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2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT will disrupt future economy – people won’t want to work

Mintz, 20 (Jack Mintz, istinguished fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and President’s Fellow of the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary, MLI, “A guaranteed basic income will be too expensive and bad for economic recovery: Jack Mintz for Inside Policy”, May 7, 2020, , Rosado)

As appealing as it seems, Friedman’s negative income tax is not so simple to implement. Obviously, minimum payments would need to recognize different households’ characteristics. Single individuals would get less than those families with multiple adults and children. Households with a disabled parent or child should be given more to cover additional costs. Those temporarily out of work, after earning a higher income, might need replacement income that would be significantly above the minimum payment. So, once we start differentiating people by their needs, we get back too many current programs – and the bureaucracy – to determine eligibility for various benefit payments. Nor is it clear voters would support the elimination of, tuition tax credits, property tax and rent credits, pension and RRSP deductions, age credits, refundable GST tax credits and other targeted relief measures, which all play a role in social policy. And if voters dislike a flat rate, a much higher marginal tax rate would be needed than 49 percent to make up for special preferences. But such high marginal tax rates would discourage work, saving and risk-taking, ultimately eroding the ability for an economy to sustain a guaranteed income. The idea of just giving out cash to relieve poverty also raises eyebrows for many voters who have to pay tax on their earnings from work. And there’s the unknown labour-supply effect: how many recipients might choose to stay at home, receiving $30,000 cheques, rather than work? That’s why many economists concerned about the working poor prefer wage subsidies instead of just handing cash to otherwise able workers. And cash alone isn’t a panacea for helping all low-income families: we would still need professionals to support those with mental or other health issues, social problems or who lack the basic skills to contend with daily life. As we begin to recover from this pandemic, the last form of intervention we need is to discourage people from pursuing new opportunities and jobs that will eventually become available. That is a lesson so far from the grand experiment we had to adopt in a hurry to help many people survive a severe recession. While necessary in the short term, if the federal government were to heed calls to continue this policy on a permanent basis it could disrupt recovery for years to come.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT has failed before and will decrease hours of work

Menon 2018

(University of Virginia with a bachelor’s degree in economics and government and a master’s degree in public policy, Universal Basic Income Has Been Tried Before. It Didn’t Work, https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/commentary/universal-basic-income-has-been-tried-it-didnt-work)

The best available evidence about the potential effects of these programs comes from the federal government’s “negative income tax” experiment. The experiment, which ran from 1968 to 1980, consisted of four random, controlled trials across six states designed to test the negative income tax. Similar to the universal basic income, a negative income tax guarantees a minimum income, which phases out as earnings increase. In his 1984 book “Losing Ground,” Murray himself described the negative income tax experiment as “the most ambitious social-science experiment in history.” “No other even comes close to its combination of size, expense, length, and detail of analysis,” he wrote. As Murray recounted, the experiment’s planners hoped that providing a minimum income would encourage work. But their worst fears were realized when the results showed the opposite. Evaluations of the experiment found that the negative income tax reduced “desired hours of work by 9 percent for husbands, by 20 percent for wives, and by 25 percent for single female heads of families.” For single males who were not heads of households throughout the experiment, the reduction in hours worked per week was a staggering43 percent. If recipients lost their jobs during the experiment, they experienced significantly longer spells of unemployment compared with non-recipients—more than two months longer for husbands, almost a year longer for wives, and longer still for single mothers. For every $1,000 in additional benefits, there was an average reductionof $660 in earned income, meaning that $3,000 in government benefits were required to increase net income by $1,000. These studies also made clear that it was the receipt of unconditional aid, not the phase-out of benefits, which led to the reduced work effort. In “Losing Ground,” Murray concluded that the effect of the negative income tax on reducing work was “unambiguous and strong.” To his credit, Murray has acknowledged that such disastrous results should be expected if guaranteed income is an add-on to, rather than a wholesale replacement of, the existing system of welfare and social insurance. In fact, he asserts in “Losing Ground” that the true negative effects in the negative income tax experiment are understated, because these effects were “over and above the effect of the work disincentives in the existing system.” Instead, Murray argues that the universal basic income will realize its full potential “only if it replaces all other transfer payments and the bureaucracies that oversee them.” But while his proposal is respectable in its intent, it presents several new problems. First, Murray proposes eliminating Social Security and Medicare payments to pay for a universal basic income. This would shift resources from the elderly to the non-elderly, including childless adults who are capable of self-support. Second, universal basic income payments would be given to all citizens, including middle- and high-income earners. By not targeting payments to those with low incomes, the proposal would transfer funds away from the vulnerable to the relatively affluent. But the most apparent flaw with the concept is that it fails to require work or work preparation for its recipients. Although the current welfare system does little to encourage self-support, a comprehensive universal basic income policy would remove the idea of personal responsibility entirely. It’s a misguided approach. Public opinion and social psychology indicate that adopting policies with a demonstrated track record of discouraging work would be a bad development. In the 2016 General Social Survey, for example, 70 percent of Americans agreed that they would enjoy working in a paying job, even if they didn’t need the money. Moreover, prominent social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that work is a central pillar of human well-being and happiness. Policy should be designed to reward work, rather than replace it. Therefore, a better alternative to a universal basic income would be to expand the earned income tax credit.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

An NIT would decrease work rate and damage the existing welfare state.

Manzi 11

(Jim Manzi, 2011, CEO (APT), B.S., Against the Negative Income Tax, February 15, 2011, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/against-negative-income-tax-jim-manzi/)

The NIT, in plain English, is a government-guaranteed minimum level of income. Sorman makes the classic argument that the biggest advantage of the NIT is that it would eliminate almost the entire welfare bureaucracy, and the tangle of often counter-productive programs that go with it. He dismisses the obvious commonsense objection — that the prospect of a lifetime income for doing nothing might discourage people from slapping the top of the alarm clock every weekday morning at 6 a.m. and going to work — with the argument that the NIT could be made progressive in a way that would theoretically encourage work as compared to the current welfare system: Say the government drew the income line at $10,000 for a family of four and the NIT was 50 percent, as most economists recommend. If the family had no income at all, it would receive $5,000—that is, 50 percent of the amount by which its income fell short of $10,000. If the family earned $2,000, it would get $4,000 from the government — again, 50 percent of its income shortfall—for a total post-tax income of $6,000. Bring in $4,000, and it would receive $3,000, for a total of $7,000. So as the family’s earnings rise, its post-tax income rises, too, preserving the work incentive. This is very different from many social welfare programs, in which a household either receives all of a benefit or, if it ceases to qualify, nothing at all. The all-or-nothing model encourages what social scientists call “poverty traps,” tempting the poor not to improve their situations. Sorman goes on to reference the famous (among nerds) series of randomized experiments in the 1960s and ’70s that tested the effects of the NIT on labor-force participation. He says that the results of these experiments were “fuzzy,” but that the first of the experiments showed that the unemployed people who received the NIT grant were “likelier to try to get back to work.” Sorman is wise to look to these tests of the theory. The power of randomized experiments is that they provide the scientific gold-standabrd method for cutting through the tangle of correlations inherent to these kinds of social questions to create a definitive answer to the question of the causal effects of a tested program on a measured outcome. But I believe his interpretation of the NIT experiments is incomplete, in ways that are fundamental to his argument. There were four large NIT experiments conducted in the U.S. between 1968 and 1980. These tested a wide variety of program variants among the urban and rural poor, in better and worse macroeconomic periods, and in geographies from New Jersey to Seattle. There was, and is, a lot of scholarly debate about many of the experimental results, and their potential application to policymaking. But there are two consistent findings across this body of experiments. First, the tested NIT programs reduce number of hours worked versus the existing welfare system. Directly contrary to how I understand Sorman’s claim that the New Jersey–Pennsylvania experiment showed that the NIT made recipients “likelier to try to get back to work,” this reduction in labor hours was primarily caused by workers remaining non-employed longer if and when they became non-employed. Second, the tested levels of progressivity of implicit tax rates did not get around this problem by encouraging work, as Sorman’s theoretical argument asserts they should. See, for example, Robert A. Moffitt (the subject-matter expert cited by Sorman), who has written extensively about why the NIT experiments showed that “lowered tax rates had essentially no effect on labor supply.” Moffitt has, in fact, written a series of papers trying to show why even the theoretical argument that implicit tax progressivity would encourage work was incorrect. While generalizing from experiments to broad policy is always complicated in social science, true randomized experiments confirm common sense: When it has been put to the test, the NIT reduced work effort. There was a further series of about 30 welfare experiments done around the time of the welfare debates of the early 1990s. These tested many ideas for improving welfare. What emerged from them was a clear picture: work requirements, and only work requirements, could be shown experimentally to get people off welfare and into jobs in a humane fashion. (I’ll have a lot more about this in the upcoming book.) These experiments were an important input into the central tenet of welfare reform — work requirements — which was one of the greatest conservative domestic policy successes of the past 20 years. It moved us in exactly the opposite direction of the permanent, lifetime dole of the NIT. But what about the argument that there is an important benefit — namely, the elimination of the welfare bureaucracy and the dog’s breakfast of “food stamps, public housing, Medicaid, cash welfare, and a myriad of community development programs” that according to Sorman’s article accounts for $522 billion of annual federal spending? This is extremely unlikely. By analogy, the debate in global-warming circles sometimes pits a “simple, efficient carbon tax” against the politicized mess of the cap-and-trade bill that emerged from Congress. But in that case, the real difference is not that between a theoretical carbon tax and a theoretical cap-and-trade system; it is the difference between an academic idea that has not yet been subjected to lobbying and legislation, on one hand, and real laws that are the product of a democratic process, on the other. In the same way, there is nothing inherent about an NIT that will prevent Congress from creating thousands of pages of special rules, exemptions, tax expenditures and so on, that are collectively just as convoluted as the current welfare system. After all, “tax each person a given fraction of income” is a pretty simple idea too, but look at the 2011 federal income tax code. And the likely maintenance or reemergence of the functional equivalents of many of these programs isn’t just the result of cynicism, but of healthy intuitions of natural justice that are essential to maintaining a well-functioning political order. As one example, do we really think it’s a good idea to further disconnect work and income? As another, if part of the motivation for giving adults income is that they spend it supporting their children, would we really allow parents receiving taxpayer money to spend it any way they want with no requirements for child welfare beyond child abuse laws? And as another, a huge portion of the costs of the list of programs Sorman provides is health care. Suppose we gave every adult in America an annual grant of $10,000, and some person who did not buy health insurance with it got sick with an acute, easily treatable condition. Would we really bar them from any urgent medical care and just say “Tough luck, but it’s time to die”? Even if you think this would be a desirable public policy, it’s not plausible that the existence of an NIT would somehow change the political calculus enough to make it substantially more of a reality than it is today. Inevitably, and justifiably, the taxpayers who will have to work more overtime, take shorter vacations, and eat out less in order to come up with the taxes to pay for an NIT or any other welfare system, will demand some degree of accountability from the recipients; which will, in turn, require monitoring, enforcement, adjudication, and the other manifestations of a welfare bureaucracy. As I put this in a recent article in National Review: This basic idea arose again and again during the 1960s and 70s. Examples of such proposals advanced by the political right and left included Milton Friedman’s negative income tax (1962), Robert Theobald’s guaranteed income (1965), James Tobin’s guaranteed income plan (1965), R.J. Lampman’s subsidy plan (1967), Edward Schwartz’s guaranteed income, the negative income tax plan of President Johnson’s Income Maintenance Commission (1969), President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (1969), George McGovern’s $1,00-a-year plan (1972), and HEW’s Income Supplementation Plan (1974). This idea constantly arises even today in academic discussions, and is being pursued seriously by the current coalition government in the U.K. The key reason we haven’t implemented such a scheme in the U.S. is that we are afraid that many of the recipients will not work, and then blow the money on Cheetos, beer and big-screen TVs. In more academic language, the moral legitimization of the welfare system requires that the recipients earn and then use this money in support of a way of living that comports in some rough sense with the idea of the good life held by taxpayers who provide the funds. The NIT is a fascinating and useful thought experiment, but it’s not a practical public policy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT solves poverty

Negative Income Tax does not solve average poverty and welfare in the long-run.

Chang et al, 23, Chang, Y., Han, J., & Kim, S. (2023). Chang is on the Monetary Policy Board in the Bank of Korea, Han is affiliated with the Economics Department in Ajou University in South Korea, Kim is affiliated with the Department of Economics in Yonsei University in South Korea “Negative income tax and universal basic income in the eyes of Aiyagari”. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1-13. doi:10.1017/S1365100523000263 https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/negative-income-tax-and-universal-basic-income-in-the-eyes-of-aiyagari/00FEC4C9D02026504E18270ABF9ED82D

We compare two welfare programs that are popular in public and political debates: the universal basic income (UBI) and a means-tested negative income tax (NIT). Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) illustrated that within the class of linear income tax-and-transfer system, the NIT can replicate the same allocation as the UBI by providing an identical marginal effective tax schedule. According to Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021), “The two policies are equivalent because the net payment—that is, taxes less transfers—is identical under the two policies The difference is only a matter of framing.” However, Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) was not explicit about the total amount of the budget of the policy. The size of the budget differs vastly between the two programs. Although the two programs can generate an identical allocation, we analytically show that the total budget of the NIT is always smaller than that of the UBI.

Based on a standard heterogeneous agents general equilibrium model [a la Aiyagari (Reference Aiyagari1994)], calibrated to approximate the income and wealth distributions in the United States, we perform quantitative analyses on various versions of the UBI and NIT (within the class of linear income tax). While the UBI that pays everyone 20% of the average income costs about 15.4% of the GDP, the NIT (that replicates the identical outcome) costs only 3.8% of the GDP. Neither program improves the average welfare significantly in the long run (in fact, it decreases slightly by 0.27% in consumption-equivalence units), as the reduction in capital and labor (owing to a tax distortion and a weakened motive for precautionary savings and work) roughly offsets the insurance benefit. Furthermore, the aggregate output, capital, and hours worked decrease by 12%, 22%, and 10%, respectively, in the long run.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT solves poverty

NIT is counterproductive and insufficient to solve poverty.

Gibson, 15 (Preceding the existence of MSNBC, Gibson hosted a news program for America’s Talking. Gibson began his broadcasting career as a West Coast correspondent for NBC News Channel, where he supplied NBC affiliates with live reports on various breaking stories and events such as the O.J. Simpson trial, Wiley Online Library, “Expand Social Protection May Do More Harm than Good: A Pessimistic Review, Sept. 9, 2015, , Roasdo)

What is a sensible effective marginal tax rate to use in this illustration? The International Monetary Fund (IMF) () shows that the income tax rate that maximises tax paid by top income earners ranges from 45 to 70 per cent and averages around 60 per cent. It would be counterproductive for the t in Figure  to be higher than any of these rates, since that would likely reduce the revenue available to fund the social protection transfers. If perhaps t = 0.5 was used, then the breakeven point would be twice the poverty line. In the PNG context, that requires taxing 27 per cent of the population to fund transfers to 73 per cent (given the shape of the density). Putting aside risk of exit by the highly skilled amongst the taxpaying 27 per cent, even a t = 0.5 rate may be too high and could result in dulled incentives to work. For example, the current author faces a marginal tax rate of 33 per cent and it seems unfair for poor people in poor countries to face higher tax rates than professors in rich countries.

How would Figure  look if t = 0.33? The answer is shown by the line labelled (b). Any person consuming less than three times the poverty line gets a transfer, and anyone living above this level pays tax to fund the transfer. This may violate condition (iii) that transfers be targeted just to the (relatively) needy since living above three times the poverty line might be considered ‘middle class’ in a country with mass poverty like PNG. A bigger problem is that just 12 per cent of the PNG population is sufficiently affluent to have a consumption level above three poverty line units, so there are likely to be too few of these affluent people to tax heavily enough to raise the revenue to fund transfers. The dashed line in the top part of Figure  shows the cumulative tax shares of households, starting from the right-hand side axis; the 12 per cent of the population living above three times the poverty line already pay about 43 per cent of the income tax and it is not clear how much more tax could be obtained from them before they sought greener fields in less-taxing countries.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › CP Links to IRS DA

NIT is hard for IRS to implement.

Allen NO DATE GIVEN

(Jodie Allen, American businesswoman, entrepreneur, and philanthropist. She is the sister of Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, and served as the chief executive officer of his investment and project management company, Vulcan Inc., from its founding in 1986 until 2015. She is also the co-founder and president of the Paul G. Allen Family Foundation, Econlib, “Negative Income Tax, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NegativeIncomeTax.html, Correct AF)

The idea of a negative income tax (NIT) is commonly thought to have originated with economist Milton Friedman, who advocated it in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom. Others, notably the late Joseph Pechman, long-time tax dean of the Brookings Institution, credited the University of Wisconsin's Robert Lampman with at least simultaneous discovery and with bringing the concept to the attention of government policy planners in 1965. In its purest form a NIT promised a revolution in American social policy. Gone would be the intrusive and costly welfare bureaucracy, the pernicious distinctions between "worthy" and "unworthy" recipients, the perverse disincentives for work effort and family formation. The needy would, like everyone else, simply file annual—or perhaps quarterly—income returns with the Internal Revenue Service. But unlike other filers who would make payments to the IRS, based on the amount by which their incomes exceeded the threshold for tax liability, NIT beneficiaries would receive payments ("negative taxes") from the IRS, based on how far their incomes fell below the tax threshold. The NIT would thus be a mirror image of the regular tax system. Instead of tax liabilities varying positively with income according to a tax rate schedule, benefits would vary inversely with income according to a negative tax rate (or benefit-reduction) schedule. If, for example, the threshold for positive tax liability for a family of four was, say, $10,000, a family with only $8,000 of annual income would, given a negative tax rate of 25 percent, receive a check from the Treasury worth $500 (25 percent of the $2,000 difference between its $8,000 income and the $10,000 threshold). A family with zero income would receive $2,500. Very neat. So attractive that researchers in the Office of Economic Opportunity, the brain trust for Lyndon Johnson's Great Society in the mid-sixties, began planning a large-scale field experiment of the idea. Several sites in New Jersey were ultimately selected for the test, which was launched in 1968 with the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty in charge of the research and a Princeton-based firm, Mathematica Inc., in charge of field operations and data collection. The primary purpose of the experiment was to address the concerns of labor-supply theorists. These labor economists worried that providing the working poor with a basic income guarantee if they quit work, and then reducing that guarantee at a fairly steep rate as income from work increased would damage work incentives and ultimately swell NIT costs. They feared that NIT would reduce work effort in two ways. First, by giving a family with no outside income a guaranteed minimum income, NIT might, at the extreme, discourage family members from working at all. And even if workers didn't quit entirely, they might work less since they could satisfy their basic needs with less work effort. Economists call this an income effect. Second, by reducing benefits some fraction of a dollar for every dollar earned, NIT would, along with payroll and state and local income taxes, reduce the net value of wages and induce recipients to "substitute" leisure for work. Economists call this a substitution effect. Using a complicated model intended to minimize program costs for a given sample design, the New Jersey experimenters set out to measure the strength of these two effects. Potential participants were assigned to a variety of "treatment" cells, with the treatment being a particular combination of basic guarantee and negative tax rate. The sample included a "control" group of families not eligible for any experimental payments. Thus, a treatment might offer a guarantee equal to half the poverty line, which was then about $8,000 for a family of four, with benefits being reduced by 50 percent of the family's income. When income was zero, the family would receive the full $4,000 (50 percent of $8,000). When income reached $8,000, the benefit would be reduced to zero and the family would "break even" (i.e., neither receive negative taxes nor pay positive taxes). The experimenters—and the planners in what was then called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (myself included) who drew upon their work in designing President Richard Nixon's Family Assistance Plan of 1969 (FAP)—quickly encountered a host of problems, both conceptual and administrative. These continue to haunt negative tax advocates to this day. The first and most basic problem is that it is currently fiscally—and perhaps administratively—impossible to construct an NIT that simultaneously 1. provides an income guarantee as generous as the cash and in-kind benefits already available to many welfare recipients in the United States 2. provides an ostensible incentive to work (a far greater concern when benefits are to be extended beyond the traditional welfare population dominated by female-headed families), and 3. restricts coverage to any manageable proportion of the population—the so-called "break-even" problem. These constraints are, in fact, irreconcilable as long as the median income remains within striking distance of the poverty line—a situation that has barely improved over the last two decades of slow average economic growth. The McGovern plan proposed by the Democrats' 1972 presidential candidate starkly illustrated this problem. With a guarantee determined by the candidate's promise of $1,000 per person, and a benefit reduction rate limited to 33 1/3 percent at the behest of economic advisers worried about imposing work disincentives on a sizable proportion of the labor force, the plan had a break-even of $12,000 for a family of four—roughly the median income at the time. Thus, it would have converted roughly half the population into federal tax beneficiaries while the other half of the population would have paid for these transfers along with the cost of all other federal activities. The second problem with a NIT is that the welfare system already provides a package of cash and in-kind benefits that, in many states, is worth considerably more than any likely NIT (though at the cost of excluding large groups of the poor—such as two-parent families—from eligibility). Political and humanitarian considerations prevent reducing these benefits, thus vitiating one of the NIT's attractions—the possibility of abolishing the welfare system. Competition from welfare was a severe problem for the New Jersey experimenters. Many of the families in the study were actually receiving welfare benefits worth more than the experimental payments. Therefore, some experts questioned the experimenters' findings that the NIT had only a minimal effect on work incentives, and indeed questioned whether the experiment had really measured anything at all. HEW attempted to solve these problems by launching subsequent income-maintenance experiments in Seattle and Denver (SIME/DIME). These experiments more carefully integrated existing welfare programs and offered more generous NIT plans. But the generosity of most of the tested plans made them unlikely to be replicated on a national scale, and more complicated to analyze. The Stanford Research Institute (SRI), which analyzed the SIME/DIME findings, found stronger work disincentive effects, ranging from an average 9 percent work reduction for husbands to an average 18 percent reduction for wives. This was not as scary as some NIT opponents had predicted. But it was large enough to suggest that as much as 50 to 60 percent of the transfers paid to two-parent families under a NIT might go to replace lost earnings. They also found an unexpected result: instead of promoting family stability (the presumed result of extending benefits to two-parent working families on an equal basis), the NITs seemed to increase family breakup. The SRI researchers—Michael T. Hannah, Nancy B. Tuma, and Lyle P. Groeneveld—hypothesized that the availability of the income guarantee to some families reduced the pressure on the breadwinner to remain with the family, while the benefit-reduction rate also reduced the value to the family of keeping a wage earner in the unit. Other researchers, notably the University of Wisconsin's Glen G. Cain, disputed the analytical strength of these findings. But at the very least the results were discouraging to those who promoted an NIT as a boon to family stability. A third set of problems is administrative. One is the matter of the appropriate income-accounting period, which spawned a whole literature (to which I contributed my share). If income for NIT purposes is measured over a year, as in the positive tax system, families in great, but temporary, need may be denied benefits. If the accounting period is shorter, say a month, as in the welfare system, and income reporting procedures are lax, potential costs and caseloads might be as much as 70 percent higher than those predicted by the annual income-based models used to estimate the costs of FAP and its early successors. The income accounting and reporting analysis—backed up by an HEW administrative experiment in cooperation with the Denver welfare department—also drew attention to the fact that many negative tax participants cheat on income reports. To be sure, many taxpayers cheat too. But the irregularity of income sources and shifting family arrangements at the lower end of the distribution make it unlikely that the IRS could prevent widespread fraud unless it converted itself into a facsimile of the much-detested local welfare offices. Some indication of the difficulty that the IRS might experience in administering a large-scale NIT is provided by the Earned Income Credit (EIC), a hybrid version of an NIT that was slipped into the tax code in 1975 by Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long. Long saw it as a way to offset the regressive effect of payroll taxes on low-income earners. The EIC works like this (using 1993 rules for a family with one qualifying child): For every dollar of earned income, the family receives a refundable tax credit of 18.5 percent, up to a maximum credit of $1,434 (not including additional credits for young children and health insurance costs) for a family with earnings of $7,750. The credit is phased out at a rate of 13.21 cents for every dollar of adjusted gross income (AGI) above $12,200, until it reaches a zero value for a family with AGI of $23,050. One attraction of the EIC is that because its benefits rise positively with earnings up to the phase-out point, it has a positive rather than negative effect on work incentives for workers earning a very low income. In the phase-out range, however, its substitution effects are identical to those of a comparable NIT. More important, a 1990 IRS study revealed that owing in part to the complexity of the EIC rules, almost 40 percent of EIC benefits were paid to families who were not eligible for them. Yet the finding of such a high error rate did not deter Congress from both enlarging and further complicating the EIC in the fall of 1990. To these problems must be added the messy reality of the day-to-day stresses and strains of many of America's poor. Data from another HEW experiment revealed that many of the low-income population's problems are not readily addressed by the provision of an extra few hundred dollars in annual income. Indeed, recent revisionist social welfare thinking has questioned the central premise of the NIT planners—that a nonintrusive income-maintenance system is preferable. More recent policy has stressed direct interventions to improve family functioning and self-reliance, including eligibility rules that require work effort. Nonetheless, the NIT is still popular among many researchers and politicians. Nixon's FAP, which compromised with both the conceptual and administrative problems by essentially retaining the current welfare system and grafting on to it a low-level income-maintenance benefit for the working poor, pleased neither academics nor welfare advocates. Nor did it please the big-city mayors and governors, who looked at welfare reform as primarily a way to reduce their share of the system's cost. (Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan's Politics of a Guaranteed Income, is the definitive text on this point.) The Ford administration floated a reworked version of FAP, but it foundered on the same concerns as FAP. President Jimmy Carter set out to develop a welfare reform that would have zero additional cost. Although Carter's plan emphasized work alternatives to welfare, HEW's analysts quickly shifted the emphasis to a more generous reworking of the FAP concept. Forced to compromise with analysts at the Department of Labor—myself, by then, included—who were promoting a low-wage guaranteed job approach, the reformers ended up with the unwieldy Better Jobs and Income Plan (BJIP), which would have cost many billions more and pleased neither liberals nor conservatives in Congress. The Reagan administration put its efforts into cutting back, rather than extending, income benefits, though the eighties witnessed both an expansion of earned-income tax credits and the 1988 welfare act, which tried, at so-far modest cost and effect, to direct more welfare recipients into jobs. More recently, some "middle-income tax relief" proposals floated in Congress in 1991 would convert the current positive tax personal exemption into a "refundable" credit, paid out in cash to families with incomes below the tax-liability threshold. These proposals, thus, would incorporate a full-bodied NIT into the Internal Revenue Code. The appeal of a negative income tax lives on. And so do its many problems.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › CP Links to IRS DA

The NIT would cost the IRS lots of time, money, and focus. Links to the net benefit.

Johnson 03, Steve Johnson is the Dunbar Family Professor of Law. Johnson has received numerous teaching awards. His courses include Taxation, Business Planning, Bankruptcy, Legislation, and Administrative Law. He also works with Florida State’s highly successful moot court program and has coached a national championship team and many other award-winning Florida State teams in moot court competitions around the country.

Sometimes the best action is inaction. When the tax law frequently changes and the changes are unclear or fail to anticipate major implementation issues, the IRS (and taxpayers) are severely burdened. The need to learn, re-learn, "unlearn," and just make it up as one goes along, is an invisible yet large cost, claiming time, attention, and energy that could have been profitably applied to other responsibilities. There is little doubt that the above describes the current unsatisfactory pace and quality of federal tax legislative outputs. Each year brings multiple tax acts, many of them major acts (as in 1997, 1998, and 2001). Unfortunately, the provisions enacted are of declining quality in terms of clarity, specificity, and foresight' One aspect of this has been Congress' tendency in recent years to "legislate concepts" rather than firm provisions, leaving it up to the IRS to sort out the details. "[A] process that deals with concepts and not in details, is one that leads to complexity, because legislators don't always focus on the impact of their provisions and what kind of burden they may be imposing. Both the volume of tax legislative outputs and the declining quality of them have put substantial pressures on the IRS. Indeed, its job has been "made worse by each successive Congress. Thus, putting tax legislation on holiday for some years would give the IRS welcome breathing space, allowing it to fulfill its present duties better. But, of course, this will not happen. The economic and political factors that have driven frenetic tax legislation in recent decades show no signs of losing steam. Thus, this relief mechanism will remain purely a theoretical option. 2. Relief from Non-Revenue Obligations. There was a time when people could seriously argue that the Internal Revenue Code should be used only to raise revenue. Those days are long gone. In the past decade, the President and Congress have used the income tax the way my mother employed chicken soup: as a magic elixir to solve all the nation's economic and social difficulties. If the nation has a problem in access to education, child care affordability, health insurance coverage, or the financing of long-term care, an income tax deduction or credit is [viewed as] the answer. The examples could easily be multiplied. A major one is the earned income credit, which is "truly a welfare system grafted onto" the answer which means the IRS is "running a negative income tax program Code, for 25 million" Americans. The fundamental problem is that the IRS is being asked to do too much. Having to administer [non-revenue responsibilities] ... has diverted IRS audit resources .... The IRS cannot do all these things well .... Many it cannot do at all. We should not expect it to. A major simplification of the nation's tax 24 law is necessary.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Perm Do CP

A negative income tax is a basic income and it’s the best.

Bowman 14

Sam Bowman, 5-23-2014, "The Negative Income Tax and Basic Income are pretty much the same thing — Adam Smith Institute," Adam Smith Institute, Associate Professor of ,  &  Co-PI, Alignment Research Group, ML² Group & CILVR Lab (on research leave Summer 2022–Summer 2024) New York University PhD 2016, Stanford NLP Group & Stanford Linguistics

I’ve been talking about the Negative Income Tax lately, and equating it with the idea of a Basic Income. I think most of the policies’ respective advocates would deny that they’re the same policy. In this post I’m going to outline why that’s incorrect and I’m happy to say that they’re basically the same thing. For the uninitiated, a Negative Income Tax is a form of welfare that replaces most existing welfare schemes with a single payment that supplements the income of the unemployed and low-paid. The payment is withdrawn as your earnings increase, ideally at a gradual enough rate that increasing your earnings (and hence reducing leisure time) is always worthwhile.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Perm Do CP

NIT is the same as basic income

Widerquist et. al 2005

(Karl Widerquist, an economist at Georgetown University, is a co-founder of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network. He is also the co-chair of the  and co-founded Basic Income News in 2011. "A Retrospective On The Negative Income Tax Experiments: Looking Back At The Most Innovative Field Studies In Social Policy". 7-10. AH)

The United States government conducted four negative income tax (NIT) experiments between 1968 and l 980. NIT is a form of basic income guarantee (BIG) that was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. It differs from basic income in that it gives money only to those with low incomes. However, both are basic income guarantees in the sense that they guarantee everyone a minimum income. Although the differences between the two policies are important, they have enough similarities so that what was learned from the NIT experiments can help us understand the consequences of either BTG plan.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › TANF-Specific › TANF Fails---2AC

TANf isn’t always used for what it’s meant for, exacerbating inequalities.

Andrew Hammond, 12-1-2017, “Welfare and Federalism's Peril”, Washington Law Review, https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5012&context=wlr

Due to its devolutionary design, TANF transformed federal cash assistance funding from “a specific funding source for cash assistance” into “a broad funding stream for various programs supporting low-income families.”144 States, all but one of which are prohibited by their own constitutions to run deficits, face significant annual budget pressures.145 In addition to those self-imposed constitutional constraints, some states have been sued to allocate additional resources to other areas, including child welfare.146 As a result, the TANF block grant has become a tempting source of general revenue for states.147 The transfer of the TANF block grant to fund foster care services is particularly prevalent: TANF “makes up about 19 percent of federal spending on child welfare services.”148 This national rate of moving nearly one in five federal dollars of TANF funding to foster services masks even greater transfers in individual states: Texas reportedly “devot[es] more than half the state’s TANF and MOE spending to child welfare” and Michigan uses “close to 40 percent” of its TANF grant to fund foster services.149 According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, thirty-one states reported spending TANF funds on child welfare services in 2011.150 States are also under increasing pressure to pay for health care services despite drops inrevenue.151 For these reasons, less than 30% of the TANF block grant is actually spent on cash assistance.152 Like the 1996 funding formula of the block grant and the 2011 elimination of supplemental grants, the discretion afforded states to reappropriate TANF funds to meet other funding needs exacerbates inequalities in state spending and policies. As a result, TANF recipients “experience extraordinarily different programs in different states.”153

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Secessionism Turn---2AC

Extinction

Valaskakis 14 – Kimon Valaskakis, Former OECD Ambassador of Canada, “Separatism Everywhere : The New Global Epidemic”, Huffington Post, 3-19, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kimon-valaskakis/separatism-everywhere-the_b_4977800.html

Like modern marriages, half of which end in divorce, there is a new and ominous global threat: the break-up of previously stable political entities through separatism.

Crimea wants to leave Ukraine. Scotland has scheduled an independence referendum from Britain in September 2014 and Britain is considering one to possibly leave Europe in 2015. Catalonia's referendum to secede from Spain is in November 2014, and Quebec may possibly organize its own in the next couple of years. Wallonie, Corsica, North Italy, Bretagne etc. may one day follow suit. There is even talk of splitting California in two!

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Secessionism Turn---2AC

Devolution spurs secessionist movements

Frank Newport ’22 is a Gallup Senior Scientist, PhD, University of Michigan education, 06/15/22, “Americans’ View on Federalism as States Take on More Power” https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/394823/americans-views-federalism-states-power.aspx

Implications of an Accelerating Devolution of Power to the States

There are several possible consequences if the states continue to gain power and control over key issues and policies and if the federal government becomes less relevant.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Federal Aid Fails---2AC

Either states can’t afford the CP or the aid they get from the federal government links to the net benefit and fails – states can’t adjust policies or do what’s best to support specific situations

Loconte 97 (Joseph Loconte, Former Director, Simon Center for American Studies, director of AWC Family Foundation Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 3-1-1997, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Government Funding," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/commentary/the-seven-deadly-sins-government-funding/Accessed July 12, 2023) sns

Government grants and contracts can be a tantalizing diversion. Even private agencies with the best of intentions may assume tasks that have little to do with their original purpose and for which they may be ill-equipped. "Most everyone is fighting for every penny they can get to run whatever program they have," says the Salvation Army's Triston. "It's really a matter of, if you can't do it the way you want, then you'll take your program and you'll fit it into what government will give you money for." Sometimes private agencies have little choice. Kristen McCormack, a former executive director of Federated Dorchester Neighborhood Houses, recalls a summer-camp contract with the state Department of Social Services to help abused and neglected children. Federated Dorchester, an association of settlement houses in Boston, ran its own camp program for local kids. But it was not equipped to handle children from the DSS caseload. Nevertheless, it struggled with the contract for years. "Everything about it was a disaster," McCormack says. "It was insane, we lost tons of money on it, it wasn't consistent with our mission." DSS caseworkers referred children from all over the city, often without reliable transportation, to the Dorchester camps, yet the agency had no buses to pick them up. DSS required numerous pages of paperwork for each referral, yet the agency lacked the administrative manpower. Most importantly, the agency was being asked to provide a program to DSS children with intense behavioral and emotional problems. "They were abused and neglected kids, which we didn't have the capacity to deal with in our summer camps," says McCormack. "We did not have intensive counseling and therapy." Eventually McCormack told a regional DSS officer that Federated Dorchester would discontinue the contract. "I said we can't provide this service and we're not meeting the needs of the kids," she recalls. The DSS officer reminded McCormack of the $2 million in day-care contracts her agency had with the state. "They actually said, 'If you want your day-care contract, you will take the summer-camp contract,'" she says. "They were very clear." The agency renewed the contract. Watching the children. Up until the late 1970s, Massachusetts performed its own investigations and assessments of welfare families, through its child protective services department. As its welfare caseload ballooned, so did the state's need for protective-service work. But government lacked the staff to monitor families effectively. By the early 1980s, the DSS began enticing child-welfare groups to take on its investigative caseload. "Rather than purchasing add-on or supportive services from private agencies," says Bill Chiaradonna, the director of programs at Boston's Catholic Archdiocese, "DSS was trying to get the agencies to do the same work that it was doing." Although it boasted a long history of work in adoption and foster care, Catholic Charities had no experience in protective services. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s the charity brought in more than $1 million a year in child-protection contracts. "This made us almost identical to the DSS office," says Chiaradonna, "and that became a problem." The problem was that Catholic Charities acquired the same stigma in the community that attaches to a government protective-service agency: It took on a quasi-policing function, monitoring and reporting parents suspected of abusing or neglecting their children. A similar identity crisis enveloped the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (MSPCC). Founded in 1878, the agency had long focused on preventive services to families at risk of neglect or abuse. But by the 1980s, after the DSS reorganized, most of the big state contracts available to private agencies funded family investigations and case management of DSS families. For abuse-prevention groups such as MSPCC, this was the wrong emphasis. The agency wanted to make sure families were getting enough support from the start -- including prenatal care, parenting skills, home visitation, counseling, health and other support services. Like Catholic Charities, however, MSPCC went along with the contract flow, eventually depending on child-protection work to fund 70 percent of its budget. "The board [of directors] felt it did contaminate their mission, and that they had to do what the state said," says Strom, who joined the agency in 1991. "They wanted to get back to the prevention word in our name." Ironically, they soon got some help from the state legislature, which passed a bill banning most nonprofits from doing child-protection work. Cases were transferred back to the state, and funding to private groups was cut off. Private agencies went into a tailspin. The MSPCC reorganized and launched a massive fundraising campaign. Catholic Charities scrambled to salvage other programs. The agency laid off social workers and supervisors, relegated program directors to part-time hours and restructured its administration. "There was a whole infrastructure that was supported in part by the DSS contracts," Chiaradonna says. "We were still being true to our mission," he insists, "but in the end, we probably would have gotten out of protective services ourselves." Heavy dependence on federal and state contracts means dancing to the government piper. Public funding, says Strom, "definitely undermines your capacity to . . . show leadership, to try new demonstrations, to find strategies that work that bureaucracies can't get away with."

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Inequality---2AC

A devolution revolution means states counteract the redistributive impact by burdening the poor.

Kousser 14 -- Thad Kousser studies American state and national politics, voting reforms, direct democracy, and how politicians use social media. His work has been published in journals such as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Political Science Review, the Revue Francaise de Science Politique, the Journal of Politics, and Political Analysis (“How America’s ‘devolution revolution’ reshaped its federalism,” Revue française de science politique, vol. 64, no. 2, 2014, pp. 265-287, Available online at // lianamalish)

While modern America may have been created through a war against England, its national structure has been formed and reshaped not through fights with external powers but by internal conflicts among states, and between states and the federal government. The battles to define American federalism were once carried out in a war and in lunch counter sit-ins, but have now shifted to the courts and to federal funding formulas. These venues may be less dramatic, but they are no less important. As Théret makes clear, federal systems need not be static, with the actual practice of federalism – including whether or not the central government equalizes resources across subnational units – determining whether the form of the federation will endure, centralize, or dissolve. hough a bloodless revolution, the “devolution revolution” nonetheless changed the structure of the federal–state relationship and the scope of the social service safety net. Were these changes for the better? The fiscal federalism literature has long argued for an increased role for states in fitting policies to local needs and demands. “In our “ideal” model”, declared influential economist Wallace Oates, “the central government provides the efficient out-put of the national public good, while numerous local governments offer individuals a wide variety of output of the local public good.” The devolution revolution clearly gave states more authority over their welfare programs, and provided the opportunity to create new health care programs and much of the money to fund them. Did this give Americans the structure of government that they wanted? A recent survey asking respondents about what level of government should address specific policy challenges found that voters wanted to see the federal government address health care, but that state and local governments should assist the poor. Because the devolutions of the 1990s provided the most latitude to states in the welfare realm, both in the freedom to craft policy and through the funding mechanism of block grants, this move appears consistent with public opinion. Does devolution give residents of each state the programs and policies that they desire? While much research has shown the impact that the preferences of state elected officials has on policy choices, a new study based on a breakthrough in the ability to measure state public opinion shows that these choices do not always reflect voter demands. Not all states respond equally to public demands, and some do such a poor job matching policy with public opinion that there is a potential “democratic deficit” in the states. Combined with Wlezien and Soroka’s recent research showing the challenges that Canadian federalism poses for public responsiveness, this recent stream of research raises questions about whether giving more authority to states truly brings government closer to the people. Looking toward the future of federalism in America, how do the lessons of this essay combine to tell us anything about what might happen if more control over the safety net is devolved to the states? Just as Newt Gingrich pushed to create Medicaid block grants in 1995, Republican candidate Mitt Romney called for block grants during the 2012 presidential campaign.  If this new round of devolution comes to pass, how will states react? The lessons of the devolution revolution suggest that growth in Medicaid spending will slow dramatically if states have to pay all of the costs of program expansion and are allowed to keep all of the savings of program cuts. Medicaid expenditures may flatten out in the way that welfare spending has evened out over the past decade. This pattern will not be uniform across states, of course. Because the two parties take clearly different positions on this issue, statehouses controlled by Republicans will be much more likely to use their newfound autonomy to cut Medicaid than Democratic-led states. The analysis in this essay, put in the context of recent findings from the cross-national study of welfare states, also suggests that the distribution of tax burdens could also shape how state policy might shift. Kato shows that, during the economic downturns of the 1980s, nations with generous social services turned to consumption taxes – a regressive yet stable source of income – in order to retain funding for their welfare states. In the American states, taxes are already much more regressive than they are at the federal level. If the next round of devolution forces states to provide more of the funding for social services, health care and welfare programs might be preserved only by raising regressive taxes such as the sales tax. If the United States thus follows the European path, social service programs will be funded through taxes that burden poor and middle-class taxpayers most heavily (as a proportion of their incomes). The redistributive impact of Medicaid and welfare would be counterbalanced by a more regressive funding, all because of a quirk of American federalism.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Inequality---2AC

Devolution fails – local governments become selfish, and it backfires on other localities

Pipa 96 (Anthony F. Pipa, Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development, 7-15-1996, "The Devolution Revolution: Why Congress Is Shifting a Lot of Power to the Wrong Levels," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-devolution-revolution-why-congress-is-shifting-a-lot-of-power-to-the-wrong-levels/Accessed July 24, 2023) sns

This can most easily be seen concerning the major problems associated with overall regional growth. They include crime spreading out from inner-city neighborhoods into surrounding suburbs, increasing traffic congestion now worse in many suburbs than downtown, and poor-quality public schools that reduce the level of labor force skills available to employers throughout each region. Other growth-related problems are the rearing of almost one-fourth of all American children in poverty-stricken homes, our inability to finance new infrastructures adequate to handle rapid population increases, failure to integrate many young unskilled workers and older down-sized workers into the mainstream workforce, and pollution of the air and water from myriad sources scattered throughout each region. All these problems are basically regional because each extends across local boundaries; so what happens concerning them cannot be determined by policies adopted only within each community. The faster the region’s total population growth, the more serious these problems become, and the less effective are any attempts at remedies adopted by particular communities acting alone. Yet the structure of governance within metropolitan areas almost never reflects these regional realities. Except for a few regional transportation or sewer-and-water authorities, almost all governmental powers affecting the above problems are divided among individual localities, most of which are too small to encompass any large fraction of those problems. True, state governments retain many such powers and have the ultimate Constitutional authority to revise local government powers and structures. But most states are too large to focus their policies upon the problems of individual metropolitan regions. And governors and state legislatures prefer to delegate key powers to many small, fragmented local units, rather than creating regional bodies that might compete with their own powers. Therefore, except in less than a dozen of the nation’s more than 300 metropolitan areas, no effective regional governance structure exists. Since every local official is legally responsible only to voters in his or her own community, they are all strongly motivated to take account only of the welfare of their own constituents, ignoring repercussions on everyone else. So each local government designs its policies to capture as many benefits as possible, while shoving as many costs as possible onto surrounding jurisdictions. Thus, Prince William County would have retained almost all the property and sales tax benefits of the Disney project and adjacent new development, while a lot of traffic congestion and other costs would have fallen upon other counties. If some type of tax-base sharing and regional land-use planning existed among these local governments, a much more rational pattern of land uses and of financing public services could be devised. Instead, especially in other areas with much smaller local governments than in the Washington region, huge disparities in local governments’ abilities to provide public services arise from variations in tax bases. Some localities have 10 to 15 times more assessed value per resident than others with central cities and inner-ring suburbs usually on the low end. This creates immensely unequal opportunities in terms of the quality of public schools and other vital services provided within a single region. In general, the poorest residents get hurt the most. The Recommendation Congress could improve this situation almost overnight by requiring each metropolitan region to develop an overall plan for the use of federal funds of all types, before any government in that region could receive any federal money at all. In 1991, Congress adopted this approach concerning federal surface transportation funds. Now it should extend the same idea to all types of federal funding of local governments and services. That would affect federal welfare, housing, and health spending, among others. Faced with this requirement, local governments in each region would have a powerful incentive to get together and form some type of regional planning alliance in order to get federal funds. Yet a devolution of power away from the national level would still take place but at a functionally far more effective level. Opponents criticize more regional governance for two reasons. First, they claim it undermines “local sovereignty” by shifting some power to regional bodies. But localities have no true “sovereignty” over regional problems, because those problems cannot be effectively attacked by purely local policies. Second, they claim any regional governance is “just creating another level of bureaucracy.” But the existing local level cannot cope with regional realities; so something else must be tried for effective results. Regional arrangements have proved very successful in both Portland, Oregon, and the Twin Cities area of Minnesota. In reality, both these objections are primarily motivated by the unwillingness of most local officials and many citizens to yield any of their existing powers, even though those powers are failing to solve many crucial social problems.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Race to Bottom---2AC

State governments are not capable of dealing with the devolution of power from the federal government.

Riedl 21 -- Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, focusing on budget, tax, and economic policy. Riedl holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in public affairs from Princeton University (“Devolution: Four Proposals to Empower States and Reduce Washington’s Political Strife,” Manhattan Institute, April 15th, Available online at // lianamalish)

Despite unhappiness with the central government, calls to transfer more power to state and local governments often meet resistance, particularly among the most politically engaged citizens. Devolution is, first of all, unsatisfying to ideologues so convinced of the superiority of their policies that nothing less than their implementation from sea to shining sea is acceptable. Partisans of both parties believe that a wave election will sweep the other party aside and provide them with full control of Washington’s levers of power, from which they can impose their tax, health-care, and safety-net agenda on all 50 states. This approach is usually accompanied by a belief that the other party’s policy approach is so destructive that no American should live with its consequences, even if local voters unwisely choose to vote for it. On one level, advocating devolution requires humility, modesty, gradualism, and acceptance of other parts of the country choosing a policy direction that one may find harmful. However, on another level, discussed later, devolution is dynamic and confident. Rather than continue with fossilized debates in the nation’s capital, devolution empowers state experimentation with new approaches—and the confidence that one’s own policy approach will work successfully enough to be replicated in others. Another criticism raises the question of competence. In this view, state governments are the minor leagues: amateurish, lacking expertise, and unwilling to provide minimum safeguards to protect families from extreme policies. Of course, the first question one must ask when assessing state government competence is: compared with what? The federal government failed to anticipate the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 housing crash, failed to run a competent health system for returning veterans, and failed to build a successful health-care enrollment website for the ACA in 2014. Federal programs waste billions of dollars annually, cannot pass an audit, and are filled with hundreds of overlapping, duplicative, and contradictory programs. The federal tax code is more complicated than ever, incentivizes tax-gaming rather than efficiency, and fails to collect $500 billion in owed taxes each year. Despite long-term warnings that it was only a matter of time before a serious pandemic might occur, Washington was caught unprepared for the coronavirus, and the early response was marred by failures and incompetence, such as the CDC’s erroneous diagnostic tests.[12] While competence levels do vary, the large majority of state governments are no less competent than the federal government. Many U.S. states have economies, populations, and geographic sizes that are comparable with those of European countries. If all states were divided into separate countries, California would be the world’s fourth-largest economy, while Texas would be ninth and New York eleventh. Moving down the list, the size of Virginia’s economy roughly matches that of Poland, Louisiana’s roughly matches Finland’s, Montana’s matches Serbia’s, and the state with the smallest economy—Vermont—approximates the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia in their economies. If those countries are large enough to determine their own policies, so are American states. European comparisons are especially relevant to American liberals. Political scientists and economists have pointed out that larger welfare states and social democracies are more likely to flourish in smaller, more homogenous countries with higher degrees of social trust.[13] Sweden’s policies were enacted in a country with a population similar in size to Georgia’s, and many of its policies have proved more popular and enduring when imposed on this scale. Put differently, national health care is highly unlikely to be imposed on a diverse nation of 330 million people but could be much more plausibly enacted on a state-by-state basis. States such as Illinois, Mississippi, and Louisiana have traditionally been exposed for wasteful, illegal, or irresponsible policies and politicians. But that is no reason to give Washington suffocating power over all 50 states. Instead, Washington’s primary role for many policy functions that it provides funding for should be to guarantee basic safeguards and accountability standards—as well as protect individual civil liberties and civil rights—across all 50 states. Beyond that, some states will make mistakes or have different policy approaches from other states. Nevertheless, in a democracy, states should be accountable to their voters and their policy preferences. Those who desire their state to reflect local consensus views must grant other states that same opportunity. Surely not all federal policies should be devolved to states, and those with significant spillover effects to other states—such as pollution, interstate communications, and interstate crime—should remain federal. Washington should also maintain control of obvious national policies such as defense, international relations, homeland security, space exploration, macroeconomic stabilization, the Federal Reserve, broad financial regulation, health and safety regulation, federal research, and the federal tax code. Federal minimum standards can avoid “races to the bottom,” whereby states drastically cut their welfare systems to motivate their caseloads to move to neighboring states. Many other policies can be devolved with the help of federal offices of interstate coordination across various policy areas. For example, with the federal highway system having been completed in the 1980s, states can maintain their portion of the interstates (as required by Washington) and use a federal office of interstate transportation coordination to collaborate on cross-state projects. Health-insurance markets already work well within states. Critics can come up with countless reasons that certain state and local governments might make mistakes on a given policy. The more important question is whether the 50 states would perform worse than the federal government on a given policy, or with less accountability to their constituents. If each European nation is capable of running its education, health, transportation, and safety-net programs, shouldn’t we be able to trust California, Wisconsin, Florida, and Massachusetts, as well?

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Empirics---2AC

Devolution fails – TANF proves.

Riedl 21 -- Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, focusing on budget, tax, and economic policy. Riedl holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in public affairs from Princeton University (“Devolution: Four Proposals to Empower States and Reduce Washington’s Political Strife,” Manhattan Institute, April 15th, Available online at // lianamalish)

Still, the TANF devolution was imperfect. States exploited loopholes in the law to exempt most families from work requirements and ignore the five-year time limit.[66] The federal grant has been frozen at $16.5 billion since 1996, despite cumulative inflation of 64%—although sharply reduced caseloads have roughly maintained per-family spending, adjusted for inflation.[67] A few outlier states have offered very low cash benefit levels, rejected as many as 98% of TANF applicants, and diverted funds into questionable or illegal uses.[68] The percentage of families in deep poverty has not fallen. The strongest criticisms of TANF have come from liberal states that object to the federal work requirements and time limits. These states prefer to put more resources into education and training (or even return to open-ended assistance with no obligations for recipients) and not be constrained by federal goals such as promoting marriage or reducing out-of-wedlock births. The result of these complaints was the Obama administration’s offer to waive (with questionable legality) some of the work requirements for some states.[69] To be sure, state and local customization is vital for a well-functioning welfare system. Every state and local community has unique poverty drivers and needs. Some communities may be plagued by high housing costs, extraordinarily expensive child care, or energy costs. Moving welfare recipients into jobs may be more feasible in one local economy than another. Even within a community, each low-income family has its own story and poverty solution. Furthermore, liberal and conservative communities have their preferred poverty approaches based on local values. These considerations do not imply that the country (or low-income Americans) would be better off by returning to AFDC; they argue, instead, for better rationalization of the federal welfare system in the direction of greater devolution. In any case, the federal welfare system is a bureaucratic mess with seemingly no one in charge. It consists of approximately 80 different federal means-tested programs spread across a half-dozen federal departments and dozens of federal agencies. For example, the Department of Agriculture runs several food programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates housing and urban aid, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) contains a multitude of cash programs, and the Treasury Department coordinates low-income tax credits. Many federally funded welfare programs are overseen by different congressional committees and reauthorized in separate bills that are enacted years (or decades) apart from each other. Lacking any consistent approach, these programs contain wildly divergent eligibilities, benefit formulas, and requirements from recipients—even the programs that interact with each other. Some programs block grant money to states, others rely on matching grants, and others bypass states entirely. Countless state welfare programs have their own approaches, eligibilities, and benefit levels, as well. In sum, federal and state welfare programs spent $1.1 trillion in FY 2016—enough to grant $100,000 per year to each of the 10 million families with incomes at or below 125% of the federal poverty threshold (or to provide $67,000 per family excluding health-care benefits).[70] In 2016, just the cash, food, and housing assistance came to 140% of the amount needed to bring every American family out of poverty.[71] In fact, much of it does—as the federal poverty rate does not include most federal benefits. Additionally, antipoverty programs assist millions of struggling families whose earners exceed the official poverty line of $21,960 for a family of three. From the standpoint of devolution, the pertinent issue is what states could do with all federal antipoverty funds consolidated into one block grant that roughly matches how much each state is already receiving. Each state could combine the federal block grant with its own funds to build a coordinated system of assistance to vulnerable families. Rather than navigate a maze of dozens of federal programs, families could visit one local welfare office and enroll in one coordinated system that is tailored to their needs. These offices could also assist with education, job training, and job placement. Policy scholar Oren Cass has called such a system a “Flex Fund,” noting that such a consolidation “increases the likelihood of constructive reform by increasing accountability and eliminating unfunded mandates from above or efforts to game the system from below.”[72] Not all federal means-tested benefits can be part of this block grant. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) would remain part of the federal tax code. However, aggressively expanding EITC can push enough working families out of poverty so that fewer families would need to enroll in the new state fund. Some may suggest a separate fund for health-care benefits (discussed below). This block grant concept is not new; yet it can address criticisms of past proposals. For instance, while the TANF block grant has been frozen at $16.5 billion for nearly 25 years, this new block grant can be designed to expand automatically annually by a formula that accounts for state poverty populations and the cost of living. It can also include recession triggers for additional increases. As with TANF, states can be required to continue contributing to this welfare system at their previous levels. And if states truly fear being cheated by Washington on the size of the grant, they can be given a frequent choice between the current system or accepting this grant. Perhaps the most challenging issue is that of federal performance standards and goals. Federal work requirements have been successful in TANF, yet more liberal states have supported more of an education and training approach, with additional work exemptions. Liberal states have also preferred to focus more on reducing poverty (by any means) than encouraging work or reducing welfare caseloads. This can all be negotiated while emphasizing that devolution means trusting states to experiment with new approaches that reflect their values. Relatedly, states that accept a federal block grant must accept basic accountability rules to ensure that funds are not misspent and that a minimum safety net is maintained. States that set absurdly low benefit levels or reject nearly 100% of applicants must be subject to federal sanctions. The continued failure to produce a welfare system that meets minimum federal standards should result in the revocation of the state’s block grant and its re-enrollment in the current federal system that sets eligibility and benefit levels for most programs. The vast majority of states are clearly equipped to design and run their welfare system if they choose. Federal accountability standards can address any outlier states that may misspend funds or attempt to eviscerate their safety net. Some states may choose more education, training, and open-ended benefits, while other states more aggressively push work requirements. Each state should reflect its own values and discover which approach works best.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC

States’ priorities don’t align with devolution – they can’t handle it carefully enough

Sawicky 2000 (Max B. Sawicky, economist, and writer in Virginia. He received his B.A. in English literature from Rutgers University, and his master’s and Ph.D. in economics at the University of Maryland/College Park. His principal areas of research and interest include the Federal budget, state and local finance, fiscal federalism, the economics of taxation, and privatization. January 2000, "The End of Welfare? Consequences of Federal Devolution for the Nation," Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/publication/books_endofwelfare/Accessed July 24, 2023) sns

States will increasingly take center stage in U.S. social policy as devolution proceeds. A basic task will be the finance of existing commitments, not to mention the new responsibilities assigned by the national government. A basic finding in these studies is that state economies can accommodate these challenges to a great extent, and state governments have the capacity and tools to cope, but the recent reform of welfare remains problematic. A similar reform of health care could substantially heighten the risks and potential problems faced by the federal system in the future. As this is being written, state fiscal conditions are sunny and the national economy is steaming along. How devolution will work under less favorable circumstances remains to be seen. National policy-makers in Congress and the Administration would do well to monitor the welfare reform process closely, particularly in terms of the fate of those who leave, are removed from, or decline to join the welfare rolls. They should keep an eye open for signs of competitive pressure on state tax systems. They should give renewed consideration to opportunities for public investment that have been neglected in the past. State governments need to heighten their focus on the problem of fiscal disparities, which a variety of factors could exacerbate in the future. They also need to look forward in terms of the future revenue needs implied by the current or prospective policies and reforms voters desire. An obvious threat deserving preparation in the form of ‘rainy-day’ funds is the onset of the next recession. In the specific, active field of welfare reform, states need to emphasize the objective of reducing poverty as the goal of welfare reform, not the mere reduction of caseloads. Insofar as education is viewed as a solution to poverty, fiscal equalization is an essential task. States also need to be alert to the social and fiscal costs associated with fiscal disparities, or (in the specific area of welfare reform) caseload reduction, so that the true costs and benefits of diverse policy options may be seen clearly and understood. If federalism is a laboratory, the devolution experiment requires safety goggles. At the very least, devolution ought to be an experiment that affords us a learning experience, so that policy achievements can be replicated, and mistakes not repeated. We hope that readers who observe, participate in, or are the objects of this experiment will benefit from this book.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC

States won’t enforce the CP

Stark ‘04 -- Kirk Stark is the Barrall Family Professor of Tax Law and Policy. He teaches Federal Income Taxation, Taxation & Distributive Justice, State and Local Taxation, and the first-year Property course. Professor Stark’s research focuses on taxation and public finance, with an emphasis on state and local tax policy and U.S. fiscal federalism ("Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution," UCLA Law Review 51, no. 5 (June 2004): 1389-1436 // lianamalish)

Working from the core insights of the Tiebout hypothesis, public finance economists have traditionally asserted that all redistributive policies should be concentrated at the most centralized level of government. The reasons behind this central canon of fiscal federalism are straightforward. One concern is that redistribution undertaken by state and local governments creates pecuniary incentives for strategic migration. Where state and local governments redistribute wealth, there is a fear that both the rich and the poor will relocate to escape or take advantage of redistribution. From an efficiency perspective, the costs incurred in these movements represent a deadweight loss. Another concern is that relying on subnational governments to redistribute wealth will result in too little redistribution. In effect, redistributive policies undertaken by state or local governments are likely to create spillover benefits for other jurisdictions, causing the redistributing jurisdiction, which is unable to internalize all of the policy's benefits, to provide too little redistribution. These problems may be avoided by centralizing redistributive policies at the highest level of government. This federal assumption of redistributive policies, centralists argue, would not only avoid the pitfalls described above but would also help to foster a more efficient provision of local public goods.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC

Devolution has too many constraints. Different stages of progress, stability, and data.

Richard P. Nathan and Thomas L. Gais, 6-1-2001, "Is Devolution Working? Federal and State Roles in Welfare," Brookings,

In the new world of welfare, two groups need particular attention. One is multi-problem families. The “silos” of governmental bureaucracies make it hard to look across these families’ needs and connect work-related human services, such as child care, job aid, transportation aid, and treatment of drug and alcohol problems, with other services, such as dealing with threats of domestic violence and child abuse. Some efforts to integrate services for these families are impressive, but they are few and far between. The second group needing attention is the working poor—families whose head is working and whose goal is to stay in, and move up in, the labor force. The 1996 welfare reform law allows the use of federal funds to aid adults and children in working-poor families. New efforts under way in many states include informing people about and helping them receive “safety net” benefits (Medicaid and food stamps), as well as providing work-support services like child care, the earned income tax credit, transportation, and job services in a way that avoids stigma and preserves dignity. But, again, progress varies widely by state. Three things are critical in making the changes required. The first is time. States and localities with the most impressive human service systems—Wisconsin, Michigan, Oregon, Riverside County in California—have been working on welfare reform since the 1980s or early 1990s. Even so, they still have many implementation issues to address. Other states may take even longer because of larger populations, more internal diversity, more autonomous counties or cities, or less professional bureaucracies. Second, devolution demands stability in rules and funding. States and localities are making extremely complex institutional connections through contracts and interagency agreements, creating expensive information systems, and implementing vast training and retraining programs—all things that can be upended by unexpected changes in rules and funding. Rapid innovation and thorough planning at the periphery demands continuity at the center. Third, devolution requires visibility for the whole range of families that the new welfare is expected to serve and at the level where service systems and policies are being formulated. If states and localities are to be accountable not just to the relatively few people on the cash assistance rolls but to the many working-poor and low-income families, more and timely information is needed about the economic status of all such families, even down to the county level. Local information of this sort does not now exist, and thus a major piece of an adaptable and accountable devolution initiative is still largely missing. Diversity may be the name of the game for shaping and implementing social policies in American federalism, but effective diversity needs stability at the top and information at the bottom.