2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Climate Advantage › 2NC – No Feedback Loops
Koven ’19 [Charles. *staff scientist @ Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. “2°c Is Not Known to Be a ‘Point of No Return’, as Jonathan Franzen Claims.” Climate Feedback. September 17, 2019.
According to our best climate models, which include all of the feedback loops that we can figure out how to put into them, there are not any thresholds beyond which warming will, on its own, spin out of control. It is true that, if the planet reaches higher amounts of warming, then we expect current carbon sinks to weaken and new processes like permafrost thaw to emit greenhouse gases. But at the same time, we also expect that the amount of warming from each additional increment of CO2 [carbon dioxide] that ends up in the atmosphere will weaken as its concentration increases.
The surprising result when we couple all of these processes together in models is that these two sets of effects tend to cancel each other out, so that the total amount of warming is roughly proportional to the cumulative amount of CO2 [carbon dioxide] we have emitted. Every bit of carbon that we emit is an extra bit of warming that the planet will experience.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Climate Advantage › 1NC – Carbon Tax Fails
Goldstein ’20 [Lorrie. *columnist for the Toronto Sun, citing a report by the Fraser Institute. “Carbon Taxes Have Been a Massive Failure, Fraser Report Study Finds.” Toronto Sun. October 20, 2020. https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/goldstein-carbon-taxes-have-been-a-massive-failure-fraser-report.]perth
“Overall, no high-income OECD country with a carbon tax has implemented it based on sound design,” said Elmira Aliakbari, co-author of the study, Carbon Pricing in High-Income OECD Countries.
“Poorly-designed carbon taxes, like those in all high-income countries around the world, do not deliver on the promise of cost-effective emissions reductions. Instead (they) cause serious and harmful economic effects that increase costs, scare away investment and deter entrepreneurship.”
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Climate Advantage › 2NC – Squo Solves Infra
Porter 21- economics reporter for the business section of The New York Times (Eduardo, “Should the Feds Guarantee You a Job?,” The New York Times, 2-18-21, Accessed Online at )
The question is, would the Biden administration embrace a policy not deployed since the New Deal?
“We tried to set the bar at a federal job guarantee,” said Darrick Hamilton, an economics professor at the New School for Social Research. He was among advisers to Senator Bernie Sanders who worked with Mr. Biden’s representatives before the November election to devise an economic strategy the Democratic Party could unite behind. “It was the cornerstone of what we brought in.”
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Climate Advantage › 1NC – Squo Solves Infra
Newburger & Cortés ’23 [Emma and Gabriel. *reporters for CNBC. “Inflation Reduction Act Has Spurred 100,000 New Green Jobs so Far: Here’s Where They Are.” CNBC. February 7, 2023. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/07/inflation-reduction-act-which-states-have-most-new-green-jobs-so-far.html.]perth
Since President Joe Biden signed the historic Inflation Reduction Act into law last August, companies have announced more than 100,000 clean energy jobs across the country, by the nonprofit Climate Power.
As of the end of January, companies have announced more than 90 new clean energy projects in small towns and larger cities in the U.S., totaling $89.5 [eighty-nine point five] billion in new investments, the report found. The wind, solar and EV manufacturing sectors are creating the new positions, which include electricians, mechanics, construction workers and technicians.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Economy › 2NC – AT: Supply Shocks
Ozdemir ’22 [Dilek, Mahak Sharma, Amandeep Dhir, and Tugrul Daim; February 2022; Assistant Professor at Izmir Katip Celebi University, Ph.D. from Istanbul Technical University; Researcher at the National Institute of Industrial Engineering, Ph.D. from the National Institute of Industrial Engineering; Professor of Research Methods at the University of Agder, Ph.D. from the University of Helsinki; Professor at Portland State University, Ph.D. from Portland State University; Technology in Society, “Supply chain resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic,” vol. 68]
Understanding the effectiveness of existing practices must figure prominently on the agenda of the supply chain literature in the face of the pandemic. Our second main finding indicates that both proactive and reactive resilience-building activities have enhanced supply chain velocity during the pandemic. Studying the effect of supply chain risk management on supply chain resilience and robustness, El Baz and Ruel [102] report similar results. Examining supply chains of essential goods, Sodhi et al. assert that traditional approaches, such as redundancies, can be effective during pandemics [103]. Sharma and her colleagues state that focusing on resilience not only helps during pandemics but also exerts positive long-term effects on supply chain viability [104]. While noting that companies have applied multiple practices, Woong and Goh [105] identify ‘increasing capacity’, ‘diversifying single-product categories’, ‘local sourcing’, ‘prioritising critical categories’, ‘repurposing assets’, ‘establishing partnerships’ and ‘leveraging social media influence’ as the most common supply chain risk management practices. Consistent with our findings, they suggest that both proactive and reactive strategies have helped companies to overcome problems in their supply chains. Although these findings are valuable, the area remains open to additional investigation.
Highly contradicting findings and diverse perspectives exist in the pandemic-era supply chain literature. Nevertheless, we know that the pandemic has affected every industry differently; thus, no one-size-fits-all solution exists. The extant literature on supply chain resilience in the pandemic context emphasises the need to think outside the box. Supply chains must be reconsidered and redesigned to enhance their viability [,,,, , [106]]. Our results reveal that existing resilience-building approaches are effective but insufficient.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Economy › 1NC – AT: Supply Shocks
Drezner ’22 [Daniel; January 2022; Professor of International Politics in The Fletcher School at Tufts University, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University; Reason, “Where’s My Stuff?” ]
Americans can be forgiven for thinking that every critical system we rely on is breaking down. The country—nay, the globe—has endured years of social, political, environmental, and epidemiological upheaval. Pick your shock: COVID-19, wildfires, George Floyd protests, climate change, January 6. They all seem like harbingers of a chaotic future.
But backlogs in Pottery Barn orders are when shit gets real.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Economy › 2NC – AT: Decline
Walt ’20 [Stephen; 5/13/20; Professor of International Relations at Harvard University; " Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]
On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.
2023
UTNIF
Negative
Neg – Climate Jobs – Case › Economy › 1NC – AT: Decline
Laio ’19 [Jianan; 2019; Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School; International Symposium on Social Science and Management Innovation, “Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation,” vol. 68]
Through the comparison of the two views, it can be found that both sides are too vague in the description of the concept of business cycle. According to economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, the business cycle is divided into four phases: expansion, crisis, recession, recovery. [12] Although there are discords in the division and naming of business cycle, it is certain that they are not simply divided into two stages of rise and recession. However, as mentioned above, scholars who discussed the relationship between business cycle and war often failed to divide the business cycle into four stages in detail to analyze the relationship.
First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impacts › !---No Russia War---2AC
Maugeri ’14 [Leonardo. *former Senior Fellow, Geopolitics of Energy Project. “Why Low Oil Prices Could Make Russia’s Putin Even More Combative.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 2014. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-low-oil-prices-could-make-russias-putin-even-more-combative.]perth
Oil prices rose again after the appointment in August 1999 of a relatively unknown political figure as the new prime minister, a move interpreted by many as just another Yeltsin experiment doomed to failure. That prime minister was Vladimir Putin, who was eventually elected President of Russia in 2000, which kicked off a decade in which oil prices reached historic highs. Oil windfall profits allowed Putin to build up an undeniable domestic consensus, restoring political stability and re-launching Russia on the international scene.
Now, however, the combination of the Ukraine crisis, international sanctions and falling oil prices open up new, worrisome scenarios for Putin, Russia and the world order. International sanctions that have hurt the Russian economy have further added to the pressure on Putin.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Impacts › !---No Middle East War---2AC
Logan ’20 [Justin. *senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East." Defense Priorities, September 30 (2020).]perth
For example, one possible scenario in which the U.S. military might come in handy is if a state like Iran were poised to conquer and consolidate control over a major oil terminal such as Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, giving it an uncomfortable, not to say market-making, amount of control over world oil markets. Fortunately, though, Iran will not have anywhere near that kind of power-projection capability in the policy-relevant future. If it did, America’s carrier-based airpower and long-range bombers could handle the threat relatively easily, meaning that nearby ground forces would not be needed. As one study of the military balance in the Gulf put it, “Iran’s land forces are shaped largely for defense in depth and seem to have limited long-range maneuver capability and uncertain survivability in the face of Arab Gulf and allied airpower.”21 This is not an offensive military power poised for conquest.
No Middle Eastern country has a shot at regional hegemony. The regional balance of power, in particular the defensive capabilities of the major states, prevents it. Power in the region is divided among Iran, Saudi Arabia (and its Gulf allies), Egypt, Turkey, and Israel. Successful conquest of even a smaller weaker state like Yemen or Lebanon would likely inflame local identity politics, which would inhibit further expansion.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Links › L/T---Petrostate Power---2AC
Berling et al. ’21 [Trine, Peer Schouten, Izabela Surwillo. *Senior researchers at DIIS. “Renewable Energy Will Lead to Major Shifts in Geopolitical Power.” Danish Institute for International Studies. October 4, 2021. https://www.diis.dk/en/research/renewable-energy-will-lead-to-major-shifts-in-geopolitical-power.]perth
The political and economic power of petrostates will gradually decline as renewable energy sources become more widespread. This means that states like Russia and the Gulf States might lose their status as powerhouses in the geopolitics of energy. This can create internal instability with potential spillover risks for entire regions. Already, countries like Sudan, Nigeria and Chad may be facing ‘shock decarbonization’ as revenues from oil – their main export commodity – plummet, leaving regimes unable to sustain fragile political settlements.
In the absence of powerful global governance structures, we can expect new conflict lines to emerge from at least three central developments. First, the shift from carbon to renewable forms of energy also means a shift between different forms of power. Second, the future will be defined by governance forms tightly connected to specific energy technologies. Third, the global demand for transition-critical minerals to produce renewable energy will accelerate and pull new states to the center of geopolitical competition.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Links › L/T---Lower Cost---2AC
Panetta ’22 [Fabio. *Italian economist, member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. “Greener and Cheaper: Could the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels Generate a Divine Coincidence?” European Central Bank. November 16, 2022. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html.]perth
Yet there are other supply forces at work that might lower prices. Supply may increase if fossil fuel producers extract their reserves now due to the “frontloading channel”.[12] Also, innovations in fossil fuel technologies, such as carbon capture and storage solutions, might support investment through the “brown innovation channel”.[13] This would cause fossil fuel prices to fall.
Demand channels also matter.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Links › N/L---No Tradeoff---2AC
Nyquist ’15 [Scott. *director in McKinsey’s Houston office. “Lower Oil Prices but More Renewables: What’s Going On?” McKinsey & Company. June 2015. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/lower-oil-prices-but-more-renewables-whats-going-on.]perth
There are four main reasons why the link between oil and renewables appears to be weakening.
They operate in different markets. Oil is predominantly used for transport—cars, trucks, planes. Very little of it is used for power; oil accounts for less than 1 percent of power generation in the United States and Canada, for example, and not much more in Europe. Globally, the figure is around 5 percent. Renewables, in contrast, are used mostly to create electricity. The more important factor for renewables, then, is not the price of oil, but the price of electricity, and the latter is not entirely a function of the cost of fuel. The electrical grid itself is expensive, which is why US power costs, which are relatively low in global terms (an average of 12 cents per kilowatt-hour), have been rising. In Europe and Japan, electricity costs are significantly higher, and the relative position of renewables is correspondingly better.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › UQ › U---Transition Now---2AC
Wallace-Wells ’22 [David. *American journalist covering climate change. “Opinion | the Green Transition Is Happening Fast. The Climate Bill Will Only Speed It Up.” The New York Times, August 17, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/opinion/environment/inflation-reduction-act-climate-change.html.]perth
This year, global investments in clean energy are expected to exceed those in fossil fuels; in the United States, investments in clean tech have roughly quadrupled since 2017. For 90 percent of the world, clean energy is now cheaper than dirty alternatives, and while countries like Spain are boasting about by 2030, in Texas, solar output 39-fold in just six years. Globally, renewable output has grown fourfold in the past decade. Ten years ago, when the United States endeavored to tackle the problem of climate change, it tried to do so largely by punishing the cost of dirty energy with a cap-and-trade system. This time, it’s giving a kick start, or a boost of momentum, to an already ongoing green transition.
In the weeks since Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia first announced his reversal and brandished the basic text of his proposed compromise, this strategic choice of carrots rather than sticks has received some deserved praise: It’s better and more popular to subsidize cheap, clean energy than it is to make the bad stuff more expensive. Sticks could be useful too, of course, since it is ultimately how much carbon we put into the atmosphere and not how much solar power we produce that determines the future of warming. But the power of carrots also just reflects some new realities: To simplify radically, a 90 percent reduction in the cost of solar power over the last decade means that the same amount of money now goes ten times as far.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › UQ › U---High Prices---2AC
Cohen ’22 [Patricia. *reporter for NYT. “Clean Energy Investment Lags as Oil and Gas Prices Soar.” New York Times. June 6, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/22/business/oil-gas-prices-clean-energy.html.]perth
Oil and gas prices are likely to remain inflated for years given the uneven transition to cleaner energy sources, the head of the International Energy Agency said Wednesday.
The push to end dependence on Russian oil and gas, coupled with efforts to battle climate change, has bumped up the pace of investments in green technology. But the increases “are not enough to replace fossil fuels,” said Fatih Birol, the agency’s executive director, which “may mean we will still see high and volatile energy prices for some time to come.”
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff Answers › UQ › U---Low Investment---2AC
Crowley ’23 [Kevin. *reporter for Bloomberg Business. 2023. “Oil Investors Get $128 Billion Handout as Doubts Grow about Fossil Fuels.” Bloomberg. March 4, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-04/oil-producers-hand-128-billion-to-investors-as-doubts-grow-about-future-of-fossil-fuels.]perth
Global investment in new oil and gas supplies already is expected to fall short of the minimum needed to keep up with demand by $140 billion this year, according to Evercore ISI. Meanwhile, crude supplies are seen growing at such an anemic pace that the margin between consumption and output will narrow to just 350,000 barrels a day next year from 630,000 in 2023, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Management teams from the biggest US oil companies recommitted to the investor-returns mantra as they unveiled fourth-quarter results in recent week and the 36% slump in domestic oil prices since mid-summer has only reinforced those convictions. Executives across the board now insist that funding dividends and buybacks takes priority over pumping additional crude to quell consumer discontent over higher pump prices. This may pose a problem in a matter of months as Chinese demand accelerates and global fuel consumption hits an all-time high.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Block › Impacts › !---Russia Scenario---2NC/1NR
Ryan ’23 [Kevin. *senior fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Belfer Center. “Why Do We Think Putin Won’t Use ‘the Bomb’?” The Hill. April 10, 2023.
In the first three months of 2023, Putin has taken several public steps to make his nuclear threats real. In February, he signed a law “suspending” Russia’s participation in the strategic nuclear arms treaty, START. In March, Putin announced he will “place tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus,” where nuclear capable Iskander missile systems are already deployed. These steps come as Putin and his inner circle continue their threats to use nuclear weapons.
When asked the odds that Putin might use a nuclear weapon in the current struggle, we opine “not likely” or “less than 50 percent.” Similar assessments were wrong about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. We can’t afford to be wrong about nuclear weapons now.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Block › Impacts › !---Russia Scenario---2NC/1NR
Gehlbach & Luo ’22 [Scott, and Zhaotian. *professor in the Department of Political Science @ the University of Chicago **assistant professor in the Department of Political Science @ the University of Chicago. “Putin Is Gambling His Future — and Russia’s.” Washington Post. The Washington Post. February 20, 2022.
Such a scenario isn’t impossible, but it is not likely. A 2022 invasion of Ukraine would look nothing like the lightning strike on Crimea in 2014, or even like the grinding conflict in the Donbas that followed. Ukraine isn’t likely to be able to stop a full-scale assault, but it can inflict substantial casualties. With help from the West, Ukrainian insurgents would continue to send Russian soldiers home in body bags, making a prolonged conflict likely.
And Putin has done little to prepare the Russian public for such losses. Russians reportedly have little appetite for a war with Ukraine, in what would be Russia’s largest military conflict since the Cold War. Opinion surveys show declining support for the conflict in Eastern Ukraine that will soon enter its ninth year, with less than 10 percent of the Russian population in support of open conflict with Ukrainian troops.
2023
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Block › Impacts › !---Middle East Scenario---2NC/1NR
Beres ’23 [Louis. *Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue. “Figuring the Odds of an Israel-Iran Nuclear War: A Complex Task for Logic, Mathematics and Law.” Jurist. April 13, 2023. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2023/04/louis-beres-israel-iran-nuclear-war/.]perth
There is more. An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war between Israel and Iran could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between fully rational leaders, but also as the unintended consequence of mechanical, electrical, or computer malfunctions. This includes hacking interference, and should bring to mind a corollary distinction between unintentional/inadvertent nuclear war and an accidental nuclear war. Though all accidental nuclear war must be unintentional, not every unintentional nuclear war would be generated by accident. An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war could sometime be the result of misjudgments (both fundamental and seemingly trivial) about enemy intentions.
“In war,” says Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously in his classic , “everything is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” In fashioning a successful ‘endgame’ to any future nuclear confrontation with Iran, it would be vital for Israel’s leaders to understand that this sort of crisis is about much more than maximizing any ‘correlation of forces’ or missile-interception capabilities. It will be about imaginative intuition and variously antecedent notions of .
2023
UTNIF
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Block › Impacts › !---Middle East Scenario---2NC/1NR
The Economist ’22 [“Israel’s Unexpected Military Alliance in the Gulf.” The Economist. June 30, 2022. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/06/30/israels-unexpected-military-alliance-in-the-gulf.]perth
On June 20th Israel’s defence minister, Benny Gantz, gave the first official confirmation of this alliance when he told members of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, that he had been working with America on a programme for strengthening defence co-operation between Israel and Arab countries. This included building a Middle East Air Defence (mead) system “against Iranian attempts to target countries in the region using rockets, cruise missiles and uavs [unmanned aerial vehicles]”. More startling still, he added, “This programme is already operating, and has already led to thwarting Iranian attempts.”
Israel and its new chums have released few details of mead publicly, though Israeli politicians privately say it will consist of a region-wide network of radar systems alongside batteries of missile interceptors. In future, they claim, the network might even extend to outer space, using surveillance satellites and lasers modelled on the “Star Wars” missile-defence system proposed by America during the 1980s.