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2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Economy › 2AC --- AT: Econ Resilient

Not resilient- small shock to US economy will have big consequences

February 14, 2017, “Global financial resilience in a time of uncertainty”, Brookings Institute, Sterland was a Fulbright Scholar, and studied economics and public policy at Princeton and Sydney Universities, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/02/14/global-financial-resilience-in-a-time-of-uncertainty/

Geithner’s analysis of the current risks in the U.S. financial system is sober but not alarmist. He correctly notes that financial regulation has materially improved the capital and liquidity buffers in the U.S. system as a whole and expanded the supervisory perimeter to include most major institutions. He emphasizes the inherent risks in the maturity transformation at the heart of modern finance – that is the practice whereby financial institutions borrow money on shorter timeframes than when they lend money out, that leaves banks and other institutions vulnerable to ‘runs’ on deposits. As financial sector experts are acutely aware, we can never know risks to the financial system with any certainty. Hence the need to assess system preparedness to respond to shocks. Liquidity risks appear to have risen in some U.S. financial markets. Some asset prices appear extended; in part, a result of the extended low interest rates that have been part of the macroeconomic response in the U.S. Non-bank financial activity is growing, in part in response to stronger regulation. However, strong memory of the 2008 crisis is probably placing some curb on the risk appetite of many players, assisted by the more intense prudential and macroprudential regulation brought forth by the crisis. As a result, the U.S. financial system risks did not figure prominently in the most recent International Monetary Fund’s survey of global financial risks. And the signs of strengthening demand and some welcome price pressures may reduce financial risks in the short term. The real risks in the U.S. will come in a time of prosperity and the seemingly inevitable complacency that sets in with investors and regulators. Nevertheless, and this is a point underplayed by Geithner, there are near-term risks to the domestic U.S. financial system emanating from outside the U.S., adding urgency to his overall arguments for focusing on resilience in U.S. policy settings. HOW AVAILABLE ARE U.S. MACROECONOMIC POLICY TOOLS IN A CRISIS? Beyond regulation, the larger risk at present is the limited firepower of macroeconomic policy to respond to any near-term shocks. Interest rates are still very low, and even with recent signs that they will soon rise, low long-term interest rates suggest that monetary policy will have less leeway in future to respond to shocks. This suggests that more of the burden of response needs to be carried by fiscal policy in the event of a future shock. Yet fiscal policy is constrained on both economic and political grounds. Nevertheless, fiscal policy tools would need to be deployed earlier in a shock to support demand and soften the economic and financial disruption. This course would pose fewer risks if fiscal policy were on a sounder long-term footing. Indeed, forging such a pathway or framework is an important component of overall crisis readiness. Pro-growth structural or productivity reforms could also help economic resilience, for example, by improving macroeconomic “speed limits” and fiscal sustainability. ARE ‘EMERGENCY POWERS’ SUFFICIENT? Limited macroeconomic firepower would suggest even more focus than usual on the effectiveness of financial regulation in preventing or limiting the severity of crises. In particular, this suggests ongoing importance for higher capital and liquidity provisioning, intensive supervision of crisis risks and preparedness (stress tests and the like), and retaining a wider regulatory perimeter (encompassing more activity in the non-bank sector and more system-wide monitoring), to make the system safer. One hopes that any “roll back” avoids watering down these important gains. Geithner’s top priorities for reform to further increase the safety of the system go against the grain of most critics, right and left. They involve increasing the discretion of regulators to deal with systemic crisis events, though within clear accountability frameworks. In particular, he advocates increased flexibility, over that allowed for in Dodd-Frank, to lend to institutions in an emerging crisis, and to use judgment in imposing losses on creditors in a failing institution (bailing-in) in a situation where this could set off a chain of dominoes in the system. Geithner’s analysis, though, gives scope to reform aspects of financial regulation while at least not further harming core crisis prevention goals. He says nothing (deliberately I suspect) of the Volker rule, which he has argued cogently elsewhere has less connection with the fragilities uncovered by the crisis. The extensive provisions covering conduct and other aspects of the finance industry’s operations involve policy tradeoffs which, while important, may not centrally affect the crisis mitigation goals of regulation. Not all reform of Dodd Frank is therefore synonymous with a return to crisis risk. But the threat of roll back of central pillars of crisis resilience such as capital and liquidity buffers is real. If such a course were chosen, the answer to the question “are we safe yet?” would be a resounding no, for the U.S. and global economies. Indeed, when the other macroeconomic vulnerabilities are added, the U.S. economy would be decidedly unsafe, and prone to even a relatively small shock having outsized consequences. Geithner comments, “Financial crises cannot be forecast. They happen because of inevitable failures of imagination and memory.” It would be a great pity if a defective collective memory led to an increase in systemic risk in the U.S. regulatory system—with possible international implications—so soon after the crisis.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- Warming › 2AC --- AT: No Warming Impact

Warming causes extinction – the most realistic scenarios go aff. Even if they win any impact defense, it’s also a threat multiplier meaning

Bryce, 20 – Emma, citing Nelson, Roman, and Kemp---Cassidy Nelson is Co-lead of the biosecurity team at Oxford), Sabin Roman earned a PhD in Complex Systems Simulation from the University of Southampton, and both Roman and Luke Kemp are research associates at the Cambridge University. "What Could Drive Humans to Extinction?" Real Clear Science, 7-27-2020, lilw

Nuclear war An existential risk is different to what we might think of as a "regular" hazard or threat, explained Luke Kemp, a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. Kemp studies historical civilizational collapse and the risk posed by climate change in the present day. "A risk in the typical terminology is supposed to be composed of a hazard, a vulnerability and an exposure," he told Live Science. "You can think about this in terms of an asteroid strike. So the hazard itself is the asteroid. The vulnerability is our inability to stop it from occurring — the lack of an intervention system. And our exposure is the fact that it actually hits the Earth in some way, shape or form." Take nuclear war, which history and popular culture have etched onto our minds as one of the biggest potential risks to human survival. Our vulnerability to this threat grows if countries produce highly-enriched uranium, and as political tensions between nations escalate. That vulnerability determines our exposure. As is the case for all existential risks, there aren't hard estimates available on how much of Earth's population a nuclear firestorm might eliminate. But it's expected that the effects of a large-scale nuclear winter — the period of freezing temperatures and limited food production that would follow a war, caused by a smoky nuclear haze blocking sunlight from reaching the Earth — would be profound. "From most of the modeling I've seen, it would be absolutely horrendous. It could lead to the death of large swathes of humanity. But it seems unlikely that it by itself would lead to extinction." Kemp said. Pandemics The misuse of biotechnology is another existential risk that keeps researchers up at night. This is technology that harnesses biology to make new products. One in particular concerns Cassidy Nelson: the abuse of biotechnology to engineer deadly, quick-spreading pathogens. "I worry about a whole range of different pandemic scenarios. But I do think the ones that could be man-made are possibly the greatest threat we could have from biology this century," she said. As acting co-lead of the biosecurity team at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, Nelson researches biosecurity issues that face humanity, such as new infectious diseases, pandemics and biological weapons. She recognizes that a pathogen that's been specifically engineered to be as contagious and deadly as possible could be far more damaging than a natural pathogen, potentially dispatching large swathes of Earth's population in limited time. "Nature is pretty phenomenal at coming up with pathogens through natural selection. It's terrible when it does. But it doesn't have this kind of direct 'intent,'" Nelson explained. "My concern would be if you had a bad actor who intentionally tried to design a pathogen to have as much negative impact as possible, through how contagious it was, and how deadly it was.” But despite the fear that might create — especially in our currently pandemic-stricken world — she believes that the probability that this would occur is slim. (It's also worth mentioning that all evidence points to the fact that COVID-19 wasn't created in a lab.) While the scientific and technological advances are steadily lowering the threshold for people to be able to do this, "that also means that our capabilities for doing something about it are rising gradually," she said. "That gives me a sense of hope, that if we could actually get on top [of it], that risk balance could go in our favor." Still, the magnitude of the potential threat keeps researchers' attention trained on this risk. From climate change to AI A tour of the threats to human survival can hardly exclude climate change, a phenomenon that (is) already driving the decline and extinction of multiple species across the planet. Could it hurl humanity toward the same fate? The accompaniments to climate change — food insecurity, water scarcity, and extreme weather events — are set to increasingly threaten human survival, at regional scales. But looking to the future, climate change is also what Kemp described as an "existential risk multiplier" at global scales, meaning that it amplifies other threats to humanity's survival. "It does appear to have all these relationships to both conflict as well as political change, which just makes the world a much more dangerous place to be." Imagine: food or water scarcity intensifying international tensions, and triggering nuclear wars with potentially enormous human fatalities. This way of thinking about extinction highlights the interconnectedness of existential risks. As Kemp hinted before, it's unlikely that a mass extinction event would result from a single calamity like a nuclear war or pandemic. Rather, history shows us that most civilizational collapses are driven by several interwoven factors. And extinction as we typically imagine it — the rapid annihilation of everyone on Earth — is just one way it could play out.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China = Neorevisionist

China isn’t neorevisionist

Nichole Ballawar 4-6-2020. (Nichole Ballawar is a Consultant at the Ministry of External Affairs Policy Planning wing of New Dehli, India. He is also a Post graduate in Political Science and International Relations with rich research experience in Nuclear Non-proliferation, Disarmament and Chinese Studies, formerly working with the Ministry of External Affairs and UNDP as a Research Intern. He represented India in Sydney for HPAIR 2017 & written a paper on India-China-Pakistan. "China." Kootneeti. Web. 4-6-2020. accessed 9-12-2022. < https://thekootneeti.in/2020/04/06/china-a-revisionist-power/ >) MSUCB

French poet & novelist Victor Hugo read the minds of millions when he said “Nothing can stop an idea whose time has come” These words of Hugo validated when China celebrated 70 years of Communist party rule recently in October 2019 where Xi Jinping asserted that “there is no force that can shake the status of this great nation. No force can stop the Chinese people and the Chinese nation forging ahead.” In academic circles, many reiterate that China’s time has come and she is at her power apex. Also, many adjectivize this emperor like state as an elephant in the room reckoning its huge economic surplus, massive overcapacity and economic might. A considerable number in the diplomatic community calls China’s Official development assistance (ODA) as a propensity of a creditor Imperialist. All these criticisms leave no doubt that Beijing is seeking to establish a Sinocentric regional order comprising of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. The Great Hall of the People (GHOP) in Beijing, China/ Image: EPA-EFE/WU HONG The China Dream The ‘China Dream’ or idea of making China great again, has been echoed by the state leaders for the last two centuries now and the idea continues to resonate with the Chinese people. The first popular expression of this sentiment was the Boxer Rebellion (1889-1901), which was anti-imperialist, anti-foreign and anti-Christian – together accumulated into resentment against the colonial powers who had divided the country, as the Chinese say, ‘like an over-ripe pomegranate’! The narrative of “a hundred years of humiliation” propagated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is part of this. The leaders, including Mao Zedong and the founders of the CCP in 1921, have articulated this with utmost intensity. One reason why it is called the ‘China Dream’ and not the Chinese Dream is that this is an idea that has inspired leaders and the leadership elite, and not the masses. At the 18th party Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping declared that he would achieve the China Dream by 2021, which is the centenary year of the CCP. He furthered this concept in 19th party Congress in 2017 by reiterating China Dream 2021, Made in China 2035 and China would become a “major world power with pioneering global influence” by 2049! The best weapon is ‘No Weapon’ It is said that Wit trumps weapons. It is a coincidence that China has taken a centre stage on the global platform without a single bullet being fired. Henry Kissinger in his memoir has articulated that Chinese characteristics have a great deal in common with Wei-qi (围棋), (pronounced way-chi) the world’s oldest and most sophisticated board game. This game replicates the intricacies of the country’s geopolitics. Scholars argue that Chinese military theory and this game are both manifestations of the same philosophy. This is outlined in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Warfare is almost always the option of last resort. The preferred and superior approach is to convince your enemy, by whatever means, that you are invincible. The game’s Chinese name translates roughly as “the game of encirclement”. Played on a square grid with 19 intersecting points along each axis, it involves two players taking turns placing white or black stones (all of equal value) on the grid. The goal is to surround and capture enemy stones, dominating the board. Fig1.1 The idea of encirclement In chapter III Attack by Stratagem point 2 the writer says “Fight and conquer in all your battle is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” It means guns and swords makes a lesser difference than fighting with strategies. This explains China’s actions in recent times with regard to contemporary world affairs. Fig1.2 Sun Tuz Art of War Tradition & Culture The history of a country forms its present character, so in China. China didn’t have a foreign ministry until 1911. Before 1911, foreign policy was conducted by the Ministry of Rites. Therefore, it could be well established that the traditional values are embedded in their thinking and these values are forging more and more into their actions. Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, decided the time had come to push its viewpoint across the world and project a positive image of the Chinese culture and traditions. They initially invested US$ 6.6 billion in the effort. The state-owned China Global Television Network (CGTN) and editions of the newspapers like People’s Daily, gave a boost to spreading the language, culture, food etc. It was felt that the negative image of China being projected by Hollywood needed to change. Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SoEs) began investing in Hollywood films and well-known foreign directors with instructions to portray China in a positive light. Therefore, this is a gradual advance to sell Chinese characteristics to the world. The Chinese are like compulsive students- for them, no problem is finally solved, every solution is an admission to a new problem – Henry Kissinger OBOR and String of Pearls China’s Belt and Road Initiative (also known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR)) is one of President Xi’s most ambitious foreign and economic policies. It aims to strengthen Beijing’s economic leadership through a vast number of infrastructure projects which costs around $8 trillion and encompasses 65 countries. Many foreign policy analysts view this initiative largely through a geopolitical lens, seeing it as Beijing’s attempt to gain political leverage over its neighbours. Many argue that Beijing not only trying to export high-end goods to the world but also to encourage the acceptance of the Chinese standards. The string of pearls conundrum is another complexion in which the cartographic of Beijing’s expansion in the Indian Ocean region is questioned. “The String of Pearls” is a geopolitical theory related to Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region. It refers to the network of their military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication. Critics argue that String of pearls is a Chinese notion of encircling India by refurbishing ports in various countries around the Indian subcontinent. Perspectives on China’s rise There are different viewpoints about China’s Rise Prof. Srikant Kondapalli from the School of International Studies, JNU, iterates that Chinas soft hand hard hand techniques are formidable. If the Chinese think that their soft power to influence is not working they would try to switch to hard power advancements, this will continue till they reach a pinnacle. This explains assertive behaviour in the Indian Ocean region. Professor also explains that China’s Comprehensively Deeping reforms under which explain China’s revisionist behaviour. John Mearsheimer from Realist school of thought argues that China will rise in the near future & it will convert her economic might into military might. He further argues that the rise of China will change the status quo, if the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the world will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force the way it was during the Cold War. Shivshankar Menon former NSA, Government of India notes that it’s China’s relative moment of dominance and they will try to change the global order in their favour. They will try to do a number of cartographic expansions for their empire to flourish at this particular point in time. Nirupama Rao former Indian Foreign Secretary in one of the interview stated that “South Asia is meant to be an integer of connectivity but BRI is an expression of growing Chinese power and influence. It’s a way they moved from the Deng Xiaoping low profile to We will be leaders narrative and it is an evidence of their strategic, economic and military advance” Conclusion In today’s comprehensive society the world has branded China as a ‘Revisionist’ power aiming to change the current status-quo. It is also argued that, over the long term, Beijing intends to replace the United States as the principal constructor of a new security order. These revisionist intentions are neither secret nor holds any element of surprise. All these ultimately are speculations on the basis of fear and anxiety. But to predict the future, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on some substantial theory because many aspects of the future are still unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in the emerging world politics.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Chinese goals require violently securing global domination – domestic policy and government documents prove – evaluate internal Chinese affairs before the aff’s empirics because it’s impossible to explain why China acts without understanding their mindset.

Seth Cropsey 1-9-2020 – Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. "Strengthening the U.S.–Taiwan Alliance", Accessible Online at: <>) MSUCB

2019 has not been a good year for China. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ambitions and the Communist Chinese Party’s imperious means to achieve them have become transparent. The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is illustrative. Two Chinese actions defined this past year's regional news cycle. First, China's reaction to Hong Kong's peaceful pro-democratic protests escalated to a full-scale military crackdown. The Beijing Government deployed 12,000 People's Armed Police – a 1.5-million strong army dedicated to internal security – to the island, beating protestors and besieging the democracy movement's university strongholds. Most remarkable has been the resilience of average Hong Kongers. The opposition lacks a designated leader and organizational structure, a clear demonstration of widespread rage at China's dishonoring the Basic Law that protects Hong Kong's freedoms and to which the CCP agreed before Hong Kong's sovereignty passed from the U.K. to China in 1997. Second, China has escalated its campaign against Uighur Muslims in the country's West. Internal party documents have confirmed that Premier Xi and his confidants have no qualms about executing the largest instance of ethnically-targeted mass internment since the Holocaust. Beijing has constructed a Stasi-style police state in Xinjiang and deported 1.5 million Uighurs to "reeducation" camps. The more horrific accusations – that China harvests organs from Uighur men, and that Chinese soldiers are raping the wives of interned Uighur men in the form of extermination-by-forced-breeding – are unconfirmed. However, the situation merits a serious independent examination of these accusations. Only with the context of these events, combined with China’s escalating aggression towards the United States and its Pacific allies, can the importance of Beijing’s pressure against Taiwan be grasped. Global dominance is China’s ultimate ambition. A toxic combination of paranoia and imperial longing propels China’s rulers – reclaiming the Middle Kingdom’s place at the center of the world requires destroying America’s international position, while—as China’s rulers apparently believe—its security entails monopolizing the Western Pacific, eliminating any ethnically or politically distinct entities within China, and ensuring Chinese access to resources and markets abroad. Chinese pressure on Taiwan, therefore, stems from the same desires that prompt repression in Hong Kong and savagery in Xinjiang. Moreover, Taiwan poses a unique problem for Beijing. Its links with the United States make it a potential forward operating base for China’s adversaries, frustrating Beijing’s ambitions to control the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s democratization after decades of military rule proves that it can govern itself without Beijing’s imperial management. Bringing Taiwan to heel, therefore, is the inexorable result of China’s ambitions. Its actions this past year demonstrate Beijing’s multi-spectrum approach to achieving this end.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Historical crises and Xi’s narratives

Christopher P. Twomey 8-3-2022. (Christopher P. Twomey received his Ph.D. from MIT in Political Science and joined the NPS faculty in 2004, later serving as Associate Chair for Research and as Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict from 2007-09.  Today, he supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the State Department on a range of diplomatic engagements across Asia and advises PACOM, STRATCOM, and the Office of Net Assessment.  He has been the lead organizer of the US-China Strategic Dialogue, a track 1.5 diplomatic meeting on strategic nuclear issues, since its inception in 2005.  He is currently a member of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, a member of the Adjunct Staff at RAND, and has consulted for the National Bureau of Asia Research (NBR) continually since 2009.. "The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Is Just Starting." War on the Rocks. Web. 8-3-2022. accessed 8-23-2022. < https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis-is-just-starting/ >)MSUCB

The Chinese military exercises that began on Aug. 3, 2022, have initiated the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. The most immediate reason for this was Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei. But this is a bigger crisis, driven by bigger factors. There has been a steady erosion in Sino-American relations and — not unrelated — a shift in the nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations that Beijing finds deeply threatening. As a result, to the crisis are chimeric, as too are blithe expectations of a quick return to the status quo ante. Like the previous three Taiwan Strait Crises, this will likely mark a turning point in Sino-American relations. As in previous crises, domestic political dynamics among all three participants will drive opportunism and complicate crisis management and diplomacy, extending its duration. This creates further potential for , all increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation. Leaders in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei should recognize the dangers inherent in this crisis and engage in both selective restraint and cautious diplomacy. Origins of the Current Crisis All the previous Taiwan crises had important implications for regional security, and we should expect the same today. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-1955 had the . It involved intense shelling of offshore islands, by the United States, and successful amphibious operations by the People’s Liberation Army that led to the seizure of several small islands. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, in 1958, involved such bravado from Mao Zedong that even Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was put off, . The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted out of Chinese anger at Taiwanese President Lee Denghui’s visit to the United States in 1995. Although it arguably had limited potential to escalate given the relevant military balance across the Taiwan Strait at the time, there were : It sparked double digit growth in China’s military budget and led the People’s Liberation Army to develop anti-access, area-denial doctrines to threaten U.S carriers deployed during future incidents. When it is finally resolved, the current crisis will likely have had similarly significant effects. Thankfully none of the previous crises escalated into a major Sino-American war, and there are reasons to be hopeful that this crisis will not either. China has a in the run up to the Party Congress in the fall, and Beijing recognizes that would be highly unpredictable. Nonetheless, we are in the early stages of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis: It is likely to continue for weeks and months and even now it is more severe than the third. Already, events have surpassed important thresholds. Some five to nine missiles passed over Taiwan en route to targets east of the main island. Portions of two of the initial exercise boxes fell within territorial waters claimed by Taiwan, and one comes within just a few miles of a small Taiwanese island. The initial bracket the island as a whole and key ports, much more than the closure zones in 1995 and 1996. Five missiles targeted areas within Japan’s claimed exclusive economic zone beyond those that China disputes. Although violations of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone have become more common in recent years, they too have intensified in the past weeks. have buzzed Taiwan’s offshore islands, have been put to sea, and additional exercises have . Beyond China, the military involvement of other actors has also been significant. The United States has gathered substantial naval capabilities in Northeast Asia, far more than a routine deployment. According to the U.S. Naval Institute, of the 114 ships currently operationally deployed across the entire globe, , the forward-based fleet originally ordered to patrol the Taiwan Strait in 1950. This includes one super carrier and two smaller carriers, with an additional super carrier and another smaller carrier finishing Rim of the Pacific exercises near Hawaii. All of those are capable of launching F-35 strike aircraft. Beyond this, a is deployed in Australia, a rotational deployment of F-35s arrived , and a 12-day command and control exercise centering on the Southern Pacific . Some of these deployments may have been long planned (China’s carrier deployment may have been as well). But others, including one of the small carriers put to sea in recent days, are clearly reactions to Chinese escalations. The result is a major concentration of forces available to monitor the situation surrounding Taiwan. And on top of all this, an additional later in the month. Of course, Taiwan’s military is also monitoring the situation and on high alert. The overflight of Taiwanese airspace obviously increases the need for monitoring and the potential for direct engagement of forces. During China’s exercises, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that its missile defense capabilities “.” In addition to conducting pre-scheduled aimed at repulsing amphibious assaults, other capabilities are in as well. Finally, Japan’s military has actively monitored the situation as well, . Not only has the military component of this crisis already escalated beyond the last one, but China has also escalated diplomatically and economically as well. A was released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Pelosi landed. The U.S. ambassador in Beijing, Nicholas Burns, was called into the Foreign Ministry to receive a formal démarche late that evening as well. Beijing also suspended or cancelled a series of planned bilateral exchanges. A set of well-crafted , including several that appeared optimized to target the more assertive Democratic People’s Party constituencies. Basic distributed denial-of-service attacks have shut down official and media web pages in Taiwan intermittently since Pelosi’s visit. A on the Taiwan issue was released, laying out the contemporary elements of China’s policy. This coordinated activity is a significant achievement within the , suggesting Beijing clearly planned well for the first stage of the crisis. These are just the opening weeks. The historical record and current context suggest the situation is unlikely to settle quickly, even if Beijing wraps up its next round of military exercises in short order. In all of the previous Taiwan Strait crises, tensions and military activity ebbed and flowed. The first and third crises lasted approximately eight months, and the second over three. International Factors Today, international and domestic factors will interact to further complicate crisis management. All three primary actors will assess the messages they have sent and received and may conclude that additional signaling of resolve is necessary. China is trying to use military signals to dissuade the United States and Taiwan from continuing past policies. The United States and Taiwan are trying to show that they are not being deterred from continuing what they see to be rightful and consistent policies. At first, China’s actions were driven by the simple question of whether Pelosi would visit Taiwan or not. Going forward, Beijing will be responding to much more complicated questions. For instance, how “official” were Pelosi’s activities in Taiwan? Does Japan’s responses suggest Tokyo’s policy is also shifting? If so, how much? In classic fashion, Beijing may find that it has provoked more official engagement between Japan and Taiwan. More fundamentally, Beijing sees Washington as moving away from ” and increasingly creating an official relationship with Taiwan. This undermines a core strategic interest for Beijing. Beginning with a cabinet level visit under the Trump administration and revision of rules for diplomatic engagement signed by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Beijing began to worry Washington was violating the commitments it made in establishing relations with the People’s Republic of China during the Cold War. of U.S. military forces in Taiwan, repeated from President Biden, and all, in Beijing’s view, provide further evidence of this shift. Thus, an important goal for Beijing in the crisis is to deter further such salami slicing of the U.S. “One China Policy” more generally, as well as protesting the specific sliver that Pelosi’s visit represents. This raises the stakes in the crisis and makes bringing it to a quick resolution less likely. Furthermore, just as with economic sanctions leveled against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic tools will take time to exact costs on the Taiwanese economy. There will be a strong logic for Beijing to retain these in place in the absence of any concession from Taipei. This too will keep tensions escalated. America’s national security apparatus will also be loath to let . This is important for Washington’s continued (if strategically ambiguous) support for Taiwan but also to help assure allies in the region, some of whom will be far more concerned with the Chinese exercises than U.S. domestic audiences. The mere presence of U.S. deployments discussed above will help on this front, but may, in themselves, be deemed insufficient. Indeed, the United States has already started talking about . Another complication, from Beijing’s side, is that the bureaucratic Chinese political system — not least the national security apparatus — remain sclerotic. This will make maintaining an integrated and coordinated response more challenging for Beijing as the pace of actions and reactions increase. Slow characterized previous crises, such as the EP-3 incident in 2001 and the Belgrade embassy bombing of 1999. If the United States, Taiwan, and China intensify the tempo of military activity as the crises continues, such inertia will be dangerous. Domestic Political Factors Domestic factors in China, Taiwan, and the United States have also played a key role in creating this crisis and will continue to drive it. The Chinese Communist Party’s reliance , and specifically as related to Taiwan, will create pressure on the regime to live up to its self-proclaimed status as defender of China’s unity. This will be particularly important from now through the fall when Xi Jinping, in a move unprecedented since the 1980s, plans to be reappointed to lead the party. There is some about Beijing’s response . While censorship and repression can contribute to managing public opinion, Chinese leaders remain sensitive to it nonetheless. In the United States, maintaining a confrontational approach to China now has bipartisan backing. As demonstrated by the recent , treating China as a threat to be confronted is one of the few things that garners support from both sides of the aisle. This makes it harder for the United States to back down, just as it from going in the first place. Finally, the Taiwanese people’s deepening identification as will make managing the cross-strait relationship even more difficult. This will color Taiwan’s local electoral campaigns in the fall and in the more distant 2024 elections for president. It has already put the Democratic Progressive Party — which is committed to creating more “international space” apart from Beijing — in full control of most elements of Taiwan’s government.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan

David Rising 8-19-2022. (David Rising is an Asia-Pacific correspondent with The Associated Press. . "China's response to Pelosi visit a sign of future intentions." No Publication. Web. 8-19-2022. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://www.aol.com/chinas-response-pelosi-visit-sign-040745163-130440352.html >) MSUCB

BANGKOK (AP) — China's response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was anything but subtle — dispatching warships and military aircraft to all sides of the self-governing island democracy, and firing ballistic missiles into the waters nearby. The dust has still not settled, with Taiwan this week and Beijing planned, but experts say a lot can already be gleaned from what China has done, and has not done, so far. China will also be drawing lessons on its own military capabilities from the exercises, which more closely resembled what an actual strike on the island claimed by Beijing as its own territory would look like, and from the American and Taiwanese response. During the nearly that followed Pelosi's early August visit, China sailed ships and flew aircraft regularly across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, claiming the de facto boundary did not exist, over Taiwan itself, and challenged established norms by firing missiles into Japan's exclusive economic zone. “I think we are in for a risky period of testing boundaries and finding out who can achieve escalatory dominance across the diplomatic, military and economic domains,” said David Chen, an analyst with CENTRA Technology, a U.S.-based consulting firm. Pelosi was the highest-level member of the U.S. government to visit Taiwan in 25 years, and , as Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to seek a third five-year term as leader of the ruling Communist Party later this year. Under Xi, China has been increasingly forceful in declaring that Taiwan must be brought under its control — — and U.S. military officials have said that Beijing may seek a military solution within the next few years. , with China conducting regular military flights near Taiwan and the U.S. routinely sailing warships through the Taiwan Strait to emphasize they are international waters. China accuses the U.S. of encouraging the island’s independence through the sale of weapons and engagement between U.S. politicians and the island’s government. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying called Pelosi’s visit a and accused Washington of breaking the status quo and “interfering in China’s internal affairs.” “China is not the old China of 120 years ago, and we are not Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan — we will not allow any foreign force to bully, suppress or enslave us,” she told reporters in Beijing. “Whoever wants to do so will be on a collision course with the Great Wall of steel forged by the 1.4 billion Chinese people.” The U.S. continues to insist it has not deviated from its “one-China” policy, recognizing the government in Beijing while allowing for informal relations and defense ties with Taipei. China held off on its maneuvers until Pelosi had left Taiwan, and turned back its forces before they approached Taiwan's coast or territorial airspace, which showed a “modicum of restraint,” Chen said. But, he noted, following Pelosi's triggered the announcement of more exercises. “We are likely entering a period of regular military demonstrations in and around China’s maritime domain," he said. “The Chinese Communist Party is also quite capable in creating cross-domain responses, as has been seen in the cyber realm. Beyond that, we could see escalatory moves in space, in the South China Sea, Africa, the Indian Ocean, or the South Pacific.” Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said the scale and coordination of the exercises suggested China toward establishing dominance in the western Pacific. That would include controlling the East and South China Seas via the Taiwan Strait, and having the capability to impose a blockade to prevent the U.S. and its allies from coming to the aid of Taiwan in the event of an attack. Short of an armed conflict, a blockade of the Taiwan Strait — a significant thoroughfare for global trade — at a time when the world is already facing disruptions. In particular, Taiwan is a crucial provider of computer chips for the global economy. Though ostensibly a reaction to Pelosi's visit, it is clear China's exercises had been long planned, said Mareike Ohlberg, a senior fellow in the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund think tank. “I do think they were looking for an ,” she said. “This is not something you prep after the announcement (of the visit) and then pull off that quickly and that easily.” The U.S. held back throughout the maneuvers, keeping an aircraft carrier group and two amphibious assault ships at sail in the region, but not close to the island. Taiwan avoided any active countermeasures. Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration's coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, said this week that the U.S. was taking a “calm and resolute” long-view approach that would include continued transits of the Taiwan Strait, supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, and otherwise deepening ties with the island. To that end, the U.S. that it was opening talks with Taiwan on a wide-ranging trade agreement. Campbell said Washington sees China’s actions as “part of an intensified pressure campaign against Taiwan, which has not ended.” “We expect it to continue to unfold in the coming weeks and months,” he said. The U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged China’s increasingly capable military, saying it has become a true rival and has already surpassed the American military in some areas, including shipbuilding, and now has the world’s largest navy. The reserved American response to the recent exercises seemed calculated to avoid any accidental confrontation that could have escalated the situation, but could also feed China’s confidence, Ohlberg said.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

China is super revisionist.

Friedberg 2020. Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. "An Answer to Aggression: How to Push Back Against Beijing." Foreign Affairs Sept.-Oct. 2020: 150+. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. Accessed 17 Sept. 2020. MSUCB

For the past four decades, Western democracies have hoped that engagement with China would cause its leaders to abandon any revisionist ambitions they might harbor and accept their country's place as a "responsible stakeholder" in the U.S.-led international order. Expanding flows of trade and investment would, it was thought, also encourage Beijing to proceed down the path toward greater economic and political openness. The policy of engagement was not absurd on its face; it was a gamble rather than an outright blunder. But as has become increasingly obvious, the West's wager has failed to pay off. Instead of opening up and mellowing out, with Xi Jinping at the helm, China is pursuing unusually brutal and oppressive policies at home and acting more aggressively abroad. China is trying to replace the United States as the world's leading economic and technological nation and to displace it as the preponderant power in East Asia. Beijing has ratcheted up its efforts to exploit the openness of democratic societies in order to shape the perceptions and policies of their governments. It is working hard to establish itself as the leader of the developing nations and, with their support, to rewrite rules and reshape international norms, standards, and institutions in line with its own illiberal, authoritarian preferences. In the long run, China's rulers evidently hope that they can divide, discredit, and weaken the democracies, lessening the appeal of their system, co-opting some, isolating others, and leaving the United States at the head of what will be, at best, a diminished and enfeebled coalition. It is one thing to have such dreams, another to actually fulfill them. In addition to its impressive strengths, China has large and mounting liabilities, including a slowing economy, a rapidly aging population, and a system of governance that relies on costly coercion rather than the freely given consent of its people. These liabilities will complicate the regime's plans and could eventually derail them. But it would be imprudent to assume that this will happen soon or of its own accord.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

China Revisionist.

Nichole Ballawar, 6 April, 2020, [Author has Masters in Political Science and International Relations from Nagpur University and Research Intern at Ministry of External Affairs, India], "China – A Revisionist Power?," Diplomatist, , Xoxo 9/20/2020

These words of Hugo validated when China celebrated 70 years of Communist party rule recently in October 2019 where Xi Jinping asserted that “there is no force that can shake the status of this great nation. No force can stop the Chinese people and the Chinese nation forging ahead.” In academic circles, many reiterate that China’s time has come and she is at her power apex. Also, many adjectivize this emperor like state as an elephant in the room reckoning its huge economic surplus, massive overcapacity and economic might. A considerable number in the diplomatic community calls China’s Official development assistance (ODA) as a propensity of a creditor Imperialist. All these criticisms leave no doubt that Beijing is seeking to establish a Sinocentric regional order comprising of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. THE CHINA DREAM The ‘China Dream’ or idea of making China great again, has been echoed by the state leaders for the last two centuries now and the idea continues to resonate with the Chinese people. The first popular expression of this sentiment was the Boxer Rebellion (1889-1901), which was anti-imperialist, anti-foreign and anti-Christian – together accumulated into resentment against the colonial powers who had divided the country, as the Chinese say, ‘like an over-ripe pomegranate’! The narrative of “a hundred years of humiliation” propagated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is part of this. The leaders, including Mao Zedong and the founders of the CCP in 1921, have articulated this with the utmost intensity. One reason why it is called the ‘China Dream’ and not the Chinese Dream is that this is an idea that has inspired leaders and the leadership elite, and not the masses. At the 18th party Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping declared that he would achieve the China Dream by 2021, which is the centenary year of the CCP. He furthered this concept in the 19th party Congress in 2017 by reiterating China Dream 2021, Made in China 2035 and China would become a “major world power with pioneering global influence” by 2049! THE BEST WEAPON IS ‘NO WEAPON’ It is said that Wit trumps weapons. It is a coincidence that China has taken a centre stage on the global platform without a single bullet being fired. Henry Kissinger in his memoir On China has articulated that Chinese characteristics have a great deal in common with Wei-qi (围棋), (pronounced way-chi) the world’s oldest and most sophisticated board game. This game replicates the intricacies of the country’s geopolitics. Scholars argue that Chinese military theory and this game are both manifestations of the same philosophy. This is outlined in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Warfare is almost always the option of last resort. The preferred and superior approach is to convince your enemy, by whatever means, that you are invincible. The game’s Chinese name translates roughly as “the game of encirclement”. Played on a square grid with 19 intersecting points along each axis, it involves two players taking turns placing white or black stones (all of equal value) on the grid. The goal is to surround and capture enemy stones, dominating the board.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Even if China isn’t revisionist writ-large --- they specifically want to undermine U.S. leadership which is all we need for our impact.

Bonnie S. Glaser & Khairulanwar Zaini 19. *Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, where she works on issues related to Asia-Pacific security with a focus on Chinese foreign and security policy. **Research Associate at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 4-5-2019. “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order.” ISEAS. .

CHINESE ACTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER – China in the South China Sea Beyond rhetoric, it is also important to examine China’s foreign policy actions. Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea is illustrative of what it is trying to achieve with respect to international maritime law. The rejection of the 2016 arbitration ruling by the United Nations Conventional on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal suggests an effort by the Chinese to carve out an exception in how UNCLOS should be implemented, at least in the South China Sea. China differs from the United States and other Western countries in its interpretations on certain provisions of UNCLOS, especially as it pertains to the conduct of military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones and whether foreign military ships have to seek permission to enter into a country’s territorial waters. China is however not unique in holding these perspectives on UNCLOS, which may encourage China to corral other countries to support its views on UNCLOS in the near future. The negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea (CoC) also merit mention. China has reportedly proposed two provisions to the code which would prohibit cooperation with energy companies from countries outside the region as well as the holding of joint military exercises with countries from outside the region.14 The first provision would not only curb the autonomy of countries in the region to pursue their own energy extraction policy, but would also provide the Chinese—as the only party to the CoC with deep-drilling technology and expertise—with an effective monopoly over any exploitation of natural resources in the region. The second provision would bar any military exercises with foreign power unless all CoC signatories have given their consent, thus providing China with a veto on all exercises in the region. Although it is unlikely that such provisions would garner support from the other ASEAN countries, it is revealing of China’s intention and efforts to curtail U.S. military presence in the region. - China and international norms In the realm of values and norms, China has also consistently opposed certain norms that have gained popular currency among Western countries, such as “the responsibility to protect”, which they view as legitimizing foreign intervention. The Chinese are also ambivalent about efforts to further democracy promotion and freedom of information in the fear that foreign countries will use these tools to undermine the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They are primarily concerned about the prospect of such norms being applied not only to other countries, but also being directed against China. China has also been active in creating new rules and norms, especially within the framework of existing institutions such as the United Nations. China, along with Russia, has been at the forefront of a concerted effort within the UN to define cyber-sovereignty as a right which justifies a country’s control over content within its borders and state censorship of the Internet. Moreover, China has prioritized the role for states to craft the rules for the newlyemerging field of cyber-governance, emphasizing the importance of state sovereignty and territoriality in the digital space, and rejecting the inclusion of civil society groups in the UN Group of Governmental Experts. China also pushed for references to “multistakeholders” to be replaced with “multilateral” and the deletion of “freedom of expression” and “democratic” in its submission of a revised International Code of Conduct for Information Security in 2015. In the UN Human Rights Council, China has also promoted orthodox interpretations of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs which weaken international norms of human rights, transparency, and accountability. This is a departure from the Hu Jintao era, when discussion about finding a universalist conception of human rights was encouraged. However, under Xi Jinping, the approach has been instead to develop a ‘socialist’ definition of human rights. The withdrawal of the United States from the Human Rights Council has also allowed China to propagate its views without any strong pushback. - Chinese and parallel institutions China has also engaged in attempts at revisionism through the creation and development of parallel institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which emerged out of the Shanghai Five grouping of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, has been expanded to include countries such as Iran. So far, however, the organization has mostly focused on addressing issues and concerns of its members, such as counterextremism efforts and economic development. It seems unlikely that the SCO will have much potential to challenge or displace the existing security architecture of the region. China has also developed global financial institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB has proven to be a good contribution to global governance, working effectively in tandem with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Indeed, the AIIB may have evolved to be operating in ways that differ from China’s original plan. When it was first proposed, the AIIB was greeted with concern and skepticism by the Obama administration. One primary reason for AIIB’s positive evolution lies in the participation of many Western countries, which allowed them to influence the operations of the bank from the inside and ensure that the AIIB adopt the kind of rules that major international financial institutions adhere to. - China’s Belt and Road Initiative Much international attention has been directed towards Xi Jinping’s signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Currently, it seems that all of China’s external economic activities—including those in the Arctic, Africa, and Latin America—are being subsumed under the BRI. It is no longer limited to the six corridors that comprised the “One Belt, One Road” plan in the aftermath of Xi Jinping’s announcement of the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in 2013. It is however a mistake to see the BRI as a coherent grand strategy that is being executed in the same way all over the world. Although the programme has evolved since its inception, it bears recalling that one of the early drivers for the BRI was Beijing’s desire to redirect its excess domestic capacity for absorption outside China. Nevertheless, there is an increasing element of strategy as China has sought to deploy BRI projects in a way to increase beneficiary countries’ economic dependence on China as a means of gaining political leverage. Moreover, the BRI enables the Chinese to subtly establish new standards for foreign investments which depart from Western conventions. In sum, it is important to recognize that, at least at present, Beijing does not oppose the entirety of the post-war international order—it is selectively revisionist regarding what it views as unjust elements of the order and U.S. hegemony. In accepting the concept of a rules-based order, China however remains dissatisfied with certain elements of the international order, although it does recognize the benefits that it have derived from the order during the post-Cold War period. In general, China has accepted and become integrated into the global economic order, it has implemented some changes in the global financial order, and it remains skeptical about aspects of the global political order. Furthermore, although China is selectively writing new rules and developing new norms, it prefers incremental change in the international order, not sudden global shifts that could harm political and economic stability. China establishes parallel institutions when it perceives that current institutions are not working to its advantage. In the years ahead, we can expect that China will demand more of a say in shaping the international order as a condition for its support, while proactively seeking ways to lead reform of global governance.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Hong Kong also proves.

Harsh V. Pant 5-30-2020. (Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at King’s College London. He is also Director (Honorary) of Delhi School of Transnational Affairs at Delhi University. He is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. "China’s revisionism: From Hong Kong to India’s borders." ORF. Web. 5-30-2020. accessed 8-23-2022. < https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-revisionism-hongkong-india-borders-67086/ >)MSUCB

Hong Kong is burning again. A new round of anti-mainland unrest has started in Hong Kong as opposition has gathered momentum against the anthem bill, which would criminalise insulting China’s national anthem, and the security law, which many fear will take away Hong Kong of basic freedoms. This is the second stage of these protests which were fuelled last year by an extradition law which was later scrapped under pressure. In 1997, under the principle of “one country, two systems,” Hong Kong became part of China with an understanding that it would enjoy “a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs” for 50 years. That very principle came under challenge with an extradition law last year that would have allowed extradition from Hong Kong to mainland China. There was a massive backlash against this law as hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers took to the streets to protest against the extradition bill which they feared would be used to target political dissidents. And then in a stunning rebuke to the Communist Party’s handling of the Hong Kong crisis, pro-democracy forces made massive gains in local elections held last year in November with pro democracy councillors getting the control of 17 of the 18 district councils in an election that saw an unprecedented voter turnout of more than 71%. Xi seems to have an implicit faith in his unyielding tough stance, and as he has centralised power to an unprecedented level, there is no one else to share any blame for the policies enunciated by him. But for Xi, Hong Kong is important. He held the Hong Kong portfolio on the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee before he became China’s de facto emperor. He seems to have an implicit faith in his unyielding tough stance, and as he has centralised power to an unprecedented level, there is no one else to share any blame for the policies enunciated by Xi. Not surprisingly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had underlined that “no matter what happens, Hong Kong is a part of China” and warned that “any attempt to mess up Hong Kong, or even damage its prosperity and stability, will not succeed.” And so after a few months of lull, Xi is back with a new security law proposed for Hong Kong which would ban treason, secession, sedition and subversion which China argues is required to combat violent protests that have grown in the territory. This is an extraordinary assertion as the original protests were a response to China going back on its 1997 commitment to the people of Hong Kong. But in the age of Xi, this does not matter. What matters is an assertion of Chinese authority on all those who defy it. At a time when China is facing global pressure and indignation over its mismanagement of the initial stages of coronavirus, tightening screws on Hong Kong gives Xi Jinping a nationalistic boost and potentially rallies the nation around the flag. At a time when China is facing global pressure and indignation over its mismanagement of the initial stages of coronavirus, tightening screws on Hong Kong gives Xi Jinping a nationalistic boost and potentially rallies the nation around the flag. This despite growing global condemnation of Chinese moves vis-a-vis Hong Kong. While countries like the UK, Canada and Australia have publicly expressed their concerns, the US has upped the ante with {former} Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certifying to the US Congress that “no reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China, given facts on the ground” and that the new security law was “only the latest in a series of actions that fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms.” This can potentially pave the way for the US Congress revoking Hong Kong’s special trade status which it enjoys under the US law. US President has announced that he was beginning the process to end preferential treatment for Hong Kong when it comes to trade and travel. Arguing that “China has replaced One Country, Two Systems with One Country, One System,” Trump has declared that sanctions would be imposed on Chinese and Hong Kong officials who were believed by Washington to be working towards eroding the territory’s autonomous status as well as suspending the entry of foreign nationals from China identified by the US as potential security risks. New Delhi’s firm military and diplomatic posturing has made it clear to Beijing that India is in for the long haul. But it is unlikely to deter the Communist Party of China (CPC) from making its moves in Hong Kong. While there might be economic costs to China due to Washington’s moves, for the CPC it is imperative that it is seen as managing the crisis in Hong Kong forcefully. Any weakness in Hong Kong can be seen as a precursor to pro-democracy sentiment elsewhere on the mainland. And at a time when Chinese economy has slowed down and unemployment levels are at an unprecedented level, the basic bargain between economic prosperity and political legitimacy of the CPC is being threatened like never before. The situation is Taiwan has already become precarious with the COVID-19 pandemic acting as a new springboard for Taiwan’s global integration much to Beijing’s discomfiture. So it is not surprising that as the situation in Hong Kong has become more precarious, Beijing has dialled down the rhetoric on the Indian border tensions with Chinese Ambassador Sun Weidong underlining that China and India should never let their differences shadow the overall bilateral ties and must enhance mutual trust. New Delhi’s firm military and diplomatic posturing has made it clear to Beijing that India is in for the long haul. Given its own problems at home and the focus on Hong Kong over the coming days, de-escalation on its borders with India suits China well. But make no mistake; China under Xi’s leadership is one of the most assertive and aggressive powers the world has encountered in a long time. Hong Kong’s woes are only likely to get worse and India should be prepared for a long protracted tussle with a neighbouring power that is revisionist to the core.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: China Not Revisionist

Official doctrines prove China is aggressive.

Thayer and Han, 6/12/19 Bradley A. Thayer Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas San Antonio and is the coauthor of How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism and the Balance of Power in International Politics. Lianchao Han is vice president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, Dr. Han was one of the founders of the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars. He worked in the U.S. Senate for twelve years, as legislative counsel and policy director for three senators, (Bradley and Lianchao, “The ‘Xi Doctrine’: Proclaiming and Rationalizing China’s Aggression”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/%E2%80%98xi-doctrine%E2%80%99-proclaiming-and-rationalizing-china%E2%80%99s-aggression-62402)MSUCB

Using the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe, delivered a sharp message to the United States, which may be termed the “Xi Doctrine” on China’s use of force, after Chinese premier Xi Jinping. Wei declaring both China’s resolve to aggress to advance its interests and a rationalization for the use of force. Wei’s de facto threat of war should not be lost in his nuances, deliberate ambiguity, or in translation. His remarks were so bellicose that the world has noticed, as was certainly intended by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Empirical evidence of China’s aggression is increasingly common, from its attempt to dominate the South China Sea, the neo-imperialist effort to gain control of states through the Belt and Road Initiative, to its technological imperialism to control 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. What is rather less frequent are statements from high-level Chinese officials proclaiming the country’s intent to be aggressive and offering an attempted legitimizing principle justifying that aggression. While much of the content of Wei’s remarks were in keeping with the gossamer pronouncements on China’s peaceful intentions, as well as a paean to Xi Jinping’s leadership, they still conveyed that China is ready and willing to resort to war if the United States stands in its way of global expansion; and they made clear that China must go to war, or even a nuclear war, to occupy Taiwan. Specifically, there are four elements that comprise the Xi Doctrine and are indications of China’s signaling its willingness to use force. The first component is a new and alarming proclamation of the undisguised threats to use force or wage an unlimited war. China is becoming bolder as its military power grows. This is evidenced in Wei’s muscular remarks on the People’s Republic of China’s approach against Taiwan, his explicit statement that China does not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and his effort to deter the United States and its allies from intervention should an attack occur. Wei forcefully stated: “If anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but must go to war, and must fight for the reunification of the motherland at all costs.” “At all cost” means that China will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons or launching another Pearl Harbor to take over Taiwan. This is a clear warning of an invasion. Second, the Xi Doctrine legitimizes territorial expansion. Through his remarks, Wei sought to convince the rest of the world that China’s seizure of most of the South China Sea is an accomplished fact that cannot be overturned. He made bogus accusations, which included blaming the United States for “raking in profits by stirring up troubles” in the region. He insisted that only ASEAN and China must resolve the issue. He claimed that China’s militarization on South China Sea islands and reefs were an act of self-defense. Should this be allowed to stand, then the Xi Doctrine will set a perilous precedent of successful territorial expansion, which will further entice China and jeopardize the peace of the region. Third, the doctrine targets the United States as a cause of the world’s major problems and envisions a powerful China evicting the United States from the region. Wei obliquely identified the United States as the cause wars, conflicts, and unrest, and sought to convey that the United States will abandon the states of the South China Sea (SCS) when it is confronted by Chinese power, a typical divide and conquer strategy used by the CCP regime. The Xi Doctrine’s fourth element is the mendacity regarding China’s historical use of force and current actions. While the distortions of history were numerous, there were three major lies that should be alarming for the states of the region and the global community. First, Wei said that China had never invaded another country, which is a claim so transparently false it can only be a measure of the contempt he held for the audience. China has a long history of aggression, including against the Tibetans and Vietnamese, and perhaps soon against the Taiwanese. Second, Wei argued that hegemony does not conform to China’s values when, in fact, China proudly was Asia’s hegemon for most of the last two thousand years. Lastly, he claimed that the situation in the SCS is moving toward stability—from China’s perspective this stability is caused by its successful seizure of territory. In fact, the SCS is far less stable as a result of China’s actions. Efforts to counter this grab are denounced by Wei as destabilizing, which is a bit like a thief accusing you of a crime for wanting your property returned. Wei’s belligerent rhetoric is an indication that the CCP regime faces deep external and internal crises. Externally, the Trump administration has shocked the CCP with the three major steps it has taken. First, it has shifted the focus of the U.S. national-security strategy and now identifies China explicitly as its primary rival—abandoning the far more muted policies of previous administrations. Second, Trump has acted on this peer competitive threat by advancing tangible measures, such as arms sales to allies and the ban of Huawei. Third, the administration has made credible commitments to assure partners and allies to counter China’s aggression and bullying. These have unbalanced the CCP regime, and its natural reaction is to bully its way out. Additionally, the CCP regime has perceived that the world today has begun to consider the negative implications of China’s rise, and the United States is determined to prevent what heretofore had been considered China’s unstoppable rise. From the perspective of CCP, conflict is increasingly seen as inevitable and perhaps even imminent. Wei’s bellicosity should be seen in this light, and the PLA is tasked with fighting and winning the war. Internally, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign that selectively targets his political rivalries, and his abandoning the established rules such as term limited of presidency, have introduced deep cleavages into the unity of the regime unity. China’s economic slowdown, made worse by the U.S. trade war, is a fundamental challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. Xi’s repression and suppression of the Chinese people, particularly human-rights defenders, Christians, Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other minorities, have miscarried. Drawing from the pages of unfortunate history, in a classic social-imperialist move, the regime wants to direct these internal tensions outward. At the same time, the nationalistic fervor advanced by the CCP’s propaganda and by the rapid military modernization have made many young militant officers in the PLA overconfident. This is infrequently noticed in the West. They can hardly wait to fight an ultimate war to defeat the arch-enemy. This plainly dangerous mentality echoes the Japanese military’s beliefs before Pearl Harbor. The bellicosity evinced in Wei’s speech is serious and is not bluster intended to deter. The United States cannot meet China’s threat with half-measures, which are likely to further encourage China’s aggressive behavior. The United States must respond to China’s belligerence with greater strength, adamantine determination, and more vigorous diplomatic and military measures. With the Xi Doctrine, China has proclaimed and rationalized its aggression. A Trump Doctrine forged in response has to reveal to all global audiences, most importantly the CCP leadership, the recklessness of the Xi Doctrine and the supreme folly of aggression.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: Heg Bad

Pursuit of heg is inevitable – the established security order deters revision

Patrick Porter, 5-4-2018, Professor of Strategic Studies, University of Exeter. “Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment” MIT Press Journals. Accessed 7-13-2019. [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00311]/mnw

Conclusion The habitual ideas of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the Blob, make U.S. grand strategy hard to change. Change is possible, but only in conditions shocking enough to undermine assumptions, and even then, only when a president is determined to overhaul primacy and absorb the political costs of doing so. I have demonstrated this assessment using the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Donald Trump. In both cases, candidates came to office promising change, in fluid conditions that ought to have stimulated revision. The demand for a peace dividend created an appetite for change in Clinton's case and constraints on resources and popular discontent did so in Trump's. Yet the Blob mostly got its way on grand strategic questions. Grand strategy emerged organically rather than through instrumental planning. Alternative grand strategies hardly penetrated decisionmaking within the executive branch. Decisionmakers were biased toward legacy institutions. Unspoken assumptions, suppression, and self-censorship narrowed choices. Internal review was ideologically circumscribed, concerned about how rather than whether to apply primacy. In identifying the Blob's constraining influence in Washington, former Obama adviser Benjamin Rhodes was right. U.S. military capabilities enable the United States to adopt a grand strategy of primacy. This does not explain, however, why it has maintained that choice, even in conditions that create incentives for revision. Theories that stress the importance of ideas and domestic politics are part of the explanation. But how ideas are transmitted is just as important as the content of those ideas. This is where the process of habit intervenes. Having been a superpower for decades is a condition that leaves the United States averse to revising fundamental assumptions and to considering alternatives. The Blob believes that the assumptions underpinning primacy are self-evidently true and that grand strategies based on retrenchment are unworthy of serious consideration. Habit-driven style impoverishes decisionmaking by insulating the most consequential assumptions from scrutiny. As a result, the starting point for most discussion of grand strategic questions reflects an intramural debate about how best to practice primacy.

2023 SDI Affirmative
2AC › 2AC --- China › 2AC --- AT: Heg Bad

Pursuit is inevitable and sustainable.

Zhang Tengjun, 17, 6-17-2018, (Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Renmin University, M.A. in International Politics from Zhejiang University, assistant research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies) "Will Washington abandon world leadership under Trump?", http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1051172.shtml, AVD

America under the rule of the business tycoon-turned politico has triggered worldwide concern for globalization and its future and raised doubts as to whether the most powerful country is seeking to give up world leadership. What's more, there is a view that the liberal international order is crumbling and Washington's retreat is the beginning of a great transformation. If the rise of Trump is viewed as a phenomenon, then its main significance lies in shaking the US' long-standing political ecology. Trump has mostly focused on domestic issues in the past five months, and the changes he has brought about to the country's foreign policy are actually less than expected. By his own admission, the "America First" position means that he puts most of his energy into addressing domestic affairs. His nature as a businessman determines the negotiability of foreign affairs. All the arrangements conducive to achieving his political goals can be compromised and changed. In this sense, the view that the US will abandon the world leadership is a pseudo-proposition. Hampered by a slew of conundrums at home, the Trump administration has yet to formulate an explicit global strategy or more specific Asia-Pacific policy. Its foreign policy is somewhat fragmented, subject to a severe lack of coherence and consistency. It has so far been handling diplomatic episodes quite passively. Though many of Trump's foreign policy measures are questioned by the international community at large, it should not be viewed as an abdication of US hegemony. Currently speaking, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that Trump is intentional giving up regional and global dominance. Two main pillars of US hegemony are the military and financial sectors. The former is backed by military power far better than other countries, the strongest circle of allies, and military bases spanning the globe. The latter is heavily dependent on dollar hegemony and the US-dominated international financial system. Trump has no intention of abandoning American military hegemony. Instead, he seeks to boost military spending by 10 percent in the coming fiscal year, further equipping the ground force, air force and navy with advanced weaponry. In this way, he inherits many of Obama's strategies. In addition, Trump remains ambiguous toward the financial system under US governance. Given the domestic landscape, he will prefer trade protectionism and a curtailment in expenditure of public products. But he will never discard US financial leadership on the world stage. More importantly, the US dollar, as a major international currency, is closely related to the country's leadership, and Trump understands this well. To say the least, even if he once planned on giving up Washington's global leadership and drawing back to the North American continent, it seems that he lacks the capacity to do so. The existing international order features a US hegemony which dates back to the start of WWII and has since been maintained through the strenuous efforts of generations of governments. Washington is unlikely to detach itself from the decades-long, consolidated framework. The conception of "peace under American governance" begun in the US has spread to every corner of the world to the extent that it is America's allies, instead of the American people, that are most concerned with Trump leading from the White House. They fear that if Washington breaks its promises on security, the international order will be plunged into chaos and conflict. By then they will find themselves mired in gridlock. Furthermore, Trump will think twice and be prudent given domestic obstruction. Both the Democrats and the Republicans continue to support American leadership in the world; they merely differ on policy and how to best exert leadership.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Economy

Decline cascades – nuclear war.

Maavak 21 – Dr. Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council. “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal, The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Vol. 9, No. 1, pg. 2-8, , 04-14-2021

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. GEOPOLITICAL The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Economy

Independently, the higher the UBI, the more growth that can happen.

Brad Jones 11-27-2017. (Brad Jones is a writer for Futurism. "Experts say universal basic income would boost US economy by staggering $2.5 trillion." Futurism. Web. accessed 5-26-2023 &lt; https://futurism.com/experts-universal-basic-income-boost-us-economy-staggering-2-5-trillion &gt;.)MSUCB

In recent months, everyone from Elon Musk to Sir Richard Branson has come out in favor of universal basic income (UBI), a system in which every person receives a regular payment simply for being alive. Now, a study carried out by the Roosevelt Institute has concluded that implementing a UBI in the U.S. could have a positive effect on the nation's economy.

The study looked at three separate proposals: a "basic income" of $1,000 per month given to every adult, a "base income" of $500 per month given to every adult, and a "child allowance" of $250 per month for every child. The researchers concluded that the larger the sum, the more significant the positive economic impact.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Economy

The Aff’s UBI is key to economic growth.

Dylan Matthews 8-30-2017. (Dylan Matthews is a senior correspondent and head writer for Vox's Future Perfect section and has worked at Vox since 2014. He is particularly interested in global health and pandemic prevention, anti-poverty efforts, economic policy and theory, and conflicts about the right way to do philanthropy., . "Study: a universal basic income would grow the economy." Vox. Web. accessed 5-10-2023 &lt; https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16220134/universal-basic-income-roosevelt-institute-economic-growth &gt;.)MSUCB

A universal basic income could make the US economy trillions of dollars larger, permanently, according to a new study by the left-leaning Roosevelt Institute.

Basic income, a proposal in which every American would be given a basic stipend from the government no strings attached, is often brought up as a potential solution to widespread automation reducing demand for labor in the future. But in the meantime, its critics typically allege that it is far too expensive to be practical, or else that it would spur millions of Americans to drop out of the labor force, wrecking the economy and depriving the government of a tax base for funding the plan.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Economy

The US economy is losing steam – fear of recession is looming.

Scott Horsley 4-27-2023. (. "The U.S. economy is losing steam. Bank woes and other hurdles are to blame.." NPR. Web. accessed 5-16-2023 &lt; https://www.npr.org/2023/04/27/1171993308/economy-gdp-growth-recession-mcdonalds &gt;.)MSUCB

From banks to burger joints, the U.S. economy is showing signs of stress as nervous shoppers watch their spending and anxious lenders keep a tight grip on credit.

A report from the Commerce Department Thursday shows the nation's gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of just 1.1% in the first three months of the year, compared to a 2.6% pace in the previous quarter. Growth was weighed down by declining inventories and housing investment.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Warming

UBI solves – laundry list of warrants.

Tara Lohan 6-26-2020. (Tara Lohan is deputy editor of The Revelator and has worked for more than a decade as a digital editor and environmental journalist focused on the intersections of energy, water and climate. Her work has been published by The Nation, American Prospect, High Country News, Grist, Pacific Standard and others. She is the editor of two books on the global water crisis., . "Should Environmentalists Embrace Universal Basic Income? • The Revelator." Revelator. Web. accessed 6-6-2023 &lt; https://therevelator.org/basic-income-climate/ &gt;.)MSUCB

The motivations behind universal income programs vary, but broadly they aim to help ensure that everyone has a decent standard of living. Yang predicted his program could ease the economic strain from the increasing automation of jobs that’s putting Americans out of work. Over the years other experts and politicians have espoused UBI as a way to address economic inequities and the growing wealth chasm. Most recently calls for a universal basic income have increased as a way of mitigating the effects of surging unemployment spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic. But could it also be a useful tool for addressing another, larger problem? That is, climate change and related efforts to transition to a clean economy? The Green New Deal, for example, proposes a just transition from a fossil fuel economy and a set of social programs to equitably support that transition. Could universal basic income help grease those wheels? And if so, why aren’t more environmentalists backing UBI initiatives? The Philosophy A lot of people balk at the idea of giving out money for nothing. But Jim Pugh, cofounder of the Universal Income Project, an organization established to raise awareness about UBI, says it isn’t like other social-welfare programs, which base their determinations on a person’s perceived or deserved need. “When you hear a politician say that no one who works full time should live in poverty, the unspoken statement is that if you don’t work full time, it’s OK you live in poverty,” he says. “What we’re trying to push is the idea that in a country with as much wealth as the United States has, no one should live in poverty.” Proponents say the benefits of UBI are far reaching, and that a stable source of income could help lift folks out of poverty; allow people to better balance responsibilities like caring for family members or pursuing a degree; encourage personal freedom; provide security for the self-employed; and simply allow people to work less. Studies analyzing pilot projects have shown that people “overwhelmingly spend [the money] on what they need,” says Pugh. “They may buy food, pay down debt or pursue some sort of education to be able to position themselves for a better career.” Potential Benefits How would UBI benefit the environment? There are many theories. More income, some experts say, could help people purchase longer-lasting and eco-friendly goods, including sustainably produced foods, that are now financially out of their reach. It could also free people from undesirable jobs in polluting industries or ones that involve long, smog-inducing car commutes, says Pugh. And it could give people the resources to increase the energy efficiency of their homes or purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles. “I think it’s incredibly hard to quantify, but if you actually can give people the financial freedom to have more options generally, then I think that there is, at the very least, the opportunity that you could get people to make more environmentally responsible choices,” he says.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Warming

UBI causes engagement within education and the community – both of which will be critical to fighting climate change.

Miranda Reid 2021-06-17. (Studying a BSc in Ocean and Geophysics at Bangor University. "The role of UBI in the fight against climate change." Basic Income Canada Network. Web. accessed 6-6-2023 &lt; https://basicincomecanada.org/the-role-of-ubi-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/ &gt;.)MSUCB

A universal basic income has been proven through numerous studies and trials to be incredibly beneficial to the well-being of both communities and individuals. Mental health improvements, food security, and protection for those faced with technological unemployment are some of the impacts most frequently mentioned. However, this idea could also prove to be a driving force for solutions to environmental concerns. Many of the benefits of implementing a universal income could lead to it becoming a key player in the fight against climate change. One of the biggest hurdles faced when creating solutions to climate change, is the ignorance of the public. Many North Americans still have doubts that the crisis even exists, and even those who take climate change as fact, may not know how to pursue a solution. By educating people on environmental concerns, we empower the public to take action. In a survey taken by participants of an Ontario trial, 32.5% of responders reported having used the money to further their education or upgrade their skills (Basic Income Canada Network, 2019). With this increase in education, we may start to see a decrease in climate change denial, and those who are motivated to take action will be more empowered to do so. Furthermore, this pursuit of knowledge will give more people the skills to create the solutions and technologies needed to solve our present environmental issues. By allowing people the financial stability to pursue higher education, we create a society that is better equipped to take on the challenge of combating climate change. In addition to a more educated public, a universal basic income can also create a more engaged community. In the same Ontario survey, 25.18% of people reported having spent more time volunteering (BICN 2019). While increased volunteering may not seem to be directly related to fighting against climate change, this effect can have a huge impact on the health of the local ecosystems through community conservation efforts such as beach cleanups, and local environmental advocacy groups. Additionally, a higher income may also lead to increased environmental stewardship. An analytical framework for environmental stewardship points to financial stability as one of the requirements for an individual to have the capacity to be an active participant in fighting for the environment (Bennett, N.J., Whitty, T.S., Finkbeiner, E., et. al., 2018). When people are no longer concerned about keeping a roof over their head or putting food on the table, their time and energy can be used to become an advocate for the planet. While education and community involvement will increase the amount of supporters in the fight against climate change, a rise in innovation is ultimately what will create solutions. There is no denying that the amount of money in sectors like renewable energy is climbing rapidly. According to research released by Imperial College London, the return on investment after both five and ten years is significantly higher for renewable energies than for fossil fuels (International Energy Agency & Centre for Climate Finance and Investment, 2020). If people are allowed the opportunity to take risks and become entrepreneurs, many will use this chance to reap the benefits of this growing industry. However, innovation and creativity are often stifled by financial burdens. If our society’s greatest minds are trapped in a cycle of poverty, we may never see the potential of what they could create. By implementing a universal basic income, people are given the chance to branch out of their everyday jobs and dive into a world of invention. With this, we will begin to see new technologies that give us the chance to move towards a more sustainable future. Climate change is an incredibly complex issue, and the solution will require widespread collaboration and innovation. Implementing a universal basic income might be the missing puzzle piece in the fight against this crisis. We are at a key turning point in history, with the power to give ourselves a fighting chance, but if a portion of the population is left out of the conversation because of monetary limitations, we are not able to truly realize our potential as a society. By ensuring financial security for all, we are empowering the people to rise up against climate change.

2023 SDI Affirmative
MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff › 1AC --- MSDI › 1AC --- Warming

A UBI is key to fighting warming – it breaks the link between work and consumption, effectively slowing down the things that trammel economic growth.

Mark Maslin & Simon Lewis 5-17-2019. (Maslin - Professor of Earth System Science, University College London (UCL); Lewis - Professor of Global Change Science at University of Leeds and UCL. "Universal Basic Income Could Fight Climate Change and Extreme Poverty." Global Citizen. Web. accessed 6-6-2023 &lt; https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/universal-basic-income-climate-change-poverty/ &gt;.)MSUCB

One of these is universal basic income (UBI) – a policy that would guarantee a financial payment to every citizen, unconditionally, without any obligation to work, at a level above their subsistence needs. Small-scale trials of UBI show that educational attainment is higher, healthcare costs go down, entrepreneurship levels both in numbers of people and success rates go up, as does self-reported happiness. However, UBI does more than this: it could break the link between work and consumption. Breaking this could, if carefully managed over time, dramatically reduce environmental impacts by slowing the treadmill of producing and consuming things that currently fuels untrammelled economic growth. We could work less and consume less, and still meet our needs. Fear for the future would recede, meaning we wouldn’t have to work ever harder for fear of having no work in the future. This is especially important as automation and intelligent machines will increasingly compete with humans for most jobs.