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2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Turns Povery/Inequality

Inflation turns the case - results in slower growth and uniquely hurts the lower classes

Floyd 23

David Floyd is a reporter for Coindesk with 5+ years of experience as a freelance financial writer. He is a former staff writer for Investopedia.; March 14, 2023; 10 Common Effects of Inflation; .; //[TMS—GK]

1. Inflation Erodes Purchasing Power This is inflation's primary and most pervasive effect. An overall rise in prices over time reduces the purchasing power of consumers since a fixed amount of money will afford progressively less consumption. Consumers lose purchasing power regardless of what the inflation rate is—whether it's 2% or 4%. This just means that they lose it twice as fast at the higher rate. Compounding ensures that the overall price level increases more than twice as much over the long run if long-run inflation were to double. Inflation measures the rise in prices over time for a basket of goods and services representative of overall consumer spending. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the best-known inflation indicator, while the Federal Reserve focuses on the PCE Price Index in its inflation targeting. 2. Inflation Disproportionately Impacts Lower-Income Consumers Lower-income consumers tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on necessities than those with higher incomes. This means they have less of a cushion against the loss of purchasing power inherent in inflation. Policymakers and financial market participants often focus on core inflation. This measurement of inflation excludes the prices of food and energy because they tend to be more volatile and less reflective of the longer-term inflation trends. But earners with lower income spend a relatively large proportion of their weekly or monthly household budgets on food and energy—commodities that are hard to substitute or go without when prices spike. The poor are also less likely to own assets like real estate, which has traditionally served as an inflation hedge. On the other hand, recipients of Social Security benefits and other federal transfer payments receive inflation protection in the form of cost of living adjustments (COLA) based on the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), which is an index of consumer prices for hourly wage earners and clerical workers. 3. Inflation Keeps Deflation at Bay The Fed's target inflation rate is set at 2% over the long run. This allows it to meet its mandates for stable prices and maximum employment. It focuses on modest inflation rather than steady prices because a slightly positive inflation rate greases the wheels of commerce, provides a margin of error in the event inflation is overestimated, and deters deflation. The overall decline in prices can be much more destabilizing than comparable inflation. Lenders can charge interest to offset the inflation likely to devalue repayments. It also helps borrowers service their debts by allowing them to make future repayments with inflated currency. On the other hand, deflation makes it more expensive to service debt in real terms, since incomes would be likely to decline alongside prices. One reason modest inflation (rather than deflation) is the norm is that wages are sticky to the downside. Workers tend to resist attempts to cut their wages during an economic downturn, with layoffs the likeliest alternative for businesses facing a downturn in demand. A positive inflation rate allows a wage freeze to serve as a cut in labor costs in real terms. The benefits of inflation are only insurance against deflation until price hikes exceed the customary and expected rate because inflation can also spiral out of control if high enough. Because deflation represents a departure from the norm, it's also more likely to trigger expectations for additional deflation, causing further spending and income declines and ultimately widespread loan defaults that can set off a banking crisis. 4. Inflation Feeds on Itself When It's High A little inflation can signal a healthy economy. As such, it's not something that's likely to cause inflation expectations to rise. If inflation was 2% last year and is 2% this year, it's mostly background noise. Businesses, workers, and consumers would likely expect inflation to remain at 2% next year in that scenario. But expectations of future inflation will begin to rise accordingly when the inflation rate accelerates sharply and stays high. As those expectations rise, workers start demanding larger wage increases and employers pass those costs on by raising prices on output, setting off a wage-price spiral. In the worst-case scenario, a bungled policy response to high inflation can end in hyperinflation. But there's no need to count the cost of soaring inflation expectations in wheelbarrow loads of Zimbabwe dollar notes denominated in trillions or in the Weimar Republic's worthless marks from Germany's five years of hyperinflation after World War I. In the U.S., rising inflation expectations during the 1970s lifted annual inflation above 13% by 1980 and the federal funds rate to more than 20% by 1981, while unemployment topped 10% as late as mid-1983 following the ensuing recessions. Inflation in Weimar Germany By December 1923, an index of the cost of living in Germany increased to a level of more than 1.5 trillion times its pre-WWI measure. 5. Inflation Raises Interest Rates As the examples above suggest, governments and central banks have a powerful incentive to keep inflation in check. The approach has been to manage inflation using monetary policy over the past century. When inflation threatens to exceed a central bank's target (typically 2% in developed economies and 3% to 4% in emerging ones), policymakers can raise the minimum interest rate, driving borrowing costs higher across the economy by constraining the money supply. As a result, inflation and interest rates tend to move in the same direction. By raising interest rates as inflation rises, central banks can dampen the economy's animal spirits or risk appetite, and the attendant price pressures. The expected monthly payments on that boat or that corporate bond issue for a new expansion project suddenly seem a bit high. Meanwhile, the risk-free rate of return available for newly issued Treasury bonds will tend to rise, rewarding savings. 6. Inflation Lowers Debt Service Costs While new borrowers are likely to face higher interest rates when inflation rises, those with fixed-rate mortgages and other loans get the benefit of repaying these with inflated money, lowering their debt service costs after adjusting for inflation. Say you borrow $1,000 at a 5% annual rate of interest. If annual inflation subsequently rises to 10%, the annual decline in your inflation-adjusted loan balance will outweigh your interest costs. Note that this doesn't apply to adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), credit card balances, or home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), which typically allow lenders to raise their interest rates to keep pace with inflation and Fed rate hikes. 7. Inflation Lifts Growth & Employment in the Short Term Higher inflation can lead to faster economic growth in the short term. While the 1970s are recalled as a decade of stagflation, U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) increased 3.2% annually on average between 1970 and 1979, well above the economy's average growth rate since. Elevated inflation discourages saving since it erodes the purchasing power of the savings over time. That prospect can encourage consumers to spend and businesses to invest. As a result, unemployment often declines at first as inflation climbs. Historical observations of the inverse correlation between unemployment and inflation led to the development of the Phillips curve expressing the relationship. For a time at least, higher inflation can spur demand while lowering inflation-adjusted labor costs, fueling job gains. Eventually, though, the bill for persistently high inflation must come due in the form of a painful downturn that resets expectations, or else chronic economic underperformance. 8. Inflation Can Cause Painful Recessions The trouble with the trade-off between inflation and unemployment is that prolonged acceptance of higher inflation to protect jobs may cause inflation expectations to rise to the point where they set off an inflationary spiral of price hikes and pay increases, as happened in the U.S. during the stagflation of the 1970s. To regain lost credibility and convince everyone again it would control inflation, the Fed was subsequently forced to raise interest rates much higher and keep them high for a longer period of time. That, in turn, caused unemployment to soar, and to stay high for longer than would likely have been the case had the Fed not allowed inflation to spiral so high. 9. Inflation Hurts Bonds & Growth Stocks Bonds are generally considered to be low-risk investments that provide regular interest income at a fixed rate. Inflation (especially high inflation) impairs the value of bonds by lowering the present value of that income. As interest rates increase in response to rising or elevated inflation, so does the yield on newly issued bonds. The market price of bonds issued previously at a lower yield then drops proportionally, since bond prices are the inverse of bond yields. Investors with Treasury bonds are still in line for the expected coupon payments, followed by principal repayment at maturity. But those who sell their bonds before maturity will receive less as a result of the increased market yields. There is less of a consensus about whether high inflation hurts or helps stocks overall. Conclusions depend on the definition of high inflation and whether the historical record cited includes the 1970s, a lost decade for U.S. stocks amid stagflation. Growth stocks, which tend to be more expensive, are notoriously allergic to inflation. Inflation discounts the present value of their future cash flows more heavily, just as it does for high-duration bonds. Technology and consumer stocks have lagged during past episodes of high or rising inflation. 10. Inflation Boosts Real Estate, Energy, & Value Stocks Real estate has historically served as a hedge against inflation since landlords can protect themselves by raising rents even as inflation erodes the real cost of fixed-rate mortgages. Rising commodity prices can cause inflation to accelerate. Once it does, commodities can change when growth slows. This is particularly true of energy commodities that tend to continue to outperform. Unsurprisingly, energy equities, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and value stocks have historically outperformed during episodes of high or rising inflation. Areas Impacted Inflation can have a positive impact on the economy. As noted above, a little inflation can be a good thing for the economy. When prices rise at a moderate rate, people continue to spend rather than save their cash. Most consumers open up their wallets even when there's a slight increase in prices because they often expect things to get more expensive in the future. But savers will take a hit as inflation continues to rise. For instance: You'll have to increase the amount of money you save for retirement. That's because the target amount you set to match your current lifestyle won't be enough when it comes time to leave the workforce. Put simply, you won't be able to afford to support yourself in retirement if you don't adjust how much you're saving based on inflation. The value of certain fixed-income investments drops. For example, the rate of return on government-issued securities drops as inflation increases. And when returns drop, more people may decide to sell them, which decreases their value. The value of the national debt rises because the amount of interest owed on that debt increases. When this happens, governments may be forced to raise taxes or cut down on spending. One thing to keep in mind is that not every asset's value moves in the same direction because of inflation. So just because one rises, the other may drop. For instance, mortgage rates may rise but the value of your home may drop. Who Benefits and Who Doesn't? As with any other economic phenomenon, inflation comes with both winners and losers. Let's take a look at who gains from inflation and who doesn't. Who it Benefits Inflation can be a boon for certain borrowers. Consider mortgagors who have fixed-rate loans on their homes. If you have a rate locked in at 5% and inflation causes interest rates to rise, you won't be affected. That can't be said about your neighbor who may have an ARM that changes based on market rates. You're probably going to be in luck if you're in the market for a new home. That's because higher prices (and, therefore, higher interest rates) often knock out the competition, boosting the amount of inventory available. So if you can afford it, you're likely going to be able to get the pick of the lot. Who it Doesn't Since inflation reduces purchasing power, consumers represent the primary group who stand to lose when prices rise. That's because their money doesn't go nearly as far and allows them a limited number of goods and services they can purchase. Most consumers tend to think twice about buying a big-ticket item, such as a new appliance or a new car when inflation is high. Home buyers may also feel the pinch during these times. That's because higher prices mean higher interest rates, which makes borrowing more expensive. People who are on a fixed income are also negatively affected by inflation. Consider retirees who receive Social Security. Although they may receive COLA increases in their benefits, it may not be enough to sustain the same standard of living they're used to when prices increase to certain levels. What Is Inflation's Primary Effect? Inflation is the rise in prices of goods and services. It causes the purchasing power of a currency to decline, making a representative basket of goods and services increasingly more expensive. How Can Inflation Benefit Homeowners? Homeowners with fixed-rate mortgages benefit from inflation because is discounts the present value of their future mortgage payments. As housing prices rise as a result of inflation, home equity increases. Finally, homeowners who rent out their homes can increase rents with inflation. What Is Deflation? Deflation is a sustained period of broadly declining prices. Deflation is often the result of a severe economic contraction that causes consumers and businesses to curtail spending and investing. Deflation is destabilizing because it makes it harder to service debts. The Bottom Line Inflation can be a blessing and a curse, depending on how you look at it. On the one hand, governments and central banks plan for manageable price increases by setting inflationary targets and consumers respond by spending as prices tend to increase at a nominal rate. But that changes when inflation overheats. It can diminish the purchasing power of consumers. When inflation runs rampant, governments generally raise interest rates, reduce the amount of money banks must have on reserve, and cut back on the money supply.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Turns Growth

Interest rate hikes turn the aff – the Fed would slam the brakes on the economy which guts the impact of the plan

Josh Bivens, 3/27/18, Economic Policy Institute, “Recommendations for creating jobs and economic security in the US,” https://www.epi.org/publication/creating-jobs-and-economic-security/, mm

The most important day-to-day lever that policymakers use to adjust the economy’s level of aggregate demand is monetary policy—the decisions made by the Federal Reserve about the level of interest rates. When the Fed cuts rates, this can potentially spur aggregate demand by inducing businesses and households to borrow more for investment and consumption (though, as we note below, the effect of monetary policy is quite asymmetric, with interest rate cuts providing only a weak boost to growth while interest rate increases reliably slow growth). Conversely, when the Fed raises rates, it reduces aggregate demand by making this borrowing more expensive. The key virtue of monetary policy actions is that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—the body that changes interest rates—is a much faster-moving entity than the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, who together control fiscal policy decisions. Perhaps surprisingly, the importance of monetary policy is not primarily due to its being a particularly effective job-creation mechanism when aggregate demand is slack. In fact, interest rate cuts have a hard time gaining purchase on a slack economy; the metaphor describing this is that rate cuts that induce, but cannot compel, businesses and households to spend more are like “pushing on a string.” But interest rate increases are extremely effective in slowing aggregate demand growth. One can obviously pull on a string with decent effect. This means that when it comes to spurring economic growth, the Fed’s key role is intentional inaction on interest rates. By not raising rates, they allow the economy’s growth to continue unabated. In times when this growth is too slow, this obviously provides very little boost. But during times when this growth has been healthy (as in the late 1990s), Fed forbearance on raising rates has allowed for rapid growth. Because monetary policy can effectively slow growth, and because the Fed is autonomous and fast-moving relative to other policymakers, the Fed essentially has veto power over efforts to spur aggregate demand growth through other policy changes. If, for example, Congress and the president passed a large package of tax cuts and spending increases to boost the economy, but the Fed thought the economy had already reached full employment or that such fiscal moves threatened to raise inflation, the Fed could block the effects of these tax cuts and spending increases with interest rate hikes. They have certainly done so in the past, most notably in the early 1980s. What this means in today’s economy is simply that the Federal Reserve controls the economy’s brake. Unless they can be convinced to stay off this brake until the economy hits genuine full employment, any job-creation strategy is likely to fail as a way to actually boost the overall stock of jobs available in the economy. This means that those worried about American labor market health must wrestle seriously with the power of the Fed to short-circuit job creation and engage the fight to convince the Fed to aggressively pursue full employment by holding off on rate increases before wage and price inflation make them absolutely necessary.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Dollar Hege

Extinction

Zoffer 20 --- Joshua Zoffer, writing on U.S. economic leadership has appeared in the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, and The National Interest., Law Student @ Yale, “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally Dominant”, Feb 3rd 2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/156417/end-forever-war-keep-dollar-globally-dominant

Yet in their recent article in The New Republic, David Adler and Daniel Bessner argue the U.S. should abandon these advantages. In their view, the dollar’s role has encouraged American militarism and should be relinquished to curb such behavior. Dollar hegemony is not without cost, but to renounce it would be a profound mistake. Adler and Bessner’s view neglects the sizable economic benefits the dollar’s role confers on the U.S., as well as its possible use as an antidote to military adventurism. It ignores the enormous good that can be done with deficit spending, much of which has gone to the American military but could instead fund progressive programs. And it elides the inability of the U.S. and its global trading partners to shift away from dollar dominance without creating worldwide financial distress. Adler and Bessner are right that the U.S. has misused its privilege, but Washington should not abandon it; rather, American leaders should seek to transform it. Generations of American policymakers have been right to protect the dollar’s key currency role for economic reasons. Most notably, dollar hegemony affords the U.S. the ability to run large and prolonged budget and balance-of-payments deficits. The dollar represents 62 percent of allocated foreign exchange reserves, is used to invoice and settle roughly half of world trade, and accounts for 42 percent of global payments. Because governments, banks, and businesses worldwide need lots of dollars, the world market always stands ready to absorb new U.S.-dollar-denominated debt without charging higher interest rates. Adler and Bessner correctly point out that the rest of the world considers the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency to be an “exorbitant privilege,” a term coined in the 1960s by then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The ability to spend beyond its means has enabled the U.S. to fund its impressive military might, whether one views that power as the fountainhead of Pax Americana or the source of illegitimate military adventurism. But these economic benefits go beyond just deficits. The demand for dollars also pushes up the dollar’s value against other currencies, enhancing American purchasing power and offering consumers access to imports on the cheap. The dollar’s role also means American firms rarely need to do business in foreign currencies, reducing transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. More broadly, America’s central economic role gives it outsize influence at crucial moments. At the height of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Federal Reserve was able to inject vital liquidity into the global financial system by selectively offering dollar swap lines to trusted foreign central banks. Dollar hegemony enabled the U.S. to act swiftly, effectively, and on its own terms. In addition, the dollar’s role offers a potent alternative to kinetic military action as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. The dollar’s broad use means access to dollar liquidity—which in turn requires access to the U.S. financial system—is essential for foreign governments and businesses. For foreign banks, especially, being cut off from dollar access is essentially a death sentence. That makes sanctions that do so a powerful tool in the international arena. In 2005, for example, the U.S. used the dollar to strike a devastating blow against North Korea without firing a single shot or even formally enacting sanctions. Using authority provided by Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the Department of the Treasury crippled Banco Delta Asia, a bank accused of facilitating illegal activity by the North Korean government, by merely threatening to cut off its access to the American financial system. Deposit outflows began within days; within weeks the bank was placed under government administration to avoid a full collapse. Pyongyang was hit hard, as other banks ceased their business with it to avoid meeting the same fate. Similarly, though the Trump administration has worked hard to undo it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to limit the development of nuclear weapons was made possible, in part, by painful dollar sanctions that brought Iran to the table. Far from being a proximate cause of military conflict, the dollar’s central global role has often been used to contain adversaries without military intervention. Still, skeptics are right to point out that the dollar’s role has indirectly funded American interventionism and that dollar sanctions have been overused, provoking the ire of American allies. But these facts suggest we should use our dollar power to forge a more progressive U.S. order, not abandon the advantage altogether. America’s exorbitant privilege need not fund warships and missiles: The same low-interest borrowing could be used to fund a new universal health care system, expand access to higher education, or pursue any number of large-scale social policy objectives, including financing global public goods that no other country or consortium of countries is prepared to fund, such as climate change mitigation.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Dollar Hege

Collapses dollar hege

SMAGHI 20 --- LORENZO BINI SMAGHI, Former Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank, “Is a Dollar Crash Coming?”, International Economy, Fall 2020, https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TIE_F20_DollarCrisisSymp.pdf

The question is whether the scenario may change abruptly, in particular if interest rates rise over time, putting at risk the sustainability of the debt. The key factor to assess debt sustainability is the relationship between the rate of interest paid on the debt and the rate of growth of the economy. As long as the economy grows faster than the rate of interest, sustainability is not at risk. If the opposite holds, fiscal policy will have to tighten in order to generate primary surpluses to ensure debt sustainability. Interest rates can rise for two main reasons. The first is higher long-term economic growth. In that case, both sides of the equation go up, and the debt can remain sustainable. The second, more worrying case, is when interest rates increase because of higher inflation. This scenario is not very likely over the next few years, as the economy recovers from the crisis, but could materialize in the medium term, especially if demographic factors lead to a trend fall in global output compared to demand. In that case, a rise in inflation could lead to higher interest payments on the debt. The main risk is that interest rates rise more than inflation because of expectations of even higher inflation in the future. This may happen if inflation expectations are dis-anchored, rising above the 2 percent target set by the central bank. In summary, the risk to debt sustainability emerges when the central bank loses control of inflation. This happens if the central bank does not act sufficiently rapidly to prevent inflation from rising above target, either because it underestimates inflationary pressures, or if it is not sufficiently independent to take the appropriate decisions. Under these circumstances, the demand for government bonds could fall, triggering further rises in interest rates and jeopardizing the credibility of the U.S. currency in the eyes of international investors. This is similar to what happened in the second half of the 1970s, before Paul Volcker was appointed as Fed chairman

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Slow Growth

Slow U.S. recovery causes China war

Bapat 20, a Professor in International Relations. He received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1998 and pursued graduate studies at Rice University, where he received an M.A. (2000) and a PhD (2004) in political science. (Navin, August 19th, 2020, “Will COVID-19 Cause a War? Understanding the Case of the U.S. and China”, (https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/ahead-of-print/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0047/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0047.xml?language=en)

We therefore see that COVID-19 may cause a decline in U.S. economic power, which may undermine its military readiness and ability to support future economic gains. However, the next question is: does the PRC seek to challenge the U.S. for global primacy, and if so, why? In his speech to the Communist Party in 2017, President Xi Jinping claimed that China should now, “take center stage in the world.” A key part in of this effort is represented by Xi’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR), which seeks to extend the PRC’s economic, political, and cultural influence throughout south Asia to the Middle East and into Europe. The OBOR utilizes the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an alternative to the World Bank, to finance infrastructure projects throughout the different regions (). From the power transition standpoint, it therefore appears that the PRC is developing a string of assets and bases extending from the Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Numerous U.S. military planners view these developments as a deliberative effort to undermine U.S. power and influence in both the Pacific and Middle East theaters. In theoretical terms, if we accept that the OBOR represents an effort by the PRC (the rising power) to supplant the U.S., war could still be avoided if the power transition moves at a relatively slower rate. model establishes that dominant powers only initiate preemptive war if they are declining at precipitous rates. This is where COVID-19 poses a significant threat. Since the outbreak, the U.S. economy has declined by 4.8%, and the U.S. is borrowing from its future at high levels. If the PRC wanted to challenge the US for supremacy, this would be the time, and there is some evidence that the PRC is exploiting the opportunity. Beginning in May 2020, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is engaging in repeated clashes with the Indian Armed Forces in the Ladekh region as part of a longstanding border dispute. As of July 2020, China is coming close to forming a strategic partnership with Iran. The pact would give the PRC a foothold in the Middle East, secure discounted oil, and perhaps allow for more oil trades to be settled in non-dollar denominations. This effort is in spite of significant strategic interests in the region and growing hostilities between Washington and Tehran. The greater concern is that China will use its newfound clout to accelerate its effort to take control of much of the territory in the South China Sea. China has long claimed large portions of this key area as its own, whereas Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei who all have competing claims. The US has long served as a balancer to prevent China from encroaching. However, beginning in December 2013, China constructed and later militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea to reinforce its territorial claims, despite promises not to do so. In this period, the states of Southeast Asia have typically looked to the U.S. Navy to challenge China’s claims. It has done so through Freedom of Navigation exercises. However, now, with COVID-19, the Navy’s capabilities are in doubt. Interestingly, most analysts conclude that China is not exploiting the opportunity in the area. Instead, the PRC’s efforts to build and fortify their islands continue at the previous rate, indicating “business as usual.”Nonetheless, the U.S. seems concerned about the possibility that China will seek to exploit the opportunity created by COVID-19. The Trump administration is therefore sending three carrier strike groups, with a large influx of naval vessels, into the area to re-assert American control of the seas. Although this increases U.S. capability, it also signals weakness, in that the U.S. would not need to take such dramatic steps unless it faced a significant challenge. While it does not appear that the US is ready to initiate a preemptive challenge here, this increased militarization raises the possibility of accidents, which in turn does increase the probability of conflict. Empirically, military mobilizations such as these raise the possibility of accidents that may trigger militarized interstate disputes, or military crises short of war (). Theoretically, military mobilizations may temporarily increase a state’s power, but this increase may be unsustainable given the increasing cost of putting armed forces in theater. This creates a dynamic where a state that has mobilized may be forced to use its weapons before it is compelled to redeploy them (Slantchev 2005; Tarar 2013). 3 COVID-19’s Long Term Threat These observations lead to several conclusions about the immediate security situation. COVID-19 seems to have cost the U.S. some of its military capability relative to China. This may encourage China to push the U.S. while it is weak, and conversely, may compel the U.S. to mobilize to counter this threat. Since each of these activities is a response to the economic shock of COVID-19, we can see that the virus has increased the likelihood of a militarized encounter between the U.S. and China. However, it is important to recognize that even if China were to succeed in all of its military challenges to the U.S., this alone would not shift hegemony from the U.S. The key reason for this is that the majority of economic actors in the world seem to view the USD as the key reserve currency, and at this point, the RMB is not in a position to challenge that status (Norrlof et al. 2020; Oatley et al. 2013; Poast 2015). Despite significant criticism of the Trump administration during the economic shock of COVID-19, much of the world seems to view Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell as a critical and stable player in international monetary policy. Powell indicated that the U.S. will continue to support global growth by keeping U.S. interest rates low. This allows for more money to be available for the rest of the world. Indirectly, this move may make China more powerful by encouraging investments in their market. However, this is also keeping the world tied to the dollar based system, which is the key component of American power. So long as the rest of the world continues to rely on USD as the means to settle transactions, and so long as the PRC’s market seems less transparent and stable, the US will continue to maintain its position of power in the international system. However, this is based on the assumption that the US will be able to recover whatever power it has temporarily lost due to COVID-19. There are a few reasons to call this assumption into question. First, the US right now is the global epicenter of the COVID-19 crisis, despite its economic power and large medical infrastructure. This is largely attributed to a poor political response, which is causing the virus to spread at a much faster rate than in other states. As a result, the US now finds itself facing travel restrictions from numerous countries. This may give other states less reason to engage in economic transactions with Americans. These lost exchanges will likely be replaced by interacting with other citizens throughout the globe, and will therefore be settled in non-dollar denominations. The more this occurs, the more demand for USD could decline into the future. The US could potentially find itself increasing isolated with fewer individuals demanding its currency. Should this occur, the ability of the US to finance its budgets through deficit spending will decrease, and it will need to raise taxes and cut spending. Some of this will likely be on defense, which means that the ability of the US to defend interests in the Pacific and the Middle East will decline, opening the door for China. Even worse, the political rhetoric inside the US is encouraging these changes. President Trump’s foreign policy platform is described as “American First”, which represents a combination of isolationism and unilateralism, and a general rejection of multilateral cooperation. If that is the case, each state in the international system will need to begin planning to move away from the American backed system. The damage done by COVID-19 to the US market, and the weakening of the US position as a result of the virus, will accelerate this process. These changes will not happen overnight, and will not happen so quickly that a rapid transition will occur. This means that it is unlikely that COVID-19 will increase the risk of general war between the US and China, though it does raise the risk of crises and limited encounters. However, over the long term, if the US is unable to get the virus under control and develop a plan of action, COVID-19 does pose significant threats to US military and economic hegemony.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Slow Growth

Insufficient growth unravels interdependence and the liberal international order---causes populism and great power war.

Oppenheimer 21, MA, Clinical Professor and leads the IR Futures concentration @ the Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University. (Michael F., “The Turbulent Future of International Relations”, The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction, pg. 28-30, Palgrave Macmillan)

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates. Illiberal Globalization Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro-Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them. What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18 As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods: We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20 The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre-World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present: Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago. …In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports. …The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable. …the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Slow Growth

Slow growth breaks down global cooperation and causes war

Landay 17 (Jonathan – Reuters National Security Correspondent, 1/9/17, “U.S. intelligence study warns of growing conflict risk”, )

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The risk of conflicts between and within nations will increase over the next five years to levels not seen since the Cold War as global growth slows, the post-World War Two order erodes and anti-globalization fuels nationalism, said a U.S. intelligence report released on Monday. “These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power – fundamentally altering the global landscape,” said “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,” the sixth in a series of quadrennial studies by the U.S. National Intelligence Council. The findings, published less than two weeks before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office on Jan. 20, outlined factors shaping a “dark and difficult near future,” including a more assertive Russia and China, regional conflicts, terrorism, rising income inequality, climate change and sluggish economic growth. Global Trends reports deliberately avoid analyzing U.S. policies or choices, but the latest study underscored the complex difficulties Trump must address in order to fulfill his vows to improve relations with Russia, level the economic playing field with China, return jobs to the United States and defeat terrorism. The National Intelligence Council comprises the senior U.S. regional and subject-matter intelligence analysts. It oversees the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates, which often synthesize work by all 17 intelligence agencies and are the most comprehensive analytic products of U.S intelligence. The study, which included interviews with academic experts as well as financial and political leaders worldwide, examined political, social, economic and technological trends that the authors project will shape the world from the present to 2035, and their potential impact. ‘INWARD-LOOKING WEST’ It said the threat of terrorism would grow in coming decades as small groups and individuals harnessed “new technologies, ideas and relationships.” Uncertainty about the United States, coupled with an “inward-looking West” and the weakening of international human rights and conflict prevention standards, will encourage China and Russia to challenge American influence, the study added. Those challenges “will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation,” the study warned. “Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War.” While “hot war” may be avoided, differences in values and interests among states and drives for regional dominance “are leading to a spheres of influence world,” it said, The latest Global Trends, the subject of a Washington conference, added that the situation also offered opportunities to governments, societies, groups and individuals to make choices that could bring “more hopeful, secure futures.” “As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term,” the study said. THE HOME FRONT The report also said that while globalization and technological advances had “enriched the richest” and raised billions from poverty, they had also “hollowed out” Western middle classes and ignited backlashes against globalization. Those trends have been compounded by the largest migrant flows in seven decades, which are stoking “nativist, anti-elite impulses.” “Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tension between counties,” it said. The trends shaping the future include contractions in the working-age populations of wealthy countries and expansions in the same group in poorer nations, especially in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment, urbanization and welfare pressures, the study said. The world will also continue to experience weak near-term growth as governments, institutions and businesses struggle to overcome fallout from the Great Recession, the study said. “Major economies will confront shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization,” said the study. “China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing counties.” Governance will become more difficult as issues, including global climate change, environmental degradation and health threats demand collective action, the study added, while such cooperation becomes harder.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Developing Economies

Global development key to resilience to all other existential threats---it outweighs.

Hanna Samir Kassab 17. Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Michigan University, Prioritization Theory and Defensive Foreign Policy. Springer International Publishing, 2017. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48018-3.

The second vulnerability that must be prioritized is economic. As of writing (February 2016), economies the world over are going through serious challenges. Decision-makers must create a more stable global market system that provides development and human security for all. Economic development (discussed in the final part of this chapter) will allow states and decision-makers the ability to become more resilient to other threats. Economic development is thus the second most important vulnerability to prioritize because it instigates the best use of resources. By using resources efficiently, states can amass capabilities to neutralize other sources of vulnerability such as health, military and political. To stem economic vulnerability requires some protection from capitalism’s inherent flux: the cycles of boom and bust. The economy must be made to serve the community; it must be able to serve the needs of society and therefore must be re-embedded: Our thesis is the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. (Polanyi 2001, 4) More regulation is therefore needed to ensure the stability of world society, not just in terms of political stability but in environmental and other areas too. Allowing a totally liberal world economy is too risky given the known costs. Proper mechanisms must be put into place to ensure sustainable growth rates to build resilience to systemic vulnerability and its reach or distribution across states. Decision-makers must see this as important but certain industries continue to fight for deregulation. These industries are too greedy to be allowed into political discourse as they pervert the minds of decision-makers (Stiglitz 2013). Greed works in the short term but it is ultimately short sighted: in the long run we are all dead after all. The other vulnerabilities are serious but are on their way to being stable. States understand the power of Ebola, Zika and cyber-security, for instance, to destroy the world. States are well down the road to developing infrastructure to absorb the chaos that can result from proliferation of such issues. This is because decision-makers fully grasp the importance of establishing control over epidemics and cyber-insecurity. Cyber-defensive measures are being bolstered and increasing power is being given to institutions and regimes to help fight and neutralize outbreaks. More can be done but I am hopeful society is moving in the right direction here. Health invulnerability has a great deal to do with mental health. Many terrorist movements take advantage of people who are clinically depressed due to their being ostracized from society. Mental health issues are part of overall health and must be treated like any other disease. For this to occur, certain stigma must disappear in favor of treatment. In this way, environment and health protection can reduce recruitment to malicious organizations through prevention. Military vulnerabilities coming from states and political vulnerabilities such as terrorist networks are the lowest priority. Strategies already exist to deal with these problems. We have established that containment is the best form of engagement for both issues. If decision-makers perceive this as a viable option, then all that is missing is the will to implement the strategy. States such as China, Russia and the USA position themselves aggressively; but war has not broken out yet because of diplomatic channels, as well as the presence of nuclear weapons that deter aggression. Containment allows for a degree of understanding and freedom of state autonomy if certain lines are not crossed. As a consequence, state conflict is not a high priority at this juncture. The same goes for violent political networks. These do not pose a serious challenge to any hegemonic state and are contained in specific areas of the world. Once we cut off access to wealth, then groups like Islamic State are sure to fizzle out eventually if left alone to their own violent devices. The ranked order of vulnerabilities necessitates a fundamental shift of priorities, especially in the realm of health and humanitarian focus. It will need serious cooperation at the global level. States must be made to work together on these matters. This is, therefore, a responsibility for great powers and hegemonic actors, those who possess enough power to create and defend the system. These systems-creative actors (see Chap. 2) must guide this prioritization process by leading the world against systems-destructive forces described. The capabilities of great powers must be used to solve systemic vulnerabilities. These interactions guide state behavior and are the defining principle of any systemic theory of international politics. Given the multiplicity of systemic vulnerabilities and their distribution across units, states must further link respective resources. The more resources available and in use, the more effectively states can solve problems. The use of securitization and prioritization discourse is essential to achieve this goal. It is here that we see the application of the reprioritization process with regards to systemic vulnerabilities. Such action is a product of the securitization/desecuritization process of prioritization as vulnerabilities are perceived as threatening to human survival. Decision-makers must not look at one source of vulnerability, but must rather take a structural approach to determine the most efficient way to deal with the wide array of problems that undermine survival. Hence, to recover well during times of systemic crisis, whether financial, the result of the rapid influx of refugees or after natural disasters, is essential in dealing with sudden and rapid systemic shocks. States that cannot deal with these on their own are considered weak and vulnerable. Great powers are those that are economically developed with the resilience necessary to adapt quickly to any event. The root of success in neutralizing systemic vulnerability is through systems-creation, that is, the formation of an international system that supports economic development. Economic development allows for the efficient use of scarce resources and is the key to resilience given systemic vulnerability. It allows a state the flexibility to absorb and defuse external shocks in all forms: economic, political, environmental and so forth. Henry Bruton’s modernist definition of economic development understands states to be economically developed if they are sufficiently flexible and diverse to adjust to change (Bruton 1965, 1). Development designates any increase in gross domestic product (GDP) that is sustainable, multidimensional and durable enough to endure economic shocks. Undeveloped countries may suffer from productivity discrepancies due to sudden shock. For example, an undeveloped country would be a monocultural economy dependent on one or two sources of wealth. Rapid fluctuations in commodity prices may send the country into macroeconomic chaos. A developed economy must be able to produce prosperity for the population given potential instability. Conversely, an underdeveloped state is “low income … predominantly a primary producing and consuming area … production is food grains and fibers, although in several countries mining is an activity of importance” (ibid., 88). Underdeveloped economies, then, possess vulnerabilities. Bruton notes this: “The rich country seems to have an economy that has growth built into it, while the poor country seems to have an economy in which ‘nongrowth’ is built into it” (ibid., 2–3). Development specifically deals with eradicating systemic issues that hamper growth (ibid., 3). Accordingly therefore, “economic development presents a means to weather exogenous and endogenous economic, environmental, political and social shocks endemic to vulnerable states … there is a clear dichotomy between these two concepts, vulnerability and development” (Kassab 2014, 66). Economic development improves the resilience of states to recover from systemic shock. It allows for best use of resources to counter threats and allows for the provision of human security, an important concept to stem the proliferation of violent political movements. Other vulnerabilities, such as health, cyber, environmental, can also be dealt with given available resources. In the event of war, a developed state could very well outlast a lesser developed, revisionist state. Hence, economic sustainability is the root of any state’s success in the face of systemic vulnerability.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Warming

Warming turns nuclear war and death spirals make resilience impossible.

Beard et al. 21 [S.J. Beard, Lauren Holt, Asaf Tzachor, Luke Kemp, Shahar Avin, Phil Torres, and Haydn Belfield, * Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, “Assessing climate change’s contribution to global catastrophic risk,” 2021, Futures, Vol. 127, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2020.102673, Table 1 & Fig. 2 Omitted]

3.1. Climate change and planetary boundaries While most of the impacts of climate change so far have fallen within the range of what was experienced during the Holocene, the rate of change is faster than in the Holocene and we are now beginning to see climate change push beyond these boundaries. In the latest edition of the planetary boundaries’ framework, climate change is placed in the zone of increasing risk, implying that while this boundary has been breached, there remains some potential for normal functioning and recovery (Steffen et al., 2015). It thus lies between what the authors identify as the ‘safe zone’ and other ‘high risk’ transgressions, such as disruption to the biochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus and loss of biosphere integrity. As part of their discussion of BRIHN Baum and Handoh (2014) note that climate change is the planetary boundary for which the risk to humanity has received most meaningful consideration and they suggest that this attention is deserved. Yet little research attention has been paid to climate change’s extreme or catastrophic effects. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that, despite currently falling outside of the area of high risk, climate change has the clear potential to push humanity across a threshold of irreversible loss by “changing major ocean circulation patterns, causing massive sea-level rise, and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events… that displace people, and ruin economies.” Even if humanity was resilient to each of these individual impacts, a global catastrophe could occur if these impacts were to occur rapidly and simultaneously. One scenario that has received comparatively more attention is that of the global climate crossing a tipping point that would trigger environmental feedback loops (such as declining albedo from melting ice or the release of methane from clathrates) and cascading effects (such a shifting rainfall patterns that trigger desertification and soil erosion). After this point, anthropogenic activity may cease to be the main driver of climate change, making it accelerate and become harder to stop (King et al., 2015). Other scenarios can be discerned from the numerous historical cases in which the modest, usually regional, climatic changes experienced during the Holocene have been implicated in the collapse of previous societies, including the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku, the Akkadians, the Western Roman Empire, the lowland Maya, and dozens of others (Diamond, 2005, Fagan, 2008). These provide a precedent for how a changing climate can trigger or contribute to societal breakdown. At present, our understanding of this phenomena is limited, and the IPCC has labelled its findings as “low confidence” due to a lack of understanding of cause and effect and restrictions in historical data (Klein et al., 2014). Further study and cooperation between archaeologists, historians, climate scientists and global catastrophic risk scholars could overcome some of these limitations by identifying how the impacts of climate change translate into social transformation and collapse, and hence what the impacts of more rapid and extreme climatic changes might be. There is also the potential for larger studies into how global climate variations have coincided with collapse and violence at the regional level (Zhang, Chiyung, Chusheng, Yuanqing, & Fung, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). However, these need to be interpreted and generalized with care given the differences between pre-industrial and modern societies. Societies also have a long history of adapting to, and recovering from, climate change induced collapses (McAnany and Yoffee, 2009). However, there are two reasons to be sceptical that such resilience can be easily extrapolated into the future. First, the relatively stable context of the Holocene, with well-functioning, resilient ecosystems, has greatly assisted recovery, while anthropogenic climate change is more rapid, pervasive, global, and severe. Large-scale states did not emerge until the onset of the Holocene (Richerson, Boyd, & Bettinger, 2001), and societies have since remained in a surprisingly narrow climatic niche of roughly 15 mean annual average temperature (Xu, Kohler, Lenton, Svenning, & Scheffer, 2020). A return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles could thus have more devastating and long-lasting effects in a world of rapid climate change and ecological disruption (Gowdy, 2020).7 Second, modern human societies may have developed hidden fragilities that amplify the shocks posed by climate change (Mannheim 2020) and the complex, tightly-coupled and interdependent nature of our socio-economic systems makes it more likely that the failure of a few key states or industries due to climate change could cascade into a global collapse (Kemp, 2019). A third set of plausible scenarios stem from climate change’s broader environmental impacts. Apart from being a planetary boundary of its own, Steffen et al. (2015) point out that climate change is intimately connected with other planetary boundaries (see Table 1). Climate change is thus identified by the authors as one of two ‘core’ boundaries with the potential “to drive the Earth system into a new state should they be substantially and persistently transgressed.” This transformative potential was elaborated on in subsequent work exploring how the world could be pushed towards a ‘Hothouse Earth’ state, even with anthropogenic temperature rises as low as 2 °C (Steffen et al., 2018). The connection between climate change and biosphere integrity (the survival of complex adaptive ecosystems supporting diverse forms of life) is particularly strong. The IPCC is highly confident that climate change is adversely impacting terrestrial ecosystems, contributing to desertification and land degradation in many areas and changing the range, abundance and seasonality of many plant and animal species (Arneth et al., 2019). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has reported that climate change is restricting the range of nearly half the world’s threatened mammal species and a quarter of threatened birds, with marine, coastal, and arctic ecosystems worst affected (Diaz et al., 2019). According to one estimate, climate change could cause 15–37 % of all species to become ‘committed to extinction’ by mid-century (Thomas et al., 2004). Disruption to biosphere integrity can have profound economic and social repercussions, ranging from loss of ecosystem services and natural resources to the destruction of traditional knowledge and livelihoods. For instance, desertification, which threatens a quarter of Earth’s land area and a fifth of the population, is already estimated to cost developing nations 4–8 % of their GDP (United Nations, 2011). Many other rapid regime shifts involving loss of biosphere integrity have been observed, including shifts in arid vegetation, freshwater eutrophication, and the collapse of fish populations (Amano et al. 2020). There is a theoretical possibility of still more profound regime shifts at the global level (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & Levin, 2018). However, the contribution of loss of biosphere integrity to GCR is yet to be assessed. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that it is unlikely to threaten human civilization, due both to a lack of plausible mechanisms for this threat and the fact that “local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses.” However, in their classification of GCRs, Avin et al. (2018) suggest the potential for ecological collapse to threaten the safety boundaries of multiple critical systems with diverse spread mechanisms at a range of scales, from the biogeochemical and anatomical to the ecological and sociotechnological. Note that both these studies were conducted for largely conceptual purposes and should not be taken as rigorous analyses of this risk, this topic warrants further investigation. 3.2. Classifying climate change’s contributions to global catastrophic risk Climate change’s contribution to GCR goes well beyond its impact on the earth system. Taking Avin et al.’s list of critical systems, we note that previous studies have mostly focused on the effects of climate change on physical and biogeochemical systems (e.g. global temperature and sea-level rise) or the lower-level critical systems that are most directly related to human health and survival (e.g. Heath Stress). However, these represent a very limited assessment of risk as it only accounts for climate change as a direct hazard/ threat and our "ontological" vulnerabilities to it. A more comprehensive risk assessment must consider the higher-order critical systems threatened by climate change passively (through a lack of alternatives) and actively (through intentional design). The probability of a global catastrophe is higher when sociotechnological and environmental systems are tightly coupled, creating a potential for reinforcing feedback loops. If environmental change produces social changes that perpetuate further environmental change, then this could actively work against our efforts at adaptation. When this change has the potential to produce significant harm, via human vulnerabilities and exposure, we describe such loops as ‘global systems death spirals.’ These spirals could produce self-perpetuating catastrophes, whereby the energy and resources required to reverse or adapt to collapse are beyond the means of dwindling human societies. Feedback loops like this could thus create tipping points beyond which returning to anything like present conditions would become extremely difficult. Global systems would shift to very different states in which the prospects for humanity would likely be bleaker. In the rest of this section, we explore just one potential spiral, between an ecological system (the biosphere) and two sociotechnological systems (the human food and global political systems). We explore each system and its interactions. Fig. 2 illustrates our model of this spiral. 3.2.1. The human food system Climate change’s impact on biosphere integrity (discussed in the previous section) could harm the human food system due to loss of ecosystem services, disruption of the cycles of water, nitrogen and phosphates, and changes in the dynamics of plant and animal health (B´elanger & Pilling, 2019). Crossing this planetary boundary is already having severe implications for global food security, including loss of soil fertility and insect-mediated pollination (Diaz et al., 2019). Systems for the production and allocation of food are already enduring significant stress. The sources of stress include climate change, soil erosion, water scarcity, and phosphorus depletion. The natural resource base, arable land and freshwater upon which food production rely are being degraded. While global food productivity and production has increased dramatically over the past century to meet rising demand from an expanding global population and rising standard of living, these constraints and risks are increasing the vulnerability of our global food supply to rapid and global disruptions that could constitute global catastrophes (Baum, Denkenberger, Pearce, Robock, & Winkler, 2015). Climate change will further reduce food security in at least three interconnected ways. First, it will affect growing conditions, including direct threats to agricultural yields from heat, humidity, and precipitation in many regions; although initially improving conditions in some (Lott, Christidis, & Stott, 2013). Second, it will increase the range of agricultural pests and diseases (Harvell et al., 2002). Third, it will increase the occurrence of extreme weather events that impair the integrity of food production and distribution networks, from production to harvest, post-harvest, transport, storage, and distribution, thereby increasing our vulnerability and exposure to supply shocks (Bailey et al., 2015). The IPCC estimates, with medium confidence, that at around 2 °C of global warming the risk from permafrost degradation and food supply instabilities will be ‘very high’, while at around 3 °C of global warming the risk from vegetation loss, wildfire damage, and dryland water scarcity will also be very high (Arneth et al., 2019). Very few studies have considered the impacts of 4 °C of global warming or more; however, the IPCC highlighted one study finding that any potential agricultural gains from climate change will be lost by this point and there could be a decrease of 19 % in maize yields and 68 % in bean yields in Africa, an 8 % reduction in yields in South Asia, and a substantial negative impact on fisheries by 2050 (Porter et al., 2014). Furthermore, multiple extreme weather events could disrupt food distribution networks (Bailey and Wellesley, 2017). While there are opportunities to adapt, disruption to the entire global food system cannot be resolved via food aid alone. Indeed, there is the potential for isolationist or heavy-handed responses that would do more harm than good. Given the high degree of interconnectivity and feedback within the global food system, our initial research suggests that any one of these climate change effects could trigger scenarios that would critically undermine the global food system’s ability to meet the minimum nutrition for well-being; making food security for all an unachievable goal, let alone rise to the challenge of continuing to grow (A. Tzachor, 2019, 2020); this would constitute what Kuhlemann (2019) terms a ‘threshold of significance.’ 3.2.2. The global political system Disrupting the global food system can create and exacerbate conflict and state failure (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). However, once again, this needs to be seen against the backdrop of a global political system under stress, with climate change as a significant contributing factor. Climate change influences political systems in many ways, from being a locus of activism and a stimulus for reform to driving rising inequality and population displacement (Arneth et al., 2019; Diffenbaugh & Burke, 2019). This is not a new phenomenon, changes in the climate are believed to have contributed to conflict between people and states throughout human history, driven by resource scarcity, population displacement, and inequality (Lee, 2009; Mach et al., 2019). As part of a comprehensive risk assessment of climate change, King et al. (2015) conducted an extensive literature review on climate change and conflict and used this to inform a series of international wargaming exercises. These found that climate change is expected to increase international conflict while highlighting the role that population displacement, state failure, and water and food insecurity would play in this (see also Mach et al., 2019; Natalini, Jones, & Bravo, 2015). Quantitative studies of the impact of climate change on violence and conflict have provided more mixed results. A survey of empirical studies by Detges (2017) found that there may be multiple differing trends: extreme weather events appear to have more significant effects on violence than do long-term climate trends, while levels of small-scale conflict and interpersonal violence appear to be more affected than large-scale conflicts and international war. Empirical studies also highlight how climate change’s impact on conflict is predominantly as a risk multiplier and intensifier. Thus, climate change may contribute more by increasing our vulnerability to other conflict-inducing factors, such as loss of livelihood, forced migration, environmental change, and food insecurity, than by acting as a direct cause of conflict (Abel, Brottrager, Cuaresma, & Muttarak, 2019; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Schubert et al., 2008).8 Of particular relevance to GCR is the effect of climate change on the risk of nuclear war (Parthemore, Femia, & Werrell, 2018). However, to our knowledge, this has never been rigorously assessed, although the potential is certainly there. One recent model of the risk of nuclear war highlighted how varied, and common, incidents with the potential to trigger a nuclear exchange are (Baum, de Neufville, & Barrett, 2018). It outlined 14 different causal pathways to an exchange, including the escalation of conventional wars and international crises, human error, and the emergence of new non-state actors. For all but two of these, they identify historical examples of potentially precipitating incidents, with 60 incidents in total (i.e. a little less than one a year). This suggests that the absence of nuclear war was less due to a lack of potential causes, tan the global political system’s ability to defuse them. Thus, the real significance of climate change may be its capacity to undermine this system: the combination of social, political, and environmental disruption, a lingering sense of global injustice, and rising food, water, and energy insecurity could increase the probability that crises escalate or that false alarms are mistaken for genuine emergencies. This topic needs further research. 3.3. The emergence of a global systems death spiral Yet, we should not conclude that a nuclear exchange is the only, or even most likely, scenario in which political instability might produce a global catastrophe. Conflict and political instability, even of moderate severity, are themselves two of the most significant drivers of biodiversity loss due to breakdowns in monitoring, governance, and (public and private) property rights (Baynham-Herd, Amano, Sutherland, & Donald, 2018). This closes a potentially reinforcing feedback loop between loss of biosphere integrity, food insecurity and political breakdown. The mechanisms by which these cascading failures might spread include many of the natural, anthropogenic, and replicator effects identified by Avin et al. (2018), making them harder to contain. At the natural level, climate change involves changes to the global atmospheric and biogeochemical systems and poses other naturally spreading harms, like global ecological collapse. At the anthropogenic level, the global interconnectedness of sociotechnological systems means that while small shocks are easier to recover from, larger shocks can be harder to contain and control. Finally, biological and informational replication can also spread the negative impacts of climate change, from vector-borne diseases and invasive species to climate fatalism and dangerous geoengineering technologies. Given these numerous spread mechanisms, critical system failures could precipitate global catastrophes. Furthermore, the spiral we have explored is unlikely to be the only set of interlinked systemic disruptions that climate change could initiate (other death spirals could involve bio-insecurity and disease), nor are these the only causal connections between these three systems. Until we understand the nature of such death spirals better, we must act cautiously. We now turn to consider what this would mean.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hard Landing

A hard landing wouldn’t be mild – the next recession would be difficult to escape

Diane Swonk, 5/4/23, Financial Review, “Risk of Fed fissures grows as inflation fight tests resolve,” https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/risk-of-fed-fissures-grows-as-inflation-fight-tests-resolve-20230504-p5d5p9, mm

Until now, Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell has effectively corralled his colleagues to show a united front at key turning points for monetary policy. However, his job has just got a lot more complicated. The Fed raised short-term interest rates by a quarter of a point on Wednesday in what was hoped to be the final rate hike of this cycle. That pushed the benchmark Fed funds target to a 5 to 5.25 per cent range. The economy slowed, but inflation accelerated in the first quarter. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation – the core personal consumption expenditures price index – jumped to a 4.9 per cent annualised pace in the quarter, the hottest in a year. That is the wrong direction and will no doubt spur debate about whether the Fed can signal a definitive end to rate rises after this week’s meeting. The US central bank sees fighting inflation as a marathon, not a sprint. History is littered with central banks that gave up before they crossed the finish line. The result was a more corrosive bout of inflation or worse: stagflation. The Fed hoped to keep credit conditions tightening even after it paused on hikes. Inflation-adjusted rates were expected to rise as inflation cooled. The inflation data for the first-quarter suggests that inflation has become sticky, which could challenge that strategy. Further complicating matters is the tightening of credit due to recent financial market turmoil. No one knows exactly how much more credit conditions will tighten. Estimates range from what would equate to 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in short-term rate rises. That is before increasing problems in the office market, which could add insult to injury. Office leases are resetting, and vacancies are rising. That will keep banks, which account for a disproportionate amount of commercial real estate loans, on the defensive. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey for the first quarter is due out on May 8. The leadership will have a sense of the direction of those results but not the full report; we are still flying blind on the tightening in the pipeline. The same survey revealed in January that 45 per cent of banks were already tightening lending standards for commercial and industrial loans; 69 per cent of loans for construction and land development were constrained. Companies with fewer than 250 employees, which are the backbone of the labour market, are especially vulnerable to those shifts. Those firms accounted for a record-breaking 70.9 per cent of job openings at the end of January, but have since lost steam. Job openings among the smallest businesses – less than 10 employees – plummeted in March, while layoffs and separations surged to their highest pace since the onset of the pandemic. Those concerns have begun to divide the Fed. The staff adopted a “mild recession” as their baseline scenario in March, while the leadership laid out a rise in unemployment that is consistent with a recession. Some had even voiced views that a pause instead of a rise in May would be prudent, given the need to assess the impact of tightening already under way. Such tightening could do much of the heavy lifting for the Fed when it comes to cooling the economy. Chicago Fed president Austan Goolsbee has led the pack in raising concerns and was one to watch to see if he dissented on those grounds at this week’s meeting. Dissents are rarely made in a vacuum; one usually represents two or more. This is before the Fed hits its hardest mile, when unemployment rises and the backlash to crossing the finish line on inflation intensifies. The fact that we are on the eve of an election year will only intensify those emotions; politicians will be eager to find a scapegoat. Most forget that even former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, who was practically canonised for his steely resolve against inflation, blinked when the going got tough. He reversed course and cut rates in mid-1980, an election year. The cuts didn’t last long; within less than six months rates skyrocketed from a low of 9 to 19 per cent. That pushed the economy into its second recession in less than a year. Powell has been attempting to avert such an outcome by trading some pain today to avoid higher inflation and a deeper recession down the road. That is great in theory, but hard to execute. Even “mild recessions”, such as the ones we saw in 1990-91 and 2001, proved difficult to escape. I have heard people use the term “garden variety recession” when discussing what may occur, as if job losses are like a stroll in the park. They are not. Divisions within the Fed are likely to deepen as the economy slows. I would like to believe that a soft landing is still possible. The only time the Fed actually achieved that outcome was in 1994, when officials were pre-empting what turned out to be nascent inflation. This time inflation is real.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hard Landing

Empirical evidence suggests we will have soft landing, but a reversion to aggressive rate hikes will trigger a hard landing

Jamie McGeever, 4/17/23, Reuters, “The Fed and a soft landing? It’s not as rare as you think,” https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/fed-soft-landing-its-not-rare-you-think-2023-04-14/, mm

Engineering a soft landing is hard. But if you zoom out from the strictest definition of the term, the U.S. Federal Reserve has managed it more often than is generally believed. Admittedly, by the textbook definition of raising interest rates to cool an overheating economy or inflation without triggering a recession, the Fed has only achieved that once in its history. That was in the mid-1990s, when the U.S. economy avoided recession after the Alan Greenspan Fed doubled interest rates to 6% between February 1994 and February 1995. The latest U.S. inflation and job market data this week sparked a tangible burst of optimism that the Fed, under the stewardship of Jerome Powell, might emulate that rare feat. To be fair to the Fed, it probably is more art than science, with luck playing a bigger part than skill. What Milton Friedman called the "long and variable lags" between monetary policy decisions and their effects on the economy can be anywhere from six months to two years. That's a big window. In a paper earlier this year, former Fed Vice Chair Alan Blinder - who was in situ during that fabled 1994-95 soft landing - said that it is "difficult, maybe impossible" to predict the timing of policy changes on the real economy. Blinder posits that the soft landing parameters of avoiding recession completely are too narrow. He argues that if GDP declines by less than 1% or there is no recession determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research for at least a year after a Fed tightening cycle, that is a "softish" landing. By this definition, Blinder reckons that five of the 11 Fed tightening cycles since 1965 were followed by soft landings to varying degrees, and the 1990-91 recession was due to Saddam Hussein and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, not Alan Greenspan. Of the five hard landings, two were not a result of Fed monetary policy: the Great Recession of 2008-09 was because the financial system imploded, and the 2020 recession was a consequence of the global COVID-19 pandemic. That leaves three recessions - 1973-75, 1980 and 1981-82 - that can fairly be considered hard landings and a direct result of high interest rates. It's no coincidence that they followed what were by far the three most aggressive tightening cycles. As Blinder says, the landing largely depends on how high the 'plane' is flying before it starts its descent. To extend the analogy further, Powell and his colleagues are flying blind now, given the fog created by post-COVID pandemic supply chain disruptions, and food and energy shocks. "To achieve another soft landing under these circumstances, the Fed will have to be skillful indeed," Blinder concludes. Paul McCulley, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and former chief economist at bond giant Pimco, reckons the Fed is at the end of its cycle even though inflation remains well above the central bank's 2% target. He draws parallels with the end of the 1994-95 hiking cycle, particularly Greenspan's remarks in February 1995 that the Fed could keep rates on hold or even cut them, "despite adverse price data", if there were signs that underlying inflation pressures were cooling. The Fed cut rates five months later and the rest is soft landing history. "Knowing when to declare enough is enough is critical, to abort a self-feeding dynamic of negative macro animal spirits," McCulley said. In a paper last year analyzing 70 tightening cycles between 1980 and 2019 across 19 advanced and six emerging economies, the Bank for International Settlements used even looser definitions for hard and soft landings. A hard landing is a recession - two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth - within three years of the interest rate peak; otherwise, it is a soft landing, the BIS wrote. The tightening cycles were defined as at least three consecutive quarters, ending with the policy rate at its peak. Of these 70 episodes, 41 ended with a hard landing and 29 with a soft landing. All else equal, larger rate hikes spread over a longer period are more likely to be associated with hard landings, and front-loaded tightening cycles tend to be followed more frequently by soft landings, the BIS found. Maybe the Fed does have a fighting chance this time around.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hard Landing

Persistent inflation will trigger a hard landing for the global economy – expansionary fiscal policy would erode monetary tightening and trigger a recession

Chris Giles and Colby Smith, 4/11/23, Financial Times, “IMF wants of ‘hard landing’ for global economy if inflation persists,” https://www.ft.com/content/29f19a32-9440-4685-8fef-e3f3fdfc2969, mm

The IMF has warned of a “hard landing” for the global economy if persistently troublesome inflation keeps interest rates higher for longer and amplifies financial risks. Although the fund left its overall economic forecasts largely unchanged from January in its latest World Economic Outlook, published on Tuesday, it stressed that signs of resilience alongside lower global energy and food prices masked a darker reality. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, the IMF’s chief economist, said: “Below the surface . . . turbulence is building, and the situation is quite fragile.” “Inflation is much stickier than anticipated even a few months ago,” he said. “More worrisome is that the sharp [monetary] policy tightening of the past 12 months is starting to have serious side effects for the financial sector.” In its twice-yearly full forecasts published on Tuesday, the IMF said the turmoil in the UK government bond market last autumn and the US banking turbulence last month showed the “significant vulnerabilities [that] exist both among banks and non-bank financial institutions”. “Risks to the outlook are heavily skewed to the downside, with the chances of a hard landing having risen sharply,” the IMF said. Gourinchas told the Financial Times that, while the banking system was far more resilient than during the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers had to “think about what could go wrong”. “We can all remember the long time between the failure of an individual institution, whether it was Bear Stearns or Countrywide,” he said, referring to institutions that failed more than a decade ago. “Every time, this was treated like an isolated incident, until it wasn’t.” The IMF’s new forecasts showed a 25 per cent chance that the annual global growth rate could fall below 2 per cent in 2023, a risk twice as large as normal. The global economy has only grown that slowly in five calendar years since 1970. If a significant financial shock hit — something the IMF attached 15 per cent risk to — the fund said global growth was likely to fall below the rate of population growth and result in a global recession. In the IMF’s unchanged central forecast, the global economy is expected to grow 2.8 per cent in 2023, rising to 3 per cent in 2024 and sticking at about that level until around 2028. IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva last week said this was the weakest medium-term outlook for the global economy since 1990. Gourinchas told the FT the fund was projecting “supercharged” growth in China with other countries reverting to a more normal rate. The IMF also assumes that global productivity will deteriorate while economies will suffer from coronavirus pandemic “scarring”, and fragmentation amid geopolitical tensions. The US economic forecast has been raised versus the January forecast, and the fund is now expecting growth of 1.6 per cent in 2023 and 1.1 per cent in 2024. Three months ago, the IMF was projecting a 1.4 per cent increase this year followed by a 1 per cent expansion the following year. The eurozone is expected to grow more slowly at 0.8 per cent this year as member states deal with last year’s energy price increases before recovering to a 1.4 per cent rate in 2024. China’s forecast growth rate of 5.2 per cent in 2023 from the IMF is in line with the Beijing government’s target, although the fund expects it to slow to 4.5 per cent in 2024. The IMF called on central banks to keep working to bring inflation down and for governments to help by removing some of the fiscal support offered in recent years to deal with Covid-19 and the energy crisis. So long as financial markets remained relatively stable, central banks should do everything they can to beat inflation, the fund said. Gourinchas warned that price pressures could continue to prove more persistent, which would result in a “harder landing scenario”. “There is a concern out there that we may not have enough tightening in the system at this point and more will be needed,” he said. “That would certainly increase the odds that output would come down further compared to our projections.” However, a credit crunch, which some economists are predicting in the wake of last month’s US banking turmoil, could act as a disinflationary force, he said. “As long as it is orderly, some of this lending contraction may actually be beneficial in terms of bringing down inflation and may substitute for further interest rate hikes.” Janet Yellen, the US Treasury secretary, was more upbeat about the outlook, seeking to ease fears of a “hard landing”. She said she had not seen “evidence at this stage suggesting a contraction in credit” after the banking sector turmoil, and noted the US economy was still “performing exceptionally well”, with “continued solid job creation, inflation gradually moving down [and] robust consumer spending”. “I wouldn’t overdo the negativism about the global economy,” Yellen said told reporters. “I think the outlook is reasonably bright.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Slow Growth

Inflation causes slow growth – forces tighter monetary policy

Sharkey 22

Sarah Sharkey is a personal finance writer; September 22, 2022; 5 Effects Of Inflation On The Economy; .; //[TMS—GK]

When inflation is on the rise, it’s more expensive to purchase goods and services. But the effects of inflation don’t stop with shoppers feeling the pinch on their wallets. The major trend impacts the economy in several different ways. Let’s explore what impacts you can expect to see. Is Inflation Good Or Bad? Inflation is measured by the consumer price index (CPI), and at low rates, it keeps the economy healthy. But when the rate of inflation rises rapidly, it can result in lower purchasing power, higher interest rates, slower economic growth and other negative economic effects. What Is Inflation? According to the U.S. Department of Labor, inflation is defined as a “general upward price movement of goods and services in an economy.” In other words, life gets more expensive as the cost of making purchases rises. Why Is Inflation Bad? In general, inflation is considered a bad thing for an economy. When the costs of goods and services rise, everyone’s wallets feel a little bit pinched. You might have seen the impacts of inflation for yourself when your normal grocery basket starts to get more expensive. But the reality is that rising costs don’t necessarily equate to rising wages, which leaves many households across the nation to face challenging times when inflation is on the rise. Typically, those with low incomes or fixed incomes. When inflation is on the rise, consumers can’t help but notice the changes. As prices begin to tick upward, while some start tightening their budget, many turn up the heat on their spending and investing. After all, many realize that their dollars are going to be worth less tomorrow than they are today. The spending trend can push prices even higher. And the markets can be slow to catch up to the changing consumer demands. For example, the housing market is still seeing high housing prices even though sales are slowing. If inflation gets too high, it can be painful for everyone as the Federal Reserve (Fed) tries to tame it through tighter monetary policy and higher interest rates. Why Is Some Inflation Good? Inflation isn’t always a bad thing. In fact, the Fed considers a modest amount of inflation as a key indicator of a healthy economy. With that, the Fed strives to keep inflation at the 2% mark. This measure aims to keep the economy growing at a healthy pace. The Fed uses several tools to accomplish its goal, including setting the Federal Funds Rate. When inflation is rising, the Fed increases interest rates to cool inflation. When inflation is too low, the Fed lowers interest rates with the hope that potential borrowers will be enticed to take out loans. For example, buyers might be enticed to buy a house or do a cash-out refinance to undertake home renovations. All of these choices help to fuel economic growth. On the opposite end of the spectrum is deflation, which happens when the cost of goods or services falls over time. At first glance, this might seem like a reprieve to consumers. But deflation is sometimes fueled by a lack of demand, which can eventually cause unemployment to rise. What Causes Inflation Rates To Rise? Many factors can contribute to the rise of inflation. But generally, inflation can be a big issue when supply and demand are out of balance. For example, a limited supply of fuel would likely lead to rising gas costs if demand stayed the same. Additionally, a relaxed monetary policy with a larger money supply than the economy can reasonably support can push inflation higher. Back in the early 1980s, the U.S. experienced a period of significant inflation as a response to the energy crisis. High inflation rates prompted the Fed to raise interest rates, culminating in the highest mortgage rate of all time on October 9, 1981, with the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage interest rate at 18.63%. Supply Side Inflation Supply side inflation occurs when there’s not enough supply to meet the demand. In that scenario, the short supply is what causes prices to rise. In the past couple of years, pandemic-caused shortages in high-demand products have seen significant inflationary pressure. For example, the limited supply of lumber made it more difficult to build a new house. An analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that 40% of the higher prices between 2019 and 2021 were due to supply-side issues. Demand Side Inflation On the other side of the coin, there’s demand-side inflation. When the demand for an item increases, that can cause prices to rise when supply stays level. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s analysis found that 60% of the higher prices between 2019 and 2021 were due to demand-side issues. This demand side inflation is partially fueled by a looser monetary policy at the onset of the pandemic. What Is Happening With Inflation Rates Right Now? As of August 2022, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) indicates that the cost of consumer goods has risen by 8.3% over the last 12 months. That’s down from 8.5% in July 2022. Notably, a few of the costs driving the high CPI include rising energy prices and unique supply chain issues caused by the pandemic. With inflation at unacceptably high rates, the Fed has made a series of interest rate hikes. It’s expected that the Fed will continue to raise interest rates until the inflation rate cools. Although home prices are still high right now, rising interest rates should eventually push the housing market into a buyer’s market. What Does Inflation Do To The Economy? As inflation rises, the impacts are pervasive. For consumers, higher prices for regular goods and services mean tight times. That’s especially true when real income erodes over time because wages often don’t keep pace with inflation. But there are two sides to every story. Sometimes, one side of a transaction benefits from inflation. For example, if it’s a seller’s market and housing prices soar, the seller could walk away with a tidy profit. But homebuyers could be stuck with higher costs and limited options. 5 Effects Of Rising Inflation Rates Although it might only seem like the trend impacts your budget, inflation often has far-reaching impacts across the economy. Let’s explore the most prevalent effects of rising inflation rates. Lost Purchasing Power The most obvious impact of inflation is the loss of purchasing power. As purchasing power erodes, many feel the impacts on their budget. But those on a low income or fixed income often feel the pinch the most. As inflation takes hold, it’s important to monitor how well your income keeps pace with the changes. If it’s within your power, negotiate for a raise or switch up your income streams to keep up with rising costs. Higher Interest Rates The Federal Reserve has a relatively limited toolkit to tame inflation. And the option they turn to first is usually raising interest rates. As the Fed pushes interest rates higher, it gets more expensive to borrow money. Since the average consumer takes advantage of borrowing to make major purchases, like a home or vehicle, a reality, this has a big impact on households across the country. If you have any debt with a variable interest rate, you’ll face higher costs tied to the higher interest rates. Higher Prices For Everything When everything is more expensive, wallets are pinched. After all, it’s impossible to go without the basics such as food or electricity. But with rising costs, it can become more difficult to make ends meet. The older and lower income wage earners are the first to feel the bite of higher prices. But eventually, it works its way up the income chain and begins to threaten companies or even entire industries. Economic Growth Slow As inflation runs rampant, the Fed tightens its monetary policy. With the money supply drying up, credit becomes more expensive and credit requirements tighten. Again, consumers looking to make major purchases find this a challenge. Since most need credit to make a major purchase, this slows down the economy. Anti-Inflationary Measures Can Cause A Recessions Inflation is a major threat to the economy. But as the Fed tries to adjust the market with monetary policy and interest rate hikes, sometimes it overcorrects. If the market isn’t ready for the Fed’s actions, that can mean lower economic growth for the country. When this happens for one quarter, it is usually referred to as a contraction. But if this happens for two quarters in a row, it is generally considered the start of a recession. During a recessionary environment, the Fed often lowers interest rates to encourage economic activity. But as the cycle continues, it can be a painful ride for everyone.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Slow Growth

Inflation causes slow growth and forces tighter monetary policy that pinches low-income households the most.

Sharkey 22

Sarah Sharkey is a personal finance writer; September 22, 2022; 5 Effects Of Inflation On The Economy; .; //[TMS—GK]

When inflation is on the rise, it’s more expensive to purchase goods and services. But the effects of inflation don’t stop with shoppers feeling the pinch on their wallets. The major trend impacts the economy in several different ways. Let’s explore what impacts you can expect to see. Is Inflation Good Or Bad? Inflation is measured by the consumer price index (CPI), and at low rates, it keeps the economy healthy. But when the rate of inflation rises rapidly, it can result in lower purchasing power, higher interest rates, slower economic growth and other negative economic effects. What Is Inflation? According to the U.S. Department of Labor, inflation is defined as a “general upward price movement of goods and services in an economy.” In other words, life gets more expensive as the cost of making purchases rises. Why Is Inflation Bad? In general, inflation is considered a bad thing for an economy. When the costs of goods and services rise, everyone’s wallets feel a little bit pinched. You might have seen the impacts of inflation for yourself when your normal grocery basket starts to get more expensive. But the reality is that rising costs don’t necessarily equate to rising wages, which leaves many households across the nation to face challenging times when inflation is on the rise. Typically, those with low incomes or fixed incomes. When inflation is on the rise, consumers can’t help but notice the changes. As prices begin to tick upward, while some start tightening their budget, many turn up the heat on their spending and investing. After all, many realize that their dollars are going to be worth less tomorrow than they are today. The spending trend can push prices even higher. And the markets can be slow to catch up to the changing consumer demands. For example, the housing market is still seeing high housing prices even though sales are slowing. If inflation gets too high, it can be painful for everyone as the Federal Reserve (Fed) tries to tame it through tighter monetary policy and higher interest rates. Why Is Some Inflation Good? Inflation isn’t always a bad thing. In fact, the Fed considers a modest amount of inflation as a key indicator of a healthy economy. With that, the Fed strives to keep inflation at the 2% mark. This measure aims to keep the economy growing at a healthy pace. The Fed uses several tools to accomplish its goal, including setting the Federal Funds Rate. When inflation is rising, the Fed increases interest rates to cool inflation. When inflation is too low, the Fed lowers interest rates with the hope that potential borrowers will be enticed to take out loans. For example, buyers might be enticed to buy a house or do a cash-out refinance to undertake home renovations. All of these choices help to fuel economic growth. On the opposite end of the spectrum is deflation, which happens when the cost of goods or services falls over time. At first glance, this might seem like a reprieve to consumers. But deflation is sometimes fueled by a lack of demand, which can eventually cause unemployment to rise. What Causes Inflation Rates To Rise? Many factors can contribute to the rise of inflation. But generally, inflation can be a big issue when supply and demand are out of balance. For example, a limited supply of fuel would likely lead to rising gas costs if demand stayed the same. Additionally, a relaxed monetary policy with a larger money supply than the economy can reasonably support can push inflation higher. Back in the early 1980s, the U.S. experienced a period of significant inflation as a response to the energy crisis. High inflation rates prompted the Fed to raise interest rates, culminating in the highest mortgage rate of all time on October 9, 1981, with the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage interest rate at 18.63%. Supply Side Inflation Supply side inflation occurs when there’s not enough supply to meet the demand. In that scenario, the short supply is what causes prices to rise. In the past couple of years, pandemic-caused shortages in high-demand products have seen significant inflationary pressure. For example, the limited supply of lumber made it more difficult to build a new house. An analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that 40% of the higher prices between 2019 and 2021 were due to supply-side issues. Demand Side Inflation On the other side of the coin, there’s demand-side inflation. When the demand for an item increases, that can cause prices to rise when supply stays level. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s analysis found that 60% of the higher prices between 2019 and 2021 were due to demand-side issues. This demand side inflation is partially fueled by a looser monetary policy at the onset of the pandemic. What Is Happening With Inflation Rates Right Now? As of August 2022, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) indicates that the cost of consumer goods has risen by 8.3% over the last 12 months. That’s down from 8.5% in July 2022. Notably, a few of the costs driving the high CPI include rising energy prices and unique supply chain issues caused by the pandemic. With inflation at unacceptably high rates, the Fed has made a series of interest rate hikes. It’s expected that the Fed will continue to raise interest rates until the inflation rate cools. Although home prices are still high right now, rising interest rates should eventually push the housing market into a buyer’s market. What Does Inflation Do To The Economy? As inflation rises, the impacts are pervasive. For consumers, higher prices for regular goods and services mean tight times. That’s especially true when real income erodes over time because wages often don’t keep pace with inflation. But there are two sides to every story. Sometimes, one side of a transaction benefits from inflation. For example, if it’s a seller’s market and housing prices soar, the seller could walk away with a tidy profit. But homebuyers could be stuck with higher costs and limited options. 5 Effects Of Rising Inflation Rates Although it might only seem like the trend impacts your budget, inflation often has far-reaching impacts across the economy. Let’s explore the most prevalent effects of rising inflation rates. Lost Purchasing Power The most obvious impact of inflation is the loss of purchasing power. As purchasing power erodes, many feel the impacts on their budget. But those on a low income or fixed income often feel the pinch the most. As inflation takes hold, it’s important to monitor how well your income keeps pace with the changes. If it’s within your power, negotiate for a raise or switch up your income streams to keep up with rising costs. Higher Interest Rates The Federal Reserve has a relatively limited toolkit to tame inflation. And the option they turn to first is usually raising interest rates. As the Fed pushes interest rates higher, it gets more expensive to borrow money. Since the average consumer takes advantage of borrowing to make major purchases, like a home or vehicle, a reality, this has a big impact on households across the country. If you have any debt with a variable interest rate, you’ll face higher costs tied to the higher interest rates. Higher Prices For Everything When everything is more expensive, wallets are pinched. After all, it’s impossible to go without the basics such as food or electricity. But with rising costs, it can become more difficult to make ends meet. The older and lower income wage earners are the first to feel the bite of higher prices. But eventually, it works its way up the income chain and begins to threaten companies or even entire industries. Economic Growth Slow As inflation runs rampant, the Fed tightens its monetary policy. With the money supply drying up, credit becomes more expensive and credit requirements tighten. Again, consumers looking to make major purchases find this a challenge. Since most need credit to make a major purchase, this slows down the economy. Anti-Inflationary Measures Can Cause A Recessions Inflation is a major threat to the economy. But as the Fed tries to adjust the market with monetary policy and interest rate hikes, sometimes it overcorrects. If the market isn’t ready for the Fed’s actions, that can mean lower economic growth for the country. When this happens for one quarter, it is usually referred to as a contraction. But if this happens for two quarters in a row, it is generally considered the start of a recession. During a recessionary environment, the Fed often lowers interest rates to encourage economic activity. But as the cycle continues, it can be a painful ride for everyone.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Slow Growth

Labor market inequities create slow and unstable growth.

Joseph E. Stiglitz 21. Joseph E. Stiglitz is an economist and professor at Columbia University. He is the co-chair of the High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress at the OECD, and the Chief Economist of the Roosevelt Institute. He has served as chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001“Fostering More-Competitive Labor Markets” Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Brookings Institution Press. (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv13vdhvm.6

Why It Matters It should be fairly obvious why these imperfections in the labor market matter so much: one of the most disturbing aspects of growth in the United States in recent decades is the growing inequality (see, e.g., Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2019; Stiglitz 2012, 2019; and a rash of other books on the topic). Most of the gains in the economy have gone to the top 10 percent, the top 1 percent, and the top 0.1 percent. Some of the growing inequality has to do with increases in wage disparity—known as labor market polarization. But much of it has to do with the decreasing share of national income going to workers.8 This is where the decreasing market power of workers and the increasing market power of corporations comes in. This decreasing market power is more than just changes in technology or even globalization: it is also the broader changes in our economy, society, and politics—and especially the changes described earlier in this introduction and elsewhere in this volume—that have led to this growing imbalance of market power. Research at the International Monetary Fund (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014) and elsewhere (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2019) has highlighted the broader consequences of this growing inequality, even on economic performance. Economies that are more unequal are less stable and grow more slowly. In The Price of Inequality I explain the reasons that we pay such a high price for inequality.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hikes Hurt Developing Economies

Fed rate increases collapse developing economies – debt servicing and capital withdrawal.

Debinski ’22 (Gabrielle is a Senior Writer at GZERO Media, BA in journalism and an MA in International Relations from the University of Melbourne, also wrote for NY Times, “How US efforts to curb inflation could hurt the developing world,” August 01, 2022, https://www.gzeromedia.com/how-us-efforts-to-curb-inflation-could-hurt-the-developing-world)

But what about the indirect consequences of the Fed’s move? The impacts of US monetary policy at home are already being felt by emerging market economies. What’s going on and where might this all be headed? A borrowing bender. Many low-and middle-income economies were already highly indebted before the pandemic, including those involved in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, which conditioned infrastructure investment on shady loans. That burden increased in 2020 as many poor countries – missing tourism and remittance dollars, and grappling with dwindling output – upped their borrowing to weather the pandemic, adding a whopping $19.5 trillion to global debt. Consider some statistics: By October 2020, debt as a percentage of GDP had soared to 214% in Malaysia, 120% in Argentina and 110% in Pakistan. (To be sure, many wealthy countries are also facing very large debt burdens, though they have greater access to financial markets and more tools at their disposal to manage the fallout.) High indebtedness has left emerging markets more vulnerable to tightening global financial conditions. For the many low and middle income states that still borrow in US dollars, servicing their debts became all the more costly recently when the US Federal Reserve tightened its belt to try and rein in 40-year high inflation. This raises the specter of a new wave of emerging market defaults like the ones that rocked the Global South in the 1980s and 1990s. What’s more, now that higher interest rates have made US bonds more attractive, many global investors might opt to pull their capital from riskier emerging economies and instead stash their money back in the US. This would weaken emerging market currencies relative to the dollar and put upward pressure on inflation in countries that are already experiencing severe cost-of-living crises. As external financing dries up, many countries would be forced to sharply reduce their consumption and investment, triggering potentially devastating recessions. This is a particularly big problem for import-reliant countries like Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world. Grappling with sky-high food prices as a result of the war in Ukraine, Egypt is also bogged down by a debt-to-GDP ratio that now exceeds a whopping 90%. Disruptions to food supplies can be a game changer in Egypt, where roughly two-thirds of the population consume subsidized bread. The past is prologue … or is it? Could emerging market economies have done more to insulate themselves from the sort of economic shocks we’re now seeing? It’s debatable, says Sebastian Strauss, a senior global macro analyst at Eurasia Group. Strauss notes that many low- and middle-income states “have been doing a lot of the right things in recent decades, like accumulating foreign exchange reserves, running smaller current account deficits, reducing their reliance on dollar-denominated debt, and diversifying their trading partners”– steps that, taken together, help build economic resilience. Some emerging market central banks like Mexico’s even started raising interest rates last year in anticipation of the Fed’s tightening cycle to prevent significant currency depreciation, inflation, and capital outflows. Having learned the lessons from the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, many Asian states in particular have undertaken significant reforms to build economic buffers, including increasing their foreign currency reserves, which central banks can use to bolster their national currencies. Consider that in 1997, Thailand’s foreign reserves were about 19% of its GDP; now they are around 52%. Of course, many countries could have done more. Still, Strauss notes that “no one could have predicted the double whammy of exogenous shocks” – the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war – that have fueled the global credit crunch we’re now seeing. Who is most vulnerable? Developing countries face a range of challenges, but some are at greater risk than others of joining the ranks of Sri Lanka as a recently collapsed economy. Those that run persistent current account deficits (i.e., spend more than they earn) and finance the shortfall with dollar-denominated borrowing are particularly vulnerable. Bangladesh, with its foreign reserves having dried up, is in dire economic straits, as is the West African country of Ghana, where high levels of government debt – exacerbated by the global energy crunch – prompted the government to recently appeal to the International Monetary Fund for a bailout. Meanwhile, many analysts say that Pakistan, which relies almost entirely on food and fuel imports and whose currency has lost 30% of its value against the greenback this year, could be next to default on its foreign debt. Looking ahead. Social unrest is never far behind economic instability. Governments across Latin America, Asia, and Africa are surely on edge … and will be for some time.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hikes Hurt Developing Economies

Rate hikes cause financial crisis in the developing world.

Arteta et al. ‘23 (Carlos Arteta, Lead Economist, Prospects Group - World Bank. Steven Kamin, Senior Fellow - American Enterprise Institute. Franz Ulrich Ruch, Senior Economist, Prospects Group - World Bank. “US interest rate increases and crisis probabilities in developing economies,” January 27, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2023/01/27/us-interest-rate-increases-and-crisis-probabilities-in-developing-economies/)

All interest rate increases are not created equal. Interest rates can go up due to expectations of improving economic prospects. Alternatively, they can be pushed up by rising inflation expectations. Or they can also increase due to expectations of more aggressive central bank policy. Interest rate increases in advanced economies—especially the United States—can create financial pressures in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Our work indicates that the types of shocks that have driven U.S. interest rates upward during 2022 are especially likely to trigger financial crises in the developing world. SHOCKS BEHIND RISING U.S. INTEREST RATES In a recent paper, we distinguish between three potential drivers of rising U.S. interest rates: “Real shocks,” which are prompted by improved prospects for U.S. economic activity; “Inflation shocks,” which reflect expectations of rising U.S. inflation; “Reaction shocks,” which reflect investors’ assessments that the Federal Reserve’s reaction function has become more hawkish. We find that, over the past year, rising U.S. interest rates have been driven mainly by reaction shocks, as the Fed has pivoted toward more aggressive action to rein in inflation (figure 1). Figure 1. Drivers of two-year U.S. interest rate yields in 2022 fig 1Note: Shocks are estimated from a sign-restricted Bayesian vector autoregression (VAR) model with stochastic volatility. Real shocks raise U.S. interest rates, inflation expectations, and equity prices (a proxy for economic prospects). Inflation shocks raise U.S. interest rates and inflation expectations but lower equity prices. Reaction shocks raise U.S. interest rates but lower inflation expectations and equity prices. Figure shows cumulative change in underlying shocks and yields since January 2022. RISING CRISIS PROBABILITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES We then estimate the impact of these shocks on the probability of EMDE financial crises. We explore three types of financial crises: sovereign debt, banking, and currency. We find that rising U.S. interest rates driven by real shocks lead to small changes in the likelihood of a crisis. In contrast, reaction shocks (the anticipation of more hawkish Fed policy) substantially boost the probability that an EMDE will experience a financial crisis (figure 2). Figure 2. Impact of increase in 2-year U.S. interest rate yield on EMDE crisis probability fig 2 Note: Based on results from panel logit model with random effects. “0” indicates the probability of a crisis in a given year when there is no change in the underlying shock and all other variables included in the model are at their sample means. “+0.25%”, “+0.50%”, and “+1.40%” indicate the crisis probabilities in the hypothetical case of 25, 50, and 140 basis point increase in the 2-year U.S. treasury yield driven by the underlying shock. What is worse, our results suggest that a doubling of the size of the reaction shock leads to a more-than-doubling of the increase in financial crisis probability. An increase of only 25 basis points in U.S. two-year yields driven by a reaction shock raises the probability of a financial crisis in a given EMDE moderately, from 3.5 percent to 6.6 percent. But during 2022, reaction shocks have boosted two-year yields by about 140 basis points, which has resulted in an increase of 51 percentage points in the probability of EMDE financial crisis, to almost 55 percent. Further increases in U.S. interest rates can result in more widespread currency distress, given the increase in EMDE debt and the depletion of foreign currency reserves that has taken place of late. MORE CURRENCY CRISES MAY LIE AHEAD The impact of reaction shocks on the probability of a currency crisis is even larger—reaction shocks in 2022 have pushed the likelihood of currency crises to 78 percent. In 2022, seven EMDEs experienced a currency crisis, and 21 EMDEs reached agreements with the IMF for additional financing. Further increases in U.S. interest rates can result in more widespread currency distress, given the increase in EMDE debt and the depletion of foreign currency reserves that have taken place of late.

Horowitz ‘22 (Julia is a senior writer. She leads CNN Business' international coverage of global markets, “How the United States is exporting inflation to other countries,” September 28, 2022 https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/28/investing/fed-interest-rates-dollar-global-consequences/index.html)

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Hikes Kill Renewables

Inflation stops investment in renewables.

Granitz & Steinberg ‘21 (Peter Granitz & Julie Steinberg are Wall Street Journal reporters, “Inflation Hurts Renewable Investments,” 12/20/2021, https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/whats-news/inflation-hurts-renewable-investments/1fddfe4d-a680-4a8b-a05e-1eff743613e4)-mikee

A.M. Edition for Dec. 20. Investors in wind and solar energy say higher costs have made projects less financially rewarding. As funds shift their focus and money, it could potentially delay the transition to renewable energy. WSJ's Julie Steinberg explains how inflation is affecting the cost of green energy and what that means for the development of new major projects. Peter Granitz hosts. Peter Granitz: That is Markets Editor, Quentin Webb. Coming up, even renewables cannot escape higher prices these days. How inflation may affect the transition from fossil fuels. That's after the break. Add renewable energy to the list of things that cannot avoid inflation. No, the sun and wind are not getting more expensive, but the materials to build wind turbines and solar panels are. That is a big change from the past few years. We've got finance reporter, Julie Steinberg with us once again, to tell us about that shift and what it means to the future of renewable energy. Welcome back. Julie Steinberg: Thanks, Peter. Peter Granitz: Julie, the story in solar for the past decade was consistently cheaper panels, what is happening now? Julie Steinberg: So we're seeing the materials involved in making solar panels being exposed to the same inflationary forces we've seen elsewhere. So these clean energy projects which are reliant on materials such as silicon and copper are becoming more expensive. The wholesale price of solar panels has risen 19% in Europe this year. That's a function both of a supply shortage as well as transit issues. Which are helping bump up the costs of everything with regard to materials used for solar panels. Peter Granitz: What's the effect on planned solar projects in the future? Julie Steinberg: So it's making things more expensive and it means that the trillions of dollars lined up by banks and investors and developers, just won't go as far when it comes to speeding the transition. The International Energy Agency projects that an additional 95 gigawatts of solar power capacity could have been built by 2026 if material costs weren't rising. That's enough to power about 71 million homes in the US. Peter Granitz: Do we know that some things aren't going to happen because of this? Julie Steinberg: There are definitely projects that some investors are passing on and that are going to be delayed. Peter Granitz: What about wind? What's happening to turbine manufacturing? Julie Steinberg: So wind has also been affected. You have the makers of wind turbines that are struggling to deliver on-budget and on-time due to the same supply chain issues. Peter Granitz: The transportation costs, the component costs, things like that? Julie Steinberg: Exactly. Peter Granitz: Are these price increases temporary, or are they severe enough to actually slow the transition from fossil fuels? Julie Steinberg: It's unclear how long these price increases are going to last. We talked to one developer who said, "They've already been quoted slightly lower prices for solar panels for delivery in the second and third quarter of 2022." So it really depends on whether your definition of inflation is transitory or not. But what is clear right now from what we're hearing is that, "It's not severe enough to throw the transition from fossil fuels off-course, rather it's enough right now to slow it." Peter Granitz: We should just say that the Federal Reserve is no longer calling inflation transitory, at least in the United States. Julie, what does this mean for investors in renewable energy? Is this now a less attractive investment? Julie Steinberg: So we've definitely heard that from investors. While you could reliably count on clean energy to serve you with higher returns, some are saying, "Those returns are sliding." One investor who invests in renewables told us that, "A solar project that earlier would've returned 8% to 9%, their rising costs might pull that down by 1 to 1.5 percentage points." Others are saying that, "The valuations in clean energy projects are so extremely toppy, that they're not able to find the returns they once would've had." Because at the same time that prices are escalating for some of these materials, you still have tons of investors rushing in because there aren't enough projects. So it's a combination of forces that are seeking to push returns down, making them less attractive for other investors.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Generic Theory

Quantity theory is true.

Cowen 22

Tyler Cowen is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a professor of economics at George Mason University and writes for the blog Marginal Revolution. He is coauthor of “Talent: How to Identify Energizers, Creatives, and Winners Around the World.”; September 21, 2022; Inflation Is Best Explained by This Underrated Economic Theory; ; //[TMS—GK]

Currently the most underrated theory in economics is the so-called Quantity Theory of Money. It has been out of fashion for a long time, and even Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has said that a strong money-price connection has not held for at least 40 years. Nonetheless, on closer examination the quantity theory does a reasonable job of explaining much of recent economic history. In its simplest form, the quantity theory states that MV = PT. That is, the quantity of money multiplied by its velocity of circulation encapsulates all relevant transactions. (Money, velocity, prices and transactions are the respective terms in that equation.) More substantively, the quantity theory suggests that it is useful to think about the “M” in this equation — the money supply — as an active causal variable for macro policy. Consider the recent spurt of 8% to 9% inflation in the US. The simple fact is that M2 — one broad measure of the money supply — went up about 40% between February 2020 and February 2022. In the quantity theory approach, that would be reason to expect additional inflation, and of course that is exactly what happened. The quantity theory has never held exactly, one reason being that the velocity (or rate of turnover) of money can vary as well. Early on in the pandemic, spending on many services was difficult or even dangerous, and so savings skyrocketed. Yet those days did not last, and when the new money supply increase was unleashed on the US economy, there were inflationary consequences. This is consistent with one of the longest-standing truths of economic history, from the inflationary episodes of ancient Rome to the French Revolution to Weimar Germany. In retrospect, America’s current inflation troubles should not have been a surprise. One reason the quantity theory fell out of favor is that the Fed increased bank reserves significantly following the financial crisis of 2008. By mid-2010, the Fed had increased reserves to the banking system by $1.2 trillion, in comparison with about $15 billion in the years just before the crisis. Yet inflation stayed below 2%, and during early parts of the crisis it fell. On closer examination, that episode does not refute the quantity theory. The theory leaves room for the possibility that declines in velocity — which also can be called increases in the demand to hold money — can counteract increases in money supply. Along those lines, the Fed started paying interest on bank reserves, which led banks to hold most of the new surge in reserves. The Fed’s policy was thus more of a capitalization of the banking system than a truly expansionary monetary policy. It is true that one earlier quantity theory advocate, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, placed too much stress on the stability of money demand. So Friedman’s theory did not apply too well to the 2008-2010 period. But the more general version of the quantity theory held up fine. So what might a quantity theorist say about the current situation? One obvious point is that, for all the Fed’s talk to the contrary, current monetary policy remains expansionary. If you look at interest rates, the recent Fed funds rate has been hovering in the range of about 2.5%. Many T-Bill rates are in the range of 3% to 4%. You can debate which is the appropriate measure of price inflation (core inflation? overall inflation? median inflation?), but under any sensible standards these interest rates are still negative in real terms. The Fed just isn’t doing that much to choke off borrowing. A brighter sign is M2 growth, which was 5.3% year-over-year in July 2022. With 2% economic growth, that is consistent with inflation of a little more than 3%, assuming changes in monetary velocity do not intervene. Better yet, M2 growth rates have been falling consistently, from almost 14% in August 2021.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Inflation DA – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Generic Theory

Theory confirms, either the AFF’s new jobs sets off a wage-price spiral or the following supply shocks cause rapid inflation.

Frick ‘22

Walter Frick-I'm an editor and writer interested in economics, technology, forecasting, and the future of media at the Harvard Business Review; December 23, 2022; What Causes Inflation?; ; //[TMS—GK]

What causes inflation? At its root, inflation is driven by too much demand relative to supply. More precisely, as former Fed chair Ben Bernanke writes in his macroeconomics textbook with Andrew Abel: “Inflation occurs when the aggregate quantity of goods demanded at any particular price level is rising more quickly than the aggregate quantity of goods supplied at that price level.” But what causes demand to outpace supply? That can happen for a few different reasons, and to understand them it helps to consider the three pillars of macroeconomics that David Moss describes in his book A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know. Moss structures the book based on output (how much an economy produces), money (how much currency people have or can easily get their hands on), and expectations (what people think will happen next). All three have a role in inflation. Supply shocks: Inflation often happens because of supply shocks — major disruptions to an important economic input, like energy. For example, if a lot of oil fields stop producing oil because of a war, the price of energy increases. Since energy is a critical input into almost every other good, prices of other things rise, too. This is often called “cost-push inflation.” In theory, a decrease in the supply of a good should lead to a higher price, fewer buyers, and a new equilibrium. In practice, things are more complicated. A supply shock might set off a sustained increase in prices because there aren’t many good alternatives and so the price keeps getting bid up. Or it might be because there’s uncertainty around when and whether the supply shock will end, or because the initial price increase changes peoples’ expectations about future inflation. Money supply: Then there’s the demand side of the equation. An increase in the money supply will tend to cause inflation, as Moss explains. “With more cash in their pockets and bank accounts, consumers often find new reasons to buy things,” he writes in the book. “But unless the supply of goods and services has increased in the meantime, the consumers’ mounting demand for products will simply bid up prices, thus stoking inflation. Economists sometimes say that inflation rises when ‘too much money is chasing too few goods.’” This is sometimes referred to as “demand-pull inflation.” The money supply theory of inflation was popularized by economist Milton Friedman who famously said that “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” While it’s true that increases in the money supply can cause inflation, Friedman’s claim was too strong. In fact, if you had to boil the causes of inflation down to one thing, it might be expectations. Expectations and spirals: In many models of inflation, the cause isn’t an increase in the money supply but an unanticipated increase in the money supply. The intuition is that if everyone knows demand will increase (because there’s more money flowing) then supply will increase to match it. It’s the unexpected increase in demand (or decrease in supply) that sets off inflation. Along those same lines, how much inflation people expect affects how much inflation we actually get. As prices of goods rise, workers aren’t able to buy as much with their wages. So, if people expect higher inflation, they’ll bargain for higher wages to maintain their living standard. But if businesses expect this wage inflation, they’ll raise prices further, which can cause what’s called a “wage-price spiral” that drives further inflation. Thankfully, wage-price spirals are fairly rare. Because expectations matter so much, central banks work hard to maintain their credibility on inflation and to keep inflation expectations “anchored.” That basically means they want to convince everyone that they’ll be able to meet their inflation target, so that people don’t worry about month-to-month inflation data and just assume that inflation will rise by whatever the central bank says it will. Unemployment and inflation Recall that the root of inflation is too much demand relative to supply. Another way of thinking about the same idea is to ask how much “slack” there is in the economy at any point in time. An economy produces stuff using people’s time and ingenuity, machines and other infrastructure, and natural resources. But for various reasons, economies sometimes don’t produce as much as they could: There are lots of workers without jobs, factories that aren’t producing anything, etc. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, this high unemployment happened in many countries. There was a lot of “slack” in the economy, meaning lots of economic resources weren’t being put to use. In an economy with lots of slack, there’s little risk of demand outpacing supply and therefore little risk of inflation. If demand suddenly increased, unemployed workers would get hired, factories would reopen, and more would be produced. It’s when an economy is operating very close to its full potential — when there’s very little slack — that inflation often happens. For that reason, inflation is more common when unemployment is low. When most available workers have jobs, they have the ability to demand higher wages, which can increase prices. And there aren’t many workers available to cope with any extra demand that arises. That’s when you get too much money chasing too few goods. Low unemployment does not always cause inflation. But when an economy is running at or near full capacity, there’s a tradeoff between low inflation and low unemployment — at least in the short-term.