2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › K Extensions on Case
Jason Hickel and Dylan Sullivan 23 {Jason Hickel is professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is the author of The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions (Penguin, 2017) and Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World (Penguin, 2020). ICTA-UAB is supported by the María de Maeztu Unit of Excellence grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). Dylan Sullivan is adjunct fellow and PhD student in the School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, where he teaches in politics, sociology, and anthropology. His research focuses on global inequality, colonial history, and the economics of socialist planning., } - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023,
Progress Today Should Be Measured Against Decent Living Standards
Noting that extreme poverty was not the normal condition of human- ity prior to the rise of capitalism is not to say that life was great at that time. Clearly nobody then had access to the higher welfare standards that are available today. This is where industrialization and technologi- cal development become so important. Industrialization has brought the capacity to produce new goods that did not exist in the past: electricity, modern health care, public transit, clean cooking fuel, higher education, communication technology, household durables, and so on, which make it possible to achieve high life expectancies and decent lives for all. By these standards, obviously most everyone was poor prior to industrializa- tion, as these goods did not exist or were very rare.
We have already established that extreme poverty is not a legitimate benchmark against which to measure progress at any time. But it certainly should not be used as a threshold for human welfare today. The higher-or- der goods that exist today are essential to decent living and should be available to everyone. As a share of global productive capacity, this does not require much (as with basic goods like food and shelter in the pre-in- dustrial period). Yet the scale of decent-living poverty is astonishing: 2.4 billion people lack food security; 3.2 billion cannot afford a healthy diet; 3.2 billion do not have a clean cooking stove; 3.6 billion do not have safely managed sanitation facilities; 3.8 to 5 billion people do not have access to essential health services.13
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › K Extensions on Case
Jason Hickel 23 {Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy} - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023, https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/on-technology-and-degrowth/)//penelope/
Under capitalism, essential goods are either underproduced (public transit) or commodified and priced out of reach of working-class house- holds (housing, health care, higher education, and so on). This explains why even in rich countries, despite their high levels of aggregate produc- tion, many people cannot make ends meet. In the United States, a quarter of the population lives in substandard housing and nearly half cannot afford health care. In the United Kingdom, 4.3 million children live in poverty. Why? Because the productive forces are organized around the interests of capital rather than around the interests of people.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › K Extensions on Case
Jason Hickel 23 {Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy} - ("Monthly Review," Monthly Review, published 7-1-2023, accessed 7-23-2023, https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/on-technology-and-degrowth/)//penelope/
Finally, green growth scenarios maintain high levels of energy use in high-income countries by constraining energy use, and therefore devel- opment, in the Global South—in some cases to levels that are below what is required for even basic needs.6 This approach is obviously immoral and unjust (the term ecofascist comes to mind), and clearly unacceptable to Global South negotiators. It is worth noting here, furthermore, that achieving and maintaining a decarbonized economy for high-income countries with their existing levels of energy use (and automobile use) would require extraordinary levels of material extraction for all the ener- gy infrastructure and batteries, most of which will be obtained from the Global South through supply chains that are already in many cases social- ly and ecologically destructive. Yes, we need renewable energy transition. But needlessly high energy use in rich countries means this transition will be slower and the social and ecological costs will be higher.
In sum, green growth scenarios play loose with science, assume in- credibly unjust arrangements, and gamble with the future of humani- ty—and all of life on Earth—simply to maintain ever-increasing levels of aggregate output in high-income countries, which, as we will see, is not even needed.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Decoupling Fails
Wiedmann 23 – (Thomas Wiedmann is a Professor of sustainability research in the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, UNSW Sydney, Australia and holds a PhD, University of Ulm, Germany, Department of Analytical and Environmental Chemistry); "Degrowth critiques of the circular economy," Australian Circular Economy Hub, https://acehub.org.au/news/degrowth-critiques-of-the-circular-economy//penelope/
Recently, several academic articles have questioned the circular economy (CE) concept on the grounds that it will not be able to decisively reduce environmental impacts as it operates in and supports economic growth. These “degrowth critiques of circular economy” argue that we need to change the way we utilise energy and materials more fundamentally to achieve necessary transformations. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? In short: It is not possible to “circle” an economy out of growth (George et al., 2015). Both energy and material consumption are so tightly linked to economic activity (Wiedmann et al., 2015) that CE in its current form is not likely to be able to decouple this link. Efforts to increase resource efficiency have in the past not led to the desired reduction. This is because gains in efficiency tend to lead to the paradox situation that they increase consumption. This has been true for more than 150 years and is known as Jeavons’ Paradox (Bauwens, 2021). CE principally fails in preventing or mitigating this rebound effect (Corvellec et al., 2022). For example, money saved on leasing, renting, sharing, or pooling a product is likely to be spent on other, potentially more environmentally damaging activities (Hofmann, 2019). A panel data analysis of CE in 28 European countries indeed confirmed that economic growth in these countries was responsible for increasing resource extraction four times more than CE practices helped to reduce it (Bianchi and Cordella, 2023). As long as the stock of materials in buildings and infrastructure is growing, the extraction of primary resources will remain necessary, as the supply of recycled material will not be sufficient (Bianchi and Cordella, 2023). And even if an equilibrium could be achieved, i.e. a zero net-addition to stock situation where all new construction material demand is satisfied with secondary materials, non-recyclable materials such as fossil fuels and some biomass will still need to be extracted. This holds true for replacing fossil with renewable energy, since this requires an increased amount of metals and other materials, all of which will need to be extracted first. Due to the laws of thermodynamics, completely closed material loops will never be possible, i.e. virgin raw materials will always be needed, even to just keep the status quo, let alone grow economies (Corvellec et al., 2022). A complete substitution of conventional linear products is not only unlikely, it is impossible in principle. Hence what is needed is a deliberate downscaling of the linear economy and a redesigning of the circular economy to focus on the prevention of material use in the first place.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Decoupling Fails
Brad Plumer 18 {Brad Plumer is a reporter covering climate change, energy policy and other environmental issues for The Times's climate team, } - ("You’ve Heard of Outsourced Jobs, but Outsourced Pollution? It’s Real, and Tough to Tally Up (Published 2018)," No Publication, published 9-4-2018, accessed 7-21-2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/climate/outsourcing-carbon-emissions.html)//penelope/
Over the past decade, both the United States and Europe have made major strides in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions at home. That trend is often held up as a sign of progress in the fight against climate change.
But those efforts look a lot less impressive once you take trade into account. Many wealthy countries have effectively “outsourced” a big chunk of their carbon pollution overseas, by importing more steel, cement and other goods from factories in China and other places, rather than producing it domestically.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Decoupling Fails
James D. Ward et al 16 {School of Natural and Built Environments, University of South Australia, } - ("Is Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible?," Plos, published 10-14-2016, accessed 7-20-2023 https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0164733//penelope/
Our model demonstrates that growth in GDP ultimately cannot plausibly be decoupled from growth in material and energy use, demonstrating categorically that GDP growth cannot be sustained indefinitely. It is therefore misleading to develop growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible. However, we also note that GDP has been shown to be [chart omitted] a poor proxy for societal wellbeing, something it was never designed to measure, and GDP growth is therefore a questionable long-term societal goal in any case. The mounting costs of “uneconomic growth” [43] suggest that the pursuit of decoupling–if it were possible–in order to sustain GDP growth would be a misguided effort.
Society can sustainably improve wellbeing, including the wellbeing of its natural assets, but only by discarding the goal of GDP growth in favor of more comprehensive measures of societal wellbeing [44]. The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),recently agreed to by all UN countries, represent a much broader conception of the goals of society. These goals include eliminating poverty and hunger, reducing inequality, protecting and restoring the climate, and terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Only one of the 17 goals mentions GDP growth, but it is qualified as “inclusive and sustainable growth”. Certainly, GDP growth over the last several decades has not been inclusive–inequality is getting worse in most countries. For GDP growth to be sustainable it would have to be decoupled from energy and material use and environmental impacts. We have shown that there is little evidence that GDP growth can be decoupled in the long-term (i.e. it is not sustainable).
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Decoupling Fails
Parrique et al 19 { Timothée Parrique, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden } - ("," No Publication, published 07-2019, accessed 7-20-2023, https://eeb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)//penelope/
> The validity of the green growth discourse relies on the assumption of an absolute, permanent,∂ global, large and fast enough decoupling of economic growth from all critical environmental∂ pressures. The literature reviewed clearly shows that there is no empirical evidence for such∂ a decoupling currently happening. This is the case for materials, energy, water, greenhouse∂ gases, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss for which decoupling is either only relative,∂ and/or observed only temporarily, and/or only locally. In most cases, decoupling is relative. When∂ absolute decoupling occurs, it is observed only during rather short periods of time, concerning∂ only certain resources or forms of impact, for specific locations, and with very small rates of∂ mitigation.∂ > There are at least seven reasons to be sceptical about the occurrence of sufficient decoupling∂ in the future. Each of them taken individually casts doubt on the possibility for sufficient∂ decoupling and, thus, the feasibility of “green growth.” Considered all together, the hypothesis∂ that decoupling will allow economic growth to continue without a rise in environmental∂ pressures appears highly compromised, if not clearly unrealistic.∂ 1 Rising energy expenditures. When extracting a resource, cheaper options∂ are generally used first, the extraction of remaining stocks then becoming a∂ more resource- and energy-intensive process resulting in an increase in total∂ environmental degradation per unit of resource extracted.∂ 2 Rebound effects. Efficiency improvements are often partly or totally compensated∂ by a reallocation of saved resources and money to either more of the same∂ consumption (e.g. using a fuel-efficient car more often), or other impactful∂ consumptions (e.g. buying plane tickets for remote holidays with the money saved∂ from fuel economies). It can also generate structural changes in the economy that∂ induce higher consumption (e.g. more fuel-efficient cars reinforce a car-based∂ transport system at the expense of greener alternatives, such as public transport∂ and cycling). ∂ 5∂ 3 Problem shifting. Technological solutions to one environmental problem can create∂ new ones and/or exacerbate others. For example, the production of private electric∂ vehicles puts pressure on lithium, copper, and cobalt resources; the production of∂ biofuel raises concerns about land use; while nuclear power generation produces∂ nuclear risks and logistic concerns regarding nuclear waste disposal.∂ 4 The underestimated impact of services. The service economy can only exist on∂ top of the material economy, not instead of it. Services have a significant footprint∂ that often adds to, rather than substitute, that of goods.∂ 5 Limited potential of recycling. Recycling rates are currently low and only slowly∂ increasing, and recycling processes generally still require a significant amount of∂ energy and virgin raw materials. Most importantly, recycling is strictly limited in its∂ ability to provide resources for an expanding material economy.∂ 6 Insufficient and inappropriate technological change. Technological progress∂ is not targeting the factors of production that matter for ecological sustainability and∂ not leading to the type of innovations that reduce environmental pressures; it is not∂ disruptive enough as it fails to displace other undesirable technologies; and it is not∂ in itself fast enough to enable a sufficient decoupling.∂ 7 Cost shifting. What has been observed and termed as decoupling in some local cases∂ was generally only apparent decoupling resulting mostly from an externalisation∂ of environmental impact from high-consumption to low-consumption countries∂ enabled by international trade. Accounting on a footprint basis reveals a much∂ less optimistic picture and casts further doubt on the possibility of a consistent∂ decoupling in the future.∂ > This report highlights the need for a new conceptual toolbox to inform and support the design and∂ evaluation of environmental policies. Policy-makers have to acknowledge the fact that addressing∂ environmental breakdown may require a direct downscaling of economic production and∂ consumption in the wealthiest countries. In other words, we advocate complementing efficiency oriented policies with sufficiency policies, with a shift in priority and emphasis from the former∂ to the latter even though both have a role to play. From this perspective, it appears urgent for∂ policy-makers to pay more attention to and support the developing diversity of alternatives to∂ green growth.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Geoengineering Bad
Chelsea Harvey 23 { Chelsea Harvey covers climate science for Climatewire. She tracks the big questions being asked by researchers and explains what's known, and what needs to be, about global temperatures. Chelsea began writing about climate science in 2014. Her work has appeared in The Washington Post, Popular Science, Men's Journal and others.} - ("Geoengineering Is Not a Quick Fix for the Climate Crisis, New Analysis Shows," Scientific American, published 4-3-2023, accessed 7-15-2023, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/geoengineering-is-not-a-quick-fix-for-the-climate-crisis-new-analysis-shows/)//marlborough-HL
Geoengineering Is Not a Quick Fix for the Climate Crisis, New Analysis Shows The IPCC recently warned about missing global temperature goals, raising interest in technologies such as solar geoengineering. Credit: Pierre Longnus/Getty Images CLIMATEWIRE | A controversial idea for cooling the earth’s climate through artificial means would likely require a much longer global commitment than policymakers and the public understand, according to a recent study that raises new questions about the potential for using solar geoengineering. If world leaders decide to use solar geoengineering to meet international climate goals, they could be locked into it for a century or more, the study suggests. The potentially long timeframe further complicates the debate about geoengineering and its viability. Geoengineering is “often communicated as temporary, a stopgap measure — so it implies being relatively short, and short in the sense of a couple of decades,” said lead study author Susanne Baur, a doctoral candidate at the European Centre for Research and Advanced Training in Scientific Computation in France. “And so when we started looking at these pathways, and we extrapolated them a bit longer, we saw that in many cases, it’s actually not that short.” The public may not realize the scope of a commitment solar geoengineering — or its risks, including the need for long-term international cooperation. “If we have to keep up a system like this for such a long time, that just increases the possibility of something bad happening,” Baur said. Solar geoengineering refers to a kind of climate geoengineering aimed at manipulating the amount of solar radiation that hits the planet. The most commonly discussed strategy involves spraying special reflective aerosols into the atmosphere to beam sunlight away from the earth, lowering global temperatures. It’s just an idea for now. And it’s highly contentious. Solar geoengineering risks and side effects range from possible damage to the earth’s ozone layer to inadvertent changes in global precipitation patterns. Once started, it would be dangerous to stop unless enough carbon had been sucked out of the atmosphere to lower the earth’s temperatures below a safe threshold. Otherwise, a sudden halt to geoengineering could cause temperatures to skyrocket, potentially faster than life could adapt, a concept known as “termination shock.” The risks have prompted scientists to urge international discussion and agreement about regulating geoengineering experiments and deployments. The new study, published March 28 in the journal Earth System Dynamics, analyzes how solar geoengineering could be used to meet climate targets and how long the world would have to maintain the practice to meet the targets. The time frames range vastly, the study finds. If nations quickly reduce emissions and atmospheric carbon, solar geoengineering could be unnecessary. But based on the carbon-cutting commitments nations have made under the 2015 Paris Agreement, solar geoengineering would likely have to persist for at least a century to keep global warming within a threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius, the study found. The study modeled hundreds of potential geoengineering scenarios to account for factors such as how quickly global emissions fall, how much carbon is removed from the atmosphere each year and how the climate system physically responds, which is still uncertain. Although the projected timelines range from no geoengineering to hundreds of years, few scenarios resulted in a timeline of less than 100 years. Those scenarios generally assume extremely aggressive climate action.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Geoengineering Bad
Ryan Gunderson 1,*,Brian Petersen 2 Anddiana Stuart et al 18 {Department of Sociology and Gerontology, Miami University, Department of Geography, Planning and Recreation, Program in Sustainable Communities, Northern Arizona University School of Earth Sciences and Sustainability, Program in Sustainable Communities, Northern Arizona University}- ("A Critical Examination of Geoengineering: Economic and Technological Rationality in Social Context," MDPI, published 1-20-2018, accessed 7-18-2023,
Related to the repelling of social alternatives, pure technological rationality works against reflection on the goodness of ends. This is a problem in the context of climate change because, as Gardiner [139] argued, climate change is the “perfect moral storm,” or, a convergence of complex global, intergenerational, and theoretical issues that makes answering and responding to ethical questions difficult, increasing susceptibility to moral corruption and inaction. In another powerful analogy borrowed from the climate scientist Gavin Schmidt, climate change is analogized as a boat being rocked by one traveler (polluters) and another traveler (geoengineers) “offers to use his knowledge of chaotic dynamics to try to counterbalance the first [polluters], but admits that he needs huge informational resources to do so, cannot guarantee success, and may make things worse” [33] (p. 249). Of course, the analogy is loaded, as it would be better for the “reckless, callous, and shallow” boat rocker to “just sit down” (reduce emissions) than to risk further human influence on the climate system [33] (p. 249).
Before concluding the discussion of geoengineering from the perspective of Marcuse’s theory of technological rationality, Gardiner’s boat rocking analogy is a helpful entry point for briefly commenting on how Marcuse can contribute to the discussion of climate ethics and the ethics of geoengineering. As stressed in this project, Marcuse helps explain why the boat rocker cannot sit down (the drive to accumulate capital), why counteracting this rocking is suggested as an alternative to sitting down (the reproduction of capital accumulation), and why this alternative is increasingly considered a viable solution to climate change (the radical instrumentalization of reason). In other words, as stressed in this project, Marcuse’s primary contribution to ethical reflection about climate change and geoengineering is “negative” and sociological (i.e., placing these ethical considerations in socio-economic context and predicting that capitalist society may be structurally incapable of responding ethically). However, Marcusian thought can make positive contributions as well. Marcuse’s distinction between essence and appearance (see Section 2.2) is not only analytical, but also an “ethical imperative, which states that our existence ought to conform to our essence“ [140] (p. 95). The latter entails a search for social movements and actors who may have be able to overcome the capital-climate contradiction and form a society in which humanity is able to “sit down” (reduce emissions) and be happy. Gunderson [60] (p. 231) argued that the movement to sustainably contract the economy (“degrowth”) (see Section 2.1) is Marcusian in nature. Marcuse’s [71] support of Third World liberation indicates that he would side with the Global South in questions of global climate justice. Further, influenced by Walter Benjamin’s messianism [35] (p. 19), questions of intergenerational climate justice would be imperative for Marcuse, informed by a future-oriented analysis of what is potential in the current social order. Finally, his late work on the “new sensibility” and “new technology” (e.g., [70,71]) have applications for discussions of environmental solutions, including climate change responses [66]. While a systematic elaboration of these insights sits outside of the aims of this project, there are positive contributions to be learned from Marcuse, and critical theory more generally, in climate ethics and politics.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Renewables Bad
Sonter’20 [Laura J. Sonter: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Gund Institute for Environment, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA. Marie C. Dade: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada. James E. M. Watson: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY, USA. Rick K. Valenta: Sustainable Minerals Institute, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia] Laura J. Sonter, Marie C. Dade, James E. M. Watson & Rick K. Valenta, Renewable energy production will exacerbate mining threats to biodiversity, 9-1-2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17928-5/HZ
Future mining threats to biodiversity The global area influenced by mining will almost certainly grow in extent and density in future, and the increased demand for renewable energy technologies and infrastructure will likely be one contributing factor. While diverting some of the materials used in non-renewable energy infrastructure may minimize threats of renewable energy production to biodiversity, fossil fuels will still likely play an important role in meeting the future energy demands of a growing global population. We discovered a greater proportion of pre-operational mines targeting materials needed for renewable energy production (83.9%) compared to operational mines targeting these materials (72.8%; Supplementary Table 2), and that pre-operational mining areas targeting the materials critical for renewables also seem more dense than those targeting other materials (3.2 vs. 2.7; Supplementary Table 2). Increasing the extent and density of mining areas will obviously cause additional threats to biodiversity, and our analysis reveals that a greater proportion of mines targeting materials for renewable energy production may further exacerbate threats to biodiversity in some areas (here demonstrated by their increased mining density within Key Biodiversity Areas and Remaining Wilderness at the global scale). Careful strategic planning is urgently required to ensure that mining threats to biodiversity caused by renewable energy production do not surpass the threats averted by climate change mitigation and any effort to slow fossil fuel extraction and use. Habitat loss and degradation currently threaten >80% of endangered species, while climate change directly affects 20%37. While we cannot yet quantify potential habitat losses associated with future mining for renewable energies (and compare this to any reduced risks of averting climate change), our results illustrate that associated habitat loss could be a major issue. At the local scale, minimizing these impacts will require effective environmental impact assessments and management. Importantly, all new projects must adhere strictly to the principals of the Mitigation Hierarchy38, where biodiversity impacts are first avoided where possible before allowing compensation activities elsewhere. While compensation may help to overcome some of the expected biodiversity impacts of mining in some places39, rarely does this approach achieve No Net Loss outcomes universally39,40.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Renewables Bad
Sonter’20 [Laura J. Sonter: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Gund Institute for Environment, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA. Marie C. Dade: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada. James E. M. Watson: School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY, USA. Rick K. Valenta: Sustainable Minerals Institute, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia] Laura J. Sonter, Marie C. Dade, James E. M. Watson & Rick K. Valenta, Renewable energy production will exacerbate mining threats to biodiversity, 9-1-2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17928-5/HZ
Climate change poses serious threats to biodiversity1,2. To keep temperature increases below 2 °C, and halt associated biodiversity losses, 140 nations committed to the Paris Climate Change Accord to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by 90% (from 2010 levels) and reach carbon neutrality by 21003. Energy sector innovation is where most progress is achievable4, but since renewable energies currently account for only 17% of global energy consumption5, significant production increases must occur to phase out fossil fuel use6. However, the production of renewable energies is also material-intensive—much more so than fossil fuels7—meaning that future production will also escalate demand for many metals8,9,10,11. It is unlikely that these new demands will be met by diverting use from other sectors or from recycling materials alone12,13. When required commodities exist in biodiverse countries that lack strong resource governance, such as the world’s second largest untouched lithium reserve in Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni salt pan5—a biodiverse area currently untouched by mining14—mining poses serious threats to species and ecosystems15. Global conservation efforts are often naive to the threats posed by significant growth in renewable energies. Production infrastructure (e.g. for wind and solar farms) has a significant spatial footprint16 and other environmental risks17, but potentially more extensive are the direct and indirect consequences of associated mining activities15,18. While some protected areas (PAs) prevent mineral extraction and prospecting activities, more than 14% of PAs contain metal mines within or nearby their boundaries19 and consequences for biodiversity may extend many kilometers from mining sites20. Other areas that are increasingly important for future conservation investment (such as Key Biodiversity Areas21), are not designed to consider the distribution of mineral resources and pressures to extract them, as they focus instead on the needs of biodiversity only. Conservation plans for these sites must identify and develop strategies to manage all major threats to biodiversity, to ensure that mining the materials needed for renewable energy production does not simply replace the climate change-related threats mitigated by reducing fossil fuel use22,23. Here, we map the global extent of areas potentially influenced by mining, according to 62,381 pre-operational, operational, and closed mining properties that target 40 commodities (Supplementary Table 1). We use a 50 km wide radius around each mining property to capture the potential influence of both direct and indirect impacts of mining on biodiversity, but also produced a conservative estimate of mining areas using a 10 km radius (see “Methods” section). We distinguish areas targeting the materials that, among many other uses in society today, will be critical for renewable energy production (here referred to as critical mining areas) from those targeting other materials (e.g. fossil fuels and fertilizers; referred to as other mining areas). We quantify the spatial overlap of mining areas with nationally designated PAs24 and sites considered important priorities for halting biodiversity loss (Key Biodiversity Areas21 and Remaining Wilderness25). We compare this overlap between mining and non-mining areas (using the latter as a baseline); between critical and other mining areas (to determine threats by renewable energy production); and among closed, operational and pre-operational areas (to indicate potential future trends). We also develop and examine an index of mine density (i.e. the number of mining properties within 50 km of each 1 km2 cell), which indicates local human pressure26 and thus potential extinction risk for many endangered species27, within overlap areas to determine differences between critical mining areas and other mining areas. We find that mining areas overlap with conservation areas and priorities and, although these areas are not more likely to overlap than other mining areas are, their areas overlapping with PAs and Remaining Wilderness do contain a greater mining density. Results and discussion Global extent and composition of mining areas Mining potentially influences 49.9 million km2 of Earth’s terrestrial land area (37%, excluding Antarctica), assuming impacts extend 50 km from mine sites (Fig. 1)—an enormous spatial footprint not specifically factored into global biodiversity threat maps26 or conservation plans28. Most mining areas (82%) target materials critical for renewable energy production (Supplementary Table 2). Critical mining areas contain five times more mines and target three times more commodities than other mining areas do (Supplementary Table 1). However, despite their larger spatial extent, critical mining areas are less dense than other mining areas (2.0 vs. 3.5 for operational mining properties; Supplementary Table 2), due to differences in resource distributions and relative production costs. For example, annual coal production (7813 Mt in 2018)29 greatly exceeds that of copper metal (21 Mt)30 (i.e. a commodity required for renewable energies; Table 1). Most copper is produced in the form of concentrate, so the tonnage of material transported in a similar way to coal would be in the order of 80 Mt. Thus, the world coal industry transports two orders of magnitude (100×) more material than the copper industry. This assertion is supported by production data per mine31, showing that the average material transported from a coal mine is more than 10 times the amount of concentrate shipped from a copper mine. As a result, costs per mine for coal are more dependent on pre-existing proximate processing and transportation infrastructure, leading to a closer clustering of these operations.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Renewables Bad
Lewis’23 [Michael Lewis is a Live Oak environmentalist and defender of the natural world of the Santa Cruz Bioregion.] Michael Lewis, ‘Renewable’ energy is unsustainable”, February 14, 2023 https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2023/02/14/guest-commentary-renewable-energy-is-unsustainable/HZ
The solution proposed is to replace fossil fuels with so-called renewable resources, such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, wave and tidal energy sources, those that do not, it is said, produce CO2 at the point of use. This solution has never been tested. We don’t know if reducing GHG will have the desired result. Part of the problem is the terminology: “renewable” and “sustainable.” “Renewable” in terms of energy resources, has come to mean: “capable of being replaced by natural ecological cycles or sound management practices.” In climate change terms, “renewable” implies that finite resources such as petroleum and coal are capable of being replaced by solar, wind, gravity, tides and hydro dams as “renewable resources.” There are two problems with this approach. Replacing fossil fuels with “renewables” means replacing a highly dense, reliably available (though finite), relatively inexpensive energy source with a dispersed, unreliable (in the short term) energy resource that requires reliable nonrenewable backups and extensive battery storage capability. In addition, “renewable” resources require complex and costly infrastructure to transform the dispersed unreliable energy sources into reliable energy useful to our complex and ever growing civilization. This infrastructure is built with finite resources such as metals, rare earth minerals, lubricating oils, polycarbonate plastics, silicon cells, exotic chemicals and cement, all of which require mining, processing, manufacture, transportation, distribution, dismantlement and recycling. In climate change parlance, sustainable means: “the integration of environmental health, social equity and economic vitality in order to create thriving, healthy, diverse and resilient communities for this generation and generations to come.” By this analysis, “renewables” are not renewable at all, nor are they sustainable, any more than are non-renewable resources. In addition solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, off-shore wind, wave and tide energy require the destruction of natural habitats and extensive impacts on the species that live there. We are seeing vast acreages of fragile desert ecosystems slathered with solar panels, access roads and support facilities, hills and plains dotted with wind generators and piles of dead raptors and other birds and bats. With this understanding, we can see that global energy systems cannot replace fossil fuels with so-called “renewable” and “sustainable” energy sources within the existing unsustainable political/economic/social system of perpetual economic and population growth at current levels of per capita consumption.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Renewables Bad
Marsh’23[Editor-in-Chief of Environment.co]Jane Marsh, How Renewable Energy Impacts Biodiversity March 17, 2023 https://www.endangered.org/how-renewable-energy-impacts-biodiversity/#:~:text=The%20destruction%20of%20plant%20life,sources%20threatens%20to%20destroy%20them/HZ
NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON BIODIVERSITY Renewable energy production often destroys habitats and hurts wildlife. Even if there are regulations against this, the sites can still cause harm to animals. Solar panels — for example —- take up a lot of space and drive animals out of their habitat. Energy production affects biodiversity with its construction and placement: Habitat loss: Energy sources take away space from plants and animals. Wildlife destruction: Renewable energy sources stress animals and even kill them. Wind turbines spin with great force and may harm birds or bats. Land Damage: The construction of renewable energy sources damages the land’s natural layout and destroys plants. Displacement: Displaced animals are sent to live elsewhere when renewable energy sources are built on their homes. Renewable energy is supposed to be environmentally friendly, but it damages local ecosystems and threatens endangered species. For example, take the effect of a solar energy development on Mojave desert tortoises. The tortoises live up to 80 years, but the threat to their habitat puts those lives in danger. The plan meant the tortoises would likely be displaced and struggle to adapt to their new environment. The destruction of plant life and wildlife is a common side effect of renewable energy. Endangered plants cannot relocate, so the construction of renewable energy sources threatens to destroy them. For example, a proposed lithium mine threatened a rare wildflower in 2022 called Tiehm’s buckwheat because it would’ve destroyed the flower’s habitat. Although lithium isn’t strictly renewable, it makes rechargeable energy that powers phones, cars and laptops. Even though renewable energy is good, the negative impact on biodiversity outweighs the positive environmental impact of rechargeable energy.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › AI Impact
Salvador Pueyo 18 - Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona. 10/01/2018. “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence.” Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736. //Penelope/
The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration.2 More directly, it is argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect production technologies and also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the socioeconomic and ecological context in which it develops. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, Sec. 5), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal scenario. Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies on a global level, which urges governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to avoid interfering in their functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast to degrowth views: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. The thought experiment illustrates how superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist markets could have very undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere. It also suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, if a non-negligible probability is assigned to these two futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation. 2. Thought experiment: superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs.
The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek argued that the spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans, because markets, he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies are actively transferring decisions to markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery (Davenport and Harris, 2005).
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Unsustainability
William I. Robinson 19 {American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His work focuses on political econo} - ("Global Capitalist Crisis and Twenty-First Century Fascism: Beyond the Trump Hype*," Science & Society, published 05-2019, accessed 7-20-2023, https://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf)//penelope/
How these three sectors of capital came together in the United States with state and paramilitary forces was abundantly demonstrated in 2016 in a military-style counterinsurgency against indigenous activists and their allies who were peacefully protesting the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline in lands near their Standing Rock Sioux reservation in North Dakota. Bankrolled by a consortium of banks that included Wells Fargo and Bank of America, the private Fortune 500 oil and gas company building the pipeline, Energy Transfer Partners, hired a mercenary and security firm known as TigerSwan, which originated as a Pentagon and State Department contractor for the Middle East wars. TigerSwan was charged with organizing a counterinsurgency campaign against the protesters in coordination with the company and with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, including National Guard troops. “Aggressive intelligence preparation of the battlefield and active coordination between intelligence and security elements are now a proven method of defeating pipeline insurgents,” stated TigerSwan, in calling the anti-pipeline protesters “jihadist fighters” and the protest area a “battlefield.” The “less than lethal” arsenal unleashed by the public–private counterinsurgency apparatus included rubber bullets, bean bag pellets, LRAD sound devices, water cannons, attack dogs, predator drones, metadata imaging, counterintelligence and psyops (Brown, 2017). While the Standing Rock ordeal is a chilling case study in paramilitarization of the global police state, such operations carried out against social justice movements are now routine around the world (see, i.a., Graham, 2011).
Classical and current discussions on fascism also stress national military expansionism. We are indeed seeing an escalating militarization that involves the increasingly autonomy and power of the military, in the United States and in many countries around the world. But I believe the concept of global police state has more analytical purchase and is more robust in discussing the nature of the current global militarization. The global order as a unity is increasingly repressive and authoritarian and particular forms of exceptional national states or national polities, including 21st-century fascism, develop on the basis of particular national and regional histories, social and class forces, political conditions and conjunctures. Yet the militarization of cities, politics and culture in such countries as the United States and Israel, the spread of neo-fascist movements in North America and Europe, the rise of authoritarian regimes in Turkey, the Philippines, and Honduras, are inseparable from these countries’ entanglement in webs of global wars and militarized transnational accumulation, or global war economy. Trumpism and Twenty-First–Century Fascism Let us reiterate that civil and political society are a unity; there can be no stable or hegemonic project without a correspondence between the two. In the United States, a neo-fascist insurgency can be traced back to the far-right mobilization that began in the wake of the crisis of hegemony brought about by the mass struggles of the 1960s and the 1970s, especially the Black and Chicano liberation struggles and other militant movements by third-world peoples, the feminist, gay liberation, anti-war, counter-cultural, and militant working-class struggles.4 Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › Unsustainability
William I. Robinson 19 {American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His work focuses on political econo} - ("Global Capitalist Crisis and Twenty-First Century Fascism: Beyond the Trump Hype*," Science & Society, published 05-2019, accessed 7-20-2023, https://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf)//penelope/
By conflating authoritarianism and fascism we lose the ability to distinguish between the two. Moreover, capitalist globalization and a global police state are decidedly not “statism.” Its whole thrust is dismantling state intervention in the market and the liberation of capital from state controls. The state is reduced to a repressive apparatus to control popular forces from below and an instrument for opening up opportunities for transnational accumulation, including opportunities for militarized accumulation and accumulation by repression. In this regard, 21st-century fascism and a global police state involve a triangulation of far-right, authoritarian, and neo-fascist forces in civil society, reactionary political power in the state, and transnational corporate capital, especially speculative finance capital, the military–industrial–security complex, and the extractive industries, all three of which are in turn dependent on and interwoven with high-tech or digital capital. The extractive and energy complexes must dislodge communities and appropriate their resources, which make them most prone to supporting or even promoting repressive and neo-fascist political arrangements. Capital accumulation in the military–industrial–security complex depends on never-ending wars and on systems of repression. Financial accumulation requires ever greater austerity that is hard, if not impossible, to impose through consensual mechanisms.
2023
DDI
Negative
Extensions › Degrowth K › RC: Populism
EuropeNow 22 [EuropeNow is an online journal that publishes 5-6 issues per year. It also publishes individual articles on a rolling basis via its Daily section. EuropeNow features research, commentaries, book reviews, interviews, and teaching & learning content pertinent to Europe, alongside literary nonfiction, fiction, poetry, translations, and visual art from or concerning Europe. EuropeNow‘s contributors are both established and emerging academics, artists, authors, educators, and journalists from a wide range of countries and disciplines, while the editorial committee members similarly consist of both experienced and emerging editors. EuropeNow is published by the Council for European Studies (CES) at Columbia University, a non-profit organization that recognizes outstanding, multi-disciplinary research on Europe through a wide range of programs and initiatives. These include fellowships, grants, publications, awards, conferences and meetings, public lectures and symposia, as well as direct research and artistic collaboration. CES is particularly committed to supporting research that can play a critical role in understanding and applying the lessons of European history and integration to contemporary problems, including those in the areas of global security, sustainability, environmental stewardship, health, social policy, and democracy. Since 1979, CES has hosted the annual International Conference of Europeanists, one of the world’s most prestigious professional gathering for academics, researchers, and policy specialists focusing on Europe, with more than a thousand scholars attending each year. The Conference alternates location between Europe and North America, “The National-Populist Mutation of Neoliberalism,” Europe Now, 2022/11/02, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2022/11/02/the-national-populist-mutation-of-neoliberalism/, accessed 7-21-2023] EAY
In contrast to the conventional approach to populism, neoliberalism scholars (mostly sociologists, historians, and social anthropologists) have been more skeptical about the supposed clash between right-wing, nationalist populism, and neoliberalism. In a path-breaking piece of research on Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, Kurt Weyland has shown that populism and neoliberalism can cohabit comfortably (Weyland 1999). In another crucial paper, Adam Harmes has distinguished between internationalism and neoliberalism (Harmes 2012). While internationalists embrace all forms of global political cooperation, neoliberals oppose forms of political globalization that would entail a new set of international institutions curtailing capital accumulation. Thus, as Harmes concludes, neoliberalism can depend on nationalist policies if they enhance capital accumulation. Right-wing populism has emerged within neoliberalism in Germany and Austria, not in opposition to it (Slobodian 2018). Several key supporters of Brexit have also argued for a return to the British state not to challenge neoliberalism but to shield it from European regulation and embark on a new export-oriented neoliberal trajectory (Wood and Ausserladscheider 2020). According to this emerging consensus amongst neoliberalism scholars, in many cases, right-wing populism is not a wholesale rejection of neoliberalism but only a variety of it. This new version remains within the neoliberal framework, amounting to a “mutation of neoliberalism” (Callison and Manfredi 2020). In contrast to the conventional approach to populism, this emerging neoliberalism literature also implies that some businesses support right-wing populists (Slobodian 2021). Thus, the two views, two academic discourses separated by disciplinary walls, could be hardly more different. In my recent article published in Socio-Economic Review (Scheiring 2022), I enter this debate by presenting a framework to analyze the national populist mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies. Following theory-testing process tracing, I substantiate this theoretical framework through a detailed mixed-method study of the strategic test case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Utilizing new empirical material on businesses and policymakers, I show how the polarization of the business class rooted in global dependency structures, in interaction with a rising group of nationalist technocrats, has contributed to the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism. National-populist neoliberalism entails a new power bloc and a new compromise between national and transnational capital. It has preserved the core tenets of neoliberalism while modifying some of its peripheral elements and cutting back on avant-garde excesses to ensure the political viability of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism meets national-populism Neoliberalism has three faces: an intellectual-professional project, a repertoire of policies, and a form of politics (Mudge 2008). As a form of politics, neoliberalism is against the types of capitalism that put temporary shackles on capital accumulation in the name of popular pressures or national development goals. In response to these models, neoliberalism does not dismantle the state but builds new state institutions to improve accumulation conditions. Market-fundamentalism should not be confused with the “proto-neoliberalism” of Hayek, who was critical of laissez-faire and saw much room for an interventionist state. Market-fundamentalism also differs from the “rollout” phase of neoliberalism in the 1990s and 2000s, a period when neoliberalism relied on active state-building and regulatory reform to constitute markets and protect them from democratic intervention (Peck and Tickell 2002). Close to neoliberalism as a form of politics, I regard neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy. As suggested by Bob Jessop, “an ‘accumulation strategy’ defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ complete with its various extra-economic preconditions” (Jessop 1991). Such accumulation strategies represent temporarily stable formations of the capitalist circuit, where various factions of the business class are conjoined, usually under the leadership of a dominant faction. In core capitalist countries, the Keynesian social-democratic configuration was the accumulation strategy of the post-war era. At the same time, import-substitution developmentalism—including state socialism—was the accumulation strategy in semi-peripheral countries. Neoliberalism emerged as the alternative to these strategies. Following Aldo Madariaga (2020) and Cornel Ban (2016), I differentiate the core tenets of neoliberalism from its peripheral aspects. Peripheral institutions can change without jeopardizing core institutions. This distinction is crucial for “neoliberal resilience,” a process whereby neoliberalism dynamically adapts to external shocks to ensure its survival. The resilience of neoliberalism depends on the ability of dominant social groups to “defend those aspects of a neoliberal policy regime that—in their view—better serve their interests while allowing degrees of freedom in those aspects that they view as less relevant” (Amable and Palombarini 2009). According to Cornel Ban, at the core of neoliberalism are institutions designed to serve three primary goals: 1) credibility with financial markets, 2) trade and financial openness, and 3) competitiveness (Ban 2016). Neoliberalism is constantly evolving, negotiated by local actors filtered through domestic power struggles and ideologies, relying on different instruments to secure popular legitimacy, leading to different hybrids. However, as long as politics adheres to these core institutions, the accumulation strategy remains neoliberal. In the real world, neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy and as a form of politics never presents itself as a pure ideology, or a set of internally coherent policies. It is embedded in social relations. Neoliberalism must ensure its political survival by forging coalitions that carry neoliberalism through the forest of governance. Neoliberalism must meet the needs of these social coalitions. Furthermore, in democratic societies, neoliberalism must secure an electoral majority to survive. Reagan and Thatcher relied on moral panics and a revival of traditional values to legitimate neoliberalism. Blair and Clinton fetishized globalism, and the spread of liberal democracy, while shifting some resources back to redistribution and human capital development to smooth the tensions inherent to neoliberalism. Some of these political instruments are at odds with economic textbook definitions of pure neoliberalism. Nevertheless, all these versions of neoliberalism remained committed to ensuring credibility with financial markets, trade and financial openness, and international competitiveness. The political instruments used to build social coalitions and to secure an electoral majority did not lead to a fundamental change in the accumulation strategy; there was no reversal back to Keynesian social democracy or a shift to a new alternative economic model. Combining Weyland’s notion of “neoliberal populism” and Harmes’s notion of “neoliberal nationalism,” I regard national-populism as a “legitimation strategy” that can contribute to the political sustainability of neoliberalism. Populism as a legitimation strategy appeals to a mass public using a Manichean logic that opposes the virtuous people to corrupt elites and affiliated out-groups (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). National-populist neoliberalism is thus a compromise between the core of neoliberalism and the political imperatives of advancing national interests, relying on populism as a legitimation strategy. National-populist neoliberalism emerged as an alternative to globalist neoliberalism. Globalist neoliberalism corresponds to what Nancy Fraser called ‘progressive neoliberalism’ (Fraser 2017) in core countries and what Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits labeled ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) in the foreign-investment-dependent economies of Central Europe. Globalist neoliberalism differs from the radical neoliberalism exemplified by Chile or the Baltic states in dependent semi-peripheral countries (Madariaga 2020) or the early “roll back” phase of neoliberalism in core countries, which relied on an authoritarian-conservative populist legitimation strategy opposed to later progressive globalism (Hall 1985) The mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies In semi-peripheral, dependent economies, such as Hungary, or most countries in Latin America and Europe’s eastern periphery, the business class is polarized based on access to international markets and technology. Compared to transnational capitalists, national capitalists have less access to the most successful sectors of the global economy. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie of peripheral states is structurally prone to rely directly on its political connections to compete with transnational companies. However, transnational capital must also compromise with domestic political and economic elites to secure the conditions of accumulation. Economic crises act as historical contingencies that throw the class compromise between the segments of the power bloc into question, thus jeopardizing the hegemony of neoliberalism. In these situations, elites need to reach a new consensus and reconstitute the power bloc. The balance of power determines whether the response to these crises leads to a new accumulation strategy or a modification of peripheral aspects of the prevailing accumulation strategy. If the national capitalist class is strong enough to mobilize but weak to dominate transnational capital, and if populists can mobilize disillusionment with neoliberalism, then the resolution of the crisis of the neoliberal accumulation strategy will be the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism. In Hungary specifically, globalist neoliberalism was an accumulation strategy maintained by the class compromise of transnational corporations (TNCs), technocrats, and politicians. It institutionalized industrial policy based on economic openness and a strict preference for transnational capital. Taxation became increasingly less progressive, with a race to the bottom on corporate tax. Globalist neoliberalism also relied on redistribution to pacify the victims of neoliberalism, which led to a combination of austerity to maintain fiscal balance and recurring deficits and cycles of indebtedness. Discursively, globalist neoliberalism offered economic modernization, a cosmopolitan ideology of human rights, democratization, and European integration as a source of mass legitimation. It also attempted to depoliticize economic questions to prevent the political mobilization of economic anger. The exhaustion of this globalist neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 2000s led to the polarization of the business class and the growing influence of nationalist technocrats. Facilitated by national-populist politicians, national capitalists reached a new compromise with transnational capital, retaining the core aspects of neoliberalism. Figure 1 presents a summary of this process.
2023
DDI
Negative
1NC › Case › 1NC Frontline
An Li, 8-10-2021, "Global Green New Deal Needs a Global South Perspective," Progress in Political Economy (PPE), https://www.ppesydney.net/global-green-new-deal-needs-a-global-south-perspective/
Moreover, despite the GGND’s emphasis on the amount of job creation in Southern countries, it nevertheless fails to pay enough attention to the quality of these jobs. An important shared characteristic of countries in the Global South is the existence of a large informal sector. An ILO estimate shows that informal employment is 85.8% of total employment in African countries, 71.4% in the Asia and Pacific region, 68.6% in the Arab states, and 53.8% in the Americas. The jobs that the GGND creates could be largely concentrated in the informal sector, where workers are not protected by labor laws, lack social welfare and employment benefits, are underpaid and overworked, and have less job security. Indeed, our estimation shows that in both solar and wind energy sectors, informal employment can take about 55% of all the generated employment!
Last but not least. A main feature of most GGND proposals is that they would create green jobs in the economy through investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. However, having a large number of green jobs does not necessarily mean that these jobs are good jobs for a sustainable society. Recent studies show that although the amounts of energy and emission required to create each dollar of output have declined (i.e. today’s technologies are more efficient), the growth of the global economy has completely wiped out the efficiency gains. The end result is increasing, not decreasing global GHG emissions. Besides, although the GGND is likely to generate a short-run economic boom, decades of global neoliberalism shows that the distribution of the economic benefits can be highly unequal, and the financial sector may extract too much value from the green economy. This is especially relevant for the Global South since it is usually the place where such contradiction manifests itself.
2023
DDI
Negative
1NC › Case › 1NC Frontline
Pat Toomey, 4-22-2021, US Senator and former Representative, "Toomey: Green New Deal Policies Destroying Jobs, Raising Energy Prices," U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey-green-new-deal-policies-destroying-jobs-raising-energy-prices
Today, I expect we will hear calls for Green New Deal-type policies. Our discussion needs to include the costs of these policies, including lost American jobs, slow economic growth, increase energy costs, and waste billions of taxpayer dollars.
Our discussion should also include the remarkable progress we’ve made in reducing carbon emissions – ironically enough, using fossil fuels. Let me explain.
2023
DDI
Negative
1NC › Case › 1NC Frontline
Julius Alexander McGee and Patrick Trent Greiner, June 2019, Both: Ph.D., assistant professor at University of Oregon, “ Renewable energy injustice: The socio-environmental implications of renewable energy consumption," Energy Research and Social Science,
Second, and conversely, the negative interaction between renewable consumption and income inequality, as measured by Gini coefficient, indicates that those nations that are effectively using renewable consumption in order to displace fossil fuel consumption, and thereby reducing higher levels of emissions, are also failing to confront the various sources of income inequality that spring from energy infrastructures at the national level. We argue that in such a situation there is a reliance on, and encouragement of, the installation of dispersed, individual level, renewable energy production systems. Such an approach to the expansion of renewable energy consumption would effectively displace consumption from fossil fuels. However, the individualist strategy employed in such scenarios would also greatly limit the number of potential renewable energy consumers to those financially capable of investing in such a capital-intensive resource. Additionally, reductions in the total number of kWh drawn from fossil fuel sources among those privileged enough to access individually maintained renewable systems could serve to drive up the prices of fossil fuel sourced energy as utility companies seek to recapture losses. Ultimately, such changes may exacerbate previously existing inequalities by leading to those populations who are unable to afford renewable installations paying more per kWh of energy than their wealthier counterparts.