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2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Links › Link -- Economics

The aff’s acts of financial redistribution only further proves their attempt to create a perfect market through the desire to achieve maximal efficiency. To escape this desire and obsession they must realize that a perfect market does not exist and is theoretically and empirically impossible. Continuing down the path of perfecting a market without realizing that it is impossible only leads to complacency through incorrect, biased conclusions

Schroeder 98, (Jeanne L. Schroeder is a professor at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva U, “The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, Harvard Law Review” Dec 1998, p. 483-558, JSTOR//JzLim

Mainstream economics is driven by a number of closely related ideals that I call, collectively, the "perfect market." Achieving the effi- ciency'03 of the perfect market is the object of the economist's desire. In this sense, the perfect market is the ideal or end to which an actual markets are the means. According to one school of law and economics, 1'04 efficiency would be achieved if the ideal perfect market were implemented. We should, therefor modify our legal and political institutions in order to make the act we can or, if that is impossible, to replicate the results of the perfect market as nearly as possible.105

Given the centrality of the ideal of the stream economics, one would expect that economic literature delineating its characteristics. Yet there is remarkable silence among law and economics advocates on the issue. I started this project largely because over the years I had heard numerous critics of law and economics assert that the concept of perfect markets was surprisingly poorly worked out, considering its importance. As a student of economics, I would reply, "That's nonsense. Every introductory economics textbook contains a discussion of the perfect market." Indeed, I thought I remembered reading such discussions, albeit twenty-plus years ago when I was a college student. "Show me," my interlocutors would challenge. In an attempt to prove them wrong, I searched for such a discussion. To my surprise, the only discussions I could find were generally sketchy and conclusory. This Commentary contains the results of my search for a coherent analysis of the perfect market. The surprising silence of the literature led me to try to understand not only the underlying logic of the concept of the perfect market so imperfectly described in the literature, but also the reason economists and lawyers (including myself) fail to attempt such an analysis and then repress this failure.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Links › Link -- Warming

The relentless desire for an idealized and predictable Nature undergirds the aff’s technological efforts toward environmental solutions. The alt is to pluralize the future by incorporating uncertainty into our environmental imaginations

Swyngedouw 10, (Eric Swyngedouw is a professor of geography at the University of Manchseter in the school of Environmet, Education, and development. "Impossible Sustainability and the Post-political Condition," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-90-481-3106-8_11)//JzLim

The Guardian International reported (13 August 2005) how a University of Maryland scientist had succeeded in producing ‘cultured meat’. Soon, he said, “it will be possible to substitute reared beef or chicken with artificially grown meat tissue. It will not be any longer necessary to kill an animal in order to get access to its meat. We can just rear it in industrialised labs”. A magical solution, so it seems, that might tempt vegetarians to return to the flock of animal protein devotees, while promising yet again (after the failed earlier promises made by the pundits of pesticides, the green revolution and now genetic engineering and Genetically Modified – GM – products) the final solution for world hunger and a more sustainable life for the millions of people who go hungry now. Meanwhile, NASA is spending about US $40 million a year on how to recycle wastewater and return it to potable conditions, something that would of course be necessary to permit space missions of long duration, but which would be of significant importance on earth as well. At the same time, sophisticated new technologies are developed for sustainable water harvesting, for a more rational use of water or for a better recycling of residual waters, efforts defended on the basis of the need to reach the Millennium Development Goals that promise, among others, a reduction by half of the 2.5 billion people that do not have adequate access to safe water and sanitation.

In the mean time, other ‘Natures’ keep wrecking havoc around the world. The Tsunami disaster comes readily to mind, as do the endless forest fires that blazed through Spain in the summer of 2005 during the country’s driest summer since records started, killing dozens of people and scorching the land; HIV continues its genocidal march through Sub-Saharan Africa, summer heat waves killed thousands of people prematurely in 2004 in France.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Links › Link -- Nuclear War

Schwab 14

[Gabriele Schwab, Gabriele M. Schwab is Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Irvine. She holds appointments in the departments of Comparative Literature, Anthropology, English and European Languages and Studies. She received her PhD in literary studies and critical theory at the University of Constance and a PhD in Psychoanalysis from the New Center for Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles. She is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, 2014, “Haunting from the Future: Psychic Life in the Wake of Nuclear Necropolitics”, ] //MK

When I first read the essay, I stumbled over the almost shock- ing “Desiring it?” Could we truly harbor an unconscious desire for nuclear war? And wouldn’t such a desire be the ultimate manifestation of the death drive? Derrida emphasized that at this point in history the vision of a “remainderless destruction,” that is, a total nuclear war that would destroy our species, if not all life on Earth, cannot be anything but a fantasy, a phantasm. I am interested in exploring what role the nuclear imaginary plays in the formation of subjectivities and subjections after World War II and the inauguration of the so-called nuclear age with the bomb- ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “No single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today,” says Derrida, “by the cold war arms race”—Derrida calls it a “speed race”—“and by the nuclear imaginary that engenders it and is engendered by it” (1984, 20).

Thirty years after Derrida made this strong assertion, we still

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Links › Link -- Hegemony

The affirmative’s reckoning around America’s hegemony through use of symbolic words and privileged discourse links to endless crises that we don’t need to meddle in. Strengthening the idea of the US’s Savior Complex through fulfilling desires fueled by the Lack leads to a continuation of the endless war against the Other- War on Terror proves

Solomon 10 (Dr Ty Solomon, PhD and lecturer of international relations at the University of Glasgow Scotland, formerly a lecturer at the University of Florida, “AFFECT AND IDENTIFICATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”, , 157-167, published 2010 accessed 12 July 2023) // skohli

To gain a more complete understanding of the hegemonic efficacy of the war on terror discourse, it is appropriate to look at a crucial moment in the initiation of the war itself. Although George W. Bush first publicly uttered the phrase ―war against terrorism in his prime time statement on the evening of September 11, 2001, a much more complete vision of the conflict was offered by the president in his address to a joint session of Congress nine days later on September 20, 2001. This speech is widely viewed as one of the major founding moments of the war on terror discourse. Jackson notes that nearly 80 million American television viewers watched the speech, while Croft discusses how the speech contained many of the key themes that would come to define the war on terror (Jackson 2005, 17; Croft 2006, 69-70, 72-73).

On the surface, this speech offered several key points about what had happened nine days before, and what the nation should expect to see in the coming ―war. The major themes of the speech relate to questions surrounding the events of September 11, 2001, such as directing Americans to the signifiers that would establish who the culprits were, why they launched the attacks, and subsequently what this ―new war would look like in terms of its aim and scope, and what the government expected of Americans. Also offered in this speech was an ultimatum to the Taliban to turn over al Qaeda suspects, an appeal to Muslims that the new U.S. policy would constitute a ―war against al-Qaeda, not Islam, and the announcement of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. In short, the speech articulated an outline for a policy program designed to respond to the events of September 11, 2001. Constructivist and discourse analyses have considered how images of ―self and ―other were defined in a hierarchical manner that served to legitimate American unilateral action against them. Jackson and Croft, for example, have cited this particular speech as one where prominent images of ―us and ―them were first constructed, and where the ―nature of the ―war 156 was defined. Croft (2006, 69) discusses how the ―nature of the enemy was ―clearly articulated in a fully formed fashion nine days after the attacks in the September 20 speech.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Links › Link – generic/inequality

The 1AC is a narcissistic fantasy machine, producing the ideological construction of development against inequality and poverty through its efforts for fiscal redistribution. That reproduces unconscious desires for individualism which conceal the neoliberal production of poverty and precarity.

Kapoor 14 (PhD Political Science , University of Toronto. MA International Affairs , Carleton University. BA (Honours) Economics and Political Science , University of Waterloo Professor of Critical Development Studies. “Psychoanalysis and development: an introduction” 10/2/14, Third World Quarterly Volume 35, 2014 - Issue 7 pg 2-5) //Sajad

International development has tended to ignore – or, tellingly, repress – human/ social passions. Yet the theory and practice of development is replete with disavowed memories (racism, (neo)colonialism, gender discrimination) and traumatic prohibitions (economic recession, poverty), which show up in dreams and fantasies (the exoticised Third World, structural adjustment as universal pan- acea), obsessions (economic growth, ‘wars’ against poverty or terror), or stereo- types (denigration, infantilisation, sexualisation or feminisation of the Third World Other). Psychoanalysis aims precisely at helping tease out these passions, that is, the unconscious fantasies and desires embedded in development. It helps explain the gap between development’s scientific commitments (eg belief in pro- gress, neutrality, objectivity, rationality) and its irrational practices (eg the seductive draw of narrow capitalistic growth, the fatal pull to aggressive racism, or the blind conformity to bureaucratic procedures or ethnic/religious identities). It helps us understand that development is not only a socioeconomic construction, but also an ideological construction intent on effacing its various internal traumas and contradictions – for example, the way in which development is “naturally” equated with neoliberal growth and liberal democracy, concealing the reality of rapacious capitalism, growing global inequalities and unevenness, and diminishing avenues for political contestation. The five articles in this sub-theme for Third World Quarterly aim to examine the intersection of psychoanalysis and development, applying in particular (although not exclu- sively), a Lacanian/Žižekian lens to a range of development issues. It is not just mainstream development that tends to ignore the domain of social passions; it is also critical thinking within the field, including political economy and post-development. Yet, as all the articles in this issue highlight, political-economic issues are imbricated with human desires. Thus, for example, Maureen Sioh links ‘libidinal economy’ to ‘political economy’ by examining how the anxiety of humiliation and the desire for dignity are acted out in the practices of a large East Asian government-linked corporation. She sees such anxieties reflected more broadly in East Asian emerging economies, whose striving for economic growth is at the same time a straining to be recognised as more ‘fully human’, as wanting to command the same degree of respect globally as does the West. In a similar vein, Japhy Wilson’s and my article both argue that one of the main reasons explaining the tremendous success of neoliberal capitalism worldwide is jouissance (a Lacanian term, loosely translated as ‘enjoyment’). That is to say, late capitalism seduces; it binds people to it libidinally by selling them not just ‘cool stuff’ such as iPhones or TVs, but also alluring fantasies about the ‘good life’. This issue of fantasy (or ideological fantasy) is an important one in Lacanian psychoanalysis and, not surprisingly, is taken up by many of the contributors, several of whom once again underscore the links between political economy and libidinal economy. Gavin Fridell shows how the discourse on fair trade is emotionally and fantasmatically loaded. The discourse includes romanticised beliefs and unconscious desires about individualism, local democracy and empower- ment, and affirms an exaggerated role for the Northern consumer, who is con- structed as saviour in being able to change the world through individualised purchases of fair trade coffee. Fridell contrasts this with the case of state-led Vietnamese coffee production: despite being a comparatively more successful example involving collective Southern agency, it is generally ignored in the Western imaginary because it offers no central or empowering role to the Northern consumer. Similarly, Fletcher et al. discuss how the fantasy of overpopulation portrays Third World ‘barbarian hordes’ as threatening the security and jouissance of the West. They argue that this overpopulation bogeyman is an ideological construction that diverts attention away from the impossibility of ‘sustainable development’, which is founded on a neoliberal capitalist system that is the very source of the inequality and ecological degradation that sustainability purports to address. This same kind of ideological diversion is at the heart of Wilson’s article. He maintains that a ‘cause marketing’ campaign such as Jeffrey Sach’s Millennium Villages Project in sub-Saharan Africa, which proposes to transform subsistence farmers into entrepreneurs, is more accurately a narcissistic fantasy: it enables Westerners to enjoy their privileged socioeconomic position in relation to abject Africans, while at the same time admiring a thriving capitalism cleansed of its social contradictions. But it is not just political economy that tends to ignore human emotions; it is also post-development. Indeed, of late, much attention has gone into Foucauldian-inspired post-development analyses, with a particular focus on the production of discourses about the Third World and their attendant disciplinary mechanisms. The problem is that such analyses fail to confront the psychic inclinations that support development discourses. In my article I argue that post-development authors such as Escobar and Ferguson provide no explanation of how power is mediated at the level of the subject, and why people so often acquiesce in, say, neoliberal discourse. In maintaining that development politics and power is produced discursively in an impersonal way (like an ‘anti-politics machine’), post-development ignores the fact that such power is only able to take hold, expand and crucially, persist through libidinal attach- ments (eg jouissance). In a similar vein Wilson concludes that philanthrocapitalism is not so much an anti-politics machine that socially engineers entrepreneurial subjects, but a ‘fantasy machine’ that helps sustain the social fantasy of neoliberalism, while disavowing capitalism’s obscene spectacle of global inequality. Yet, if the contributors to this collection are correct in pointing to the social passions that undergird development, thereby issuing a rejoinder to political economy and post-development, they are also posing a challenge to those on the Left who rely on critical pedagogies for effective sociopolitical transforma- tion. Indeed, the implication of a psychoanalytic approach (underlined in both Fletcher et al.’s and my pieces) is that it is not enough to critically deconstruct discourses, to point out their gaps, discontinuities and contradictions; it is also vital to identify and come to terms with our libidinal attachments to, and unconscious investments in, these discourses. In other words, knowledge and critical rationality must be complemented by a reorientation of our desires.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc – race – necropolitics – long

Only psychoanalysis deconstructs the unconscious epistemic and ideological foundation of racism.

McGowan et al 21 — Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont; Sheldon George, Professor and Chair of the Department of Literature & Writing at Simmons University; and Derek Hook, Associate Professor at Duquesne University, Lacan and Race--Racism, Identity, and Psychoanalytic Theory, Routledge, 2021, pp. 19-22) // skohli

The contemporary proliferation of racism in spite of our knowledge about its wrongs suggests that we have an unconscious investment in racism that continues and multiplies. Armed with education and a belief in racism’s fundamental immorality, people today should have no problem leaving racist ideas and practices behind. But education and morality are not enough. They are powerless in the face of an unconscious investment, which provides the foundation for racism’s continuing appeal for those who indulge in it. The unconscious investment is the central pillar of racism’s intransigence. Unless one takes the unconscious as the starting point for making sense of racism’s appeal, the mystery of the enduring power of racism is almost impossible to decipher. Today, there is a proliferation of historical accounts of all the various manifestations of racism. These accounts make clear the extent of the problem, but they do not help us to resolve it because they never attack racism at the point where it has a hold over us. The struggle against racism requires an engagement with the unconscious, but deciphering the unconscious appeal of racism places us on the difficult terrain of psychoanalytic interpretation.1

When we look at the terminology deployed in the contemporary combat against racism, one might mistakenly assume that the combatants have already taken the unconscious into account. The predominance of the term unconscious bias specifically names this aspect of the psyche. But this apparent nod to psycho- analytic thought is ultimately misleading. Although the term unconscious bias has become a regular part of the anti-racist lexicon, the analysis of the unconscious has not. In fact, the proponents of the term often take pains to distinguish their thought from Freud’s. In Blindspot, their leading work on unconscious bias, Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony Greenwald assure us that “an understanding of the unconscious workings of the mind has changed greatly in the century since Freud’s pathbreaking observations.”2 According to Banaji and Greenwald, Freud’s un- scientific conception of the unconscious has given way to a scientifically verifiable one: we have now collectively moved beyond Freud’s failure to be scientific enough.3 But in the process of this shift, what has been lost is Freud’s insistence on the radical otherness of the unconscious in relation to consciousness.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc – race – necropolitics – long

Racial hostility preshapes class consciousness. Economic views of race cannot explain the fundamental irrationality of racism.

Meyerson 97 Gregory Meyerson is a professor at UNC Greenboro, "Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Labor Competition", 1997, University of British Columbia, pp. 12-14 // skohli

Copyright © 1997 by Gregory Meyerson and Cultural Logic, ISSN 1097-3087 // skohli

Marxists who are economic determinists, who analyze white working-class racism via the labor competition hypothesis or what Saxton calls "the direct economic argument," must deny the graphic particularities of racism, must as a corollary view class consciousness as purified of racialization or gendering. This leads naturally enough to the charge of ahistoricism and hyperrationalism leveled by discourse theorists focusing on how class formation always already takes place in discourse. The ahistoricism of the notion of class interest relied on by economic determinists carries with it the assumption that workers transparently know their interests, which are in turn defined in narrow, economic, calculating, utilitarian terms. Thus, Marxism as economic determinism presupposes a historical, rationalist Lockean man, and Marxism thus falls prey to the bourgeois ideology it claimed to deconstruct. The flipside of the deracialized version of working-class consciousness is that the ruling class is itself seen in essentially non-racial terms. First, it knows (transparently) its economic interest and then, second, it utilizes racism to legitimate a pre-existing non-racial class consciousness.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc – race – necropolitics – long

Racism is a necropolitical technology of governance, reproduced through unconscious processes which subsume the logic of capital. Traditional theories of Black resistance internalize Eurocentric neuroses and constrain their political imaginaries – turns the case and re-entrenches the intergenerational colonial trauma of anti-blackness. Only psychoanalytic socio-diagnosis mobilizes black reason against the phantom of colonialism.

Naicker 21 (Veeran Naicker recently obtained his doctorate in Sociology from the University of Cape Town, Dr Naicker’s current research into the Necropolitical structure of the Township, racialized trauma and the black body is supported by a prestigious postdoctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, at Stellenbosch University. His research interests include postcolonial studies, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, critical theory and the intersections between histories of the Anthropocene, racism, patriarchy and capitalism. “The Necropolitical Crisis of Racial Subjectivity in the South African Postcolony: Black Consciousness as a Technology of the Self and the limits to Transformation” 12/15/21. 136-139) //Sajad

I argue that race is not as an anachronistic remnant of a pre-modern worldview, but a necropolitical ‘technology of governance’ (Mbembe: 2017, p.35) that establishes a racial logic and racism as unconscious processes that constitute modern social reality, (Goldberg: 2001, p.108). Unlike classical Marxism, the racial, colonial and consequently postcolonial state is not bound to the logic of capital but, under the terms of colonial governmentality, both capital and the state enjoy a relationship of reciprocal autonomy. In the case of the Apartheid state, the logic of capital was subordinated to the logic of racial purity (Goldberg: 2002, p.106). It was the conception of the racial state that rendered possible the colonial project, and inversely, the materiality of the racial state is testament to the racializing success of colonial discourse despite the formal demise of colonialism (Goldberg: 2002, p.108). The European colonial state was characterized by governmental policies that ‘manufactured homogeneity,’ while the colonial state outside Europe concerned itself with ‘managing difference, regulating the threat of heterogeneity, or anarchy (or statelessness)’ (Goldberg: 2002, p.120). Although both types of colonial governance gave birth to racial subjects that outlived the end of colonialism, these formations not only differ in form and content but, in their racial mode of subjection, represent different modes of governance.

My claim is therefore that the ideologies of resistance and otherness in the twentieth century, ‘negritude, the black personality and African philosophy’ are not the expression of an innate creativity or an intrinsic will to resistance, but rather evidence that African anticolonial discourses on the self-have come to internalise and invert the Western depiction of the African subject as ‘the other of history’ and therefore become the speaking subjects that have reified master/slave positions in nativist and Pan African discourse as regimes of truth in African anticolonial nationalist discourse in the colonial library or episteme (Diawarra: 1990, p.81). Mbembe designates this nativist/Africanist discourse as the second narrative of black reason (Mbembe: 2017, p.30). African scholars have transposed a Foucauldian analytic of power/knowledge to explicate that nationalist and contemporary African discourses on the black subject continue to rely on the colonial episteme, which we can also designate as the colonial library (Srygotski: 2008, p.83). The second narrative of black reason constituted the early and mid-century aesthetic black imaginary, generating counter-discourses possessed by people subjected to and opposing the violent technologies of colonial governance. The black discourses constituting the second narrative of black reason opposed ‘racial hierarchies, slavery and imperialism’ (Mbembe: 2017, p.87). Although there were attempts to liberate human beings from any type of racial ontology and system of governance that produced racial subjects, this failed because nativist and Pan African discourses colonised African thought. These discourses inverted the racial logic of Western metaphysics, which problematically constitutes a neurotic form of negative difference, incapable of ethico-political transformation that is self- affirmative (Diagne: 2002). To take up a moral position, the self-declared black subject is required to define itself against an ‘evil white subject’ that is primary within the parameters of the colonial episteme.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc – race – necropolitics – short (1 card)

Racism is a necropolitical technology of governance, reproduced through unconscious processes which subsume the logic of capital. Traditional theories of Black resistance internalize Eurocentric neuroses and constrain their political imaginaries – turns the case and re-entrenches the intergenerational colonial trauma of anti-blackness. Only psychoanalytic socio-diagnosis mobilizes black reason against the phantom of colonialism.

Naicker 21 (Veeran Naicker recently obtained his doctorate in Sociology from the University of Cape Town, Dr Naicker’s current research into the Necropolitical structure of the Township, racialized trauma and the black body is supported by a prestigious postdoctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, at Stellenbosch University. His research interests include postcolonial studies, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, critical theory and the intersections between histories of the Anthropocene, racism, patriarchy and capitalism. “The Necropolitical Crisis of Racial Subjectivity in the South African Postcolony: Black Consciousness as a Technology of the Self and the limits to Transformation” 12/15/21. 136-139) //Sajad

I argue that race is not as an anachronistic remnant of a pre-modern worldview, but a necropolitical ‘technology of governance’ (Mbembe: 2017, p.35) that establishes a racial logic and racism as unconscious processes that constitute modern social reality, (Goldberg: 2001, p.108). Unlike classical Marxism, the racial, colonial and consequently postcolonial state is not bound to the logic of capital but, under the terms of colonial governmentality, both capital and the state enjoy a relationship of reciprocal autonomy. In the case of the Apartheid state, the logic of capital was subordinated to the logic of racial purity (Goldberg: 2002, p.106). It was the conception of the racial state that rendered possible the colonial project, and inversely, the materiality of the racial state is testament to the racializing success of colonial discourse despite the formal demise of colonialism (Goldberg: 2002, p.108). The European colonial state was characterized by governmental policies that ‘manufactured homogeneity,’ while the colonial state outside Europe concerned itself with ‘managing difference, regulating the threat of heterogeneity, or anarchy (or statelessness)’ (Goldberg: 2002, p.120). Although both types of colonial governance gave birth to racial subjects that outlived the end of colonialism, these formations not only differ in form and content but, in their racial mode of subjection, represent different modes of governance.

My claim is therefore that the ideologies of resistance and otherness in the twentieth century, ‘negritude, the black personality and African philosophy’ are not the expression of an innate creativity or an intrinsic will to resistance, but rather evidence that African anticolonial discourses on the self-have come to internalise and invert the Western depiction of the African subject as ‘the other of history’ and therefore become the speaking subjects that have reified master/slave positions in nativist and Pan African discourse as regimes of truth in African anticolonial nationalist discourse in the colonial library or episteme (Diawarra: 1990, p.81). Mbembe designates this nativist/Africanist discourse as the second narrative of black reason (Mbembe: 2017, p.30). African scholars have transposed a Foucauldian analytic of power/knowledge to explicate that nationalist and contemporary African discourses on the black subject continue to rely on the colonial episteme, which we can also designate as the colonial library (Srygotski: 2008, p.83). The second narrative of black reason constituted the early and mid-century aesthetic black imaginary, generating counter-discourses possessed by people subjected to and opposing the violent technologies of colonial governance. The black discourses constituting the second narrative of black reason opposed ‘racial hierarchies, slavery and imperialism’ (Mbembe: 2017, p.87). Although there were attempts to liberate human beings from any type of racial ontology and system of governance that produced racial subjects, this failed because nativist and Pan African discourses colonised African thought. These discourses inverted the racial logic of Western metaphysics, which problematically constitutes a neurotic form of negative difference, incapable of ethico-political transformation that is self- affirmative (Diagne: 2002). To take up a moral position, the self-declared black subject is required to define itself against an ‘evil white subject’ that is primary within the parameters of the colonial episteme.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc shells › 1nc – policy – generic

Their life-affirmation culminates in fundamentalist violence – only the death drive makes life worth living

McGowan 13 [Todd, Associate Professor of Film and Television Studies at the University of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, Symploke, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, NE): 2013, p. 224-7]

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. 3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value. 5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death- the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are - is a mode of avowing one's allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.• This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modem inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its own most potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being·in·the-world."" Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.• We can see this in the two great systems of modernity- science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.• Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough- crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one - but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity." Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility." The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite - an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite - the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real." 15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › 1nc shells › 1nc – policy – generic

The 1AC is a narcissistic fantasy machine, producing the ideological construction of development against inequality and poverty through its efforts for fiscal redistribution. That reproduces unconscious desires for individualism, which conceal the neoliberal production of poverty and precarity. The alt is the reorientation of desires against and away from contradictory spectacle economies of entrepreneurship.

Kapoor 14 (PhD Political Science , University of Toronto. MA International Affairs , Carleton University. BA (Honours) Economics and Political Science , University of Waterloo Professor of Critical Development Studies. “Psychoanalysis and development: an introduction” 10/2/14, Third World Quarterly Volume 35, 2014 - Issue 7 pg 2-5) //Sajad

International development has tended to ignore – or, tellingly, repress – human/ social passions. Yet the theory and practice of development is replete with disavowed memories (racism, (neo)colonialism, gender discrimination) and traumatic prohibitions (economic recession, poverty), which show up in dreams and fantasies (the exoticised Third World, structural adjustment as universal pan- acea), obsessions (economic growth, ‘wars’ against poverty or terror), or stereo- types (denigration, infantilisation, sexualisation or feminisation of the Third World Other). Psychoanalysis aims precisely at helping tease out these passions, that is, the unconscious fantasies and desires embedded in development. It helps explain the gap between development’s scientific commitments (eg belief in pro- gress, neutrality, objectivity, rationality) and its irrational practices (eg the seductive draw of narrow capitalistic growth, the fatal pull to aggressive racism, or the blind conformity to bureaucratic procedures or ethnic/religious identities). It helps us understand that development is not only a socioeconomic construction, but also an ideological construction intent on effacing its various internal traumas and contradictions – for example, the way in which development is “naturally” equated with neoliberal growth and liberal democracy, concealing the reality of rapacious capitalism, growing global inequalities and unevenness, and diminishing avenues for political contestation. The five articles in this sub-theme for Third World Quarterly aim to examine the intersection of psychoanalysis and development, applying in particular (although not exclu- sively), a Lacanian/Žižekian lens to a range of development issues. It is not just mainstream development that tends to ignore the domain of social passions; it is also critical thinking within the field, including political economy and post-development. Yet, as all the articles in this issue highlight, political-economic issues are imbricated with human desires. Thus, for example, Maureen Sioh links ‘libidinal economy’ to ‘political economy’ by examining how the anxiety of humiliation and the desire for dignity are acted out in the practices of a large East Asian government-linked corporation. She sees such anxieties reflected more broadly in East Asian emerging economies, whose striving for economic growth is at the same time a straining to be recognised as more ‘fully human’, as wanting to command the same degree of respect globally as does the West. In a similar vein, Japhy Wilson’s and my article both argue that one of the main reasons explaining the tremendous success of neoliberal capitalism worldwide is jouissance (a Lacanian term, loosely translated as ‘enjoyment’). That is to say, late capitalism seduces; it binds people to it libidinally by selling them not just ‘cool stuff’ such as iPhones or TVs, but also alluring fantasies about the ‘good life’. This issue of fantasy (or ideological fantasy) is an important one in Lacanian psychoanalysis and, not surprisingly, is taken up by many of the contributors, several of whom once again underscore the links between political economy and libidinal economy. Gavin Fridell shows how the discourse on fair trade is emotionally and fantasmatically loaded. The discourse includes romanticised beliefs and unconscious desires about individualism, local democracy and empower- ment, and affirms an exaggerated role for the Northern consumer, who is con- structed as saviour in being able to change the world through individualised purchases of fair trade coffee. Fridell contrasts this with the case of state-led Vietnamese coffee production: despite being a comparatively more successful example involving collective Southern agency, it is generally ignored in the Western imaginary because it offers no central or empowering role to the Northern consumer. Similarly, Fletcher et al. discuss how the fantasy of overpopulation portrays Third World ‘barbarian hordes’ as threatening the security and jouissance of the West. They argue that this overpopulation bogeyman is an ideological construction that diverts attention away from the impossibility of ‘sustainable development’, which is founded on a neoliberal capitalist system that is the very source of the inequality and ecological degradation that sustainability purports to address. This same kind of ideological diversion is at the heart of Wilson’s article. He maintains that a ‘cause marketing’ campaign such as Jeffrey Sach’s Millennium Villages Project in sub-Saharan Africa, which proposes to transform subsistence farmers into entrepreneurs, is more accurately a narcissistic fantasy: it enables Westerners to enjoy their privileged socioeconomic position in relation to abject Africans, while at the same time admiring a thriving capitalism cleansed of its social contradictions. But it is not just political economy that tends to ignore human emotions; it is also post-development. Indeed, of late, much attention has gone into Foucauldian-inspired post-development analyses, with a particular focus on the production of discourses about the Third World and their attendant disciplinary mechanisms. The problem is that such analyses fail to confront the psychic inclinations that support development discourses. In my article I argue that post-development authors such as Escobar and Ferguson provide no explanation of how power is mediated at the level of the subject, and why people so often acquiesce in, say, neoliberal discourse. In maintaining that development politics and power is produced discursively in an impersonal way (like an ‘anti-politics machine’), post-development ignores the fact that such power is only able to take hold, expand and crucially, persist through libidinal attach- ments (eg jouissance). In a similar vein Wilson concludes that philanthrocapitalism is not so much an anti-politics machine that socially engineers entrepreneurial subjects, but a ‘fantasy machine’ that helps sustain the social fantasy of neoliberalism, while disavowing capitalism’s obscene spectacle of global inequality. Yet, if the contributors to this collection are correct in pointing to the social passions that undergird development, thereby issuing a rejoinder to political economy and post-development, they are also posing a challenge to those on the Left who rely on critical pedagogies for effective sociopolitical transforma- tion. Indeed, the implication of a psychoanalytic approach (underlined in both Fletcher et al.’s and my pieces) is that it is not enough to critically deconstruct discourses, to point out their gaps, discontinuities and contradictions; it is also vital to identify and come to terms with our libidinal attachments to, and unconscious investments in, these discourses. In other words, knowledge and critical rationality must be complemented by a reorientation of our desires.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › TANF-Specific › TANF Fails---2AC

TANf isn’t always used for what it’s meant for, exacerbating inequalities.

Andrew Hammond, 12-1-2017, “Welfare and Federalism's Peril”, Washington Law Review, https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5012&context=wlr

Due to its devolutionary design, TANF transformed federal cash assistance funding from “a specific funding source for cash assistance” into “a broad funding stream for various programs supporting low-income families.”144 States, all but one of which are prohibited by their own constitutions to run deficits, face significant annual budget pressures.145 In addition to those self-imposed constitutional constraints, some states have been sued to allocate additional resources to other areas, including child welfare.146 As a result, the TANF block grant has become a tempting source of general revenue for states.147 The transfer of the TANF block grant to fund foster care services is particularly prevalent: TANF “makes up about 19 percent of federal spending on child welfare services.”148 This national rate of moving nearly one in five federal dollars of TANF funding to foster services masks even greater transfers in individual states: Texas reportedly “devot[es] more than half the state’s TANF and MOE spending to child welfare” and Michigan uses “close to 40 percent” of its TANF grant to fund foster services.149 According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, thirty-one states reported spending TANF funds on child welfare services in 2011.150 States are also under increasing pressure to pay for health care services despite drops inrevenue.151 For these reasons, less than 30% of the TANF block grant is actually spent on cash assistance.152 Like the 1996 funding formula of the block grant and the 2011 elimination of supplemental grants, the discretion afforded states to reappropriate TANF funds to meet other funding needs exacerbates inequalities in state spending and policies. As a result, TANF recipients “experience extraordinarily different programs in different states.”153

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Secessionism Turn---2AC

Extinction

Valaskakis 14 – Kimon Valaskakis, Former OECD Ambassador of Canada, “Separatism Everywhere : The New Global Epidemic”, Huffington Post, 3-19, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kimon-valaskakis/separatism-everywhere-the_b_4977800.html

Like modern marriages, half of which end in divorce, there is a new and ominous global threat: the break-up of previously stable political entities through separatism.

Crimea wants to leave Ukraine. Scotland has scheduled an independence referendum from Britain in September 2014 and Britain is considering one to possibly leave Europe in 2015. Catalonia's referendum to secede from Spain is in November 2014, and Quebec may possibly organize its own in the next couple of years. Wallonie, Corsica, North Italy, Bretagne etc. may one day follow suit. There is even talk of splitting California in two!

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Secessionism Turn---2AC

Devolution spurs secessionist movements

Frank Newport ’22 is a Gallup Senior Scientist, PhD, University of Michigan education, 06/15/22, “Americans’ View on Federalism as States Take on More Power” https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/394823/americans-views-federalism-states-power.aspx

Implications of an Accelerating Devolution of Power to the States

There are several possible consequences if the states continue to gain power and control over key issues and policies and if the federal government becomes less relevant.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Federal Aid Fails---2AC

Either states can’t afford the CP or the aid they get from the federal government links to the net benefit and fails – states can’t adjust policies or do what’s best to support specific situations

Loconte 97 (Joseph Loconte, Former Director, Simon Center for American Studies, director of AWC Family Foundation Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 3-1-1997, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Government Funding," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/civil-society/commentary/the-seven-deadly-sins-government-funding/Accessed July 12, 2023) sns

Government grants and contracts can be a tantalizing diversion. Even private agencies with the best of intentions may assume tasks that have little to do with their original purpose and for which they may be ill-equipped. "Most everyone is fighting for every penny they can get to run whatever program they have," says the Salvation Army's Triston. "It's really a matter of, if you can't do it the way you want, then you'll take your program and you'll fit it into what government will give you money for." Sometimes private agencies have little choice. Kristen McCormack, a former executive director of Federated Dorchester Neighborhood Houses, recalls a summer-camp contract with the state Department of Social Services to help abused and neglected children. Federated Dorchester, an association of settlement houses in Boston, ran its own camp program for local kids. But it was not equipped to handle children from the DSS caseload. Nevertheless, it struggled with the contract for years. "Everything about it was a disaster," McCormack says. "It was insane, we lost tons of money on it, it wasn't consistent with our mission." DSS caseworkers referred children from all over the city, often without reliable transportation, to the Dorchester camps, yet the agency had no buses to pick them up. DSS required numerous pages of paperwork for each referral, yet the agency lacked the administrative manpower. Most importantly, the agency was being asked to provide a program to DSS children with intense behavioral and emotional problems. "They were abused and neglected kids, which we didn't have the capacity to deal with in our summer camps," says McCormack. "We did not have intensive counseling and therapy." Eventually McCormack told a regional DSS officer that Federated Dorchester would discontinue the contract. "I said we can't provide this service and we're not meeting the needs of the kids," she recalls. The DSS officer reminded McCormack of the $2 million in day-care contracts her agency had with the state. "They actually said, 'If you want your day-care contract, you will take the summer-camp contract,'" she says. "They were very clear." The agency renewed the contract. Watching the children. Up until the late 1970s, Massachusetts performed its own investigations and assessments of welfare families, through its child protective services department. As its welfare caseload ballooned, so did the state's need for protective-service work. But government lacked the staff to monitor families effectively. By the early 1980s, the DSS began enticing child-welfare groups to take on its investigative caseload. "Rather than purchasing add-on or supportive services from private agencies," says Bill Chiaradonna, the director of programs at Boston's Catholic Archdiocese, "DSS was trying to get the agencies to do the same work that it was doing." Although it boasted a long history of work in adoption and foster care, Catholic Charities had no experience in protective services. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s the charity brought in more than $1 million a year in child-protection contracts. "This made us almost identical to the DSS office," says Chiaradonna, "and that became a problem." The problem was that Catholic Charities acquired the same stigma in the community that attaches to a government protective-service agency: It took on a quasi-policing function, monitoring and reporting parents suspected of abusing or neglecting their children. A similar identity crisis enveloped the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (MSPCC). Founded in 1878, the agency had long focused on preventive services to families at risk of neglect or abuse. But by the 1980s, after the DSS reorganized, most of the big state contracts available to private agencies funded family investigations and case management of DSS families. For abuse-prevention groups such as MSPCC, this was the wrong emphasis. The agency wanted to make sure families were getting enough support from the start -- including prenatal care, parenting skills, home visitation, counseling, health and other support services. Like Catholic Charities, however, MSPCC went along with the contract flow, eventually depending on child-protection work to fund 70 percent of its budget. "The board [of directors] felt it did contaminate their mission, and that they had to do what the state said," says Strom, who joined the agency in 1991. "They wanted to get back to the prevention word in our name." Ironically, they soon got some help from the state legislature, which passed a bill banning most nonprofits from doing child-protection work. Cases were transferred back to the state, and funding to private groups was cut off. Private agencies went into a tailspin. The MSPCC reorganized and launched a massive fundraising campaign. Catholic Charities scrambled to salvage other programs. The agency laid off social workers and supervisors, relegated program directors to part-time hours and restructured its administration. "There was a whole infrastructure that was supported in part by the DSS contracts," Chiaradonna says. "We were still being true to our mission," he insists, "but in the end, we probably would have gotten out of protective services ourselves." Heavy dependence on federal and state contracts means dancing to the government piper. Public funding, says Strom, "definitely undermines your capacity to . . . show leadership, to try new demonstrations, to find strategies that work that bureaucracies can't get away with."

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Inequality---2AC

A devolution revolution means states counteract the redistributive impact by burdening the poor.

Kousser 14 -- Thad Kousser studies American state and national politics, voting reforms, direct democracy, and how politicians use social media. His work has been published in journals such as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Political Science Review, the Revue Francaise de Science Politique, the Journal of Politics, and Political Analysis (“How America’s ‘devolution revolution’ reshaped its federalism,” Revue française de science politique, vol. 64, no. 2, 2014, pp. 265-287, Available online at // lianamalish)

While modern America may have been created through a war against England, its national structure has been formed and reshaped not through fights with external powers but by internal conflicts among states, and between states and the federal government. The battles to define American federalism were once carried out in a war and in lunch counter sit-ins, but have now shifted to the courts and to federal funding formulas. These venues may be less dramatic, but they are no less important. As Théret makes clear, federal systems need not be static, with the actual practice of federalism – including whether or not the central government equalizes resources across subnational units – determining whether the form of the federation will endure, centralize, or dissolve. hough a bloodless revolution, the “devolution revolution” nonetheless changed the structure of the federal–state relationship and the scope of the social service safety net. Were these changes for the better? The fiscal federalism literature has long argued for an increased role for states in fitting policies to local needs and demands. “In our “ideal” model”, declared influential economist Wallace Oates, “the central government provides the efficient out-put of the national public good, while numerous local governments offer individuals a wide variety of output of the local public good.” The devolution revolution clearly gave states more authority over their welfare programs, and provided the opportunity to create new health care programs and much of the money to fund them. Did this give Americans the structure of government that they wanted? A recent survey asking respondents about what level of government should address specific policy challenges found that voters wanted to see the federal government address health care, but that state and local governments should assist the poor. Because the devolutions of the 1990s provided the most latitude to states in the welfare realm, both in the freedom to craft policy and through the funding mechanism of block grants, this move appears consistent with public opinion. Does devolution give residents of each state the programs and policies that they desire? While much research has shown the impact that the preferences of state elected officials has on policy choices, a new study based on a breakthrough in the ability to measure state public opinion shows that these choices do not always reflect voter demands. Not all states respond equally to public demands, and some do such a poor job matching policy with public opinion that there is a potential “democratic deficit” in the states. Combined with Wlezien and Soroka’s recent research showing the challenges that Canadian federalism poses for public responsiveness, this recent stream of research raises questions about whether giving more authority to states truly brings government closer to the people. Looking toward the future of federalism in America, how do the lessons of this essay combine to tell us anything about what might happen if more control over the safety net is devolved to the states? Just as Newt Gingrich pushed to create Medicaid block grants in 1995, Republican candidate Mitt Romney called for block grants during the 2012 presidential campaign.  If this new round of devolution comes to pass, how will states react? The lessons of the devolution revolution suggest that growth in Medicaid spending will slow dramatically if states have to pay all of the costs of program expansion and are allowed to keep all of the savings of program cuts. Medicaid expenditures may flatten out in the way that welfare spending has evened out over the past decade. This pattern will not be uniform across states, of course. Because the two parties take clearly different positions on this issue, statehouses controlled by Republicans will be much more likely to use their newfound autonomy to cut Medicaid than Democratic-led states. The analysis in this essay, put in the context of recent findings from the cross-national study of welfare states, also suggests that the distribution of tax burdens could also shape how state policy might shift. Kato shows that, during the economic downturns of the 1980s, nations with generous social services turned to consumption taxes – a regressive yet stable source of income – in order to retain funding for their welfare states. In the American states, taxes are already much more regressive than they are at the federal level. If the next round of devolution forces states to provide more of the funding for social services, health care and welfare programs might be preserved only by raising regressive taxes such as the sales tax. If the United States thus follows the European path, social service programs will be funded through taxes that burden poor and middle-class taxpayers most heavily (as a proportion of their incomes). The redistributive impact of Medicaid and welfare would be counterbalanced by a more regressive funding, all because of a quirk of American federalism.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Inequality---2AC

Devolution fails – local governments become selfish, and it backfires on other localities

Pipa 96 (Anthony F. Pipa, Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development, 7-15-1996, "The Devolution Revolution: Why Congress Is Shifting a Lot of Power to the Wrong Levels," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-devolution-revolution-why-congress-is-shifting-a-lot-of-power-to-the-wrong-levels/Accessed July 24, 2023) sns

This can most easily be seen concerning the major problems associated with overall regional growth. They include crime spreading out from inner-city neighborhoods into surrounding suburbs, increasing traffic congestion now worse in many suburbs than downtown, and poor-quality public schools that reduce the level of labor force skills available to employers throughout each region. Other growth-related problems are the rearing of almost one-fourth of all American children in poverty-stricken homes, our inability to finance new infrastructures adequate to handle rapid population increases, failure to integrate many young unskilled workers and older down-sized workers into the mainstream workforce, and pollution of the air and water from myriad sources scattered throughout each region. All these problems are basically regional because each extends across local boundaries; so what happens concerning them cannot be determined by policies adopted only within each community. The faster the region’s total population growth, the more serious these problems become, and the less effective are any attempts at remedies adopted by particular communities acting alone. Yet the structure of governance within metropolitan areas almost never reflects these regional realities. Except for a few regional transportation or sewer-and-water authorities, almost all governmental powers affecting the above problems are divided among individual localities, most of which are too small to encompass any large fraction of those problems. True, state governments retain many such powers and have the ultimate Constitutional authority to revise local government powers and structures. But most states are too large to focus their policies upon the problems of individual metropolitan regions. And governors and state legislatures prefer to delegate key powers to many small, fragmented local units, rather than creating regional bodies that might compete with their own powers. Therefore, except in less than a dozen of the nation’s more than 300 metropolitan areas, no effective regional governance structure exists. Since every local official is legally responsible only to voters in his or her own community, they are all strongly motivated to take account only of the welfare of their own constituents, ignoring repercussions on everyone else. So each local government designs its policies to capture as many benefits as possible, while shoving as many costs as possible onto surrounding jurisdictions. Thus, Prince William County would have retained almost all the property and sales tax benefits of the Disney project and adjacent new development, while a lot of traffic congestion and other costs would have fallen upon other counties. If some type of tax-base sharing and regional land-use planning existed among these local governments, a much more rational pattern of land uses and of financing public services could be devised. Instead, especially in other areas with much smaller local governments than in the Washington region, huge disparities in local governments’ abilities to provide public services arise from variations in tax bases. Some localities have 10 to 15 times more assessed value per resident than others with central cities and inner-ring suburbs usually on the low end. This creates immensely unequal opportunities in terms of the quality of public schools and other vital services provided within a single region. In general, the poorest residents get hurt the most. The Recommendation Congress could improve this situation almost overnight by requiring each metropolitan region to develop an overall plan for the use of federal funds of all types, before any government in that region could receive any federal money at all. In 1991, Congress adopted this approach concerning federal surface transportation funds. Now it should extend the same idea to all types of federal funding of local governments and services. That would affect federal welfare, housing, and health spending, among others. Faced with this requirement, local governments in each region would have a powerful incentive to get together and form some type of regional planning alliance in order to get federal funds. Yet a devolution of power away from the national level would still take place but at a functionally far more effective level. Opponents criticize more regional governance for two reasons. First, they claim it undermines “local sovereignty” by shifting some power to regional bodies. But localities have no true “sovereignty” over regional problems, because those problems cannot be effectively attacked by purely local policies. Second, they claim any regional governance is “just creating another level of bureaucracy.” But the existing local level cannot cope with regional realities; so something else must be tried for effective results. Regional arrangements have proved very successful in both Portland, Oregon, and the Twin Cities area of Minnesota. In reality, both these objections are primarily motivated by the unwillingness of most local officials and many citizens to yield any of their existing powers, even though those powers are failing to solve many crucial social problems.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Race to Bottom---2AC

State governments are not capable of dealing with the devolution of power from the federal government.

Riedl 21 -- Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, focusing on budget, tax, and economic policy. Riedl holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in public affairs from Princeton University (“Devolution: Four Proposals to Empower States and Reduce Washington’s Political Strife,” Manhattan Institute, April 15th, Available online at // lianamalish)

Despite unhappiness with the central government, calls to transfer more power to state and local governments often meet resistance, particularly among the most politically engaged citizens. Devolution is, first of all, unsatisfying to ideologues so convinced of the superiority of their policies that nothing less than their implementation from sea to shining sea is acceptable. Partisans of both parties believe that a wave election will sweep the other party aside and provide them with full control of Washington’s levers of power, from which they can impose their tax, health-care, and safety-net agenda on all 50 states. This approach is usually accompanied by a belief that the other party’s policy approach is so destructive that no American should live with its consequences, even if local voters unwisely choose to vote for it. On one level, advocating devolution requires humility, modesty, gradualism, and acceptance of other parts of the country choosing a policy direction that one may find harmful. However, on another level, discussed later, devolution is dynamic and confident. Rather than continue with fossilized debates in the nation’s capital, devolution empowers state experimentation with new approaches—and the confidence that one’s own policy approach will work successfully enough to be replicated in others. Another criticism raises the question of competence. In this view, state governments are the minor leagues: amateurish, lacking expertise, and unwilling to provide minimum safeguards to protect families from extreme policies. Of course, the first question one must ask when assessing state government competence is: compared with what? The federal government failed to anticipate the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 housing crash, failed to run a competent health system for returning veterans, and failed to build a successful health-care enrollment website for the ACA in 2014. Federal programs waste billions of dollars annually, cannot pass an audit, and are filled with hundreds of overlapping, duplicative, and contradictory programs. The federal tax code is more complicated than ever, incentivizes tax-gaming rather than efficiency, and fails to collect $500 billion in owed taxes each year. Despite long-term warnings that it was only a matter of time before a serious pandemic might occur, Washington was caught unprepared for the coronavirus, and the early response was marred by failures and incompetence, such as the CDC’s erroneous diagnostic tests.[12] While competence levels do vary, the large majority of state governments are no less competent than the federal government. Many U.S. states have economies, populations, and geographic sizes that are comparable with those of European countries. If all states were divided into separate countries, California would be the world’s fourth-largest economy, while Texas would be ninth and New York eleventh. Moving down the list, the size of Virginia’s economy roughly matches that of Poland, Louisiana’s roughly matches Finland’s, Montana’s matches Serbia’s, and the state with the smallest economy—Vermont—approximates the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia in their economies. If those countries are large enough to determine their own policies, so are American states. European comparisons are especially relevant to American liberals. Political scientists and economists have pointed out that larger welfare states and social democracies are more likely to flourish in smaller, more homogenous countries with higher degrees of social trust.[13] Sweden’s policies were enacted in a country with a population similar in size to Georgia’s, and many of its policies have proved more popular and enduring when imposed on this scale. Put differently, national health care is highly unlikely to be imposed on a diverse nation of 330 million people but could be much more plausibly enacted on a state-by-state basis. States such as Illinois, Mississippi, and Louisiana have traditionally been exposed for wasteful, illegal, or irresponsible policies and politicians. But that is no reason to give Washington suffocating power over all 50 states. Instead, Washington’s primary role for many policy functions that it provides funding for should be to guarantee basic safeguards and accountability standards—as well as protect individual civil liberties and civil rights—across all 50 states. Beyond that, some states will make mistakes or have different policy approaches from other states. Nevertheless, in a democracy, states should be accountable to their voters and their policy preferences. Those who desire their state to reflect local consensus views must grant other states that same opportunity. Surely not all federal policies should be devolved to states, and those with significant spillover effects to other states—such as pollution, interstate communications, and interstate crime—should remain federal. Washington should also maintain control of obvious national policies such as defense, international relations, homeland security, space exploration, macroeconomic stabilization, the Federal Reserve, broad financial regulation, health and safety regulation, federal research, and the federal tax code. Federal minimum standards can avoid “races to the bottom,” whereby states drastically cut their welfare systems to motivate their caseloads to move to neighboring states. Many other policies can be devolved with the help of federal offices of interstate coordination across various policy areas. For example, with the federal highway system having been completed in the 1980s, states can maintain their portion of the interstates (as required by Washington) and use a federal office of interstate transportation coordination to collaborate on cross-state projects. Health-insurance markets already work well within states. Critics can come up with countless reasons that certain state and local governments might make mistakes on a given policy. The more important question is whether the 50 states would perform worse than the federal government on a given policy, or with less accountability to their constituents. If each European nation is capable of running its education, health, transportation, and safety-net programs, shouldn’t we be able to trust California, Wisconsin, Florida, and Massachusetts, as well?

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---Empirics---2AC

Devolution fails – TANF proves.

Riedl 21 -- Brian Riedl is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, focusing on budget, tax, and economic policy. Riedl holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in public affairs from Princeton University (“Devolution: Four Proposals to Empower States and Reduce Washington’s Political Strife,” Manhattan Institute, April 15th, Available online at // lianamalish)

Still, the TANF devolution was imperfect. States exploited loopholes in the law to exempt most families from work requirements and ignore the five-year time limit.[66] The federal grant has been frozen at $16.5 billion since 1996, despite cumulative inflation of 64%—although sharply reduced caseloads have roughly maintained per-family spending, adjusted for inflation.[67] A few outlier states have offered very low cash benefit levels, rejected as many as 98% of TANF applicants, and diverted funds into questionable or illegal uses.[68] The percentage of families in deep poverty has not fallen. The strongest criticisms of TANF have come from liberal states that object to the federal work requirements and time limits. These states prefer to put more resources into education and training (or even return to open-ended assistance with no obligations for recipients) and not be constrained by federal goals such as promoting marriage or reducing out-of-wedlock births. The result of these complaints was the Obama administration’s offer to waive (with questionable legality) some of the work requirements for some states.[69] To be sure, state and local customization is vital for a well-functioning welfare system. Every state and local community has unique poverty drivers and needs. Some communities may be plagued by high housing costs, extraordinarily expensive child care, or energy costs. Moving welfare recipients into jobs may be more feasible in one local economy than another. Even within a community, each low-income family has its own story and poverty solution. Furthermore, liberal and conservative communities have their preferred poverty approaches based on local values. These considerations do not imply that the country (or low-income Americans) would be better off by returning to AFDC; they argue, instead, for better rationalization of the federal welfare system in the direction of greater devolution. In any case, the federal welfare system is a bureaucratic mess with seemingly no one in charge. It consists of approximately 80 different federal means-tested programs spread across a half-dozen federal departments and dozens of federal agencies. For example, the Department of Agriculture runs several food programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates housing and urban aid, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) contains a multitude of cash programs, and the Treasury Department coordinates low-income tax credits. Many federally funded welfare programs are overseen by different congressional committees and reauthorized in separate bills that are enacted years (or decades) apart from each other. Lacking any consistent approach, these programs contain wildly divergent eligibilities, benefit formulas, and requirements from recipients—even the programs that interact with each other. Some programs block grant money to states, others rely on matching grants, and others bypass states entirely. Countless state welfare programs have their own approaches, eligibilities, and benefit levels, as well. In sum, federal and state welfare programs spent $1.1 trillion in FY 2016—enough to grant $100,000 per year to each of the 10 million families with incomes at or below 125% of the federal poverty threshold (or to provide $67,000 per family excluding health-care benefits).[70] In 2016, just the cash, food, and housing assistance came to 140% of the amount needed to bring every American family out of poverty.[71] In fact, much of it does—as the federal poverty rate does not include most federal benefits. Additionally, antipoverty programs assist millions of struggling families whose earners exceed the official poverty line of $21,960 for a family of three. From the standpoint of devolution, the pertinent issue is what states could do with all federal antipoverty funds consolidated into one block grant that roughly matches how much each state is already receiving. Each state could combine the federal block grant with its own funds to build a coordinated system of assistance to vulnerable families. Rather than navigate a maze of dozens of federal programs, families could visit one local welfare office and enroll in one coordinated system that is tailored to their needs. These offices could also assist with education, job training, and job placement. Policy scholar Oren Cass has called such a system a “Flex Fund,” noting that such a consolidation “increases the likelihood of constructive reform by increasing accountability and eliminating unfunded mandates from above or efforts to game the system from below.”[72] Not all federal means-tested benefits can be part of this block grant. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) would remain part of the federal tax code. However, aggressively expanding EITC can push enough working families out of poverty so that fewer families would need to enroll in the new state fund. Some may suggest a separate fund for health-care benefits (discussed below). This block grant concept is not new; yet it can address criticisms of past proposals. For instance, while the TANF block grant has been frozen at $16.5 billion for nearly 25 years, this new block grant can be designed to expand automatically annually by a formula that accounts for state poverty populations and the cost of living. It can also include recession triggers for additional increases. As with TANF, states can be required to continue contributing to this welfare system at their previous levels. And if states truly fear being cheated by Washington on the size of the grant, they can be given a frequent choice between the current system or accepting this grant. Perhaps the most challenging issue is that of federal performance standards and goals. Federal work requirements have been successful in TANF, yet more liberal states have supported more of an education and training approach, with additional work exemptions. Liberal states have also preferred to focus more on reducing poverty (by any means) than encouraging work or reducing welfare caseloads. This can all be negotiated while emphasizing that devolution means trusting states to experiment with new approaches that reflect their values. Relatedly, states that accept a federal block grant must accept basic accountability rules to ensure that funds are not misspent and that a minimum safety net is maintained. States that set absurdly low benefit levels or reject nearly 100% of applicants must be subject to federal sanctions. The continued failure to produce a welfare system that meets minimum federal standards should result in the revocation of the state’s block grant and its re-enrollment in the current federal system that sets eligibility and benefit levels for most programs. The vast majority of states are clearly equipped to design and run their welfare system if they choose. Federal accountability standards can address any outlier states that may misspend funds or attempt to eviscerate their safety net. Some states may choose more education, training, and open-ended benefits, while other states more aggressively push work requirements. Each state should reflect its own values and discover which approach works best.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Devolution-Specific › Devolution Fails---2AC

States’ priorities don’t align with devolution – they can’t handle it carefully enough

Sawicky 2000 (Max B. Sawicky, economist, and writer in Virginia. He received his B.A. in English literature from Rutgers University, and his master’s and Ph.D. in economics at the University of Maryland/College Park. His principal areas of research and interest include the Federal budget, state and local finance, fiscal federalism, the economics of taxation, and privatization. January 2000, "The End of Welfare? Consequences of Federal Devolution for the Nation," Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/publication/books_endofwelfare/Accessed July 24, 2023) sns

States will increasingly take center stage in U.S. social policy as devolution proceeds. A basic task will be the finance of existing commitments, not to mention the new responsibilities assigned by the national government. A basic finding in these studies is that state economies can accommodate these challenges to a great extent, and state governments have the capacity and tools to cope, but the recent reform of welfare remains problematic. A similar reform of health care could substantially heighten the risks and potential problems faced by the federal system in the future. As this is being written, state fiscal conditions are sunny and the national economy is steaming along. How devolution will work under less favorable circumstances remains to be seen. National policy-makers in Congress and the Administration would do well to monitor the welfare reform process closely, particularly in terms of the fate of those who leave, are removed from, or decline to join the welfare rolls. They should keep an eye open for signs of competitive pressure on state tax systems. They should give renewed consideration to opportunities for public investment that have been neglected in the past. State governments need to heighten their focus on the problem of fiscal disparities, which a variety of factors could exacerbate in the future. They also need to look forward in terms of the future revenue needs implied by the current or prospective policies and reforms voters desire. An obvious threat deserving preparation in the form of ‘rainy-day’ funds is the onset of the next recession. In the specific, active field of welfare reform, states need to emphasize the objective of reducing poverty as the goal of welfare reform, not the mere reduction of caseloads. Insofar as education is viewed as a solution to poverty, fiscal equalization is an essential task. States also need to be alert to the social and fiscal costs associated with fiscal disparities, or (in the specific area of welfare reform) caseload reduction, so that the true costs and benefits of diverse policy options may be seen clearly and understood. If federalism is a laboratory, the devolution experiment requires safety goggles. At the very least, devolution ought to be an experiment that affords us a learning experience, so that policy achievements can be replicated, and mistakes not repeated. We hope that readers who observe, participate in, or are the objects of this experiment will benefit from this book.