths, and mining on the scale required to feed a growing economy will create massive and growing environmental damage. Nuclear power from either fission or fusion cannot develop fast enough to meet the energy requirements of economies that continue to grow. Similarly, carbon capture technologies are not maturing fast enough, and ironically depend on energy to work; plus they are a response to only one of our environmental problems. Thirdly, geoengineering projects like injecting the upper atmosphere with particles to create a veil to reflect sunlight, which the European Union is already considering, are extraordinarily risky. Fourthly, our problem is not confronted simply with rising temperatures but with a damaged planet, and if we had 100% clean energy we would “raze more forests, trawl more fish, mine more mountains, build more roads, expand industrial farming, and send more waste to landfill—all of which have ecological consequences our planet can no longer sustain.” Economists have long identified a paradox that innovations that create more efficient ways of using energy and resources briefly reduce consumption but then increase it. As Hickel explains it’s not really a paradox but what would be expected—because companies use the savings to reinvest in more production and the growth swamps the efficiency improvements.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Cap K › 1NC

The alternative is an uncompromising revolutionary stance against the universality of racial capitalism. Our historical materialist analysis understands theory as the material force that galvanizes workers against global imperialism and exploitation.

Maclean 22 is a historian, independent scholar, organizer, and bartender based in the Finger Lakes region of New York State. He wrote his PhD at the University of Michigan in the 2000s, and currently pursues an eclectic range of interests, including Black experimental aesthetics, especially music; world history in the era of imperialism; Marxist and Leninist critical theory and philosophy; and emergent late capitalist modes of sociality, namely, online gaming. (The Future of Lenin: Power, Politics, and Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Alla Ivanchikova, and Robert R. Maclean, State University of New York Press, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ku/detail.action?docID=6992711.)

The same contradiction, between the impotence of “hegemonic” critical theory in civil society and the material power of revolutionary theory in the hands of the oppressed masses, can be appreciated by turning to a person who was arguably at the time the second most advanced Marxist theorist in California and likely the United States as a whole: George Jackson. Jackson became imprisoned in 1960 as a teenaged petty criminal and had no formal education. For holding up a gas station, he was given an “indeterminate” sentence, which became a practical life sentence. By the end of the decade, he was the Black Panther Party’s leading theoretician and wrote cogently on the application of Lenin and other revolutionary theorists to the struggle for liberation in the United States and especially in the prison system. He did this with a shockingly limited access to textual resources and wrote much of his theoretical output on a plastic typewriter. As was and is common in U.S. prisons, he was subjected to extended solitary confinement as punishment, some of that time in open-air cages. In his letters and writings he described the prison’s sadistic tortures, its corruptions and obscenities and plots. At the time of his death he had ninety-nine books in his cell: his access to Lenin’s thought was limited and he mostly had to rely on secondary sources or anthologies. The fact that his theoretical development was so acute and sophisticated under these conditions suggests something of the universal pertinence of revolutionary theory in the Leninist vein. In his theoretical work, especially Blood in My Eye, a major work published posthumously, Jackson attempted a clear-eyed confrontation with the “fascist” character of the U.S. racial state and social system. He also excavated Leninist revolutionary theory’s relevance to the predicament of America’s oppressed masses, insisting over and again on the international character of the struggles raging in U.S. ghettos and prisons. Following Mao Zedong in particular, Jackson advocated a prolonged people’s war against the U.S. government. Echoing Engels, he insisted that “People’s War is not polite or proper. . . . People’s War is improvisation and more improvisa- tion.”25 Following Fanon, he appreciated the importance of state violence in imposing colonial conditions and recognized that the development of revolutionary class consciousness was hindered absent a militarily powerful revolutionary movement that could offer real protection for oppressed peoples. Like Lenin, Jackson always framed his struggle as a planetary struggle of oppressed peoples against imperialism. In Left-Wing Communism and other texts, Lenin characterized the newly formed workers’ state as engaged in unrelenting war with the international bourgeoisie. For Jackson likewise, the latest sadistic technique of brutality introduced by the “pigs”—prison guards—was but a material manifestation of the real global struggle that the Black Panther Party shared with the National Liberation Front, and other military forces opposing the U.S. empire. Jackson is a quintessential Leninist not only because he persistently advocated for proletarian revolution (although that is so), but because he conceived of his own struggle, which was one of life and death within a small enclosed space, as part and parcel of a planetary transition that was open to scientific, materialist analysis. From his cell, Jackson could reevaluate the history of the U.S. state and social system without illusion, and realize that as a racial dictatorship, its history was linked to and coeval with other forms of fascism. Prison lays power relations bare—on that, most would agree. But for Jackson, the effect was not to narrow his vision to the demoralizing and undignified intrusions of the state onto his person, but to evince a stark and penetrating analysis of the prison as a legible manifestation of white supremacist global governance. It is such a perspective, I am arguing in part, that allows for and warrants the designation “Leninist”: an uncompromisingly revolutionary stance toward “local” political questions, such as the fate of one particular nation-state: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the USA to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. . . . We simply stop allowing ourselves to be hunted and do some stalking of our own; their secret police aren’t really too secret at all. (55) As Lenin insisted in State and Revolution, a materialist idea of the state sees it as nothing more than “special bodies of armed men, prisons, etc.”26 From George Jackson’s vantage point of being completely controlled by this apparatus, he concluded optimistically that its overthrow was nigh. The latter, moreover, was a prerequisite for the realization of a true universality, one where Black people were in fact free to live. What does it mean to point, then, to the unrealized universality of (Leninist) revolutionary theory? For one thing, it serves to remind us that whatever one thinks of the heroic scenario of the proletariat’s role in history, its alleged mission to abolish first the capitalist system and then all class distinctions as such (creating a proletarian state and then “withering” it into nonexistence),27 it is a theoretical terrain open to the future—and not one that restricts understanding of class struggle to the point of production.28 Second, perhaps more pointedly, it reminds us that for Lenin and revo- lutionary theorists of the twentieth century broadly, imperialism was the name for the planetary system into which capitalism had developed, not a policy of this or that country. Imperialism was, and is, inseparable from the division of the planet into oppressor and oppressed nationalities: liberation from national oppression thus cannot come without a confrontation with imperialism qua global system. Third, and most pointedly still, it insists that there can be no talk of universality as if it were a settled accomplishment: we cannot talk as if humanity is not still “divided.” Put more simply, “humanity” itself is (has always been) the name for a false, presumptive (white supremacist) operationalization of “universality,” the latter having been foreclosed by the racial dynamics of capitalism’s own development. Finally, we cannot understand Black Leninism without understanding its never-ending confrontation with white supremacist counterrevolutionary forces, without understanding Blackness as premature death, without the dialectical relations of the “unrealized” and universal. White supremacist state violence is not an ancillary condition of capitalism—it cannot be explained away in a footnote as in contradiction to this or that philosopher’s appeal to the universal condition of humanity. On the contrary, the “universal” as we have come to inherit it is not just drenched in blood, but irredeemably constricted by its emergence from within the racial partitioning of humanity. Only a revolutionary break with the white supremacist racial states that continue to govern the imperialist system can allow for the realization of a true universality. If we take together the examples of two mid-century comrades, Angela Davis and George Jackson, it couldn’t be clearer: the Black claim to universal emancipation elicits state violence. Liberation for Black people means liberation from the U.S. empire, which is why the latter designates so many state resources to the global and local maintenance of white supremacy. The violence unleashed against Jackson and whosoever invoked his name to assert the “humanity” of the imprisoned (at Attica and so on); the state’s determined effort to try Davis for her life—such examples must be appreciated in the context of a truly planetary operational field (U.S. support for Rhodesia, its proxy wars to prop up apartheid Southern Africa, etc.). Quite simply, the history of Black Leninism suggests that the putative universals we have come to anticipate, such as “humanity” or emancipation per se or theory for that matter, require a thoroughgoing and radical reconstruction, rather than to be “decentered” amid a pluralism of incommensurate forms of life. After the apparent contraction of Black liberation struggles in the late 1970s, the (temporary) end of the long Black freedom movement, there was much academic hand-wringing about whether and to what degree Marxist theory does or can attend to Black liberation, to a universality constituted by Black people: does it not throw Marxism, or Leninism, as “European” theories, into epistemological crisis, or push them uncomfortably into a different ontological terrain? On the contrary, I have argued in this section that it is only by way of Black critique of putative universals do we arrive at the truly universal implications (realizable in the future) of the Leninist ambition to overthrow imperialism as the world system. Moreover, critiques of the presumptive universality of (white, European) theory are necessary to the revival of revolutionary theory per se—not as an idealist, academic language game, but as a material force that grips and bolsters the multinational working class. The final section will examine one particular example of a policy oriented toward a revolutionary transformation within the heart of imperialism—the Black Belt Thesis.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Cap K › 1NC

Fiscal redistribution recreates democratic despotism – their project is a feel-good moment that actually makes imperial violence inevitable. Only an organizational form that breaks up the kinds of racialized attachments which facilitate counterinsurgency against capitalism can solve.

Pitts, ’20 [Jennifer Pitts, Professor of Political Science and in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, “Empire and its afterlives,” published in 2020, //jwc]

The most important feature of the modern world order, arguably, has been its imperial structure of racialized, capitalist hierarchy. The contours of this hierarchy of wealth, political power and legal standing have changed significantly since its inauguration in the fifteenth century, but its continuity as a basic fact and its implications for the world since so-called decolonization should remain at the center of our description and analysis. The pervasive nature of these imperial dynamics means that the tasks for postcolonial political theory are vast. The very categories that have structured the discipline of political science since the end of the Second World War contribute to the challenge. Political theory was conceived in the postwar period largely as the study of the state and of politics within states, alongside a discipline of International Relations that took itself to be the study of the relations among states, with an implicit understanding that the states in question were post-imperial and disavowing its own prewar past as a discipline preoccupied with the management of colonial and racial hierarchy. Postcolonial theory, in contrast, refers not to a time after the end of empire, a condition that we are nowhere near achieving, but rather after the inauguration of the modern imperial world order (Seth, 2013, p. 1). Twentieth-century anticolonial thought offered precisely such an ‘expansive account of empire that situated alien rule within international structures of unequal integration and racial hierarchy’ (Getachew, 2019, p. 2). as well as resourceful political responses to that condition, now just beginning to be tapped by disciplinary political theory. As I’ll suggest below, W.E.B. Du Bois’s writings on the global order, beginning during the First World War, remain one potent source of empirical analysis of and theoretical insight into this phenomenon. Indeed, the continuing resonance of his account of the imperial global order underscores how much persists, despite changes as seemingly significant as formal decolonization and the onset and then the end of the Cold War. The tenacity of this imperial formation is due in part to the flexibility, and the attractions, of some of its key legitimating discourses, including liberalism and international law. In Boundaries of the International, I studied the relation between imperial structure and discursive scaffolding by exploring the mutual constitution of international law and the imperial global order. I stressed the politics of international law’s conceptual frames: the ways in which an image of the world as an international community of free and independent states was used to justify European imperial domination, and sometimes to criticize it, but especially to occlude it. The state system itself, that is, as an ideology and as a set of legal institutions and political practices, entrenched imperial hierarchies while simultaneously obscuring them with the appearance of formal equality, as it continues to do. As a conceptual frame, or ‘language of disclosure’, the notion of an international community of states has thus obscured or distorted much of global politics since it was invented, and as it was entrenched over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Tully, 2008, vol. 2, p. 127). It follows that any discussion of the politics of territorial states, or of the world as a system of such states, must take place alongside a recognition of more fundamental imperial structures. Given the extent of the task of taking stock of the persistence of global hierarchy, I hesitate to write prescriptively about what political theorists concerned with empire should be considering. Since we were invited to take Boundaries as a point of departure, though, I can begin by noting some of the ways I had hoped it would be engaged and taken up, as well as some of the questions and dynamics that the book does not address and lines of approach that I hope to follow in future work. I am only too aware of the limitations of the approach I took in Boundaries, particularly that it privileges discursive contexts over material dynamics and that its objects are mainly European thinkers, as Vasko, Ince and Nichols observe below. Among the book’s key preoccupations are the epistemic pitfalls and political limitations of the dominant conceptual framework that we have for talking about global politics, as a community of independent territorial states. Boundaries addresses the historical development of this framework and its occlusions but says less about their implications for contemporary normative theory. To place imperial structures at the heart of our critical descriptions of the global order may be to challenge quite fundamentally both the ideal of an international community of free and equal nations and the cosmopolitan ideal that has constituted its main rival within normative international theory. The notion of such a community of states that respect one another’s autonomy, while offering assistance when needed, is in many ways a compelling normative vision. But it has always also been, as is commonly the case in international law, an aspiration couched as a description, a conflation that has generated two different but related problems. First, to the extent that the aspiration has been used as a working description, it has masked the imperial nature of European states (as in Rawls, 1999). Second, to the extent that the aspiration has been shaped by empirical assumptions – for instance, as to what forms of prosperity or solidarity are possible in the modern nation-state – it has presupposed conditions that came about through imperialism and in many instances remain dependent on global hierarchies. This is one reason among many to relinquish ‘liberal-democratic’ states of the global north as normative models. Du Bois’s critique of what he called ‘democratic despotism’ illuminates these two intertwined but distinct problems. As I only began to suggest in Boundaries, Du Bois’s First World War essays offer a profound contrast with the views of the European international lawyers and political theorists of whom my study is a critique. Du Bois saw the modern world order not as an expanding community of states but as a global economic and political system shaped above all by the dynamics of imperial domination. His early efforts to make sense of the industrial imperialism of his present involved a longue durée global history linking conquest, commerce, and race, and showing that the key political developments on which modern Europeans prided themselves – advancing freedom and equality under democracy, the increasing prosperity of their populations – were parasitic on imperial exploitation. His critique bore on the interaction of ideas and material forces: white supremacy and European ideas of civilization together with the operations of global capital. The ideology and the legal and institutional structure of the international system facilitated the exploitation inevitable under capitalism by placing it in imperial and racialized spaces outside the bounds of ‘international’ concern. And because European democratization itself relied on imperial exploitation, empire had morphed into a distinct and novel phenomenon: ‘democratic despotism’. The sharing of imperial spoils eased social conflict within Europe, simultaneously reconciling the ruling ‘captains of industry’ to increased power-sharing at home as long as they had continued impunity in the colonies, and mitigating the poverty and political agitation of the European masses through colonial profits and consumer goods (Du Bois, 1915, p. 709). Despite the fact that the white working classes themselves suffered under imperial capitalism, white socialists and their labor supporters failed to acknowledge or to combat the dynamics of global domination because they were also its beneficiaries: ‘in this crime white labor is particeps criminis with white capital’ (Du Bois, 1921, p. 7). They had been seduced into demanding a greater share of imperial profits, rather than recognizing that ultimately their own liberation depended on their working to end the even more extreme exploitation of non-whites around the world. On Du Bois’s account, the modern nation – and therefore the international system – was not, as other critics such as J.A. Hobson were arguing, perverted by imperialism, but in fact created by it. The Euro-American nation-state system emerged as an idealization perched atop structures of global empire. A wealth of recent scholarship on empire, settler colonialism, and their contemporary instantiations, develops these Du Boisian insights, drawing the connections between racial and imperial domination ‘within’ societies and between them, tracing the connections between democracy or popular sovereignty and imperial subjugation, elucidating the dynamics of racial capitalism, and attending to the resources in anticolonial thought and action, especially in political solidarities across the global south. As Aziz Rana argued in Two Faces of American Freedom, freedom and equality among whites in the North American colonies, and then the United States, depended materially and symbolically on the exploitation and expropriation of subject communities: ‘settler empire was the servant of a unique and robust view of self-rule, seen by many as crucial to the fulfillment of emancipatory ambitions’ (2010, p. 3). Settlers’ ongoing insistence on interpreting Indigenous claims for land and political autonomy in their own terms, moreover – as claims for property rights and cultural freedoms – renders them impervious to the radical challenge such claims pose to the settler-colonial model of development, capital accumulation by means of dispossession, and the political practices that depend on them (Coulthard, 2014). These pathologies are closely bound to the broader dynamics of democratic despotism identified by Du Bois – to democratization in non-settler imperial states – in ways that bear on both democratic theory and the study of settler-colonial societies. The economic and political life of European metropolitan citizens was similarly premised on imperial domination and expropriation: the industrial productivity enabled by the opening of agricultural land in the western hemisphere to European economies; the fueling of the European working class by sugar calories made cheap by the use of slave labor; the sense of political inclusion of the working class generated by a shared colonial project. Class conflict in Europe was mitigated, democratic communities forged, and welfare states inaugurated on the back of imperial expropriation, white supremacy, and, as Inés Valdez has shown, racialized imperial labor control. Valdez’s account of the immigration policies of contemporary nation-states as ‘imperial remnants rather than legitimate attributes of sovereignty’ (2019, p. 22) sheds light on contemporary right-wing populism and exposes the limits of left positions on migration that seek to protect only domestic labor while leaving capital’s global exploitation of labor unchallenged. Thanks to the global hegemony of the United States, the constellation of distinct but connected forms of imperial domination that has characterized American history – slavery, settler colonialism, and conquest of both adjacent and more distant territory – has ramified around the world. As the sociologist Matthew Desmond (2019) has argued, America’s ‘low-road capitalism’ – characterized by depressed wages, extreme inequality, racism, union-busting, the punitive disciplining of workers, lax regulation of labor standards, and ‘normalized insecurity’ – can be traced to slavery. If that low-road capitalism is not typical of wealthy countries, on Desmond’s account, its centrality to the world’s largest economy intensifies the imprint of empire on the contemporary world economy, while the exploitation by global capital of labor in more vulnerable states amounts to the exportation of low-road practices outside the political boundaries, but not the economies, of other wealthy states. Just as Du Bois had demonstrated the continuities between empires and European nation-states as their chief modern agents, he also showed that postcolonial states suffered new iterations of imperial domination obscured by international law. Anticipating the idea of neo-colonialism developed by Kwame Nkrumah and others in the 1950s, Du Bois argued in 1925 that Liberia, one of the few formally independent African states at the time, was wrongly ‘looked upon as a self-steered craft, master of her own fate instead of being, as she has always been, a canoe tossed on raging economic currents which eddied out of the slave trade of the eighteenth-century into the swirl of the World War in the twentieth century’ (Du Bois, 1925, p. 327). As it was for Liberia in Du Bois’s time, debt remains a major mechanism of neo-colonial control, now enforced by a rigid ‘statist’ norm of repayment that states in the global north did not abide by before the 1930s, when they were the major borrowers and defaults were common. This norm, widely considered to be both apolitical and indispensable to the functioning of international finance, is neither. It imposes extraordinary costs on the populations of postcolonial states, while encouraging speculators and investors to make indiscriminate loans, confident that, however illegitimate, predatory or transitory a given regime or loan package, the population is on the hook for repayment (Lienau, 2014; Roos, 2019). In this way, international law and norms, and a flawed, tendentious understanding of their history, discipline postcolonial states to adhere to unprecedentedly onerous repayment terms and further entrench their subjugated international standing. In Boundaries I followed Martti Koskenniemi in treating law as a set of discursive and institutional resources mobilized by ‘people with projects’, asking what sort of political work these resources did for those who deployed them (Kennedy, 2000; Koskenniemi, 2002; Marks and Lang, 2013). The focus of the book’s analysis and critique is liberal ideology as it appeared in the discourses of the law of nations and international law. I recognized the importance of profit motives and commercial agents to this history, but capitalism was not a central category of analysis. Still, given that modern empires and capitalism developed jointly, and must be understood in relation to one other, it would have been useful to address more explicitly the relationship between liberalism and capitalism, as does recent Marxian work in the history of international law that has sought to capture the ‘systemic logics at work’ in international legal hierarchies (Marks, 2008, p. 302) and the literatures on racial capitalism and colonialism that Ince flags below. Where my emphasis in Boundaries tended to be on the persistent violation of international law’s avowed norms of freedom and equality, and the obfuscations of that violation that the articulation of the norms has performed, this scholarship tracks more explicitly liberal international law’s work in service to imperatives of capitalism: the domination performed by the norms themselves rather than by their violation. International law, as these accounts show, created the conditions necessary for capitalism by ‘reconstructing the world in the image of a particular kind of “free” and “equal” or “sovereign” legal subject’, one with individual rights, especially freedom of religion and conscience, and rights of property and freedom to trade (Parfitt, 2019, p. 57). The democratic nation-state as it emerged in Europe, then, was both a creature and an agent of imperial capitalism, though in its self-conception it was the antithesis of empire and its successor in a historical progression toward a more just and equal world. Just as the capitalist corporation is sometimes described as an ‘externality machine’ – a structure designed to internalize profits while offloading costs onto others – the western democratic nation has never been self-sustaining, but rather took the form that it did only by imposing devastating costs elsewhere. I have alluded to the attractions of some liberal and democratic norms and of the ideal of an international community of nations treating one another with mutual respect as independent and as equals; the same can be said of the concern for the dignity and moral equality of every individual that underlies cosmopolitan projects in political theory. Du Bois himself saw ‘but one adequate method of salvation – the giving of democratic weapons of self-defense to the defenseless’ (at other times he might have said the taking of such weapons by the defenseless) (Du Bois, 1915, p. 712). If these values are to serve as the basis for critique or constructive political projects we must continue to reckon as he did with their imperial entanglements past and present.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Cap K › 1NC

All capitalism is racial capitalism – global political economy was built and sustained by theft of Indigenous land, superexploitation of Black labor, imperial extraction, and racist devaluation of “disposable” populations. This necroeconomy is terminally unsustainable, culminating in endless war and ecological collapse.

Burden-Stelley, ’20 [Charisse Burden-Stelley, you should totally read HER work for non-debate reasons, assistant professor of Africana Studies and political science at Carleton College, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights,” published in July 2020, *Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, all others omitted for readability **edited for problematic language //jwc]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization. [Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51. [End Footnote 14] My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes [Black people] was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40 Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro [Black] bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41 Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44 Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48 The entrapment of Black women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23 › Populism Adv CP › 1NC

Accelerating tech development is catalyzing a populist wave – continued innovation and growth accelerates populism

Hiebert '22 [Kyle; MA in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights @ University of Nottingham, B.A. in Sociology & Political Economy @ University of Manitoba;"Tech-Fuelled Inequality Could Catalyze Populism 2.0"; 10-19-2022; published Centre for International Governance Innovation; accessed 7-15-2023; https://www.cigionline.org/articles/tech-fuelled-inequality-could-catalyze-populism-20/;]//LS

Geopolitical crises, looming climate chaos and the relentless expansion of surveillance capitalism are driving the development of the technologies of tomorrow — artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, green energy, big data, advanced robotics, virtual and augmented reality, nanotechnology, quantum computing, the Internet of Things and more. Each of these tools holds tremendous potential to improve lives and help solve the world’s biggest problems. But technological change always produces winners and losers by giving rise to new concentrations of power and novel forms of inequality. For example, a study by the US National Bureau of Economic Research found that between 50 and 70 percent of lost wages in America from 1980 to 2016 stemmed from automation — far more than from aggressive offshoring or the withering of labour unions. However, automation has brought about new occupations as well, evidenced by the absence of mass joblessness in the United States over the same period. Despite the lost wages, the US unemployment rate from 1993 to 2019 stayed around or below seven percent when excluding a four-year recovery following the exogenous shock of the 2008 financial crisis. Productivity has also increased by nearly 62 percent since 1979. But the wages of American workers have failed to keep pace, rising only 17.5 percent, signalling a deep disconnect in recent history between new technologies being adopted and the average worker being better off as a result. Similar circumstances across the democratic world have provoked severe political consequences over the past decade. Disaffected populations caught on the wrong side of economic transformations and alienated by the accompanying social changes spurred by globalization have aligned themselves with populists pitching simplistic solutions to complex problems. Polarization has skyrocketed; international cooperation has frayed. As the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution accelerates in coming years, upending how economies and societies operate, a new form of populism rooted in tech-fuelled disparities may eventually consume democratic nations. To avoid this outcome, governments must get serious about harnessing new technologies to make the democratic process more agile and responsive to voters’ frustrations. The Coming Age of Disruptive Automation Since researchers at Oxford University published a landmark study in 2013 estimating that some 47 percent of total US employment was at risk of automation, fears over the prospect of mass displacements of human labour by new technologies have grown. They have also become more urgent in the wake of the pandemic. According to one assessment, the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 fast-tracked four years’ worth of digital adoption in business operations and supply chains, and seven years’ worth of investment into digital-based products. American academic Erik Brynjolfsson has noted that when it comes to technology’s job-creating potential, past trends are not necessarily guaranteed to play out in the future. “Improvements in technology can improve productivity. For most of the 20th century, those productivity increases were associated with job growth and growing wages. But there is no economic law saying that always has to be the case.” That seems to hold true when looking at the six largest tech companies in the world — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Tesla and Meta. As of early October, with a combined market valuation of nearly $8 trillion — a bit less than half the GDP of China, the world’s second-largest economy — they collectively employed just 2.25 million people, significantly less than the US federal government. And at least 1.5 million of that total comes from Amazon, which launched an ill-fated pandemic hiring binge and has routinely come under fire for poor working conditions for its staff. When it comes to digital products being created by tech companies, Beijing-based venture capitalist Kai-Fu Lee predicted in 2017 that AI would replace half of all human labour before 2030. That same year, a report by the McKinsey Global Institute appeared to corroborate Lee’s ominous forecast. After analyzing 2,000 different work responsibilities across 800 different job roles, McKinsey suggested “about half the activities people are paid almost US$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology.” While only five percent of the occupations analyzed by McKinsey could, in theory, disappear entirely, technological progress has accelerated. Clearly, some jobs are in greater jeopardy than others. The positions most susceptible to automation are based on physical activities in highly structured and predictable environments, or the collection and processing of data, say the report’s authors. Among those most vulnerable are low-skilled positions in manufacturing, hospitality and retail commerce. The report claims that “technical, economic and social factors will determine the pace and extent of automation,” but that half of contemporary work activity could be automated by 2055, possibly even as soon as 2035. Others offer a more upbeat assessment, saying AI and automation will create more jobs than they threaten by producing future occupations yet to be imagined. Analysis published in October 2020 by the World Economic Forum — several months after the pandemic was declared, once companies had had time to evaluate the need and opportunities for increased automation — predicted that by 2025, “a shift in the division of labour between humans and machines” might eliminate 85 million jobs, while also creating 97 million new ones. Such positions would see work functions split more evenly between humans, machines and algorithms; machines would handle more physical tasks while algorithms could simplify and augment human-based inputs and decision-making processes. However, while 12 million net new jobs sounds positive, context is important. Ensuring that workers displaced by technology can avoid joblessness by transitioning to new roles will require re-skilling on an enormous scale, at a considerable cost and in an ever-shrinking window of time. For comparison, governments have so far mostly failed in producing credible plans for a “just transition” for a much smaller and more predictable number of fossil fuel workers poised to lose out as the world shifts to alternative energy sources. A decrease in human labour’s share of work responsibilities could also suppress wage growth. Another sector ripe for disruption by automation is transportation, which accounts for approximately 29 workers per 1,000 people in the European Union. Trucking could be hit particularly hard, affecting more than 2.2 million drivers in the United States and hundreds of thousands of workers in Canada. Self-driving vehicles in the freight industry are already being road-tested, with proponents saying autonomous trucks will not only be safer but also reduce shipping operator costs by 40 percent due to not having to hire a human driver. The vast majority of those human drivers, according to labour market research company Zippia, are white males over 48 years old with lower levels of education. Truck-driving is also the highest-paid “low-skilled” large labour segment remaining in the North American economy. Elsewhere, large AI language models, systems that understand and generate text, will eventually compete for millions of low-skilled jobs involving a range of customer support services. Existing models can already provide strikingly accurate and original responses to human interaction — so much so that Google researcher Blake Lemoine caused widespread alarm this past June by claiming that a chatbot based on Google’s LaMDA model had become sentient. Lemoine was later let go by the company. The capabilities of LaMDA and its rivals, such as OpenAI’s GPT-3 — which wrote an op-ed for The Guardian in September 2020 — and Meta’s free version, OPT-175B, will expand exponentially as they incorporate audiovisual material into their data training sets. Right now, these training sets consist only of huge troves of text scoured from across the internet. Moreover, user-friendly machine-learning models such as OpenAI’s Dall-E and those from Midjourney AI are producing increasingly sophisticated computer-generated art and illustrations, while others are generating music. Both will likely eliminate career opportunities in the creative industries. The impacts of technology will also upset social relations in other ways that can exacerbate culture wars and grievance politics. For example, cloud computing and better virtual reality for use in business meetings will provide white-collar workers with ever-greater job flexibility, just as climate change renders blue-collar jobs much more dangerous. This may entrench the sort of contentious digital divide and risk imbalance experienced between office staff and front-line workers during the pandemic. Meanwhile, consumer biotechnology will enable the well-educated and wealthy to live longer, healthier lives that will extend their working careers, possibly narrowing opportunities for young people and new graduates. At the same time, wider adoption of pre-crime and predictive policing tools could aggravate the discrimination and stigmatization already felt within disadvantaged communities. Policies that successfully attract tens of thousands of skilled immigrants to plug labour gaps in the tech sector could inflate local housing prices. Many thinkers are also already confronting questions about when and how — not if — intelligent machines could be granted some equivalent to human rights. In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari extrapolates even further. He posits that if this century’s technological advances — and the quasi-religious zeal attached to those gains — mean citizens in liberal democracies eventually cede much of their military and economic usefulness to robots and algorithms, the political system “will stop attaching much value to them.” The result, according to Harari, would be an erosion of the core liberal belief that each human, as an individual, holds intrinsic value and deserves to exercise choice through democratic elections and free markets. Should these scenarios come true, they are likely to worsen the already growing bifurcation within democratic politics — a split between those who believe in open economies and societies, and those seeking primacy for their chosen social and political tribes. The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Populism Reinvented The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Everywhere, their base of support is comprised of voters demanding retribution against an undefined set of “elites” perceived as clinging unfairly to the top of the socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, the meritocracy and promise of social mobility that have historically underpinned liberal democracies seem to be faltering. In 2017, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Peter Temin laid out an argument that escaping poverty in America takes 20 years of effort combined with uninterrupted good luck. Income inequality among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development prior to the pandemic was already at its highest levels in five decades, much of it due to the disappearance of middle-class job opportunities. More recently, a report from the UN Development Programme released in September warned that “in a stunning first,” cascading global crises had so impacted life expectancies, education levels and quality of life worldwide that its Human Development Index — a broad country-by-country measurement of human progress — had declined for two years in a row, a change equivalent to “erasing the gains of the preceding five years.” The latest annual World Inequality Report, produced by the Paris-based World Inequality Lab, sheds light on where these losses are being felt (and perceived) the most — the middle and working classes of wealthy nations. The past two decades of globalization have narrowed inequality between rich countries and the developing nations, while simultaneously increasing inequality within countries themselves. “This sharp rise in within country inequalities has meant that despite economic catch-up and strong growth in emerging countries, the world remains particularly unequal today. It also means that inequalities within countries are now even greater than the significant inequalities observed between countries.” The resulting angst is being channelled into democratic societies in visible and distressing ways — from online conspiracies and extremism to the embrace of political violence and victimhood as a source of identity and personal meaning. In short, many people in the Western world in particular are increasingly unable to deal with the dissonance between their subjective expectations for their lives and the objective material realities they must contend with. In 2022, the legacies of pandemic lockdowns and vaccine mandates, combined with a global energy crisis and red-hot inflation eating away at individuals’ purchasing power, are breathing new life into populist movements. And different types of tech-focused populists are emerging to harness this maelstrom of inequality, rage and technological advancement as a pathway to power. Among them are Republican Missouri Senator Josh Hawley, author of a book entitled The Tyranny of Big Tech. In vowing to “fight to recover America’s populist democracy,” Hawley epitomizes a growing number of ideologues and reactionaries, on the far right and far left both, who instinctively point to Google, Amazon, Facebook and Twitter as the cause of a whole range of modern ills, no matter how tenuous the connection. Conversely, the new leader of Canada’s opposition Conservative Party, Pierre Poilievre, has embraced technology’s potential for circumventing established institutions. An outspoken ally of the so-called “freedom convoy” that drew international attention for its weeks-long occupation of downtown Ottawa earlier this year, Poilievre won the Conservative leadership contest by a record margin by promising to make Canada the “freest country on Earth” via downsizing government and eliminating “gatekeepers.” This included Poilievre’s pledge to fire the governor of the Bank of Canada, which he made while avidly promoting cryptocurrencies because, he says, “Canada needs less financial control for politicians and bankers and more financial freedom for the people.” (Poilievre has noticeably toned down his public comments around cryptocurrencies after their recent crash.) However, while leaders of populist movements routinely rail against the excesses of government while in opposition, once they’re elected, manipulating the levers of state power tends to become central to executing their broader agenda. In that light, tech-savvy populists may eventually look to emulate the “techno-authoritarianism” of Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, or of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose Hindu nationalist government has been accused of encouraging citizens’ enrolment in India’s voluntary biometric ID system — the world’s largest, known as Aadhaar — as a means of gathering information needed to enact exclusionary populist policies that favour Modi’s Hindu nationalist base.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Econ DA

That causes nuclear war

Tønnesson 15 - Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Econ DA

Economic decline and national debt undercuts US Leaderships-Leads to deterrence and assurance failures

Landry Signé 12[Landry Signé, "The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt",7-10-2012, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-real-national-security-threat-americas-debt/, 1LEE]

Economic renewal and fiscal reform have become the preeminent issues, not only for domestic and economic policy but for foreign policy as well. As the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, was fond of saying, national debt has become perhaps our top national security threat. And neither major presidential candidate is doing enough about it. This issue needs to be framed as crucial not just for our future prosperity but for international stability as well.

The United States has been running trillion-dollar deficits, resulting in a huge explosion in the country’s indebtedness. Publicly held debt now equals 70% of gross domestic product, a threshold many economists consider significant and highly worrisome. Making matters worse, half of our current deficit financing is being provided by foreigners. We are getting by with low interest rates and tolerable levels of domestic investment only because they find U.S. debt attractive, which may not last.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Econ DA

Rate hikes would be detrimental to the economy – stock market, bonds, and mortgage loans prove.

Curry 23, (Ben is the Retirement and Investing Editor for Forbes Advisor. With two decades of business and finance journalism experience, Ben has covered breaking market news, written on equity markets for Investopedia, and edited personal finance content for Bankrate and LendingTree) “What Happens When The Fed Raises Interest Rates?," Forbes Advisor, 6/21/23, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/fed-raises-interest-rates/ // EE

Higher market interest rates can have a negative impact on the stock market. When Fed rate hikes make borrowing money more expensive, the cost of doing business rises for public (and private) companies. Over time, higher costs and less business could mean lower revenues and earnings for public firms, potentially impacting their growth rate and their stock values.

“If the cost of borrowing money from a bank increases, the opportunity to expand investment in capital goods by a corporation stalls,” says Dan Chan, a Silicon Valley investor and a former pre-IPO employee of PayPal. “The interest rate may be so high that many companies will not be able to afford to grow.”

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Econ DA

UBI inevitably drives demand higher than supply – creates a vicious cycle of rate hikes and inflation

CFI Team 20, (CFI is the leading global provider of training and productivity tools for finance and banking professionals. CFI delivers the skills, certifications, CPE credits, and resources to help anyone—from beginner to seasoned pro—drive their career in finance & banking.) “Universal Basic Income (UBI): An agreed-upon minimum income given to an individual to cover the the basic cost of living”, 6/16/20, // EE

A UBI system is still a theoretical approach, one that comes with good intentions and noble goals. Still, widespread financial equality and independence offer the potential to cause some serious economic issues.

One major issue with a universal basic income, raised by those who oppose such a practice, is inflation. It’s easy to see how the institution of a UBI may fuel inflation.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Solvency Deficits › Kills VTL

Life is a pre-requisite to expidenture

Itzkowitz 99 (Kenneth Itzkowitz is a professor of philosophy at Marietta, “To witness spectacles of pain: The hypermorality of Georges Bataille,” College Literature Vol. 26, No. 1 ///ghs-sc)

Yet in our lives there are also limits. It is unlikely that Bataille would applaud Manson for the same reason he ultimately rejects Sade. They are both indiscriminate; they both go too far. "Continuity is what we are after," Bataille confirms, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run. What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain. De Sade's aberration exceeds that limit. (Bataille 1962, 13) In other words, our wasteful consumption must also have limits. To actually approve of our own self-destruction goes too far. Later on in Death and Sensuality, Bataille continues, Short of a paradoxical capacity to defend the indefensible, no one would suggest that the cruelty of the heroes of Justine and Juliette should not be wholeheartedly abominated. It is a denial of the principles on which humanity is founded. We are bound to reject something that would end in the ruin of all our works. If instinct urges us to destroy the very thing we are building we must condemn those instincts and defend ourselves from them. (Bataille 1962, 179-80) This passage is crucial for understanding Bataille's ethics. Usually Bataille writes on behalf of the violence that remains unaffected by absolute prohibitions. Prohibitions cannot obviate this transformative violence. There is always ample motive to produce the experiences of sacred transformation, i.e., to transgress the prohibitions. Yet self-preservation is also a fundamental value for Bataille; there is also ample motive to resist the violence that denies the value of the well being of life itself. As he says in the second of the above passages, we must condemn what threatens to destroy us; our sovereign aspirations can be taken too far. In another passage he speaks of our need "to become aware of . . . [ourselves] and to know clearly what . . . [our] sovereign aspirations are in order to limit their possibly disastrous consequences" (1962, 181). It is when we are ignorant of these aspirations that we are most vulnerable to them, enacting them anyway, albeit inattentively.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Solvency Deficits › Kills VTL

Bataille kills VTL

Johnson 03 (David Johnson, Ph.D., “Why View All Time from the Perspective of Time’s End? A Bergsonian attack on Bataillean transience,” in Time and Society, 2003, ///ghs-sc)

Life is a serious business of highly charged temporal stakes, involving a being’s struggle to secure for itself the experience of pleasure time/free time rather than pain time/slave time. Since lived time is a living stake, death is not the profound phenomenon that Bataille thinks it is. For one who is racked by drawn-out pain, the pain of death situated at the end of time is an irrelevance. And for one who is caught up in the throes of extended pleasure, the dubious pleasure of death is likewise irrelevant. Death, far from being profound, may simply provide a pragmatic escape from a life of pain and toil, or a simple halt to a life of pleasure and freedom. We can see death as important to time in that it is the end of the great game of time, the great flow. But death is relative in importance to time for the same reason; it is simply the end of the great game of time, a game without which it would be pure abstraction. However, we are not suggesting that death has absolutely no importance for living beings. On the contrary. By countering Bataille’s view of death, which tries to domesticate death through attempting to engage it in ‘intimate’ dialogue, and which tries to make political gain out of death, we can see death as a real, non-negotiable phenomenon. Death can no longer be thought of as an ambiguous but essentially accessible deity, but must instead be seen as that which wipes out real substantial time with no hope of appeal. Death can now be viewed as a certain element in the game of time, as something to be dreaded or desired as the end of time, but which has no fixed moral or political meaning in itself. By affirming the reality of time we are in fact affirming the reality of death, and so we are proposing a more tragic philosophy than the one Bataille proposes – which is ironic, given that Bataille is considered by most postmodernist/ post-structuralist philosophers to be perhaps the cruellest thinker.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Solvency Deficits › Squo Unproductive

The USFG consistently invests in unproductive spending – inefficient use of capital, labor, time, and resources thump the aff

Chris Edwards 14 [1-9-2014. Chris Edwards: BA in economics from the University of Waterloo and an MA in economics from George Mason University. "Reducing Wasteful Federal Spending". https://www.cato.org/testimony/reducing-wasteful-federal-spending. 7-23-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

I have been reading the Washington Post for 24 years, and there has been a never‐​ending stream of articles on federal waste and agency failures. Programs do not work, officials are wasting taxpayer money, and many unscrupulous people are receiving improper payments.

However, federal waste is not just a modern phenomenon. I have researched some of the oldest federal agencies and found that cost overruns, pork‐​barrel spending, fraud, and scandals were common as far back as the 19th century. In that century, for example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was rife with corruption and organized groups plundered the aid sent to Indian tribes.3 The Army Corps of Engineers has also been known for mismanagement and pork‐​barrel spending for a very long time. The House Ways and Means Committee issued a report in 1836, for example, looking into chronic cost overruns in that agency’s projects.4

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Solvency Deficits › Gift prompts reciprocity

Inherent reciprocity nullifies solvency of the gift – increases tensions between the state and the people

Alan D. Schrift 14 [2014. Alan D. Schrift: M.A., Ph.D., Purdue University B.A., Brown University. "Should Philosophers Still Read Mauss? Thoughts on Contemporary American Politics". https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5325/jspecphil.28.3.0389.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6df8591d4117f5a9d87b13092db6912c&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1. 7-23-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

It appears, however, that this engagement with Mauss among anglophone philosophers is now a thing of the past, and I think that some of the responsibility for this also falls upon Derrida, or at least upon what I would call an insufficient reading of Given Time. That is to say, many readers of Given Time see Derrida’s laying out the fundamental aporia of the gift as an exemplary deconstruction. In what became a paradigmatic deconstructive gesture in his later works on hospitality, forgiveness, and ethics more generally, Derrida’s analysis of the gift reveals that the gift’s conditions of possibility are precisely the conditions of its impossibility. In other words, once the gift is recognized as a gift, it is no longer a gift; insofar as it is recognized as a gift, it obliges its recipient to reciprocate, and in the act of reciprocation, Derrida argues, the gift has been annulled.4 But as I said, a reading of Given Time that stops here is insufficient, for Derrida notes that Mauss’s Essay also “deals with economy, exchange, contract (do et des), it speaks of raising the stakes, sacrifice, gift and counter-gift—in short, of everything that in the thing itself impels the gift and the annulment of the gift,” and as such, Derrida playfully suggests that “Mauss’s Essay on the Gift s,peaks of everything but the gift.”5

We need here follow Derrida no further, although his suggestion that the gift is coextensive with a radical forgetting by both the donor—who will resent the gift until it has been returned—and the donee—who will feel it as a duty to repay until such restitution is discharged—might have ethical and economic implications that should give some of his followers reason to pause before they abandon Mauss to his possible/impossible aporia.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Productivity Good › Productivity Good

Standard of Living and productivity are directly proportional – a decrease in productivity means a decrease in the standard of living

McKinsey & Company 23 [2-13-2023. McKinsey & Company: global management consulting firm founded in 1926 by University of Chicago professor James O. McKinsey, that offers professional services to corporations, governments, and other organizations.. "What is productivity?". https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-productivity. 7-24-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

Focus up: you probably know that the amount of work you can get done in one day is your rate of productivity. Productivity in economics is pretty much the same as productivity at your desk. But for companies or even countries, measuring productivity is a little more complex than how well you were able to hold a video call over the construction noise from the street or your cat’s incessant meowing.

On a country scale, productivity can mean the difference between good and not-so-good standards of living. For a company, productivity can determine whether it can afford to increase wages for its employees or even if it can continue operating. Stagnating or contracting productivity can spell serious trouble ahead for individuals, organizations, and nations alike.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Author Indites › Bataille

His theory links to itself – valorizing expidenture recreates the order of instrumental reason

Wolin 04 (Richard Wolin is a Distinguished Professor of History and Political Science at the CUNY Graduate Cente, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology in ‘The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism,’” 2004 ///ghs-sc)

At times, Bataille's celebration of transgression for its own sake seems woefully simplistic. In lieu of a conceptual framework that would permit one to distinguish between constructive and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption simpliciter. Bataille seeks to ground postmodern ethics in the attitudes of a cultural avant-garde (Acephale and the College of Sociology) oriented toward precapitalist life forms that modernity has scorned. Yet the very idea of achieving a conceptual reckoning with Bataille-generated ideals such as "transgression," "heterogeneity," and "expenditure" would seem inimical to their very spirit. In his idiom, to rely on procedures of principled legitimation or a rational accountability would be to succumb to the logic and rhetoric of "productive consumption"—the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and commodity exchange. (165)

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Author Indites › Bataille

Bataille’s theory is functionally useless in the era of postmodern consumer capitalism

Yang 2000 (Mayfair Mei-hui Yang is a Professor of Anthropology at the University of California Santa Barbara, “Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual Expenditure,” Current Anthropology, University of Chicago Journals ///ghs-sc)

Scholars such as Jean‐Joseph Goux () have pointed to a troubling overlap between Bataille’s views on luxury and sacrificial expenditure and postmodern consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is also predicated on massive consumption and waste rather than on the thrift, asceticism, and accumulation against which Bataille directed his theory of expenditure. It exhibits potlatch features in the tendency for businesses to give goods away in the hope that “supply creates its own demand”; it collapses the distinction between luxury and useful goods and between need and desire (Goux ). Unlike modernist capitalism, postmodern consumer capitalism is driven by consumption rather than production. Thus, Bataille’s vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism does not address this different phase of consumer capitalism, whose contours have only become clear since his death in 1962. It seems to me that despite their overt similarities, the principles of ritual consumption and those of consumer capitalism are basically incompatible. If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the service of production and productive accumulation, since every act of consumption in the world of leisure, entertainment, media, fashion, and home décor merely feeds back into the growth of the economy rather than leading to the finality and loss of truly nonproductive expenditure. Even much of modern warfare is no longer truly destructive but tied into the furthering of military‐industrial production. Nor, despite its economic excesses, does our consumer culture today challenge the basic economic logic of rational private accumulation as a self‐depleting archaic sacrificial economy does. Furthermore, capitalist consumption is very much an individual consumption rather than one involving the whole community or social order.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › Author Indites › Bataille

Bataille supports fascism – reject his theory

Richard Wolin 6 [Oct 1996. Richard Wolin: Distinguished Professor of European Intellectual History at the CUNY Graduate Center. “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology”. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-8675.1996.tb00037.x. 7-18-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

Here, the analysis must begin with an examination of Bataille’s essay, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” often rightly hailed as a theoretical breakthrough in our understanding of the mass psychological appeal of modern authoritarian rule. Yet, the essay also contains a barely veiled admiration for the vitality and energy of the existing fascist states, especially when contrasted with the decadence and inertia of the contemporary European democracies. Bataille purveys a critique of parliamentarianism that is as zealous as anything one finds in the work of Carl Schmitt. Parliamentary decision-making, he claims, partakes wholly of the order of the homogenous. It aims solely at co-optation, the elimination of difference. As such, it is purely instrumental and serves primarily to suppress the breakthrough of heterogeneous elements that threaten to explode the normative bases of the given economic and political order. As Bataille observes, in a striking anticipation of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s association of “consensus” and “terror”: “The reduction of differences in parliamentary practice indicates all the possible complexity of the internal activity of adaptation required by homogeneity.60 Bataille can perceive no fundamental differences between the conduct of political and economic life in modern democratic societies, insofar as both are examples par excellence of homogeneity – this despite the fact that discussion aims at mutual understanding, whereas economic activity is goal-oriented and utilitarian. Given this curt dismissal of the institutional bases of democracy, it comes as little surprise that Bataille glorifies the role played by fascism in modern political life as a type of breakthrough of the heterogeneous. For Bataille, “the fascist leaders are incontestably part of heterogeneous existence. Opposed to democratic politicians, who represent in different countries the platitude inherent to homogeneous society, Mussolini and Hitler immediately stand out as something other.”62 What he admires about these men and the movement they represent is that they embody “a force that situates them above other men,” which accounts for their “sovereignty.” Yet, he also esteems greatly their thoroughgoing antagonism to law: “the fact that laws are broken is only the most obvious sign of the transcendent, heterogeneous nature of fascist action.”63 Here, the parallels with Schmitt’s critique of bourgeois legal positivism are of course profound. Both Schmitt and Bataille view the institution of law as the consummate embodiment of the spirit of bourgeois rationalism. It symbolizes everything they detest about the reigning social order: its prosaic longing for security, its unrevolutionary nature, its abhorrence of “transcendence,” its anathematization of the vitality and intensity one finds in the “exception” (Schmitt) or “transgression” (Bataille). Moreover, for Bataille the system of law merits especially harsh treatment insofar as it signifies a type consecration of the profane order of things, as such, it stands as an impediment to contact with the heterogeneous or the sacred. Bataille concludes his endorsement of fascist politics with the following encomium: “Heterogeneous fascist action belongs to the entire set of higher forms. It makes an appeal to sentiments traditionally defined as exalted and noble and tends to constitute authority as an unconditional principle situated above any utilitarian judgment.” As opposed to the bourgeois order of life, which, with its utilitarianism and its legalism, merely sanctifies “the prose of the world,” fascism offers a new political aesthetic, the return, as it were, of an aesthetic politics: a type of politics that reintroduces the long lost elements of charismatic leadership (in Bataille’s terms, “sovereignty”), violence, and martial glory. It is, moreover, a politics that facilitates a great emotional cathexis between leaders and masses, a point which Bataille emphasizes repeatedly. For one of fascism’s great attributes is that it “clearly demonstrates what can be expected from a timely recourse to reawakened affective forces” – forces capable of guaranteeing a measure of collective solidarity, which have been banished from a society in which the division of labor and rationalization reign supreme. In sum, fascism serves to reintroduce a type of ecstatic politics into the forlorn and disenchanted landscape of political modernity, a politics that aims at the creation of a quasi-Nietzschean ecstatic community.