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2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

Jobs guarantee effectively ends recessions and solves inequality- it provides a floor for income while creating spillover effects to the private sector

Dylan Matthews dylan@Vox, 4-20-2018, "Cory Booker’s new big idea: guaranteeing jobs for everyone who wants one," Vox, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/20/17260578/cory-booker-job-guarantee-bill-full-employment-darity-hamilton

The idea of a job guarantee serves both a policy and a political purpose. On the policy side, a job guarantee would, in theory, effectively end recessions in America. Right now, the US government’s strategy when the economy stops growing is to use a combination of monetary stimulus (in which the Federal Reserve cuts interest rates or buys up billions of dollars of long-term bonds) and fiscal stimulus (as in the 2009 stimulus package, which blended a boost in spending with temporary tax cuts). For a variety of political and institutional factors, the Fed and Congress weren’t able to do enough in 2008 to 2010 to prevent unemployment from breaking 10 percent, and they certainly weren’t able to effect a full recovery within a couple years. Returning to normal unemployment rates took nearly a decade, resulting in years of human misery and lost wage gains that a healthier and faster recovery could’ve delivered. Job guarantee advocates argue that their plan effectively creates a permanent form of fiscal stimulus that politicians wouldn’t need to scramble to pass whenever disaster hits. Instead, if the economy took a turn for the worse and companies started shedding jobs, the government would automatically soak up anyone who’s laid off and give them work. That, in turn, would put more money in consumers’ pockets, boosting demand and improving business’ prospects. Before you know it, the economy’s back to normal. Advocates argue the policy could prove beneficial during economic booms as well. The fruits of economic recoveries and booms aren’t evenly shared, demographically. As of March 2018, , but only 58.4 percent of black people were. Once black men’s disproportionate representation in prisons and jails is accounted for, the gap grows still larger. In 2016, the most recent year for which we have data, a mere , compared to 72.8 percent of nondisabled people. Nor do booms affect all geographic areas equally. There are still  with a combined labor force of over 6.7 million people that have unemployment rates of 7 percent or higher as of February 2018. Seventy-eight counties, like , still have unemployment rates in excess of 10 percent. A job guarantee would, in principle, lessen those inequalities. People in struggling regions would be guaranteed work without having to move. Black Americans and disabled Americans wouldn’t be expected to wait until employers have run out of white and nondisabled people to hire until they get their chance. Finally, advocates argue that the policy would lead to an increase in wages for everyone. That’s a big benefit at a time when unemployment is low but . Think of it this way: Walmart pays its employees a ; part-time employees aren’t guaranteed benefits like  or a 401(k) match. If you’re a part-time employee at Walmart, and all of a sudden you can get $15 an hour, work full time, and earn full benefits by working for the federal government — wouldn’t you? And, knowing that, wouldn’t Walmart try to increase wages to keep you? Advocates say Walmart would. And they have some empirical evidence on their side from India, where a type of job guarantee known as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme functions largely as an insurance system, offering a source of income for rural farmers during the dry season. A group of economists —  — found that the job guarantee, they estimate, increased earnings for low-income households by 13.3 percent. Ninety percent of that increase is due to higher wages and increased work in the private sector, not the job guarantee program itself. Just as job guarantee advocates would predict, the program bid up wages everywhere. Perhaps the most surprising result was that the program not only increased wages, but increased employment in the private sector.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

Current policies are unethical and view the unemployed as a necessity to support the economy- only JG can solve

Tcherneva 18, Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Economics at Bard College, the Director of OSUN’s Economic Democracy Initiative, and a Research Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute, NY. She specializes in modern money and public policy, The Job Guarantee: Design, Jobs, and Implementation, Levy Economics Instiute, April 2018, https://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_902.pdf//Isim

For the purposes of this paper full employment is defined as a situation where any person of legal working age who wants to work is able to obtain employment at a living wage and decent working conditions. This includes but is not limited to new entrants in the labor market, people in “hidden unemployment” who are not normally counted in the official statistics, and individuals who are employed involuntarily in part-time working arrangements or other forms of precarious work. At the macroeconomic level, unemployment is understood as: A monetary problem: It is a consequence of business cycles dynamics and profitseeking firms behavior, as well as the State’s inadequate management of the currency and the monetary system. A situation that cannot be remedied by private firms: The private sector is unable to produce and maintain tight full employment over the long run. 3 A problem that is best understood as a silent epidemic: There is a distinct and discernable geographical pattern and propagation mechanism of unemployment, which mimics the behavior of a virus or mass contagion (Tcherneva 2017). Joblessness behaves like a disease and generates large social, health, and economic costs. A problem that is already “paid for”: The costs of these social and economic ills— both in real and financial terms—are already “paid for” by the economy and society at large. A problem by design and a public sector failure: Unemployment is a problem created by concrete policy measures (targeting a non-accelerating rate of unemployment [NAIRU], austerity policies). The government has chosen an explicit policy of keeping a percentage of the population in involuntary unemployment (the NAIRU is a policy benchmark). The government is also responsible for supporting the unemployed, i.e., the unemployed are already in the public sector. Government, public institutions, and civil society are not only paying the direct cost of unemployment, but more importantly are already bearing the large associated real costs of unemployment. A moral failure: Unemployment has been used as the main bulwark against inflation and economic instability and is considered a “necessary evil.” The idea that some people will necessarily lose their jobs and livelihoods in the fight against other economic ills is a profound moral failure of the economics profession. Unemployment is the failure and responsibility of the public sector and it is already “paid for.” By contrast, the JG offers a superior policy option to the current approach, and one that is macroeconomically sound and humane. It pays to employ the unemployed, preventing and reducing the outsized costs of unemployment, supporting the production of valuable public goods, and investing in and empowering people, planet, and community.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

Experts acknowledge that UBI isn’t sufficient- FJG ensures to reinvigorate the economy.

Paul et al 17, Mark Paul is a postdoctoral associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University and holds a PhD in economics from the University of Massachusetts Amherst. William Darity Jr is the Samuel DuBois Cook professor of public policy, African and African-American Studies, and economics; and the director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. Darrick Hamilton is associate professor of economics and urban policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and the Department of Economics, New School for Social Research, “5 Reasons Why a Federal Job Guarantee Makes Sense”, Jacobin, 2.4.2017, . //Isim

Universal basic income (UBI), an annual government-sponsored payment to all citizens, has been gaining traction across the American political landscape. Andy Stern, former Service Employees International Union president, believes the program will counteract the ​“acceleration of technology” that he thinks will likely create ​“work but not reliable jobs or incomes.” On the Right, the American Enterprise Institute’s Charles Murray argues that we should replace the ​“entire bureaucratic apparatus of government social workers” with a UBI. Other heavy-hitters agree it’s worth discussing. Robert Reich’s recent video calls on the government to provide a minimum payment for every citizen. President Obama told Wired that the United States will have to debate UBI and similar programs ​“over the next ten or twenty years.” The renewed attention makes sense: UBI would cover workers who, thanks to technological progress, have lost their jobs. One often-cited report tells us that 47 percent of all jobs are at risk of being automated. Yet existing social insurance programs are insufficient. The current array of programs — such as unemployment insurance, the earned income tax credit, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—help many Americans, but over forty-three million people still live below the poverty line. Children are among the most vulnerable, with nearly half living at or near poverty. The UBI represents one way to fight increasing deprivation. But another potential intervention — the federal job guarantee (FJG) — might be a far more promising demand. A job guarantee is not a new idea. It has been part of the American conversation at least since populist governor Huey Long put forth his Share Our Wealth Plan. In 1934, he argued that the United States should use public works to ensure ​“everybody [is] employed.” These calls were echoed by politicians from Roosevelt in his Economic Bill of Rights to George McGovern during his 1972 presidential bid. Martin Luther King also stumped for a job guarantee, demanding immediate ​“employment for everyone in need of a job.” He saw ​“a guaranteed annual income at levels that sustain life and decent circumstances” as the second-best option. Here are five reasons to agree with him. 1. A job guarantee means fewer poor Americans. A job guarantee would reduce poverty more quickly and provide more benefits than a UBI. To ensure a sufficient income, we argue for a FJG that would pay a minimum annual wage of at least $23,000 (the poverty line for a family of four), rising to a mean of $32,500. This would eliminate the ​“working poor” for full-time working households. In addition to the wage, workers in the FJG program would receive health insurance and pension benefits in line with those that all civil servants and elected federal officials receive. In comparison, many of the UBI proposals promise around $10,000 annually to every citizen (for an example, see Charles Murray’s proposal here). On the one hand, this plan would break the link between employment and money. But it does so at half the rate that would be available under the FJG, not even considering lifesaving benefits like health insurance. 2. The robots haven’t taken over yet. We still need workers. The dangers of imminent full automation are overstated: there is little evidence that companies are largely replacing human workers with robots. As Dean Baker explains, If technology were rapidly displacing workers then productivity growth — the rate of increase in the value of goods and services produced in an hour of work — should be very high, because machines are more efficient. In the last decade, however, productivity growth has risen at a sluggish 1.4 percent annual rate. In the last two years it has limped along at a pace of less than 1 percent annually. By comparison, in the post – World War II ​“Golden Age,” from 1947 to 1973, productivity grew at an annual rate of almost 3 percent. No doubt, stable and high-paid employment opportunities are dwindling, but we shouldn’t blame the robots. Workers aren’t being replaced by automatons; they are being replaced with other workers — ones lower-paid and more precariously employed. Nevertheless, technology, and globalization, have struck fear into American workers. Not because they are by nature a raw deal, but because the balance of forces over the last few decades has been skewed so dramatically in the favor of capital. Technology, nor globalization, need have negative employment effects on workers — but they certainly can. It’s time to get the rules right, and ensure workers are provided the dignity of a job. A federal job program would solve the real problem, while UBI would simply treat a side effect. 3. A FJG could build an inclusive economy. Conventional wisdom holds that people dislike work. Introductory economics classes will explain the disutility of labor, which is a direct trade-off with leisure. Granted, employment isn’t always fun, and many forms of employment are dangerous and exploitative. But the UBI misses the way in which employment structurally empowers workers at the point of production and has by its own merits positive dimensions. This touches on a heated debate on the Left. But for now, there is no doubt that people want jobs, but they want good jobs that provide flexibility and opportunity. They want to contribute, to have a purpose, to participate in the economy and, most importantly, in society. Nevertheless, the private sector continues to leave millions without work, even during supposed ​“strong” economic times. The workplace is social, a place where we spend a great deal of our time interacting with others. In addition to the stress associated with limited resources, the loneliness that plagues many unemployed workers can exacerbate mental health problems. Employment — especially employment that provides added social benefits like communal coffee breaks—adds to workers’ well-being and productivity. A federal job guarantee can provide workers with socially beneficial employment — providing the dignity of a job to all that seek it. The FJG would also act as a de facto wage floor — private employers will have to offer wages and benefits at least as enticing as the federal government to attract workers. There has been extensive public support for recent increases in the minimum wage, such as the Fight for $15 campaign, demonstrating that most Americans believe workers deserve a living wage. Fighting for a higher minimum wage is an important step to ensure that workers are compensated a living wage rather than a poverty wage, yet let us not forget that the effective minimum wage in this country without a UBI or a job guarantee is $0. This must change. Finally, some argue that a ​“skills mismatch” explains why some workers remain unemployed. While we reject that narrative, a well-designed FJG will nevertheless include a training element to build workers’ skills and a jobs ladder to create upward mobility in the workplace. All of these elements will build an inclusive economy that provides good jobs for all. The UBI, in contrast, could subsidize bad jobs — allowing low minimum wages and lack of benefits to persist. 4. Federal jobs could provide socially useful goods and services. During the Great Depression, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were public employment programs designed to put Americans back to work after the national unemployment rate reached 25 percent. These programs, implemented under the Roosevelt administration, provided socially beneficial goods and services that benefited all Americans. Some of our national parks — Zion, Glacier, and Shenandoah — received substantial work contributions from employees of the federal jobs programs. The Blue Ridge Parkway was a federally funded and staffed infrastructure program. A new federal job guarantee could undertake similarly bold and much-needed public-works projects. The American Society of Civil Engineers gave the United States a D+ in infrastructure and prices necessary repairs at $3.6 trillion. This lack of investment has lowered employment rates, cost businesses sales, and reduced incomes for American families. Make no mistake, these are government choices. They could choose instead to hire unemployed workers to repair bridges, maintain roadways, and update power grids. Likewise, Bill McKibben just called for us to ​“declare war” against climate change. With climate change being perhaps the largest threat to our well-being, bold action is needed. The job guarantee program would create the capacity to do just that. Professor Robert Pollin of the Political Economy Research Institute calls for scaling up the transition to a green economy, which would create millions of new jobs along the way. He and his colleagues estimate what a Green New Deal would look like, and find that a transition to a green economy would amount to an estimated $200 billion in investment annually, resulting in a drop in ​“US emission by 40 percent within 20 years, while creating a net increase of 2.7 million jobs.” In part, this is due to the labor-intensive nature of energy efficiency and other ​“green” investments. Additional services, when combined with a FJG, would save average American households thousands, if not tens of thousands, a year. According to the Economic Policy Institute, for example, tuition-free and universal child care and education — staffed by FJG workers — would trim an average of $22,631 annually from families’ budgets in expensive places such as DC while saving households in places like Arkansas a more modest $5,995 on average. To be sure, a UBI would free up time to volunteer, to care for sick relatives, or to start small businesses. Additionally, the UBI would finally provide greater financial freedom to those that choose to stay at home and engage in care work — disproportionately provided by women. However, the FJG has the ability to provide high quality services, such as child care and elder care, that would greatly reduce the care burden, providing more choice while building on the current social safety net. 5. It’ll stabilize the economy. A FJG would bring us much closer to actual full employment, not the neoclassical full employment that subjectively allows for some optimal frictional unemployment. Most contemporary economists rely on the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to calculate this less-than-full full employment artificial statistic which functions as a disciplinary tool of the bourgeoisie, but this, according to Roger Farmer is ​“an idea past its sell-by date.” By full employment, we mean simply that everyone seeking a job gets one. We’d wager that if you asked the average American what full employment means to them, they’d give you a similar answer — a job for all. Indeed, a plurality of Americans will also tell you they support a FJG. The UBI would likely still leave a substantial segment of the population in poverty. As Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs, one of the most prominent UBI advocates, acknowledged, even a large payment through the UBI won’t necessarily secure a comfortable living for all citizens. How about those without jobs, or those who earn below subsistence wages? Of course, a UBI coupled with a non-poverty wage option and strong unionization could seriously combat poverty. The UBI would eliminate the effective minimum wage of $0 currently offered in the United States, though it would fail to provide adequate employment for all that demanded it — a crucial shortfall of such a program. A FJG is a sounder mechanism to combat structural inequalities, for instance through closing the persistent unemployment gap experienced by stigmatized groups who face continued discrimination. (Note, since 1972 unemployment has average double digits for black workers and has never fallen below 7 percent — a level that is only reached during times of economic crisis — for white workers). Further, the FJG will have a strong macroeconomic stabilization effect. During economic downturns, it would expand and hire more people; it would then shrink during economic boom periods as people move from public to better-paying private employment. Pavlina R. Tcherneva, a leading voice on the FJG’s macroeconomic effects, argues that policies like the UBI have no counter-cyclical features. Thus, when the economy takes a downturn — say as it did in 2007 — basic incomes provide no automatic stabilizers to right the sinking ship. This is good for the economy as a whole. Rather than expanding the unemployment insurance rolls during economic busts, the FJG would put folks to work and moderate the business cycle. Federal workers’ paychecks will increase demand, which will increase economic growth. Many economists agree that today’s secular stagnation — insufficient demand — is contributing to continued ​“lackluster” growth after the Great Recession. Only modest upticks in growth for the foreseeable future will come if we continue the status quo. Finally, as a less costly program a FJG might be easier for a future left government to enact. Some estimate that basic income could easily cost more than $3 trillion each year, while others say it will only come to $2.7 trillion. The FJG, on the other hand, will cost orders of magnitude less. Even if we conservatively guess that fifteen million unemployed workers need jobs, funding the FJG would take about $750 billion. We want to build an inclusive economy. The FJG will build an economy that serves the working class more efficiently and effectively than the UBI. The benefits will be immediately and broadly distributed. The FJG will directly target the unemployed — remedying a key predictor of poverty. By providing universal employment, it will also counteract employers’ systematic discrimination against ex-offenders, recent military veterans, and certain racial groups. Furthermore, through providing a guaranteed job, workers will be emboldened to take new actions in the private sector. This could be just the policy to reinvigorate the labor movement, spurring unionization drives to improve working conditions. These benefits will result in the federal jobs raising beneficiaries and their families above the poverty line. The UBI can make no such guarantee. Not only would a federal job guarantee bring justice to the millions who desire work, but it would also address the long-standing unjust barriers that keep large segments of stigmatized populations out of the labor force. Finally, it would reverse the rising tide of inequality for all workers. By strengthening their bargaining power and eliminating the threat of unemployment once and for all, a federal job guarantee would bring power back to the workers where it belongs.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

FJG k2 stable economy- work and productivity even during economic downturns

MARK PAUL et al 2017 (Mark Paul is an assistant professor of economics and environmental studies at New College of Florida; William Darity Jr is the Samuel DuBois Cook professor of public policy, African and African-American Studies, and economics; and the director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University; Darrick Hamilton is associate professor of economics and urban policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and the Department of Economics, New School for Social Research; Jacobin; “Why We Need a Federal Job Guarantee”; https://jacobin.com/2017/02/federal-job-guarantee-universal-basic-income-investment-jobs-unemployment/)//Isir

It’ll stabilize the economy. AFJG would bring us much closer to actual full employment, not the neoclassical full employment that subjectively allows for some optimal frictional unemployment. Most contemporary economists rely on the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to calculate this less-than-full full employment artificial statistic which functions as a disciplinary tool of the bourgeoisie, but this, according to Roger Farmer is “an idea past its sell-by date.” By full employment, we mean simply that everyone seeking a job gets one. We’d wager that if you asked the average American what full employment means to them, they’d give you a similar answer — a job for all. Indeed, a plurality of Americans will also tell you they support a FJG. The UBI would likely still leave a substantial segment of the population in poverty. As Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs, one of the most prominent UBI advocates, acknowledged, even a large payment through the UBI won’t necessarily secure a comfortable living for all citizens. How about those without jobs, or those who earn below subsistence wages? Of course, a UBI coupled with a non-poverty wage option and strong unionization could seriously combat poverty. The UBI would eliminate the effective minimum wage of $0 currently offered in the United States, though it would fail to provide adequate employment for all that demanded it — a crucial shortfall of such a program. A FJG is a sounder mechanism to combat structural inequalities, for instance through closing the persistent unemployment gap experienced by stigmatized groups who face continued discrimination. (Note, since 1972 unemployment has average double digits for black workers and has never fallen below 7 percent — a level that is only reached during times of economic crisis — for white workers). Further, the FJG will have a strong macroeconomic stabilization effect. During economic downturns, it would expand and hire more people; it would then shrink during economic boom periods as people move from public to better-paying private employment. Pavlina R. Tcherneva, a leading voice on the FJG’s macroeconomic effects, argues that policies like the UBI have no counter-cyclical features. Thus, when the economy takes a downturn — say as it did in 2007 — basic incomes provide no automatic stabilizers to right the sinking ship. This is good for the economy as a whole. Rather than expanding the unemployment insurance rolls during economic busts, the FJG would put folks to work and moderate the business cycle. Federal workers’ paychecks will increase demand, which will increase economic growth. Many economists agree that today’s secular stagnation — insufficient demand — is contributing to continued “lackluster” growth after the Great Recession. Only modest upticks in growth for the foreseeable future will come if we continue the status quo. Finally, as a less costly program a FJG might be easier for a future left government to enact. Some estimate that basic income could easily cost more than $3 trillion each year, while others say it will only come to $2.7 trillion. The FJG, on the other hand, will cost orders of magnitude less. Even if we conservatively guess that fifteen million unemployed workers need jobs, funding the FJG would take about $750 billion. We want to build an inclusive economy. The FJG will build an economy that serves the working class more efficiently and effectively than the UBI. The benefits will be immediately and broadly distributed. The FJG will directly target the unemployed — remedying a key predictor of poverty. By providing universal employment, it will also counteract employers’ systematic discrimination against ex-offenders, recent military veterans, and certain racial groups. Furthermore, through providing a guaranteed job, workers will be emboldened to take new actions in the private sector. This could be just the policy to reinvigorate the labor movement, spurring unionization drives to improve working conditions. These benefits will result in the federal jobs raising beneficiaries and their families above the poverty line. The UBI can make no such guarantee. Not only would a federal job guarantee bring justice to the millions who desire work, but it would also address the long-standing unjust barriers that keep large segments of stigmatized populations out of the labor force. Finally, it would reverse the rising tide of inequality for all workers. By strengthening their bargaining power and eliminating the threat of unemployment once and for all, a federal job guarantee would bring power back to the workers where it belongs.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

A Federal Jobs Guarantee will improve the economy- the buffer stock improves macroeconomic stability

Landwehr 20

(Jannik, The Jobs Guarantee, Exploring Economics, https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover/job-guarantee/#Benefits+of+a+JG+policy)

First, by definition, the textbook JG policy facilitates a full-employment situation, as the state creates an infinitely elastic demand for labour (Minsky, 2008; Tcherneva, 2018). Whereas a JG might not prevent from frictional unemployment, full employment can be understood as the abolishment of structural and cyclical unemployment (Wray, 1998). By guaranteeing a job opportunity and a steady living-wage a JG policy, as a bottom-up approach, reduces poverty most effectively (Minsky, 1965; Tcherneva, 2018). Second, a JG supports labour income, thus the wage share increases. Moreover, the within labour income distribution improves as JG projects create demand and raise incomes for lower-skilled workers. (Tcherneva, 2018) Third, the JG labour pool functions as a buffer stock for the private labour market (Mitchell, 1998). Consequently, a JG policy improves macroeconomic stability, due the buffer stock’s countercyclical mechanism (Tcherneva, 2018). In a recession, the buffer stock absorbs workers, which drop out of the private sector and vice versa. Public fiscal spending will automatically adjust and does not rely upon policymaker’s forecasts, targets and conceptual understanding of the economy’s mechanisms (Fullwiler, 2007). Fourth, the living wage, paid to JG workers, sets a basic wage floor below which private-sector wages practically cannot fall, i.e. the JG wage functions as an indirect minimum wage. No worker will be willing to work for a lower wage in the private sector if a JG job generates a higher income. Additionally, JG projects could take a role model function and establish a labour standard for decent work via the same mechanism. (Wray 2015; Tcherneva 2018) Fifth, a JG policy prevents human capital loss through (long-term) unemployment (Tcherneva, 2018). As Tcherneva (2017, p. 8) states: “[U]nemployment breeds unemployability […]”. On the one hand, because of individual demotivation, on the other hand, due to certain labour market dynamics – employers disadvantage workers with significant gaps in their work experience (Tcherneva, 2017). The provision of training and education measurements even fosters the acquisition of new skills, reduces the costs of rehiring and facilitates the integration into the labour market (Godin & Lang, 2018). Sixth, JG projects can tackle various socioeconomic issues. A JG is based on the separation of employment and profitability, allowing for the investment in public goods and social services which are detrimental for the society’s well-being but not covered by private firms (Tcherneva, 2018). The studies of Tcherneva (2013) and Abukhadrah (2017) show that a correct policy design can enhance women empowerment significantly. Furthermore, a JG can enhance caretaking for certain social groups (elderly, disabled, homeless, …), community cohesion and environmental work (Tcherneva, 2018). Also, the decline of unemployment and related social exclusion can decrease interracial, interethnic tensions, antisocial, violent and criminal behaviour and drug abuse (Darity, 1999; Tcherneva, 2017). Seventh, besides material and socioeconomic issues, a JG can have multiple impacts on the well-being of individuals (Tcherneva, 2017, 2018). Whereas the JG approach follows a concept of social inclusion, traditional unemployment policies have significant, lasting negative effects on social participation and the social capital of unemployed (Kunze & Suppa, 2017). Generally, unemployment is detrimental for health, as concerned persons show increasing rates of alcoholism, physical illness, psychological illness (e.g. depression and anxiety), insecurity as well as decreased morality and motivation (Linn et al., 1985; Wisman, 2010; Wray, 2015). The socioeconomic costs, as well as the deprivation of human and social capital and physical and mental health conditions, lead to vicious cycles of unemployment, which are hard to break (Darity, 1999; Tcherneva, 2017). A JG scheme tackles psychological and behavioural factors on the individual level, hence thwart social deprivation and the vicious cycle/dynamic of unemployment (Tcherneva, 2017, 2018).

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › FJG Solves Econ

A Federal Jobs Guarantee will improve the economy- stabilizes the economy by providing an employment and wage buffer

Landwehr 20

(Jannik, The Jobs Guarantee, Exploring Economics, https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover/job-guarantee/#Benefits+of+a+JG+policy)

First, by definition, the textbook JG policy facilitates a full-employment situation, as the state creates an infinitely elastic demand for labour (Minsky, 2008; Tcherneva, 2018). Whereas a JG might not prevent from frictional unemployment, full employment can be understood as the abolishment of structural and cyclical unemployment (Wray, 1998). By guaranteeing a job opportunity and a steady living-wage a JG policy, as a bottom-up approach, reduces poverty most effectively (Minsky, 1965; Tcherneva, 2018). Second, a JG supports labour income, thus the wage share increases. Moreover, the within labour income distribution improves as JG projects create demand and raise incomes for lower-skilled workers. (Tcherneva, 2018) Third, the JG labour pool functions as a buffer stock for the private labour market (Mitchell, 1998). Consequently, a JG policy improves macroeconomic stability, due the buffer stock’s countercyclical mechanism (Tcherneva, 2018). In a recession, the buffer stock absorbs workers, which drop out of the private sector and vice versa. Public fiscal spending will automatically adjust and does not rely upon policymaker’s forecasts, targets and conceptual understanding of the economy’s mechanisms (Fullwiler, 2007). Fourth, the living wage, paid to JG workers, sets a basic wage floor below which private-sector wages practically cannot fall, i.e. the JG wage functions as an indirect minimum wage. No worker will be willing to work for a lower wage in the private sector if a JG job generates a higher income. Additionally, JG projects could take a role model function and establish a labour standard for decent work via the same mechanism. (Wray 2015; Tcherneva 2018) Fifth, a JG policy prevents human capital loss through (long-term) unemployment (Tcherneva, 2018). As Tcherneva (2017, p. 8) states: “[U]nemployment breeds unemployability […]”. On the one hand, because of individual demotivation, on the other hand, due to certain labour market dynamics – employers disadvantage workers with significant gaps in their work experience (Tcherneva, 2017). The provision of training and education measurements even fosters the acquisition of new skills, reduces the costs of rehiring and facilitates the integration into the labour market (Godin & Lang, 2018). Sixth, JG projects can tackle various socioeconomic issues. A JG is based on the separation of employment and profitability, allowing for the investment in public goods and social services which are detrimental for the society’s well-being but not covered by private firms (Tcherneva, 2018). The studies of Tcherneva (2013) and Abukhadrah (2017) show that a correct policy design can enhance women empowerment significantly. Furthermore, a JG can enhance caretaking for certain social groups (elderly, disabled, homeless, …), community cohesion and environmental work (Tcherneva, 2018). Also, the decline of unemployment and related social exclusion can decrease interracial, interethnic tensions, antisocial, violent and criminal behaviour and drug abuse (Darity, 1999; Tcherneva, 2017). Seventh, besides material and socioeconomic issues, a JG can have multiple impacts on the well-being of individuals (Tcherneva, 2017, 2018). Whereas the JG approach follows a concept of social inclusion, traditional unemployment policies have significant, lasting negative effects on social participation and the social capital of unemployed (Kunze & Suppa, 2017). Generally, unemployment is detrimental for health, as concerned persons show increasing rates of alcoholism, physical illness, psychological illness (e.g. depression and anxiety), insecurity as well as decreased morality and motivation (Linn et al., 1985; Wisman, 2010; Wray, 2015). The socioeconomic costs, as well as the deprivation of human and social capital and physical and mental health conditions, lead to vicious cycles of unemployment, which are hard to break (Darity, 1999; Tcherneva, 2017). A JG scheme tackles psychological and behavioural factors on the individual level, hence thwart social deprivation and the vicious cycle/dynamic of unemployment (Tcherneva, 2017, 2018).

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality !- War

Growing economic inequality drives diversionary nationalism and makes war inevitable.

Frederick Solt 11. Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, pgs. 821-830, July 2011.

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states instill the nationalist myth in their citizens to divert their attention from great economic inequality and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect diversion, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments than the international context. Given that nuclear weapons—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more hostility towards immigrants and minorities. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame ethnic animosities. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the likelihood of war. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a cause of war, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more militaristic foreign affairs posture and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the growth in economic inequality over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and more international conflict. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.

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AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality !- Growth

It’s the key internal link to growth---wage depression constrains worker supply, constrains output, and decreases investment.

Sharon Block & Benjamin Elga 21. Sharon Block is the former executive director of the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School, where she also teaches. She currently serves as the Associate Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. Benjamin Elga is the founding executive director of Justice Catalyst and Justice Catalyst Law. “The Legal Case for Reform”. Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Brookings Institution Press. (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv13vdhvm.7

Intuitively, it seems likely that less expensive inputs or lower wages would mean savings for firms to pass on to the consumers. But it turns out that inefficiencies and lack of competition in upstream markets have ripple effects that can harm everyone. In a competitive market, employers pay the market wage; when there are vacancies, a marginal increase in pay will follow so employers can fill those vacancies. Labor monopsonists have different incentives. If they raise pay to fill a marginal vacancy, they might also have to raise pay for their existing employees. The small increase in pay needed to attract one more worker could mean a massive swing in overall labor cost (Krueger 2017). So even if growth would generally be good for the company, they might not be able to add the workers they need specifically because of the special dynamics of controlling too much of the market. This is an extreme example, but the same general principle applies when employers have the market power to depress wages below competitive levels. When the marginal cost of filling vacancies and growing one’s business to efficient levels diverges from the firm’s individual incentives for doing so, firms are constricted and leave jobs unfilled. Constraining inputs like labor leads to constrained outputs, and if firms are producing less of the products that consumers want, then prices for those products go up. After all, supply constraints and price increases are two sides of the same coin, economically. Fewer workers ultimately means fewer goods, and fewer goods means higher prices for the limited amount of goods available.4 Over time, this problem is magnified because fewer workers are incentivized to enter the field at all. The supply of qualified workers will go down, further reducing the firm’s ultimate output below efficient levels. In the end, everyone suffers except the firm with market power, which captures outsized profits. Think: Why does America have a chronic undersupply of nurses or teachers, as well as stagnant wages (Council of Economic Advisers 2016)? In a competitive market, undersupply would lead to higher wages and increased entry to the field. If wages are inefficiently underpriced, we end up without enough nurses and ballooning healthcare costs. (Not to mention that, in the case of nurses, we end up with worse health outcomes for consumers!) This is part of the reason it is so problematic to interpret the consumer welfare standard to mean that short-term consumer prices are increased: presumed price effects could be irrelevant or misleading as to the overall effect on consumers. Antitrust enforcement is supposed to be dynamic and to be able to keep up with the state of economic theory.5 But this cross-pollination is not in evidence. For example, even though inefficiency anywhere in the supply chain leads to worse outcomes for consumers, product market cases outnumber labor market cases by a factor of nearly 15, and in mergers by closer to 35. Moreover, no recent merger has been blocked on the basis of labor market effects alone (Levi 1948, 540, fn10). A quick foray into how antitrust law has developed follows.

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AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality !- Growth

Inequality hollows out economics resilience---shocks are inevitable, only worker stability makes recovery possible.

Kate Bahn 21. Washington Center for Equitable Growth Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, "Kate Bahn testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on monopsony, workers, and corporate power". Equitable Growth. 7-14-2021. https://equitablegrowth.org/kate-bahn-testimony-before-the-joint-economic-committee-on-monopsony-workers-and-corporate-power/

Thank you Chair Beyer, Ranking Member Lee, and members of the Joint Economic Committee for inviting me to testify today. My name is Kate Bahn and I am the Director of Labor Market Policy and the interim Chief Economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. We seek to advance evidence-backed ideas and policies that promote strong, stable and broad-based growth. Core to this mission is understanding the ways in which inequality has distorted, subverted and obstructed economic growth in recent decades. Mounting evidence, which I will review today, demonstrates how the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient. Reversing the trends that have led to a “second gilded age” is critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery following the pandemic-induced economic crisis of 2020 and encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future. Introduction The United States boasts one of the wealthiest economies in the world, but decades of increasing income inequality, job polarization, and stagnant wages for most Americans has plagued our labor market and demonstrated that a rising tide does not lift all boats. Furthermore, economic evidence demonstrates how inequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources while increasing corporate concentration that enriches the few while holding back the entire economy from its potential. Understanding the causes and consequences of the concentration of corporate power will guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery in the next phase of the pandemic will be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy. “Monopsony” is a key economic concept to understand in this discussion. Monopsony is the labor market equivalent of the better-known phenomenon of “monopoly,” but instead of having only one producer of a good or service, there is effectively only one buyer of a good or service, such as only one employer hiring people’s labor in a company town. Like in monopoly, this phenomenon is not limited to when a firm is strictly the only buyer of labor. Today I will explain the circumstances and effects of employers having significant monopsony power over the market and over workers. When employers have outsized power in employment relationships, they are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces. Given this monopsony power, employers undercut workers. This means paying them less than the value they contribute to production. One recent survey of all the economic research on monopsony finds that, on average across studies, employers have the power to keep wages over one-third less than they would be in a perfectly competitive market. Put another way, in a theoretical competitive market, if an employer cut wages then all workers would quit. But in reality, these estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business. It is not only important for workers to earn a fair share so they can support themselves and their families, but also critical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient. Prior to the current public health crisis and resulting recession, earnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s while the labor share of national income has been declining in same period. This is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run. The unprecedented economic shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic revealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy, where those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers typically spend more of their income in the economy. But the crisis also demonstrated how economic policy targeted toward workers and families can provide a foundation for growth. This is because workers are the economy, and pushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth. The Causes of Monopsony The concept of monopsony was initially developed by the early 20th century economist Joan Robinson, who examined how lack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes. The prototypical example of monopsony is a company town, where there is one very dominant employer and workers have no choice but to accept low wages since they have no outside options. This is the most extreme case, but it is important to note that firms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly in search of the highest wages they can get. Firms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages any time workers: Have few potential employers Face job mobility constraints Can only gather imperfect information about employers and jobs Have divergent preferences for job attributes Lack the ability to bargain over those offers I will go through each of these factors in turn and demonstrate how labor markets are unique compared to other markets in dealing with competitive forces. While concentrated labor markets are not the norm, they are pervasive across the United States, especially within certain sectors or locations. When markets are very concentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse, knowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay. (See Figure 1.) A study published in the journal Labour Economics by economists Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated as defined by U.S. antitrust authorities’ 2010 horizontal merger guidelines. This accounts for 20 percent of employment in the United States. Research by economists Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury, and Bledi Tsaka goes further by estimating workers’ outside options, or the likelihood a worker is able to change into a different occupation or industry. This study finds that even with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by employer concentration by at least 2 percent, and a significant proportion of these workers facing few outside options are facing pay suppression of 5 percent or more. As study co-author Anna Stansbury noted, “for a typical full-time workers making $50,000 a year, a 2 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $1,000 per year and a 5 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $2,500 per year.” Certain sectors are now very concentrated, such as the healthcare industry. In a paper by the economists Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt, they find that hospital mergers led to negative wage growth among skilled workers such as nurses or pharmacy workers. Consolidation and outsized employer power, alongside other phenomenon such as the fissuring of the workplace, may have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have historically been a pathway for upward mobility.

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AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality !- Generic

Inequality decreases social cohesion, causing violence and political unrest

Ferreria et al 22, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Rachel M Gisselquist. UNU-WIDER- Finland; Finn Tarp- Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; “On the Impact of Inequality on Growth, Human Development, and Governance”, Oxford Academic, 12 January 2022, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/24/1/viab058/6460467//Isim

Several theoretical explanations exist across disciplines for the effects of inequality on socioeconomic and political outcomes. Before we describe in more detail these channels of influence and the resulting outcomes, we highlight a broader set of arguments, which act as a roadmap for the rest of the section. provides a schematic overview. Starting from the left- to the right-hand side, the diagram represents different channels of transmission of the effects of higher levels of inequality, their intermediate effects, and the resulting positive or negative impact on our three outcomes of interest: growth, human development, and democracy. We broadly divide these channels according to their underlying drivers: the poor, the population at large or the average, and the wealthy. Overall, the diagram suggests that high inequality has predominantly harmful effects on our three outcomes of interest, according to theoretical explanations advanced in the literature. The dominant view then runs contra the expectations of the classical theorists, i.e., that inequality has a positive impact on growth, via savings and investment (shown at the top of ). We highlight six main transmission channels. First, inequality affects incentives for savings and investment and the overall level of institutional quality through its influence on policy making and increased political instability, and consequent effects on property rights and the regulatory framework. This has implications for growth both directly and indirectly via governance. Second, by favoring private over public investment, inequality affects investment in public goods, namely health and education, with implications across the three outcomes. Third, and related, inequality results in underinvestment on human capital resulting from credit constraints, and high fertility, which affects education levels and overall economic growth. Fourth, high taxation will be demanded by a well-endowed median voter and the likelihood of transition to and stability of democracy will also depend on the pressure for redistribution, which is higher with lower levels of equality. Moreover, and fifth, a small middle class will affect the demand not only for democracy but also for manufactures. Finally, high levels of polarization will lead to weak social cohesion via their effects on social capital, as well as low trust and potential high levels in violent crime, which affect health directly and indirectly via investment in public health. Additionally, the concentration of power on the rich leads to increased probability of political violence and affects political engagement. Some of these channels affect all of the outcomes. For instance, the effect through investment in public goods has detrimental effects on human development, and on growth and democracy. Moreover, the resulting polarization and social discontent, which increase the chances of political violence, again negatively impact the three outcomes. However, there is also some indication that, when it comes to growth, the effect might be ambiguous depending on the predominance of the effects of transmission mechanisms. The channel through savings (and investment) points to a potential positive effect, while the different effects through public investment, taxation, the structure of demand, imperfect credit markets, fertility, and social discontent suggest potential negative consequences for growth. This section uncovers more details about these different theoretical predictions. It starts by introducing the main hypotheses advanced for the effects of inequality on growth. While the approach in this article considers the three outcomes separately, we recognize that they are not disjointed or orthogonal and refer to the links between them. Nevertheless, a full discussion of these interlinkages is beyond the scope of this article. As suggested in and described in more detail below, some of these channels point to the impact of inequality on our remaining outcomes of interest, namely education and health, or governance. We return to them in the remaining two subsections, where we expand to consider the insights from other strands of literature.

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AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Econ !-

Slow growth causes great power wars.

Daniel Drezner 16. Professor of International Politics, Tufts; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings. “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy.” Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings. May 2016.

The erosion of the trade and demographic drivers puts even more pressure on technological innovation to be the engine of economic growth in the developed world. As one McKinsey analysis concluded, “For economic growth to match its historical rates, virtually all of it must come from increases in labor productivity.”78 Growth in labor productivity is partially a function of capital investment, but mostly a function of technological innovation. The key question is whether the pace of technological innovation will sustain itself. This remains a known unknown. The pace of innovation relative to global population has slowed dramatically over the past fifty years.79 Consider that the developed world still relies on the same general purpose technologies of modern society that were originally invented 50-100 years ago: the automobile, airplane, telephone, refrigerator, and computer. To be sure, all of these technologies have improved in recent decades, in some cases dramatically. But nothing new has replaced them. And even these improvements have not necessarily had dramatic systemic effects. For example, the average speed on a passenger aircraft has actually fallen since the introduction of the Boeing 707 in 1958, because of the need to conserve fuel. For all of the talk of “disruptive innovations,” the effect of these disruptions on both the business world and aggregate economic growth have been exaggerated.80 At present, many of the fields that seem promising for innovation—nanotechnology, green energy, and so forth—require massive fixed investments. Only large institutions, like research universities, multinational corporations and government entities, can play in that kind of game. Joseph Schumpeter warned that once large organizations became the primary engine of innovation, the pace of change would naturally slow down. Because large organizations are inherently bureaucratic and conservative, they will be less able to imagine radical innovations.81 What if the “secular stagnation” debate is really just a harbinger of a deeper debate about a return to pre-19th century growth levels? An obvious counter to this argument is that the pace of technological innovation in laptops, smart phones, tablets, and the Internet of things has accelerated. This is undeniably true—but the problem is that the gains in utility have not been, strictly speaking, economic. Most of the important innovations that we think about with respect to the Internet—Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube and so forth —are free technologies for consumers. As Tyler Cowen argues, “The big technological gains are coming in revenue-deficient sectors.”82 They generate lots of enjoyment but little employment. The largest and most dynamic information technology firms, like Google and Apple, hire only a fraction of the people who worked for General Motors in its heyday. At the same time, Internet-based content has eroded the financial viability of other parts of the economy. Content-providing sectors—such as music, entertainment, and journalism—have suffered directly. The growth of “sharing economy” firms like Uber and Airbnb that develop peer-to-peer markets are causing similar levels of creative disruption to the travel and tourism sectors.83 The rapid acceleration of automation is also leading to debates about whether the “lump of labor” fallacy remains a fallacy—in other words, whether displaced workers will be able to find new employment.84 A slow-growth economic trajectory also creates policy problems that increase the likelihood of even slower growth. Higher growth is a political palliative that makes structural reforms easier. For example, Germany prides itself on the “Hartz reforms” to its labor markets last decade, and has advocated similar policies for the rest of the Eurozone since the start of the 2008 financial crisis. But the Hartz reforms were accomplished during a global economic upswing, boosting German exports and cushioning the shortterm cost of the reforms themselves. In a low-growth world, other economies will be understandably reluctant to engage in such reforms. It is possible that concerns about a radical growth slowdown are exaggerated. In 1987, Robert Solow famously said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”85 A decade later, the late 1990s productivity surge was in full bloom. Economists are furiously debating whether the visible innovations in the information sector are leading to productivity advances that are simply going undetected in the current productivity statistics.86 Google’s chief economist Hal Varian, echoing Solow from a generation ago, asserts that “there is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley, because we don’t have a good way to measure it.”87 It is also possible that current innovations will only lead to gains in labor productivity a decade from now. The OECD argues that the productivity problem resides in firms far from the leading edge failing to adopt new technologies and systems.88 There are plenty of sectors, such as health or education, in which technological innovations can yield significant productivity gains. It would foolhardy to predict the end of radical innovations. But the possibility of a technological slowdown is a significant “known unknown.” And if such a slowdown occurs, it would have catastrophic effects on the public finances of the OECD economies. Most of the developed world will have to support disproportionately large numbers of pensioners by 2036; slower-growing economies will worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios of most of these economies, causing further macroeconomic stresses—and, potentially, political unrest from increasingly stringent budget constraints.89 2. Are there hard constraints on the ability of the developing world to converge to developed-country living standards? One of the common predictions made for the next generation economy is that China will displace the United States as the world’s biggest economy. This is a synecdoche of the deeper forecast that per capita incomes in developing countries will slowly converge towards the living standards of the advance industrialized democracies. The OECD’s Looking to 2060 report is based on “a tendency of GDP per capita to converge across countries” even if that convergence is slow-moving. The EIU’s long-term macroeconomic forecast predicts that China’s per capita income will approximate Japan’s by 2050.90 The Carnegie Endowment’s World Order in 2050 report presumes that total factor productivity gains in the developing world will be significantly higher than countries on the technological frontier. Looking at the previous twenty years of economic growth, Kemal Dervis posited that by 2030, “The rather stark division of the world into ‘advanced’ and ‘poor’ economies that began with the industrial revolution will end, ceding to a much more differentiated and multipolar world economy.”91 Intuitively, this seems rational. The theory is that developing countries have lower incomes primarily because they are capital-deficient and because their economies operate further away from technological frontier. The gains from physical and human capital investment in the developing world should be greater than in the developed world. From Alexander Gerschenkron forward, development economists have presumed that there are some growth advantages to “economic backwardness”92 This intuitive logic, however, is somewhat contradicted by the “middle income trap.” Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin have argued in a series of papers that as an economy’s GDP per capita hits close to $10,000, and then again at $16,000, growth slowdowns commence.93 This makes it very difficult for these economies to converge towards the per capita income levels of the advanced industrialized states. History bears this out. There is a powerful correlation between a country’s GDP per capita in 1960 and that country’s per capita income in 2008. In fact, more countries that were middle income in 1960 had become relatively poorer than had joined the ranks of the rich economies. To be sure, there have been success stories, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Israel. But other success stories, such as Greece, look increasingly fragile. Lant Prichett and Lawrence Summers conclude that “past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Regression to the mean is the single most robust and empirical relevant fact about cross-national growth rates.”94 Post-2008 growth performance of the established and emerging markets matches this assessment. While most of the developing world experienced rapid growth in the previous decade, the BRICS have run into roadblocks. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these economies are looking less likely to converge with the developed world. During the Great Recession, the non-Chinese BRICS—India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa—have not seen their relative share of the global economy increase at all.95 China’s growth has also slowed down dramatically over the past few years. Recent and massive outflows of capital suggests that the Chinese economy is headed for a significant market correction. The collapse of commodity prices removed another source of economic growth in the developing world. By 2015, the gap between developing country growth and developed country growth had narrowed to its lowest level in the 21st century.96 What explains the middle income trap? Eichengreen, Park and Shin suggest that “slowdowns coincide with the point in the growth process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting additional workers from agriculture to industry and where the gains from importing foreign technology diminish.”97 But that is insufficient to explain why the slowdowns in growth have been so dramatic and widespread. There are multiple candidate explanations. One argument, consistent with Paul Krugman’s deconstruction of the previous East Asia “miracle,”98 is that much of this growth was based on unsustainable levels of ill-conceived capital investment. Economies that allocate large shares of GDP to investment can generate high growth rates, particularly in capital-deficient countries. The sustainability of those growth rates depends on whether the investments are productive or unproductive. For example, high levels of Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s masked the degree to which this capital was misallocated. As Krugman noted, a lesser though similar phenomenon took place in the Asian tigers in the 1990s. It is plausible that China has been experiencing the same illusory growth-from-bad-investment problem. Reports of overinvestment in infrastructure and “ghost cities” are rampant; according to two Chinese government researchers, the country wasted an estimated $6.8 trillion in “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2013 alone.99 A political explanation would be rooted in the fact that many emerging markets lack the political and institutional capabilities to sustain continued growth. Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson argue that modern economies are based on either “extractive institutions” or “inclusive institutions.”100 Governments based on extractive institutions can generate higher rates of growth than governments without any effective structures. It is not surprising, for example, that post-Maoist Chinese economic growth has far outstripped Maoist-era rates of growth. Inclusive institutions are open to a wider array of citizens, and therefore more democratic. Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that economies based on inclusive institutions will outperform those based on extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions are less likely to be prone to corruption, more able to credibly commit to the rule of law, and more likely to invest in the necessary public goods for broad-based economic growth. Similarly, Pritchett and Summers conclude that institutional quality has a powerful and long-lasting effect on economic growth—and that “salient characteristics of China—high levels of state control and corruption along with high measures of authoritarian rule—make a discontinuous decline in growth even more likely than general experience would suggest.”101 A more forward-looking explanation is that the changing nature of manufacturing has badly disrupted the 20th century pathway for economic development. For decades, the principal blueprint for developing economies to become developed was to specialize in industrial sectors where low-cost labor offered a comparative advantage. The resulting growth from export promotion would then spill over into upstream and downstream sectors, creating new job-creating sectors. Globalization, however, has already generated tremendous productivity gains in manufacturing—to the point where industrial sectors do not create the same amount of employment opportunities that they used to.102 Like agriculture in the developed world, manufacturing has become so productive that it does not need that many workers. As a result, many developing economies suffer from what Dani Rodrik labels “premature deindustrialization.” If Rodrik is correct, then going forward, manufacturing will fail to jump-start developing economies into higher growth trajectories—and the political effects that have traditionally come with industrialization will also be stunted.103 Both the middle-income trap and the regression to the mean observation are empirical observations about the past. There is no guaranteeing that these empirical regularities will hold for the future. Indeed, China’s astonishing growth rate over the past 30 years is a direct contradiction of the regression to the mean phenomenon. It is possible that over time the convergence hypothesis swamps the myriad explanations listed above for continued divergence. But in sketching out the next generation global economy, the implications of whether regression to the mean will dominate the convergence hypothesis are massive. Looking at China and India alone, the gap in projections between a continuation of past growth trends and regression to the mean is equivalent to $42 trillion—more than half of global economic output in 2015.104 This gap is significant enough to matter not just to China and India, but to the world economy. As with the developed world, a growth slowdown in the developing world can have a feedback effect that makes more growth-friendly reforms more difficult to accomplish. As Chinese economic growth has slowed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic reform plans have stalled out in favor of more political repression. Follows the recent playbook of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has added diversionary war as another distracting tactic from negative economic growth. Short-term steps towards political repression will make politically risky steps towards economic reform that less palatable in the future. Instead, the advanced developing economies seem set to double down on strategies that yield less economic growth over time. 3. Will geopolitical rivalries or technological innovation alter the patterns of economic interdependence? Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place. Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115 If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119 Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Econ !-

Slow U.S. recovery causes China war

Bapat 20, a Professor in International Relations. He received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1998 and pursued graduate studies at Rice University, where he received an M.A. (2000) and a PhD (2004) in political science. (Navin, August 19th, 2020, “Will COVID-19 Cause a War? Understanding the Case of the U.S. and China”, (https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/ahead-of-print/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0047/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0047.xml?language=en)

We therefore see that COVID-19 may cause a decline in U.S. economic power, which may undermine its military readiness and ability to support future economic gains. However, the next question is: does the PRC seek to challenge the U.S. for global primacy, and if so, why? In his speech to the Communist Party in 2017, President Xi Jinping claimed that China should now, “take center stage in the world.” A key part in of this effort is represented by Xi’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR), which seeks to extend the PRC’s economic, political, and cultural influence throughout south Asia to the Middle East and into Europe. The OBOR utilizes the newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an alternative to the World Bank, to finance infrastructure projects throughout the different regions (). From the power transition standpoint, it therefore appears that the PRC is developing a string of assets and bases extending from the Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Numerous U.S. military planners view these developments as a deliberative effort to undermine U.S. power and influence in both the Pacific and Middle East theaters. In theoretical terms, if we accept that the OBOR represents an effort by the PRC (the rising power) to supplant the U.S., war could still be avoided if the power transition moves at a relatively slower rate. model establishes that dominant powers only initiate preemptive war if they are declining at precipitous rates. This is where COVID-19 poses a significant threat. Since the outbreak, the U.S. economy has declined by 4.8%, and the U.S. is borrowing from its future at high levels. If the PRC wanted to challenge the US for supremacy, this would be the time, and there is some evidence that the PRC is exploiting the opportunity. Beginning in May 2020, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is engaging in repeated clashes with the Indian Armed Forces in the Ladekh region as part of a longstanding border dispute. As of July 2020, China is coming close to forming a strategic partnership with Iran. The pact would give the PRC a foothold in the Middle East, secure discounted oil, and perhaps allow for more oil trades to be settled in non-dollar denominations. This effort is in spite of significant strategic interests in the region and growing hostilities between Washington and Tehran. The greater concern is that China will use its newfound clout to accelerate its effort to take control of much of the territory in the South China Sea. China has long claimed large portions of this key area as its own, whereas Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei who all have competing claims. The US has long served as a balancer to prevent China from encroaching. However, beginning in December 2013, China constructed and later militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea to reinforce its territorial claims, despite promises not to do so. In this period, the states of Southeast Asia have typically looked to the U.S. Navy to challenge China’s claims. It has done so through Freedom of Navigation exercises. However, now, with COVID-19, the Navy’s capabilities are in doubt. Interestingly, most analysts conclude that China is not exploiting the opportunity in the area. Instead, the PRC’s efforts to build and fortify their islands continue at the previous rate, indicating “business as usual.”Nonetheless, the U.S. seems concerned about the possibility that China will seek to exploit the opportunity created by COVID-19. The Trump administration is therefore sending three carrier strike groups, with a large influx of naval vessels, into the area to re-assert American control of the seas. Although this increases U.S. capability, it also signals weakness, in that the U.S. would not need to take such dramatic steps unless it faced a significant challenge. While it does not appear that the US is ready to initiate a preemptive challenge here, this increased militarization raises the possibility of accidents, which in turn does increase the probability of conflict. Empirically, military mobilizations such as these raise the possibility of accidents that may trigger militarized interstate disputes, or military crises short of war (). Theoretically, military mobilizations may temporarily increase a state’s power, but this increase may be unsustainable given the increasing cost of putting armed forces in theater. This creates a dynamic where a state that has mobilized may be forced to use its weapons before it is compelled to redeploy them (Slantchev 2005; Tarar 2013). 3 COVID-19’s Long Term Threat These observations lead to several conclusions about the immediate security situation. COVID-19 seems to have cost the U.S. some of its military capability relative to China. This may encourage China to push the U.S. while it is weak, and conversely, may compel the U.S. to mobilize to counter this threat. Since each of these activities is a response to the economic shock of COVID-19, we can see that the virus has increased the likelihood of a militarized encounter between the U.S. and China. However, it is important to recognize that even if China were to succeed in all of its military challenges to the U.S., this alone would not shift hegemony from the U.S. The key reason for this is that the majority of economic actors in the world seem to view the USD as the key reserve currency, and at this point, the RMB is not in a position to challenge that status (Norrlof et al. 2020; Oatley et al. 2013; Poast 2015). Despite significant criticism of the Trump administration during the economic shock of COVID-19, much of the world seems to view Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell as a critical and stable player in international monetary policy. Powell indicated that the U.S. will continue to support global growth by keeping U.S. interest rates low. This allows for more money to be available for the rest of the world. Indirectly, this move may make China more powerful by encouraging investments in their market. However, this is also keeping the world tied to the dollar based system, which is the key component of American power. So long as the rest of the world continues to rely on USD as the means to settle transactions, and so long as the PRC’s market seems less transparent and stable, the US will continue to maintain its position of power in the international system. However, this is based on the assumption that the US will be able to recover whatever power it has temporarily lost due to COVID-19. There are a few reasons to call this assumption into question. First, the US right now is the global epicenter of the COVID-19 crisis, despite its economic power and large medical infrastructure. This is largely attributed to a poor political response, which is causing the virus to spread at a much faster rate than in other states. As a result, the US now finds itself facing travel restrictions from numerous countries. This may give other states less reason to engage in economic transactions with Americans. These lost exchanges will likely be replaced by interacting with other citizens throughout the globe, and will therefore be settled in non-dollar denominations. The more this occurs, the more demand for USD could decline into the future. The US could potentially find itself increasing isolated with fewer individuals demanding its currency. Should this occur, the ability of the US to finance its budgets through deficit spending will decrease, and it will need to raise taxes and cut spending. Some of this will likely be on defense, which means that the ability of the US to defend interests in the Pacific and the Middle East will decline, opening the door for China. Even worse, the political rhetoric inside the US is encouraging these changes. President Trump’s foreign policy platform is described as “American First”, which represents a combination of isolationism and unilateralism, and a general rejection of multilateral cooperation. If that is the case, each state in the international system will need to begin planning to move away from the American backed system. The damage done by COVID-19 to the US market, and the weakening of the US position as a result of the virus, will accelerate this process. These changes will not happen overnight, and will not happen so quickly that a rapid transition will occur. This means that it is unlikely that COVID-19 will increase the risk of general war between the US and China, though it does raise the risk of crises and limited encounters. However, over the long term, if the US is unable to get the virus under control and develop a plan of action, COVID-19 does pose significant threats to US military and economic hegemony.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Econ !-

slow growth goes nuclear – breaks down global cooperation

Landay 17 (Jonathan – Reuters National Security Correspondent, 1/9/17, “U.S. intelligence study warns of growing conflict risk”, )

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The risk of conflicts between and within nations will increase over the next five years to levels not seen since the Cold War as global growth slows, the post-World War Two order erodes and anti-globalization fuels nationalism, said a U.S. intelligence report released on Monday. “These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power – fundamentally altering the global landscape,” said “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,” the sixth in a series of quadrennial studies by the U.S. National Intelligence Council. The findings, published less than two weeks before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office on Jan. 20, outlined factors shaping a “dark and difficult near future,” including a more assertive Russia and China, regional conflicts, terrorism, rising income inequality, climate change and sluggish economic growth. Global Trends reports deliberately avoid analyzing U.S. policies or choices, but the latest study underscored the complex difficulties Trump must address in order to fulfill his vows to improve relations with Russia, level the economic playing field with China, return jobs to the United States and defeat terrorism. The National Intelligence Council comprises the senior U.S. regional and subject-matter intelligence analysts. It oversees the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates, which often synthesize work by all 17 intelligence agencies and are the most comprehensive analytic products of U.S intelligence. The study, which included interviews with academic experts as well as financial and political leaders worldwide, examined political, social, economic and technological trends that the authors project will shape the world from the present to 2035, and their potential impact. ‘INWARD-LOOKING WEST’ It said the threat of terrorism would grow in coming decades as small groups and individuals harnessed “new technologies, ideas and relationships.” Uncertainty about the United States, coupled with an “inward-looking West” and the weakening of international human rights and conflict prevention standards, will encourage China and Russia to challenge American influence, the study added. Those challenges “will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation,” the study warned. “Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War.” While “hot war” may be avoided, differences in values and interests among states and drives for regional dominance “are leading to a spheres of influence world,” it said, The latest Global Trends, the subject of a Washington conference, added that the situation also offered opportunities to governments, societies, groups and individuals to make choices that could bring “more hopeful, secure futures.” “As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term,” the study said. THE HOME FRONT The report also said that while globalization and technological advances had “enriched the richest” and raised billions from poverty, they had also “hollowed out” Western middle classes and ignited backlashes against globalization. Those trends have been compounded by the largest migrant flows in seven decades, which are stoking “nativist, anti-elite impulses.” “Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tension between counties,” it said. The trends shaping the future include contractions in the working-age populations of wealthy countries and expansions in the same group in poorer nations, especially in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment, urbanization and welfare pressures, the study said. The world will also continue to experience weak near-term growth as governments, institutions and businesses struggle to overcome fallout from the Great Recession, the study said. “Major economies will confront shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization,” said the study. “China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing counties.” Governance will become more difficult as issues, including global climate change, environmental degradation and health threats demand collective action, the study added, while such cooperation becomes harder.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Econ !-

Economic collapse overcomes traditional barriers to conflict.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov 19. Former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War.” .

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened. Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers. They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta! Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Econ !/FJG Solvency

Economic growth is the backbone of US national security- only a jobs program gives the US the resources needed to maintain military strength and combat multiple global crises

Baird 20

Former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations [Zoë “Equitable Economic Recovery Is a National Security Imperative”, in Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response, Ed. Bitounis and King, October 2020, p. 89-90]

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come. An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market. To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement. Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world. After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people. The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement. Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3 The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4 The Case for an Inclusive Recovery A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity. The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Unemployment Hurts Econ

Job loss harms the economy

SOMER ANDERSON and RYAN EICHLER 2023

​Somer G. Anderson is CPA, doctor of accounting, and an accounting and finance professor who has been working in the accounting and finance industries for more than 20 years. Her expertise covers a wide range of accounting RYAN EICHLER, corporate finance, taxes, lending, and personal finance areas.

Ryan Eichler holds a B.S.B.A with a concentration in Finance from Boston University. He has held positions in, and has deep experience with, expense auditing, personal finance, real estate, as well as fact checking & editing.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Wages

Unemployment and diminishing bargaining power contribute to rising inequality

Cooper and Mishel 23 (David Cooper is a senior researcher at the Economic Policy Institute and director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network (EARN). Lawrence Mishel is the former president of the Economic Policy Institute (2002–17) and retired as a distinguished fellow. He has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. “America's Vast Pay Inequality Is a Story of Unequal Power.” American Bar Association. 1/06/23. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/wealth-disparities-in-civil-rights/americas-vast-pay-inequality-is-a-story-of-unequal-power/)

Our organization, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), has rigorously documented the factors that explain the divergence between productivity and worker compensation—effectively, the choices that have suppressed wage growth for most U.S. workers. The largest and most obvious factor is excessive unemployment. The Federal Reserve (Fed) is charged with the dual mandate of pursuing the maximum level of employment consistent with stable inflation. However, since 1979, while the Fed has aggressively sought to tame inflation, it has been far more tolerant of high unemployment. Operating under the theory that tighter labor markets inevitably lead to higher inflation as rising wages push up consumer prices, the Fed has consistently reined in job growth by hiking interest rates whenever unemployment approached the allegedly “natural rate,” regardless of whether there was any evidence that inflation was on the rise. Congressional and state lawmakers share culpability here too—until the COVID-19 pandemic-induced recession, fiscal policies to spur recoveries were weak and sometimes sabotaged by state-level austerity, as happened in the recovery after the Great Recession. The result was an unemployment rate that averaged 6.3 percent from 1979 through 2017, a full percentage point higher than during the previous three decades, denying workers the opportunity to benefit from tighter labor markets. (When jobs are plentiful, workers have more leverage to demand higher pay because the implicit threat of an outside job option becomes more real.) Our research estimates that had unemployment averaged 5.5 percent (a modest goal) rather than 6.3 percent, median wages would have been 10 percent higher in 2017. Had the unemployment rate averaged 5 percent, median wages would have been 18 percent higher. The erosion of collective bargaining was the second most important factor. In 1979, 27 percent of U.S. workers were union members. By 2019, less than 12 percent of the workforce was unionized. This drop in unionization occurred across many industries, the result of increasingly aggressive corporate anti-union practices, weak labor laws, and the proliferation of an entire industry of union-avoidance consultants that emerged in the 1980s. EPI estimates that the drop in collective bargaining suppressed wages at the median by 7.9 percent overall and by 11.6 percent for the median male worker. The third most significant factor was globalization; however, it’s again critical to recognize that globalization occurred through the intentional corporate and political choices that deliberately offshored manufacturing and drove increased imports from low-wage nations. This reduced wages by roughly 5.6 percent, or about $2,000 annually, for a full-time U.S. worker earning the median wage. These three factors alone—excessive unemployment, eroded collective bargaining, and corporate-driven globalization—can account for more than half of the divergence between net productivity and median hourly compensation. The COVID-19 pandemic was an inflection point in these trends. The federal government’s unprecedented relief programs—broad expansions to unemployment insurance and direct cash assistance to households—provided millions of workers left jobless by lockdowns with a financial cushion that kept them afloat until the economy reopened. This, combined with a jobs recovery that was dramatically faster than previous ones—again, a result of strong federal relief programs—has given workers more bargaining power than they have had in decades. Ample job openings have facilitated quitting to take a new, better job. Consequently, wage growth since early 2021 for low-wage workers has been strong. High rates of inflation, caused by pandemic-induced supply chain snarls and exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, have moderated the impact of these gains, but not entirely. Low-wage workers have experienced real wage growth over the past year, narrowing slightly the gap between those in the middle and those at the bottom of the pay distribution. However, the high inflationary period has been a boon for corporate profits—meaning those at the top have pulled even further away from everyone else. Reversing the United States’ seemingly unstoppable growth in inequality will require doing more to empower America’s workers. The pandemic recovery illustrates what is possible: a tight labor market, precipitated by strong government protections against financial hardship, and greater public salience around adjacent aspects of job quality—e.g., access to paid sick leave, childcare, remote work—have spurred greater worker organizing, interest in unions, and measurable wage gains in many sectors. Whether this momentum will be sustained remains to be seen; without reforming weak and outdated labor laws, America’s working class still faces an uphill battle.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Wages

Income inequality is high---wage growth is artificial---only the plan solves.

Lawrence Mishel & Jori Kandra 12/13. **Distinguished fellow at the Economic Policy Institute, served as president from 2002–2017. **Research assistant at the Economic Policy Institute. “Wage inequality continued to increase in 2020.” 12/13/21. https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-inequality-continued-to-increase-in-2020-top-1-0-of-earners-see-wages-up-179-since-1979-while-share-of-wages-for-bottom-90-hits-new-low/

Newly available wage data from the Social Security Administration allow us to analyze wage trends for the top 1.0% and other very high earners as well as for the bottom 90% during 2020. The upward distribution of wages from the bottom 90% to the top 1.0% that was evident over the period from 1979 to 2019 was especially strong in the 2020 pandemic year, yielding historically high wage levels and shares of all wages for the top 1.0% and 0.1%. Correspondingly, the share of wages earned by the bottom 95% fell in 2020.

Two features of the pandemic economy distorted wage patterns in 2020 and led to faster wage growth, especially at the top. One feature was that inflation grew at a subdued 1.2% rate, boosting the average real wage (but not affecting distribution). A second feature was that, as employment fell (the number of earners fell by 1.7 million, or 1.6%) and unemployment rose (to 8.1%), the composition of the workforce changed. Specifically, job losses were heaviest for lower wage workers so the mix of jobs shifted toward higher paying ones, artificially boosting average wages (see Gould) and generating faster measured wage growth especially in the bottom half.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Wages

Wage stagnation fuels rising inequality

Cooper and Mishel 23 (David Cooper is a senior researcher at the Economic Policy Institute and director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network (EARN). Lawrence Mishel is the former president of the Economic Policy Institute (2002–17) and retired as a distinguished fellow. He has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. “America's Vast Pay Inequality Is a Story of Unequal Power.” American Bar Association. 1/06/23. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/wealth-disparities-in-civil-rights/americas-vast-pay-inequality-is-a-story-of-unequal-power/)

Over the past five decades, growing wage inequality has been one of the defining features of the American economy. Since the late 1970s, inflation-adjusted pay for most U.S. workers has largely stagnated, while pay for the country’s highest earners has skyrocketed. This sluggish wage growth for middle-income Americans has been widely acknowledged and recognized by economists and politicians across the political spectrum. Yet, the root causes of these trends have frequently been wrongly attributed as an unfortunate result of apolitical market forces that one neither can nor would want to alter, such as automation and globalization. In fact, disappointing wage growth for most workers in the U.S. economy was not an unintended consequence—it was the intentional outcome of legislative, regulatory, and corporate policies deliberately implemented to constrain labor costs, decisions made on behalf of the rich and corporations and validated by many economists. Bargaining power is the central though often unspoken determinant of wage outcomes. Generations of economics students have been taught that markets efficiently set wages through supply and demand and that an individual worker’s pay reflects their productivity. This naive textbook model assumes that employees and employers have equal bargaining power, that any worker being underpaid relative to the value they produce for a firm can simply quit and find a better-paying option. But this perfect textbook market is the exception, not the rule. Employers almost always have disproportionate bargaining power, and for much of the last half-century, public policy has been shaped to ensure that outcome. The simplest illustration of this unequal bargaining power is shown in the divergence between labor productivity and typical worker compensation. Between 1979 and 2019, economy-wide productivity (the amount of income generated in an average hour of work, net of depreciation) grew by 59.7 percent, while the compensation (wages plus benefits) of the median U.S. worker rose by only 13.7 percent—a 46 percentage point divergence between the growth in value of what American workers produced and what the typical worker was paid. During this time, the bottom 90 percent of U.S. workers experienced wage growth slower than the economy-wide average, while top wage earners (mostly in finance and corporate management) and owners of capital reaped large rewards made possible only by this anemic wage growth for the bottom 90 percent. Three wage gaps aptly describe how pay has diverged over the last four decades: the gap between low- and middle-wage workers, the gap between middle-wage and highly paid workers, and the gap between the very highest-paid earners and everyone else. From 1979 to 2019, wages for the lowest wage workers—measured by the tenth percentile wage—barely budged over a 40-year stretch, rising just 3 percent after inflation. Remarkably, the bulk of this minuscule growth occurred only in the more recent past. Wages for low-wage workers fell drastically during the 1980s when the federal minimum wage was frozen amid high inflation. Since 1988, the gap between low-wage workers and middle-wage workers has shrunk somewhat but remains larger today than it was in 1979. As already noted, wage growth in the middle has been sluggish, with median pay rising just 13.7 percent from 1979 to 2019. In contrast, annual pay for high earners, measured as those in the 90th to 95th percentiles, rose by 51.8 percent over this same period. Still, this pales in comparison to pay growth for those at the top. From 1979 to 2019, the wages of the top 1 percent rose by 160 percent after inflation, while wages rose 345 percent for the highest 0.1 percent of earners. A major factor driving these changes was the astronomical growth in CEO compensation at large firms, which rose nearly 1,200 percent from 1978 to 2019. As a result of this astronomical growth, these workers’ share of the pie has doubled: the top 0.1 percent went from receiving 1.6 percent of overall earnings in 1979 to 5 percent by 2019, while the top 1 percent share rose from 7.3 percent to 13.2 percent. In summary, wage growth for the vast majority—those in the bottom 90 percent—has been relatively weak, while those in the top 10 percent, especially those in the top 1 percent, have done exceedingly well.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Labor

Labor monopsony is the biggest internal link.

Eric A. Posner 8/13/21. Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor at University of Chicago. How Antitrust Failed Workers. Oxford University Press, 2021.

In the United States, and much of the Western world, economic growth has slowed, inequality has risen, and wages have stagnated. Academic research has identified several possible causes, ranging from structural shifts in the economy to public policy failure. One possible cause that has received increasing attention from economists is labor market power, the ability of employers to set wages below workers’ marginal revenue product.1 New evidence suggests that many labor markets around the country are not competitive but instead exhibit considerable market power enjoyed by employers, who use their market power to suppress wages. This phenomenon—the power of employers to suppress wages below the competitive rate—is known among economists as labor monopsony, or simply labor market power. Wage suppression enhances income inequality because it creates a wedge between the incomes of people who work in concentrated and competitive labor markets. Wage suppression also reduces the incomes of workers relative to those of people who live off capital, and the latter are almost uniformly wealthier than the former. Wage suppression also interferes with economic growth since it results in underemployment of labor and, while it may seem to raise the return on capital, actually depresses it, as capital must lie idle to take advantage of monopsony power. With wages artificially suppressed, qualified workers decline to take jobs, and workers may underinvest in skills and schooling. Many workers exit the workforce and rely on government benefits, including disability benefits that have become a hidden welfare system.2 This in turn costs the government both in lost taxes and in greater expenditures. One estimate finds that monopsony power in the U.S. economy reduces overall output and employment by 13% and labor’s share of national output by 22%.3 The claim that labor market power raises inequality and reduces growth mirrors another claim that has received attention lately—that the product market power of firms has contributed to rising inequality and faltering growth.4 A product market is a collection of products defined by frequent consumer substitution. When a small number of sellers or one seller of these products exist, we say that each seller has product market power, which enables it to charge a price higher than marginal cost, or the price that would prevail in a competitive market. When a small number of employers hire from a pool of workers of a certain skill level within the geographic area in which workers commute, the employers have labor market power. One major source of market power in both types of markets is thus concentration, where only a few firms operate in a given market. Imagine, for example, a small town with only a few gas stations. Each gas station sets the price of gas to compete with the prices of the other gas stations. When a gas station lowers its price, it may obtain greater market share from the other gas stations—which increases profits—but it also receives less revenue per sale. If only a single gas station exists, it will maximize profits by charging a high (“monopoly”) price because the gains from buyers willing to pay the price exceed the lost revenue from buyers who stay away. If only a few gas stations exist, they might illegally enter a cartel in which they charge an above-market price and divide the profits, or they might informally coordinate, which is generally not illegal, though the social harm is the same. In contrast, if many gas stations compete, prices will be bargained down to the efficient level—the marginal cost—resulting in low prices for consumers and high aggregate output of gasoline. Labor market concentration creates monopsony (or, if more than one employer, oligopsony, but I use these terms interchangeably) where labor market power is exercised by the buyer rather than (as in the example of gas stations) the seller. Employers are buyers of labor who operate within a labor market. A labor market is a group of jobs (e.g., computer programmers, lawyers, or unskilled workers) within a geographic area where the holders of those jobs could with relative ease switch among the jobs. The geographic area is usually defined by the commuting distance of workers. A labor market is concentrated if only one or a few employers hire from this pool of workers. For example, imagine the gas stations employ specialist maintenance workers who monitor the gas-pumping equipment. If only a few gas stations exist in that area, and no other firms (e.g., oil refineries) hire from this pool of workers, then the labor market is concentrated, and the employers have market power in the labor market. To minimize labor costs, the employers will hold wages down below what the workers would be paid in a competitive labor market—their marginal revenue product. Faced with these low wages, some people qualified to work will refuse to. But the employers gain more from wage savings than they lose in lost output because of the small workforce they employ. Antitrust law does not distinguish monopoly and monopsony (including labor monopsony): firms that achieve monopolies or monopsonies through anticompetitive behavior violate antitrust law. But product market concentration has received a huge amount of attention by courts, researchers, and regulators, while labor market concentration has received hardly any attention at all.5 The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which are used to screen potential mergers for antitrust violations, provide an elaborate analytic framework for evaluating the product market effects of mergers. Yet, while the Merger Guidelines state that there is no distinction between seller and buyer power,6 they say nothing about the possible adverse labor market effects of mergers. Similarly, while there are thousands of reported cases involving allegations that firms have illegally cartelized product markets, there are few cases involving allegations of illegally cartelized labor markets.7 This historic imbalance between what I will call product market antitrust and labor market antitrust has no basis in economic theory. From an economic standpoint, the dangers to public welfare posed by product market power and labor market power are the same. As Adam Smith recognized, businesses gain in the same way by exploiting product market power and labor market power—enabling them to increase profits by raising prices (in the first case) or by lowering costs (in the second case).8 For that reason, businesses have the same incentive to obtain product market power and labor market power. Hence the need—in both cases—for an antitrust regime to prevent businesses from obtaining product and labor market power except when there are offsetting social gains.