Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Sustainable Economy Advantage › Extension – GND stimulates sustainable economy

Green New Deal will boost infrastructure development, growing our GDP, and creating millions of new jobs.

Carlock, et.al, 2018 GREG CARLOCK Contributing Author EMILY MANGAN Executive Producer SEAN MCELWEE CO-FOUNDER OF Data for Progress September 2018 Policy Report by Data for Progress A GREEN NEW DEAL A PROGRESSIVE VISION for ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY and ECONOMIC STABILITY https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal-report

The argument that we cannot afford a Green New Deal is also a false one. We have made massive investments in public infrastructure and specific industries in the past that transformed the economy—rural electrification, the federal highway system, hydrologic dam systems, space exploration, and nuclear energy. Economy analyses have shown that in the near term, increases in infrastructure spending would significantly boost economic activity and employment and have the potential to increase public and private sector productivity growth in the long term. For example, the Economic Policy Institute found that investing in building efficiency and national smart grid for carbon mitigation would boost GDP by $147 billion annually and create 1.1 million jobs in the first year.58 Even bigger investments show potential for larger pay-offs. In addition, there is new analysis that a carbon tax will not hamper the economy, particularly as revenues are reinvested smartly in communities.59

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Sustainable Economy Advantage › Extension – GND stimulates sustainable economy

Green New Deal will create millions of sustainable, high wage jobs – driving the economy

Carlock, et.al, 2018 GREG CARLOCK Contributing Author EMILY MANGAN Executive Producer SEAN MCELWEE CO-FOUNDER OF Data for Progress September 2018 Policy Report by Data for Progress A GREEN NEW DEAL A PROGRESSIVE VISION for ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY and ECONOMIC STABILITY https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal-report

A GREEN NEW DEAL IS A JOB CREATOR Accomplishing a Green New Deal requires millions of new living wage jobs that provide dignity to families and renew our vision of America in the 21st century. It will grow the economy and revive our belief in a good American job. The goal is to create 10 million new jobs over the first 10 years through employment and training programs associated with Green New Deal grants and projects. There are signs that the jobs of the future are green jobs: ⊲In 2017, there were 800,000 Americans employed in low carbon emission generation technologies, and 2.25 million employed in energy efficiency. This compares to only 92,000 for coal-fired generation.35 ⊲Solar jobs have grown 168 percent over the past seven years, and wind turbine technician is one of the fastest growing jobs in America.36,37 ⊲One study estimates that spending 2 percent of annual GDP on the green economy could create over 15 million green jobs in 5 years.38

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Sustainable Economy Advantage › Extension – GND stimulates sustainable economy

Comprehensive nature of the Green New Deal will kickstart a new age of just economic development.

Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray Can we afford the Green New Deal? 2020 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2020.1835499

If one looks at the financial costs of the Green New Deal, its comprehensive nature is presented as a weakness due to its high price tag. What we have demonstrated instead is that the comprehensive nature of the GND is its strength. If we were to go all in on greening the economy, we could see more inflation than if we were to do that in conjunction with implementing Medicare for All and the Job Guarantee, both of which can release or mobilize resources for “greening” the economy. On the other hand, implementing Medicare for All without an offsetting increase in spending in the economy would be deflationary, while combining it with spending on greening the economy solves the problem. Further, having a Job Guarantee provides a transition for workers to transition from the private health insurance industry and fossil fuel industries to other fields. The logic that the government is like a household and should balance its budget that’s hindering us today was in full play during the Great Depression as well. Despite its comprehensive scope, the original New Deal was constantly dogged by concerns about excessive government spending. Roosevelt’s attempt to balance the budget in 1937 put the economy back into a depression. WWII eliminated that obstacle unleashing historically unprecedented economic mobilization. We have argued that we should treat the climate crisis as the moral equivalent of war, and hence engage in large scale economic mobilization. In the process, we can transform our economy to achieve higher employment, lower income inequality, better infrastructure and potentially kickstarting the second Golden Age of the American economy.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension – Wetlands

Cheever & Owley, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2016

(Federico, Jessica, Co-Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Enhancing Conservation options: An Argument for statutory recognition of options to purchase conservation easements (opces)”, doa: 8/19/16, L/N, awa)

Climate Change-Induced Extinctions and Sea-Level Rise The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's ("IPCC") Fifth Assessment Report paints a dire picture of both the present and future. n21 As Working Group II's Summary for Policymakers observes, the impact of climate change is already all around us. n22 Increasing rates of species extinction, shifting migration patterns, and rising sea levels are among the most severe risks that climate change models anticipate. n23 Many species are at risk of extinction as a result of climate change-related impacts, including ecosystem shifts, habitat modifications, and introductions of invasive species including diseases. n24 In 2004, a group of prominent scientists predicted that 15-37% of species on Earth were "committed to extinction." n25 While only a few recent extinctions are directly attributed to climate change, n26 scientists agree that climate change is an obstacle to slowing the already accelerated extinction rate caused by other human activities such as habitat conversion. n27 How climate change will affect species extinction is not entirely understood by scientists. There are many factors at issue including climate change's effects on food availability and species interactions. n28 Moreover, the harm from climate change is likely to be magnified as it "interacts with other stressors, such as habitat modification, over-exploitation, pollution, and invasive [*7] species." n29 As a result, some scientists suggest that current predictions may underestimate species extinctions due to climate change. n30 Besides biodiversity loss, climate change is likely to result in a world that looks very different from our current one. The IPCC reports with "high confidence" that many species have already "shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances, and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change." n31 For example, scientists have already found species shifting to higher latitudes and elevations. n32 While scientists agree that many species are shifting their ranges, they also acknowledge that individual species vary greatly in their migration rates. n33 Researchers still struggle to predict patterns of species dispersal and migration under climate change. n34 Programs to protect species will need to be flexible to account for multiple future scenarios. Currently protected areas may be poorly suited for building ecological resilience in the face of climate change, particularly where the conservation plan is based on static assumptions about habitats and climate stability. n35 Shifting ranges require a shifted approach to land conservation. The IPCC also predicted rising sea levels throughout the twenty-first century and beyond, warning that "coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding, and coastal erosion ... ." n36 Sea level rise will also cause subsidence, n37 loss of coastal wetlands, n38 and habitat loss. n39 Such climatic impacts will likely cause economic and social impacts related to displacement n40 and casualties. n41 Although scientists [*8] agree that some degree of sea-level rise is inevitable, there is uncertainty regarding the rate of coastal loss and local impacts. n42 The location and impacts of storm surges and catastrophic events are particularly challenging to predict. n43

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension – Wetlands

Wetlands important – laundry list

National Park Service “Why are Wetlands Important?” May 5, 2016 https://www.nps.gov/subjects/wetlands/why.htm

Why Are Wetlands Important? In the not too distant past, wetlands were regarded as wastelands. Most people felt that they were places to be avoided, and it was common practice to drain them, fill them or treat them as dumping grounds. A study published by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1990 revealed a startling fact: more than half of the 221 million acres of wetlands that existed in the lower 48 states in the late 1700s have been destroyed. Today, we know that wetlands provide many important services to the environment and to the public. They offer critical habitat for fish, waterfowl and other wildlife, they purify polluted waters, and they help check the destructive power of floods and storms. They also provide a wide variety of recreational opportunities such as fishing, hunting, photography, and wildlife observation. As these and many other wetland functions and values described below have become more widely known, wetlands are increasingly seen as productive and valuable resources worthy of protection and restoration. Water Quality: Wetlands act as natural water purifiers, filtering sediment and absorbing many pollutants in surface waters. In some wetland systems, this cleansing function also enhances the quality of groundwater supplies. Reduction of Coastal Storm Damage: Coastal wetlands help to blunt the force of major storms. For example, mangrove forests in south Florida and salt marshes along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts reduce flooding, coastal erosion, and property damage during major storms. Flood Control and Streamflow Maintenance: Wetlands along rivers and streams absorb energy and store water during storms, which reduces downstream flood damage and lessens the risk of flash floods. The slow release of this stored water over time can help keep streams flowing during periods of drought. Streambank Stabilization and Erosion Control: Wetland vegetation binds the soil on streambanks and riparian wetlands, preventing excessive erosion and sedimentation downstream. Wildlife Habitat: Wetlands provide habitat for many species of amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals that are uniquely adapted to aquatic environments. Upland wildlife like deer, elk and bears commonly use wetlands for food and shelter. Wetlands are particularly vital to many migratory bird species. For example, wood ducks, mallards, and sandhill cranes winter in flooded bottomland forests and marshes in the southern U.S., and prairie potholes provide breeding grounds for over 50% of North American waterfowl. Fish and Shellfish Habitat: Freshwater and marine life including trout, striped bass, pike, sunfish, crappie, crab, and shrimp rely on wetlands for food, cover, spawning, and nursery grounds. Between 60% and 90% of U.S. commercial fisheries depend on wetlands. Habitat for Threatened and Endangered Species: About one-third of all plants and animals listed as threatened or endangered species in the United States depend on wetlands for their survival, including whooping cranes, American crocodiles, the dwarf lake iris and several orchid species. Specialized Plant Habitat: Nearly 7000 plant species live in U.S. wetlands, many of which can only survive in these wet environments. Ecosystem Productivity: Some wetland types are among the most productive ecosystems on earth. A stand of cordgrass in a salt marsh can produce more plant material and store more energy per acre than any agricultural crop except cultivated sugar cane. Nutrients and plant material flushed from some wetland systems during storms provide essential food for plants, fish, and wildlife in estuaries and other downstream ecosystems. Recreational Opportunities: Many wetlands contain a diversity of plants, animals and water features that provide beautiful places for sightseeing, hiking, fishing, hunting, boating, bird watching, and photography. Water Supply: Some wetlands help provide clean, plentiful water supplies. For example, wetlands in Florida's Everglades help recharge the Biscayne Aquifer, the sole source of drinking water for the Miami metropolitan area. Education: Ecological, cultural, and historic resources run abundant in our nation's wetlands, and provide countless opportunities for environmental education and public awareness programs.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension – Wetlands

Exponentially escalating environmental impact

Laura Rabinow (deputy director of research at the Rockefeller Institute of Government) “The Shape of Water Regulations The Disputed Waters of the United States” October 2020 https://rockinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/10-22-20-WOTUS-Report-web.pdf

Wetlands are transitional areas between water bodies and drained (or seemingly dry) land that typically exist where the water table is at, near, or just above the land’s surface.11 Wetlands can exist in a wide variety of geographic regions including coastal areas, as with salt marshes and mangroves, or inland areas like swamps, bogs, and freshwater marshes. Wetlands, commonly referred to as the kidneys of the landscape, are also often highlighted in ecosystem studies as the most valuable part of the system, providing among other things: flood and drought mitigation; carbon sequestration; habitats for rare and endangered species; soil development; and, of course, water quality improvement.12 These processes and functions have not only individual, but cumulative impacts on ecological, geological, and hydrological systems, and in turn on downstream water quality. Although certain wetlands may be geographically “isolated” or not connected to water bodies through surface water connections, wetlands are rarely hydrologically isolated due to their subsurface water connections.13, 14 This is especially important given that under the 2020 Rule only wetlands that are “adjacent” to navigable waters through surface water connections that exist during a “typical year” are protected. That is, the 2020 Rule and recent guidance documents from the Army Corps of Engineers, do not reflect an understanding of hydrological connectivity (see Figure 3).15

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension –Civilian Climate Corps

CCC enhances diversity and spurs renewables

Lisa Friedman, 7-28-2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/climate/climate-corps-Congress.html, "Democrats Want a ‘Climate Corps.’ They Just Can’t Agree How to Create It. (Published 2021)," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-21-2023)

The Civilian Climate Corps is modeled after the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s which put 3 million men — it was explicitly single men aged 18 to 25, and mostly white men at that — to work building trails and campgrounds, fighting forest fires, planting trees and building dams across the country.

Supporters of the reimagined corps said they intend to ensure diversity among workers and managers, as well as a $15 per hour wage and health care benefits. They envision climate corps workers installing solar panels, weatherizing buildings and providing water and other supplies during heat waves and storms.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension –Civilian Climate Corps

CCC solves wildfires & protects wetlands

Testimony of Charles “Chas” Robles, 7-20-2021 Ancestral Lands Conservation Corps Director, Conservation Legacy House Natural Resources Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands On “Examining the Potential for a Civilian Climate Corps” (ermo/sms, Acc:6-21-2023)

Catastrophic Wildfire Problem - Forests are degrading and have not been managed to protect communities from catastrophic wildfire. Tree mortality rates have doubled in western National Parks from drought and bark beetles as the threat of wildfire continues to grow. Wildfires are burning hotter and bigger destroying watersheds, habitat, and communities. Solution - The Ancestral Lands Conservation Corps and corps across the country can mobilize thousands of young people through a Civilian Climate corps to help to improve forest health and management. A CCC can treat and improve hundreds of thousands of acres through fire fuel reduction, prescribed burning and help rehabilitate burned areas to protect waterways and streams.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension –Civilian Climate Corps

CCC solves climate crisis

Rachel Ramirez,Ella Nilsen, 9-28-2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/28/politics/what-is-the-civilian-climate-corps/index.html, "Democrats say a Civilian Climate Corps will create jobs. Here's how it could work.," CNN (ermo/sms, Acc:6-21-2023)

CNN When he met with governors this summer from Western states wracked by wildfires and drought, President Joe Biden highlighted one way to tackle the climate crisis that goes beyond more funding for aerial firefighting and better forest management: a Civilian Climate Corps.

The corps is now one of several key climate provisions that are planned for Democrats’ $3.5 trillion budget bill, alongside a clean electricity program and tax credits for renewable energy.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension –Civilian Climate Corps

Spurs reforestation and sea level resilience

Randy Moore, 9-29-2021 Chief, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Department Of Agriculture, The 2021 Wildland Fire Year: Responding To And Mitigating Threats To Communities Subcommittee On Conservation And Forestry Of The Committee On Agriculture (ermo/sms, Acc:6-21-2023)

The CHAIR. Yes. And Chief Moore, in your answer you spoke about forest maintenance, and thinning the forests, and earlier this year I introduced a piece of legislation called the Climate Stewardship Act (H.R. 2534), alongside Senator Booker in the Senate. It laid out a framework for some climate-smart Federal investments in forestry and conservation. It also includes funding for a Civilian Climate Corps. Separately, I worked with Congressman Neguse of Colorado to introduce the Civilian Climate Corps Act (H.R. 2241), which counterparts Senators Coons, Heinrich, and Luja´n have introduced in the Senate. Do you see, and do you have any feedback for us, as we look forward, and continue to try and move these bills forward—do you think that the creation of, or do you have any advice for us related to the creation of a Civilian Climate Corps how that might be helpful in building up the forestry workforce in that forest maintenance, and in the preventative work that you just mentioned?

Mr. MOORE. Yes. Thank you, Chair. So, the Civilian Conservation Corps is a part of our proud history. In fact, a lot of the work that they have done back in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s still stands today. There are a lot of skills that are being developed within that workforce. In terms of a Civilian Climate Corps, this VerDate Aug 31 2005 12:06 Apr 19, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\117-17\47306.TXT BRIAN 15 will put a new, diverse generation of Americans to work that can help conserve and restore public lands and waters, and I think that the investment in restoration, reforestation, reclamation, and other activities that improve the function and form of natural systems will not only bolster our nation’s resilience to extreme wildfires, sea level rise, droughts, storms, and all the other climate impact, but they will also create a new pathway to the forestry workforce of the future.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 GND not feasible

Don’t need to specify a technology – all options should be on the table to quickly slash emissions.

Aronoff, et.al., 2019 A Planet to Win: Why We Need a Green New Deal Kate Aronoff, Alyssa Battisoni, Daniel Aldana Cohen, and Thea Riofrancos 2019 google books

In short, we see no reason to arbitrarily decide in advance which technologies will ultimately be sustainable or morally preferable. We want the longest possible list of options for quickly slashing carbon. We want to build power for better technology, inspired by calls for a new digital commons that would put the power of machine learning and algorithms under transparent, democratic control. And we want to radically loosen patents to speed global cooperation on clean tech, making the best tools available to all countries. The possibility of technological miracles in the future can’t be an excuse to do less now. As we’ve argued, we want to increase public research and accelerate deployment of no-carbon technologies we already have.

Renewable energy is proven technology, a good investment, and can be adequately scaled up to meet energy needs

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 GND not feasible

Clean energy sources are possible without significant increases in land use or risks to biodiversity

Bryn Huxley Reicher, Policy Analyst, Frontier Group Nov 21 2022 How much land will a renewable energy system use?https://frontiergroup.org/resources/land-use-renewable-energy-system/

Renewable energy sources like solar panels and wind turbines take up a fair amount of space. Unsurprisingly then, one of the main concerns raised about the idea of transitioning to a fossil fuel-free, renewable energy-powered society has been land use. Can America build a clean energy future without covering the landscape with solar panels and wind turbines, becoming endlessly mired in local land use conflicts, or threatening special and ecologically vulnerable places? It’s an important question. But while there are legitimate issues to be worked out, it is very easy to overstate the barrier that land use poses to the clean energy transition. First, while renewable energy does take up land, so does the current energy system, primarily for land-intensive, low-value forms of energy, like ethanol. Second, a clean energy future won’t necessarily use more land than the current system and might even use less. This is especially true if we reduce reliance on biofuels in the transition away from fossil fuels. And third, there are many tools we can use – from energy efficiency and distributed forms of energy generation (such as solar panels) to the adoption of less energy-intensive lifestyles and tools to shape our demand for energy – that can reduce the amount of renewable energy capacity we need to build in order to meet the needs of society.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 GND not feasible

It is possible to power the world on 100% renewable energy – studies prove.

Mary Meade 2021 Could the World be Fully Powered by Renewable Energy? https://greenamerica.org/green-economy-work/could-world-be-powered-fully-renewable-sources

If the world transitioned out of fossil fuels, could we generate the energy needed to power the world on 100 percent renewable energy? According to a new report by LUT University in Finland and Energy Watch Group, a German nonprofit, the answer is yes. The nearly five-year-long study simulated a global transition to 100 percent renewable energy by 2050 across all sectors—from power, heat, transport, and water sanitation/desalinization—and demonstrated that a sustainable energy system is more efficient and cost effective than our current energy system. The world’s population is expected to grow from 7.7 billion in 2019 to 9.7 billion in 2050, and total energy demand is expected to grow by almost two percent annually to keep up with a higher standard of living. To match this growth, the study divided the world into nine major regions and 145 sub-regions. Energy use in these regions and sub-regions were measured hourly within five-year intervals from 2015 until 2050. Almost all of the energy supply will be produced using a mix of existing and locally available renewable energy sources; the report emphasizes that decentralization of energy production will be vital to increased efficiency. Additionally, our we must transition from fossil fuels to electricity-based sources or biofuels, like biodiesel or algae fuels. Replacing carbon-intensive energy options in the power and heat sectors is possible by 2030, while the transport sector decarbonizes between 2030 and 2050. The report claims that while energy supply in the fully renewable energy system will be covered by a mix of sources, solar and wind energy will lead the transition. Together, they will make up 88 percent of the total energy supply. The report predicts that a fully renewable global energy system will support an estimated 35 million local jobs, with solar leading job creation. This report is the first of its kind to analyze a sustainable energy system on an hourly basis at a global level. It is a detailed and thorough study in support of 100 percent renewable energy and a vital testimony for climate change activists.

Most obstacles to renewable development can be dealt with through public support – plan manages these dilemmas

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 GND not feasible

The goals of the Green New Deal are achievable – society has undertaken transformations before and succeeded. Changing the consumption habits of just 10 percent of the population can make a massive difference.

Ann Pettifor 2020 The Case for the Green New Deal. google books.

We Green New Dealers know we can achieve that in the ten years or so that the UN’s scientists believe are left to us. One reason it is achievable is this important fact: just 10 percent of the global population are responsible for around 50 percent of total emissions. Tackling the consumption and aviation habits of just 10 percent of the global population should help drive down 50 percent of total emissions in a very short time. This understanding helps us grasp the rate and scope of what is possible if we genuinely believe climate breakdown threatens human civilisation. Furthermore, we know we can do this because we have, in the past, undertaken huge transformations within less time than that suggested by the 2018 IPCC Report. Our confidence should stem not only from knowledge of past transformations, but also from a new understanding of money and monetary systems. I am determined to ensure that this knowledge is shared, in order to empower campaigners and environmentalists with economic evidence and arguments with which to confidently challenge purveyors of capitalist economic dogma, the climate deniers, defeatists and naysayers. Those who consider it utopian to believe society can end a deeply entrenched system of racialized capitalism. Those who are convinced that there is no money for transformation and that government spending is inflationary. Those who feel capitalism’s hyper-globalization is working just fine. That poverty, racial and gender inequality and injustice are not a result of globalized capitalism, but rather of human weakness. That decent jobs for all is a pipe dream. That humanity has survived previous periods of climate breakdown and will do so again. That humanity is essentially evil and driven by greed and self-interest. That there is no hope. Not true. There is hope; and it rests not on a utopian vision of humanity, but on our knowledge of human genius, empathy, ingenuity, collaboration, integrity and courage. We know that it is possible to transform the globalized financial system because we have done it before—and in the relatively recent past. That too will be a theme of this book. To transform the current economic and financial system we must ignore defeatists on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, and arm ourselves with sound knowledge. Such knowledge can empower millions of people, and be a motor for action.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 GND not feasible

It is feasible – but action now is critical. Renewables can be scaled up and innovation can close the gaps with proper government signaling which can be sustained through the plan.

IPCC, April 4 2022 The evidence is clear: the time for action is now. We can halve emissions by 2030.https://www.ipcc.ch/2022/04/04/ipcc-ar6-wgiii-pressrelease/

GENEVA, Apr 4 – In 2010-2019 average annual global greenhouse gas emissions were at their highest levels in human history, but the rate of growth has slowed. Without immediate and deep emissions reductions across all sectors, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is beyond reach. However, there is increasing evidence of climate action, said scientists in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report released today. Since 2010, there have been sustained decreases of up to 85% in the costs of solar and wind energy, and batteries. An increasing range of policies and laws have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and accelerated the deployment of renewable energy. “We are at a crossroads. The decisions we make now can secure a liveable future. We have the tools and know-how required to limit warming,” said IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee. “I am encouraged by climate action being taken in many countries. There are policies, regulations and market instruments that are proving effective. If these are scaled up and applied more widely and equitably, they can support deep emissions reductions and stimulate innovation.” The Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Working Group III report, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of climate change was approved on April 4 2022, by 195 member governments of the IPCC, through a virtual approval session that started on March 21. It is the third instalment of the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), which will be completed this year. We have options in all sectors to at least halve emissions by 2030 Limiting global warming will require major transitions in the energy sector. This will involve a substantial reduction in fossil fuel use, widespread electrification, improved energy efficiency, and use of alternative fuels (such as hydrogen). “Having the right policies, infrastructure and technology in place to enable changes to our lifestyles and behaviour can result in a 40-70% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. This offers significant untapped potential,” said IPCC Working Group III Co-Chair Priyadarshi Shukla. “The evidence also shows that these lifestyle changes can improve our health and wellbeing.” Cities and other urban areas also offer significant opportunities for emissions reductions. These can be achieved through lower energy consumption (such as by creating compact, walkable cities), electrification of transport in combination with low-emission energy sources, and enhanced carbon uptake and storage using nature. There are options for established, rapidly growing and new cities. “We see examples of zero energy or zero-carbon buildings in almost all climates,” said IPCC Working Group III Co-Chair Jim Skea. “Action in this decade is critical to capture the mitigation potential of buildings.” Reducing emissions in industry will involve using materials more efficiently, reusing and recycling products and minimising waste. For basic materials, including steel, building materials and chemicals, low- to zero-greenhouse gas production processes are at their pilot to near-commercial stage. This sector accounts for about a quarter of global emissions. Achieving net zero will be challenging and will require new production processes, low and zero emissions electricity, hydrogen, and, where necessary, carbon capture and storage. Agriculture, forestry, and other land use can provide large-scale emissions reductions and also remove and store carbon dioxide at scale. However, land cannot compensate for delayed emissions reductions in other sectors. Response options can benefit biodiversity, help us adapt to climate change, and secure livelihoods, food and water, and wood supplies. The next few years are critical In the scenarios we assessed, limiting warming to around 1.5°C (2.7°F) requires global greenhouse gas emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest, and be reduced by 43% by 2030; at the same time, methane would also need to be reduced by about a third. Even if we do this, it is almost inevitable that we will temporarily exceed this temperature threshold but could return to below it by the end of the century. “It’s now or never, if we want to limit global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F),” said Skea. “Without immediate and deep emissions reductions across all sectors, it will be impossible.” The global temperature will stabilise when carbon dioxide emissions reach net zero. For 1.5°C (2.7°F), this means achieving net zero carbon dioxide emissions globally in the early 2050s; for 2°C (3.6°F), it is in the early 2070s. This assessment shows that limiting warming to around 2°C (3.6°F) still requires global greenhouse gas emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest, and be reduced by a quarter by 2030. Closing investment gaps The report looks beyond technologies and demonstrates that while financial flows are a factor of three to six times lower than levels needed by 2030 to limit warming to below 2°C (3.6°F), there is sufficient global capital and liquidity to close investment gaps. However, it relies on clear signalling from governments and the international community, including a stronger alignment of public sector finance and policy. “Without taking into account the economic benefits of reduced adaptation costs or avoided climate impacts, global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be just a few percentage points lower in 2050 if we take the actions necessary to limit warming to 2°C (3.6°F) or below, compared to maintaining current policies,” said Shukla. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals Accelerated and equitable climate action in mitigating and adapting to climate change impacts is critical to sustainable development. Some response options can absorb and store carbon and, at the same time, help communities limit the impacts associated with climate change. For example, in cities, networks of parks and open spaces, wetlands and urban agriculture can reduce flood risk and reduce heat-island effects. Mitigation in industry can reduce environmental impacts and increase employment and business opportunities. Electrification with renewables and shifts in public transport can enhance health, employment, and equity. “Climate change is the result of more than a century of unsustainable energy and land use, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production,” said Skea. “This report shows how taking action now can move us towards a fairer, more sustainable world.”

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 Warming inevitable

Warming is reversible---staying below 500PPM is key

Stern 15 (Stern studied the Mathematical Tripos and was awarded a is Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and his DPhilEcon in economics at Nuffield College, Oxford with thesis on the rate of economic development and the theory of optimum planning in 1971 supervised by James Mirrlees, “Why Are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change”, MIT Press, Apr 17, 2015)

The scale of the problem and the risks we face if we fail to act are potentially immense. It is possible to reduce these risks. Much discussion over recent years has focused on the scale of action required to limit temperature increases to less than 2°C from levels in the mid-nineteenth century. This is a widely accepted target in international discussion as a temperature beyond which climate change is "dangerous," and it is embodied in international agreements such as that of the UNFCCC in Cancun in December 2010. At temperature increases above 2°C, the probabilities of nonlinearities and tipping points are believed to increase greatly. Clearly, a higher probability of success would be preferable (for instance offering us at least a 66% chance of limiting the increase to 2°C). The target is sometimes expressed in terms of 66% but more often in terms of a 50-50 chance of a 2°C increase. We have to use such a formulation because outcomes are not defined with certainty and there is a probability distribution around any central estimate. Indeed, a 50% chance of going above "dangerous" levels is itself worrying, but this has been a standard benchmark. It will be broadly necessary to hold concentrations of GHGs to below 500 ppm CO2e, and reduce from there, to give a reasonable (50%) chance of staying below 2°C. A plausible emissions path would see global emissions fall from around 50 billion tonnes of CO2e in 2013' to under 35 billion tonnes in 2030, and under 20 billion tonnes in 2050. We are actually likely to have to go well under 20 billion tonnes by 2050. We can do less now and more later. For example, with strong assumptions about the ability to go to zero or negative emissions in the second half of the century, the 35 billion tonnes in 2030 might be raised to 42. Figure 1.2 illustrates the range of feasible paths we could follow that are consistent with at least a 50-50 chance of holding temperature increase to 2°C. The message is the same in all: for that objective, the emissions trend needs to change significantly and rapidly. While we can in principle do more earlier and less later, or vice versa, the shape of plausible paths will be similar, and it could be very costly to catch up if we postpone actions. An alternative way of expressing future possible paths is to think of there being only a certain allowance of total cumulative emissions, remaining—a limited "carbon space"—if we are to keep warming to only 2°C. While figure 1.2 shows several emissions trajectories, the area und each curve is similar,' and it is this area that must fit into the "carbon space" remaining. New important reports such as from the IPCC estimates the remaining “space” consistent with 2°C trajectories as being in the region of 1-1.5 trillion tonnes of CO2 emissions. 29 To a rough approximation, 30 this is equivalent at the very most to current annual world CO2 emissions over a 40-year period. Given that emissions rising, that space would be exhausted well before 40 years without strong action.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 Warming inevitable

Tipping points are likely---only 1.5 degrees solves

Yongyang Cai 16, Computational and Environmental Economist, Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics, PhD in Copmutational and Mathematical Engineering, at Stanford, Timothy M. Lenton, Thomas S. Lontzek, Risk of multiple interacting tipping points should encourage rapid CO2 emission reduction, http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v6/n5/pdf/nclimate2964.pdf

Existing scientific studies suggest there are multiple climate tipping points that could be triggered this century or next if climate change continues unabated7,8 , and there are causal interactions between tipping events such that tipping one element affects the likelihoods of tipping others8 (Fig. 1). The likelihood of specific tipping events varies, but is generally expected to increase with global temperature7,8 . However, internal variability within the climate system, and relatively rapid anthropogenic forcing, mean that even if deterministic tipping points could be precisely identified, the actual systems could be tipped earlier or later9 . Thus, any assessment of their policy implications needs to represent the stochastic uncertainty surrounding when tipping points could occur10. Furthermore, the impacts of passing different tipping points are expected to vary7,11, and to unfold at different rates depending on the internal timescale of the part of the climate system being tipped7,11 Relative to this scientific understanding, most cost–benefit analyses of climate change allow for only simple and scientifically unrealistic representations of climate tipping points11. Most previous IAM studies of climate catastrophes have treated them in a deterministic fashion, sometimes giving them a probability distribution5,12–15. Some recent IAM studies have considered one stochastic climate tipping point impacting economic output10, nonmarket welfare16, climate sensitivity17, or carbon cycle feedbacks17 . This can lead to up to 200% increases in the SCC in extreme cases10, with the results clearly sensitive to the timescale over which tipping point impacts unfold, as well as the final magnitude of those impacts10. However, there has been little consideration of multiple tipping points and interactions between them, or of how an appropriate representation of risk aversion affects the optimal response to the prospect of future tipping points. A recent IAM study18 has examined three loosely defined tipping points that instantaneously alter climate sensitivity, carbon cycle feedbacks, or economic output, and interact through their effects on atmospheric CO2 , global temperature, or economic output. Here we consider five carefully defined tipping points7,8 and the direct causal interactions between them identified by scientific experts8 (Fig. 1). These interactions occur primarily through aspects of the climate system that are not resolved in simple IAMs. The impacts of our tipping points unfold at a rate appropriate for the system being tipped, in contrast with instantaneous changes17,18 in climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedbacks, which are scientifically questionable10. Our tipping points principally affect economic output, although we also consider their feedback effects on the carbon cycle. Instead of arbitrarily specifying the likelihood of the tipping points18, we calibrate their likelihoods (and the causal interactions between them) on the basis of the results of an existing expert elicitation8 . Furthermore, in contrast to recent work18, we alter the specification of the social planner’s preferences regarding risk aversion and intergenerational equity, in a manner appropriate for the stochastic uncertainty surrounding future tipping points. Modelling tipping points We use the dynamic stochastic integration of climate and economy (DSICE) framework19 to incorporate five stochastic tipping points and causal interactions between them into the 2013 version of the well-known DICE model20 (see Methods and Supplementary Figs 1 and 2). This means solving a sixteen-dimensional stochastic model—the first time in the field of economics of climate change that an analysis on such a scale has been accomplished (our previous work10 solved a seven-dimensional system, whereas other simplified stochastic versions17 of DICE consider only four dimensions). In our stochastic version of the DICE model, we use annual time steps, and calibrate parameters in the carbon cycle and temperature modules against the emulated median response of complex climate models for the four RCP (representative concentration pathway) scenarios21 (see Supplementary Methods). In a deterministic setting within our model (without considering climate tipping points) our calibration gives a SCC in 2010 of US$15 per tCO2 (all results are in 2010 US dollars). For reference, the DICE-2013R model20 that uses five-year time steps and is calibrated against one RCP scenario also has a 2010 SCC of US$15 per tCO2 In IAMs such as DICE, greater emission control at present mitigates damages from climate change in the future but limits consumption and/or capital investment today. A ‘social planner’ is assumed to weigh these costs and benefits of emission control to maximize the expected present value of global social welfare. When faced with stochastic uncertainty about future tipping events, the social planner’s response will depend on their preferences regarding risk and smoothing consumption. DICE adopts a specification of risk aversion that is inversely tied to the decision-maker’s preferences to smooth consumption over time (that is, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution). Thus, a high inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is taken to imply a low risk aversion. In the baseline DICE model, risk aversion RA = 1.45, and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution IES = 1/1.45. However, empirical economic data do not support this inverse proportionality (implying timeseparable utility) and suggest instead decoupling these preferences22 . Hence, we incorporated ‘Epstein–Zin’ (EZ) preferences22 using default parameter settings23 of RA = 3.066 and IES = 1.5, which are consistent with empirical findings23 (implying non-time-separable utility). Estimates of IES > 1 have been obtained from, for example, stockholder data24, IES = 1.5 is used in a long-run risk model19,25 , and the upper bound is considered23 to be IES ∼ 2. Using IES = 1.5, equity returns data23 suggest RA = 3.066, which is in the range RA = 3–4 from a separate study of equity premiums of rare disasters26, with the upper bound considered25 to be RA ∼ 10. The five interacting, stochastic, potential climate tipping points7,8 (Fig. 1 and Table 1) represent reorganization of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet (GIS), collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS), dieback of the Amazon rainforest (AMAZ), and shift to a more persistent El Niño regime (ENSO). We used published expert elicitation results8 to derive the likelihoods (see Methods) of each of the five tipping events (Table 1), and the causal interactions between them (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 1). By causal interaction, we mean that the hazard rate of each tipping point depends on the state of the others. For each tipping event, we specified a transition timescale10 (Table 1, see Methods)—that is, how long it would take for the full impacts to unfold, based on current scientific understanding of the timescales of the systems being tipped7,11 (for example, ice sheets melt more slowly than the ocean circulation can reorganize). Recognizing the scientific uncertainty surrounding transition times, we explore a factor of 5 uncertainty range in either direction. We must also specify a final damage for each tipping event (Table 1, see Methods), taken to be an irreversible percentage reduction in world GDP (gross domestic product). This is the most problematic and debatable part of the parameterization, because of a gross shortage of scientific and economic estimates of tipping point damages11. We can make some scientific inferences about relative damages (for example, based on the eventual contributions of different ice sheets to sea-level rise). Past studies with DICE have loosely associated a 25–30% reduction in GDP comparable with the Great Depression with a collapse of the AMOC27,28, but when combined with other tipping points this could lead to excessively high overall damages. Our assigned damages for individual tipping points range from 5 to 15% reduction in GDP with a combined reduction in GDP if all five tipping events occur and complete their transitions of 38%. However, owing to relatively low probabilities and long transition timescales, the expected tipping point damages in our default scenario amount to only 0.53% of GDP in 2100 and 1.89% of GDP in 2200. In our sensitivity analysis, we consider a factor of 2–3 total uncertainty range in final damages for each tipping point. Finally, we include some conservative effects of tipping particular systems on the carbon cycle (Table 1, see Methods). Optimal policyThe result of including multiple interacting tipping points under the default EZ preferences (Fig. 2) is a nearly eightfold increase in the initial SCC from US$15 per tCO2 in the baseline model (grey line) to US$116 per tCO2 (black line). Across 10,000 sample paths of the model, there are cases where one or more tipping points still occur, leading to uncertainty ranges for the key variables (grey-shaded areas). The emissions control rate jumps from ∼18 to ∼56% in 2010 and rises to 100% by 2050, effectively shutting down fossil fuel CO2 emissions—whereas in the baseline model, emissions continue into the next the century. The average atmospheric carbon peaks in the 2030s at 415 ppm and then declines (owing to ongoing ocean carbon uptake)—whereas in the baseline model, atmospheric CO2 continues to rise to ∼650 ppm by 2100. Temperature rise slows down and is almost stable around 1.4 ◦C above pre-industrial by 2100—whereas in the baseline model, warming continues and approaches 3 ◦C by 2100. Following the expected path (black line) there is only an 11% probability of one or more tipping events by 2100, reduced from 46% in the baseline model, or 87% under a prescribed RCP8.5 emissions scenario (Table 2). A factor of 2.4 increase from the baseline SCC to US$36 per tCO2 is just due to the change to IES = 1.5 (dashed black line, Fig. 2), with a further factor of 3.2 increase due to the potential for multiple tipping points. With just IES = 1.5 (and no stochastic tipping points), the initial emissions control rate increases from ∼18 to ∼29% with 100% emissions control in 2100. Atmospheric carbon peaks around 550 ppm, with surface temperature stabilizing around 2.3 ◦C above pre-industrial. Tipping point interactions In the full model, there are both positive and negative causal interactions between tipping points (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 1), which are conservatively calibrated (see Methods). Hence their inclusion has only a modest net effect on the expected SCC, increasing it from US$109 per tCO2 to US$116 per tCO2 (see also Supplementary Fig. 3). However, a specific sample path where multiple tipping events occur before 2200 (Fig. 3, solid line) reveals that some tipping point interactions can have a strong effect on the time evolution of the SCC. Considering a no-interactions sample path (Fig. 3, dashed line) shows that, in general, passing a tipping point reduces the incentive to mitigate and therefore lowers the SCC, because it can no longer be avoided. However, with interactions, tipping of the GIS significantly increases the likelihood of AMOC tipping (which is assumed to be the most damaging event); hence, this causes a large increase in the SCC to try to avoid AMOC tipping. (This is consistent with previous suggestions29,30 that tipping points can create multiple optima—here for the SCC and corresponding emissions30.) Subsequent tipping of AMOC greatly reduces the SCC. Tipping of ENSO causes a small increase in the SCC because it increases the likelihood of tipping the Amazon. Subsequent tipping of the Amazon halves the SCC because there is now an unavoidable extra source of carbon to the atmosphere and only WAIS left to tip. There are other sample paths where the first tipping event does not increase the likelihood of others, so the SCC drops—for example, when the Amazon rainforest tips first (Supplementary Fig. 4). The SCC therefore depends on whether tipping events occur and in which order. This can also be seen by looking at the sample paths for the earliest and sole tipping before 2100 of each element (Supplementary Fig. 5). If the GIS tips first, this leads to the highest SCC path and the most stringent emission control, reaching 100% before 2040, because of the increased risk of AMOC collapse. If the AMOC tips first, this gives the lowest SCC path because it has the greatest damages, which can no longer be avoided—yet emission control remains above 60% and the SCC remains above US$110 per tCO2 . If the Amazon tips first, this also lowers SCC and emission control, but it leads to the highest atmospheric carbon and temperature trajectory because of an accompanying carbon source. If ENSO tips first, this slightly increases emission control because the likelihood of the AMAZ tipping is increased. If the WAIS tips first, there is little effect on emission control because it only slightly increases the likelihood of tipping the AMOC and GIS. CO2 emissions trajectories (Supplementary Fig. 6) therefore depend on the contemporaneous state of tipping elements. Sensitivity analysis The high SCC is robust to sensitivity analyses (see Methods). Combined variations in assumed transition times and final damages of the tipping points give a full range in initial SCC of US$50–166 per tCO2 (Supplementary Table 2). With pessimistic settings for the expert assessment of interactions between tipping elements (Supplementary Table 3), the SCC increases from US$116 per tCO2 to US$121 per tCO2 . Including an endogenous transition time for the GIS gives only a slight reduction in SCC to US$114 per tCO2 because its damages tend to be discounted away anyway. Allowing all tipping elements to have an endogenous transition time reduces SCC to US$94 per tCO2 Retaining an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution IES = 1.5 but increasing risk aversion to RA = 10 increases the SCC from US$116 per tCO2 to US$146 per tCO2 .With the original RA = 3.066 and an upper limit of IES = 2, the SCC increases to US$151 per tCO2 . Using the default DICE settings of IES = 1/1.45 and RA = 1.45 gives an SCC of US$28 per tCO2 , a factor 1.9 increase from the default US$15 per tCO2 due to the five interacting tipping points. Thus, EZ preferences magnify the effect of including potential future tipping points, causing a factor 3.2 (rather than 1.9) increase in the SCC. To disentangle the effect of IES and RA, we also investigate a case with IES = 1.5 and RA = 1/1.5, which gives an SCC of US$104 per tCO2 . That is, when we incorporate the climate tipping risks, using time-separable preferences as in DICE, an increase from IES = 1/1.45 (and RA = 1.45) to IES = 1.5 (and RA = 1/1.5 ) leads to a factor 3.7 increase in the SCC, and the additional change to our default time non-separable EZ preferences (IES = 1.5, RA = 3.066) leads to an extra SCC of US$12 per tCO2 . Discussion and conclusion Putting our results in scientific context, there is already evidence that major ice sheets are losing mass at an accelerating rate31,32 . GIS mass loss is estimated to be contributing ∼0.7 mm yr−1 to sea-level rise33, with a corresponding increase in freshwater flux to the North Atlantic34 since 1990 of ∼0.01 Sv. Although modest at present, this and other contributors to increasing freshwater input to the North Atlantic35 are thought8 to increase the likelihood of AMOC tipping, and our results suggest that this should be increasing the incentive to control CO2 emissions. WAIS mass loss is contributing ∼0.35 mm yr−1 to sea-level rise32, and there is evidence that parts of the West Antarctic ice sheet are already in irreversible retreat36–38. If the WAIS has already passed a tipping point, then mitigation cannot avoid it, but our results suggest that this should not significantly reduce the incentive to mitigate to try to avoid other tipping events. Our results and policy recommendations differ considerably from another recent study considering multiple tipping points18 , which recommends at most a doubling of the SCC that allows CO2 emissions to continue to grow past mid-century, with temperature ultimately peaking at just under 3 ◦C. In contrast, our results recommend a nearly eightfold increase in the SCC to drive a cessation of CO2 emissions by mid-century, which limits warming to <1.5 ◦C. This very different outcome is a result of our different specification of tipping points together with our change in decision-maker preferences to something more appropriate for such stochastic climate risks.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 Can adapt to warming

Romm 16

(Joseph, PhD in physics from MIT, former assistant secretary for energy efficiency and renewable energy at the U.S. department of Energy, “Climate Change: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford University Press, PROQUEST, Accessed 11-2-16 LKM)

Most environmental problems that people, communities, and governments have experience dealing with are reversible. A polluted lake or river can be cleaned up and then used for swimming and fishing. A city with polluted air can put in place clean air standards and turn its brown haze into blue skies. However, climate change is different from most environmental problems. The scientific literature has made it increasingly clear that key impacts are irreversible on a time scale of centuries and possibly millennia. This means that climate change creates risks that are unparalleled in human history. It also means that if we follow the traditional way of dealing with an environmental problem, that is, wait until the consequences are obvious and unmistakable to everybody, it will be “too late" to undo those consequences for a long, long time. Climate inaction inherently raises issues of equity because it will harm billions of people who have contributed little or nothing to the problem. However, what makes the issue unique in the annals of history is that the large-scale harm is irreparable on any timescale that matters (and that we could avoid the worst of the irreparable harms at a surprisingly low net cost, as discussed in Chapter Four). Because irreversibility is such a unique and consequential fact about climate change, the world's leading climate scientists (and governments) took extra measures to emphasize the issue in the most recent international assessment of climate science by the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—the November 2014 full, final "synthesis" report in its Fifth Assessment all of the scientific and economic literature. In the IPCC's final "synthesis" report of its Fourth Assessment, issued in 2007, irreversibility was only mentioned two times and there was minimal discussion in the Summary for Policymakers. Seven years later, the "Summary for Policymakers" of the IPCC's synthesis report mentions "irreversible" 14 times and has extended discussions of exactly what it means and why it matters. The full report has an even more detailed discussion. What do the world's leading scientists mean by "irreversible impacts"? In the latest IPCC report, they explain that Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6 [where emissions are cut sharply]. Surface temperatures will remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. A large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale, except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period… It is virtually certain that global mean sea-level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100, with the amount of rise dependent on future emissions. In other words, impacts will be much worse than described in this report after 2100 in every case but the one where we sharply cut carbon dioxide starting now (to stabilize at below 2°C total warming). In addition, whatever temperature the planet ultimately hits thanks to human-caused warming, that is roughly as high as temperatures will stay for hundreds of years after we bring total net human-caused carbon pollution emissions to zero. The "case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period" means a time far beyond when humanity has merely eliminated total net human-caused emissions—from deforestation and burning fossil fuels (and from whatever amplifying carbon-cycle feedbacks we have caused, such as defrosting permafrost). To start reversing the irreversible, we have to go far below zero net emissions to actually sucking vast quantities of diffuse CO2 out of the air and putting it someplace that is also permanent, which, according to a 2015 National Academy of Sciences report (discussed in Chapter Six), we currently do not know how to do on a large scale. One can envision such a day when we might be able to go far below zero—if we sharply reduce net carbon pollution to zero by 2100, as we must to stabilize near 2°C. However, it is much more difficult to imagine when it would happen if emissions are anywhere near current levels by 2100, and we have started one or more major amplifying carbon-cycle feedbacks that make the job of getting to even zero net emissions doubly difficult. If we do not get on the 2°C path, then some of the most serious climate changes caused by global warming could last a thousand years or more. The IPCC explained in 2014, "Stabilisation of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilisation for all aspects of the climate system." That is to say, as we warm above 2°C, then even at a point many hundreds of years from now when temperatures start to drop, some changes in the climate—sea-level rise being the most obvious example—will likely keep going and going. The IPCC reports are primarily reviews of the scientific literature, so the new focus on the irreversible nature of climate change is no surprise. In a 2009 study titled "Irreversible Climate Change Because of Carbon Dioxide Emissions," researchers led by NOAA scientists concluded that "the climate change that is taking place because of increases in carbon dioxide concentration is largely irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop." It is significant to note that the NOAA-led study warned that it was not just sea-level rise that would be irreversible: Among illustrative irreversible impacts that should be expected if atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increase from current levels near 385 parts per million by volume (ppmv) to a peak of 450-600 ppmv over the coming century are irreversible dry-season rainfall reductions in several regions comparable to those of the "dust bowl" era and inexorable sea level rise. Recent studies strongly support that finding for both sea-level rise and Dust-Bowlification of some of the world's most productive agricultural lands, as we have seen. This 2014 Synthesis report may be the first time the world's leading scientists and governments explain why the irreversibility of impacts makes inaction so uniquely problematic. Here is the key finding (emphasis in original): Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side-effects, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change, increasing the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts. Why is this conclusion so salient? The IPCC is acknowledging that mitigation efforts taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have risks in addition to their cobenefits—"possible adverse side effects of large-scale deployment of low-carbon technology options and economic costs," as the full report puts it. However, the risks involved in reducing emissions are both quantitatively and qualitatively different than the risks deriving from inaction because they are not likely to be anywhere near as "severe, widespread, and irreversible." The full 2014 "Synthesis" report expands on this point, noting that "Climate change risks may persist for millennia and can involve very high risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant irreversibilities combined with limited adaptive capacity." In sharp contrast, "the stringency of climate policies can be adjusted much more quickly in response to observed consequences and costs and create lower risks of irreversible consequences." Put another way, if some aspect of the emissions reduction strategy turns out to start having unexpected, significant negative consequences, humanity can quickly adjust to minimize costs and risks. However, inaction—failing to embrace strong mitigation—will lead to expected climate impacts that are not merely very long lasting and irreversible, but potentially beyond adaptation. For instance, sea-level rise would become so great, so rapid, and so unstoppable that we simply have to abandon the vast majority of coastal cities.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › A2 Can adapt to warming

Even if some climate change is locked in, rapid mitigation now prevents catastrophic impacts – adaptation alone fails

Pancost 16 (Professor Rich Pancost, organic geochemist, biogeochemist and palaeoclimatologist. Director of the interdisciplinary University of Bristol Cabot Institute, August 2, 2016. “Climate Change: Mitigation or adaptation?” https://preventablesurprises.com/blog/climate-change-mitigation-or-adaptation/)

Now, as then, the sole focus on adaptation is deeply flawed. Let’s start with those arguing that either the mitigation opportunity has passed by or that nations will be unwilling to enact the perceived painful policies necessary to limit warming. Aside from the ethical flaws of this argument, it would be naive for investors to assume that an agreement among nearly 200 nations will have no legal or policy consequences; even the INDCs, though they are incomplete measures, will require vast social, economic, and political change. However, the central argument that mitigation remains vital and necessary is scientific. Those suggesting that mitigation has failed or will fail tend to fixate on the 2°C global warming limit at the centre of policy discussions for the past decade and the acute challenge we face in achieving it. There are good reasons to have a 2°C (or lower) limit, as that is the representative temperature when a number of system changes begin to occur, very high sea level rise becomes locked in, and changes in weather, including extreme events, becomes very difficult to predict, all of which will have dramatic economic and social impacts. Climate change, however, is not a binary. We are already experiencing the consequences of anthropogenic climate disruption. These will become more pronounced as the planet approaches 2°C of warming. And they will become even worse at higher CO2 levels and higher global temperatures. The Earth system does have some bimodal features but the tipping points between them occur at a range of temperatures, with great uncertainty, and in complex ways. Sea level rise showcases this well. In the Pliocene era, about 3 million years ago, CO2 levels were 400 to 500 ppm; temperatures were 2°C higher; and the sea level was 5 to 20 metres higher than today. Such changes would be devastating in modern times, with huge infrastructure costs, long-term economic consequences, and unprecedented social displacement. The last time Earth experienced 500 to 1000 ppm CO2, however, temperatures were about 4-5°C higher, and sea level was 70-100 metres higher than today. These represent a long-term Earth system equilibrium so neither scenario is expected for the next several hundred years or more; but they are illustrative of the profound differences between a 2°C and 5°C global warming scenario. Crucially, unabated biomass loss and fossil fuel burning—especially with new technologies allowing unconventional shale gas and tar sands to be exploited—could result in warming of 5 to 6°C, maybe even more depending on how effective we are at tapping new reservoirs, whether climate sensitivity is at the high or low end of our estimates, and whether positive feedbacks in the Earth system will exacerbate our fossil fuel impacts. To the best of our understanding, 5 to 6°C global warming will have vast and devastating impacts on our climate and ecosystems, probably with similarly devastating impacts on society. In short, even if we fail to sufficiently curtail fossil fuel usage to limit global warming to 2°C, we must certainly do so to prevent far more extreme warming. As long as fossil fuel resources exist to tempt us, mitigation will always be a priority. And yet. Even under our most ambitious mitigation strategies, climate change will happen and we must adapt to it. Already, with the Earth having experienced only about 1°C warming, droughts, floods and heat waves—many of which have been directly attributed to global warming—are occurring. When that warming has combined with natural climate variability, which happened with the strong El Niño of this past year, local affects are even more pronounced, whether it be global coral bleaching or crippling heat waves in the tropics. These events, in turn, have affected food security, productivity and global security. They could destroy marine ecosystems and in turn one of our most important food sources and one of nature’s most beautiful features. And yet, we are committed to further emissions, further warming, and further climate disruption. It is hoped that if we limit warming to 1.5°C, the most severe aspects of sea level rise, extreme weather and ecosystem disruption will be avoided—but we do not know that and some have argued that we have already locked in up to 4 metres of sea level rise. If we limit warming to 2°C, we will almost certainly have to adapt to sea level rise, human displacement, infrastructure devastation; it will also expose us to feedback risks that could add additional warming beyond our direct influence. There is no choice between avoiding severe climate disruption or adapting to it. We will do both. We will leave fossil fuel assets in the ground and we will adapt to some environmental disruption. The only choices we have are how we balance those two needs, how we do so fairly, and how rapidly we make the inevitable transition.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming Adv › Extension – Warming turns war

Warming risks war—exacerbates underlying issues that drive conflict

World Economic Forum, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2016, 11th Edition, 2016, p. 30-31.

Climate change is expected to amplify existing security problems and create new ones. As explored in Part 1, the world will increasingly feel its effects: extreme weather events including prolonged high temperatures and droughts, freak storms and floods, and rising sea levels threatening coastal cities and island countries are expected to occur more frequently and at greater scale, touching many countries, especially those already grappling with poverty, fragility and ineffective governance. The likely impact of climate change on food security, explored in depth in Part 3, is another channel of impact on the international security landscape. As wells dry up, crops and fisheries fail, and people lose their livelihoods, simmering tensions between social groups are more likely to boil over into community violence. Armed non-state actors, including insurgencies and terrorist groups, will be able to leverage this new source of insecurity as an additional grievance on which to build their narratives, finding new recruits among those made destitute. Stresses on water and food could contribute to rising tensions among states. Trade may be interrupted by the hoarding of commodities, local populations can object to foreign control of arable land, and arguments may erupt over rights to draw water from rivers and aquifers that cross borders. Interstate tensions are also likely to be stoked by an increase in migration into countries less affected by the changing climate. Environmental stresses will accelerate migration across borders and also to cities, putting additional stress on urban infrastructure in many countries. Cities will need to find new tools and policies to manage security risks.