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2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Labor

Increased concentration of buyer power in labor markets drives inequality.

Lauren Sillman 20. Antitrust Associate, Clifford Chance LLP; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of Iowa. “ANTITRUST FOR CONSUMERS AND WORKERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS IN MERGER REVIEW.” https://lawjournal.ku.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/4_Sillman_Antitrust_V30_I1.pdf

A détente is especially desirable today in light of the severe stagnation in American wages. In the past thirty-five years, U.S. gross domestic product has all in all grown but the purchasing power of the average worker has barely changed.3 Labor’s share of national income declined precipitously in the 2000s, and in the five years after the Great Recession it was lower than at any point since World War II.4 Because most people get most of their income from labor, and because those who get most of their income from capital tend to be wealthy, this income shift has dramatic consequences for inequality. Economists and policymakers have advanced numerous explanations for this troubling trend ranging from the decline of unions, to tighter monetary policy, to increased trade liberalization, and more.5 One explanation that has received attention in recent years is an apparent epidemic of market concentration and flagging competition.6 A growing body of evidence suggests that over time fewer and fewer firms have come to dominate sectors across the economy.7 One study found that from 1982 to 2012, the share of sales by the sectors’ top four firms increased in manufacturing, finance, services, utilities, retail trade, and wholesale trade.8 Average markups above cost—a manifestation of market power—rose from eighteen percent in 1980 to sixty-seven percent in 2014.9 This increase in concentration is due, in part, to a growing wave of mergers. By one count over 325,000 mergers have been announced since 1985.10 That year, around 2,000 mergers with a value of a little over $300 billion were announced.11 In 2018, 15,000 mergers occurred—valued at just under two trillion dollars.12 The ability of firms to charge prices for their products or services that exceed the competitive level harms workers in their role as consumers, and the reverberating inefficiencies have consequences for wages as well.13 Workers are harmed more directly, though by firms with buyer power in labor markets. Instead of enabling firms to charge high prices for the goods or services they sell, buyer power—also known as monopsony power—allows firms to push wages below the level workers would receive in competitive labor markets. A recent study applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is used to measure market concentration. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (“the agencies”) used HHI in merger review, and found that at least forty percent of job markets fell into the “highly concentrated” category, making them especially susceptible to anticompetitive behavior by employers.14 The hiring markets for the twenty-five percent most concentrated occupations in almost every commuting zone in the country have concentration levels nearly tripled the “highly concentrated” threshold.15 In commuting zones across middle America, the hiring market for nearly every occupation is highly concentrated.16 As discussed below, a concentrated labor market generally increases the buyer power of participants in that market. Recent research on labor supply elasticity, which is an indicator of vulnerability to employers’ market power, further challenges traditional assumptions of competitiveness in labor markets.17 Historically, antitrust enforcers have given far less attention to firms’ power as buyers than as sellers and have been particularly hesitant to check their power as buyers of labor. However, the tide may be beginning to change. Federal and state enforcers have begun to challenge anticompetitive labor contracts,18 and there is a small but growing body of precedent addressing increased buyer power in mergers.19 In 2016, the Obama Administration’s Council of Economic Advisors issued a report describing the problem of labor market power and encouraging greater attention to the issue by the antitrust enforcement agencies.20 Separately, then-Acting Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse stated that antitrust enforcement efforts should not only be concerned with the welfare of consumers, but should “also benefit workers, whose wages won’t be driven down by dominant employers with the power to dictate terms of employment.”21 Nevertheless, to date, the agencies have never blocked a merger on the basis of harm to workers. There are many reasons that may account for the dearth of enforcement, including misunderstandings of the relationship between labor and antitrust laws, the momentum of precedent focused on seller-side harms, and the resistance of some to increased antitrust enforcement as a general matter.22 In addition to these practical and ideological impediments, mistaken intuitions about the economics of buyer power create obstacles for enforcement. At first glance it would seem that if firms use their buyer power to lower their costs, downstream customers are ultimately benefitted. Therefore, the consumer welfare standard, which underpins modern antitrust enforcement, would seem to counsel against intervention contrary to buyer power. In most cases, though, this intuition is simply wrong.23 More competitive labor markets are not just good for workers; they are good for consumers too. Clarifying the relevant interests at stake is crucial as policy reforms begin in earnest, and there is reason to believe that such reforms are on the horizon. Several politicians have recently advocated for greater antitrust scrutiny of labor markets. For example, in 2017 Senator Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill that would require the enforcement agencies to pay greater attention to buyer power in merger review.24 Senator Elizabeth Warren—who seeks more interventionist antitrust policy on many fronts25—and Senator Cory Booker—who in 2017 sent a letter to the DOJ and FTC citing concern with the failure of the agencies to address labor market power—have also taken up the cause.26 Labor market issues are also garnering increased attention from antitrust scholars.27 In an article published in 2018, C. Scott Hemphill and Nancy Rose argued for more interventionist merger policy directed at various forms of buyer market power.28 The same year, Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl published Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, a sweeping analysis of the myriad options available to enforcers to promote more competitive labor markets.29 This legal analysis has been spurred by a growing body of empirical work on buyer power in labor markets.30 An array of scholars concluded that labor market power is a problem and one that antitrust institutions should do more to address. This paper similarly argues that buyer power—and specifically buyer power in labor markets—deserves greater antitrust scrutiny and, to that end, develops a framework for systematically evaluating labor market power in merger analysis. The enthusiasm of some progressive politicians for more interventionist antitrust policy has drawn skepticism from many antitrust practitioners and scholars who worry that reforms will unmoor antitrust policy from its foundational principles and turn antitrust enforcement over to political whims.31 At least with respect to labor market power, however, economic theory and empirical evidence support increased enforcement without any reform of the basic legal framework and without deviating from substantial consensus about the proper role for antitrust in the economy.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Inequality High- Generic

U.S. inequality is skyrocketing now- wealth concentration is at the top

Bernard “Sandman” Sanders 9-2-2022

["The US has a ruling class – and Americans must stand up to it," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/sep/02/the-us-has-a-ruling-class-and-americans-must-stand-up-to-it]

Let’s be clear. The most important economic and political issues facing this country are the extraordinary levels of income and wealth inequality, the rapidly growing concentration of ownership, the long-term decline of the American middle class and the evolution of this country into oligarchy. We know how important these issues are because our ruling class works overtime to prevent them from being seriously discussed. They are barely mentioned in the halls of Congress, where most members are dependent on the campaign contributions of the wealthy and their Super Pacs. They are not much discussed in the corporate media, in which a handful of conglomerates determine what we see, hear and discuss. So what’s going on? We now have more income and wealth inequality than at any time in the last hundred years. In the year 2022, three multibillionaires own more wealth than the bottom half of American society – 160 million Americans. Today, 45% of all new income goes to the top 1%, and CEOs of large corporations make a record-breaking 350 times what their workers earn. Meanwhile, as the very rich become much richer, working families continue to struggle. Unbelievably, despite huge increases in worker productivity, wages (accounting for real inflation) are lower today than they were almost 50 years ago. When I was a kid growing up, most families were able to be supported by one breadwinner. Now an overwhelming majority of households need two paychecks to survive. Today, half of our people live paycheck to paycheck and millions struggle on starvation wages. Despite a lifetime of work, half of older Americans have no savings and no idea how they will ever be able to retire with dignity, while 55% of seniors are trying to survive on an income of less than $25,000 a year. Since 1975, there has been a massive redistribution of wealth in America that has gone in exactly the wrong direction. Over the past 47 years, according to the Rand Corporation, $50tn in wealth has been redistributed from the bottom 90% of American society to the top 1%, primarily because a growing percentage of corporate profits has been flowing into the stock portfolios of the wealthy and the powerful. During this terrible pandemic, when thousands of essential workers died doing their jobs, some 700 billionaires in America became nearly $2tn richer. Today, while the working class falls further behind, multibillionaires like Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Richard Branson are off taking joyrides on rocket ships to outer space, buying $500m super-yachts and living in mansions with 25 bathrooms. Disgracefully, we now have the highest rate of childhood poverty of almost any developed nation on Earth and millions of kids, disproportionately Black and brown, face food insecurity. While psychologists tell us that the first four years are the most important for human development, our childcare system is largely dysfunctional – with an inadequate number of slots, outrageously high costs and pathetically low wages for staff. We remain the only major country without paid family and medical leave. In terms of higher education, we should remember that 50 years ago tuition was free or virtually free in major public universities throughout the country. Today, higher education is unaffordable for millions of young people. There are now some 45 million Americans struggling with student debt. Today over 70 million Americans are uninsured or underinsured and millions more are finding it hard to pay for the rising cost of healthcare and prescription drugs, which are more expensive here than anywhere else in the world. The cost of housing is also soaring. Not only are some 600,000 Americans homeless, but nearly 18m households are spending 50% or more of their limited incomes on housing. It’s not just income and wealth inequality that is plaguing our nation. It is the maldistribution of economic and political power. Today we have more concentration of ownership than at any time in the modern history of this country. In sector after sector a handful of giant corporations control what is produced and how much we pay for it. Unbelievably, just three Wall Street firms (Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street) control assets of over $20tn and are the major stockholders in 96% of S&P 500 companies. In terms of media, some eight multinational media conglomerates control what we see, hear and read. In terms of political power, the situation is the same. A small number of billionaires and CEOs, through their Super Pacs, dark money and campaign contributions, play a huge role in determining who gets elected and who gets defeated. There are now an increasing number of campaigns in which Super Pacs actually spend more money on campaigns than the candidates, who become the puppets to their big money puppeteers. In the 2022 Democratic primaries, billionaires spent tens of millions trying to defeat progressive candidates who were standing up for working families. Dr Martin Luther King Jr was right when he said: “We must recognize that we can’t solve our problem now until there is a radical redistribution of economic and political power” in America. That statement is even more true today. Let us have the courage to stand together and fight back against corporate greed. Let us fight back against massive income and wealth inequality. Let us fight back against a corrupt political system. Let us stand together and finally create an economy and a government that works for all, not just the 1%.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Unemployment Rising

Stagflation is coming – high unemployment and slow economic growth

Daniel Liberto 12/21/22 (Daniel is a highly regarded journalist with over a decade of experience writing and editing news, comments, and deeper analysis features. He started out writing a blog and various articles on a freelance basis for different U.K. news organizations. A few years later, the Financial Times awarded him with a bursary to study a master's in journalism.; Investopedia; “Why Is Stagflation Bad for the Economy?”; https://www.investopedia.com/why-is-stagflation-bad-for-the-economy-6892152)//IS

Will Stagflation Return in 2023? Today, there are fears that a similar situation could unfold again. Inflation is unusually high, and the economy is, well, not exactly firing on all cylinders. 4 How did we find ourselves in this situation? A combination of unique, random factors is mainly to blame. First, there was the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to a lockdown and a halt in production followed by surging demand once restrictions were lifted. Then Russia invaded Ukraine, causing yet more supply chain issues and leading oil prices to spike. And to top it all off, each of these unlikely, destabilizing events occurred when interest rates were historically low and money was extremely cheap to borrow. 4 Other factors in some way contributing to today’s stagflation include high debt, protectionist trade policies, an aging population, geopolitical tensions, climate change, and cyber warfare. And some of these aren’t going away, meaning stagflation could be here to stay for a while. 10 Technically, the economy is not in a recession. 11 However, most economists now agree that the one thing missing, higher unemployment, could soon become a reality as loftier costs to service debt tempt companies to lay off employees. Match lots of people out of work and sluggish economic growth with high inflation, and you have stagflation. So, are we doomed? Not necessarily. Economist Nouriel Roubini is convinced that the Federal Reserve and other central banks’ attempts to curb inflation will lead to a hard landing and a grueling stagflationary debt crisis. However, his opinion isn’t shared by everyone. Stanford economist John Cochrane, for example, is hopeful that inflation likely will go away and the risk of stagflation will be averted. 10 12 At this point, a lot depends on the effectiveness of interest rate rises curtailing demand and whether major supply shocks can be ironed out quickly. If inflation doesn’t ease soon, then the U.S. and global economies could face more than just a regular recession. When the economy is heading toward recession, central banks ease monetary conditions. They can’t do that now, though—inflation is high, and that’s potentially very worrying. Why Is Stagflation Bad for the Economy? Stagflation is a combination of three negatives: slow economic growth, higher-than-normal unemployment, and expensive cost of living. Whichever way you look at it, that situation is going to be painful. Usually, to get companies hiring again and the economy back up and running, interest rates are cut. But when inflation is soaring, that action is dangerous, so you are left with people and companies strapped for cash while having to worry about higher prices to service their debts and obligatory purchases costing more and more each week or month. This is not only an extremely uncomfortable environment to live in but also quite tricky for governments to fix. With no easy cure, stagflation can drag on for years, causing heavy damage to the economy. Stagflation can make a regular recession seem like a walk in the park. Prices rise rather than stay flat or fall, and the tools normally used to fix the economy are ineffective, meaning that this discomfort may last for a long time. Should we soon find ourselves in this situation, the consequences could be catastrophic. As Roubini points out, private and public debts are much higher than in the past, accounting for about 350% of global gross domestic product (GDP) because interest rates were low for ages. Now that this is changing, a storm is brewing, with higher borrowing costs threatening to push leveraged households, companies, financial institutions, and even governments into bankruptcy and default. 10 If events pan out as Roubini envisions, we could soon find ourselves in an economic crisis like no other, with 1970s-style stagflation potentially being accompanied by a debt meltdown similar to the 2008 Great Recession. Just the thought of a mixture of these downturns, two of the worst on record, is enough to send shivers down the spine, Roubini writes. 10

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Unemployment Rising

Unemployment is rising- interest rate hikes are bringing recession, causing job losses

Zahn 22

(Max, has an M.A. from CUNY in journalism, former reporter at yahoo finance, The Fed says unemployment will rise. Here's who economists say would lose their jobs first., abc news, https://abcnews.go.com/Business/fed-unemployment-rise-economists-lose-jobs/story?id=90375709)

The Federal Reserve escalated its fight against inflation this week, instituting a major rate increase and saying more will likely follow. The moves will cause a jump in the number of unemployed Americans by the end of next year, the central bank said. The Fed has put forward a series of aggressive interest rate hikes in recent months as it tries to slash price increases by slowing the economy and choking off demand. But the approach risks tipping the United States into a recession and causing widespread joblessness. Fed Chair Jerome Powell on Wednesday acknowledged that rate hikes would cause pain for the U.S. economy, as growth slows and unemployment rises. He added, however, that "a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain later on." The job losses forecasted by the Fed this week would by the end of 2023 raise the unemployment rate from its current level of 3.7% to 4.4%. That outcome would add an estimated 1.2 million unemployed people, according to Omair Sharif, the founder of research firm Inflation Insights. Those job losses will disproportionately fall on some of the most vulnerable workers, including minorities and less-educated employees, according to economists and studies of past downturns.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Rising Inequality Coming- AI

Inequality will only increase in the future – AI development and climate factors.

Zia Qureshi, 5-16-2023, "Rising inequality: A major issue of our time," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/rising-inequality-a-major-issue-of-our-time/

Large and persistent increases in inequality within economies are not an inevitable consequence of forces such as technological change and globalization. Much depends on how public policy responds to the new dynamics that these forces generate. In the midst of these common forces of change, the rise in inequality has been uneven across countries. The difference lies largely in countries’ institutional and policy settings and how they have responded. In general, looking across countries, public policy has been behind the curve. It has been slow to rise to the new challenges to promote more inclusive outcomes from economic change. Public policy to reduce inequality is often viewed narrowly in terms of redistribution―taxes and transfers. This is indeed an important element, especially in view of the erosion of the state’s redistributive role in recent decades. But there is a much broader policy agenda of “predistribution” that can make the growth process itself more inclusive and produce better market outcomes—by promoting wider access to new opportunities for firms and workers and enhancing their capabilities to adjust as market dynamics shift. This latter agenda of reforms spans competition policy and regulatory frameworks to keep markets competitive and inclusive in the digital age; innovation ecosystems and technology policies to put innovation to work for broader groups of people; digital infrastructure and literacy to reduce the digital divide; education and (re)training programs to upskill and reskill workers while addressing inequalities in access to these programs; and labor market policies and social protection systems to enable workers to obtain a fair share of economic returns and to support them in times of transition. In many of these reform areas, the new dynamics that economies are facing call for fresh thinking and significant policy overhaul. Absent more responsive policies to combat inequality, the current high levels of inequality are likely to persist or even rise further. Artificial intelligence and related new waves of digital technologies and automation could increase inequality further within countries. Even as new technologies increase productivity and produce greater economic affluence, and new jobs and tasks emerge to replace those displaced and so prevent large technological unemployment, inequality could reach much higher levels. The economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced some of the inequality-increasing dynamics. Also, a high and increasing concentration of wealth can exacerbate income inequality in a mutually reinforcing cycle. Technological change also poses new challenges to global economic convergence that has reduced inequality between countries in the past couple of decades. Faster growth in emerging economies led by export of manufactures has depended greatly on their comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing based on large populations of low-skill, low-wage workers. This source of comparative advantage increasingly will erode as automation of low-skill work expands. Emerging economies face the challenge of recalibrating their growth models as technology disrupts traditional pathways to growth and development. Emerging economies’ growth prospects also face other headwinds, including the scarring effects of the pandemic and global supply chain disruptions exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and an unsettled global geopolitical environment, which would hit the more trade-dependent economies harder. If growth in emerging economies falters, the decline in between-country inequality will slow, which could stall or even reverse the modest decline in global inequality observed since about 2000 if within-country inequality continues to mount. Climate change is another factor that could worsen inequality within and between countries. Low-income groups and countries are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have less capacity to cope with them. Income and wealth inequality is elevated. In the absence of policies to counter recent trends, inequality could rise to still higher levels. High and rising inequality entails adverse economic, social, and political consequences. Policymakers must pay more attention to the changing distributional dynamics in the digital age and harness the forces of change for more inclusive prosperity. History tells us that large and unabated rises in inequality can end up badly.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Economy/Inequality Advantage › Job Losses Coming- AI

AI integration is rising in the workforce puts humans at risk of unemployment, especially financially insecure families.

Jacob 23 turns complex ideas into readable content. Marketing Technology, Health Technology, and Business Technology enthusiast, “The Rise of AI Like Chatgpt and Other Chatbots Could Lead to Mass Unemployment,” Hackernoon, Janurary 6, 2023, Isim

As the world becomes increasingly reliant on technology, artificial intelligence (AI) and chatbots have emerged as key players in many industries. But with the rise of these advanced technologies comes the potential for mass unemployment, as AI and chatbots are able to automate tasks that were previously performed by humans. In this article, I will explore the current state of AI and chatbots and their potential impact on employment. First, let's define what we mean by AI and chatbots. AI refers to the ability of a computer or machine to perform tasks that would normally require human intelligence, such as learning, problem-solving, and decision-making. Chatbots, on the other hand, are computer programs designed to simulate conversation with human users through artificial intelligence. Currently, AI and chatbots are being used in a variety of industries, from customer service to healthcare to finance. They are able to handle tasks such as answering customer inquiries, scheduling appointments, and processing transactions. While these technologies have the potential to improve efficiency and reduce costs for companies, they also have the potential to displace human workers and contribute to mass unemployment. This is a major concern that must be addressed as we continue to embrace the advancements of AI and chatbots. The Potential for Mass Unemployment as AI and chatbots continue to advance, it's becoming increasingly clear that they have the potential to automate many tasks currently performed by humans. In fact, some experts predict that AI could potentially replace up to 50% of all jobs within the next decade. This raises the concern of mass unemployment, as the use of these technologies could lead to widespread job displacement. One of the main industries that may be affected by the increased use of AI and chatbots is customer service. Chatbots are already being used to handle customer inquiries and resolve issues, and as they become more advanced, they may be able to handle more complex tasks. This could lead to job loss for customer service representatives. Other industries that may be impacted by the adoption of AI and chatbots include finance, healthcare, and manufacturing. AI-powered machines and robots are already being used to perform tasks such as processing transactions, analyzing medical images, and medical diagnoses, and assembling products. As these technologies continue to improve, they may be able to handle more complex tasks, potentially leading to job loss for workers in these industries. It's important to note that the potential for mass unemployment is not a certainty. However, it is a concern that must be taken seriously as we continue to embrace the advancements of AI and chatbots. Companies and governments have a responsibility to consider the potential consequences of adopting these technologies and to take steps to mitigate any negative impacts on employment. The Ethical Considerations of AI and Chatbots The rise of AI and chatbots raises important ethical considerations, particularly in terms of the impact on workers and their livelihoods. As these technologies are able to automate more tasks, there is a potential for widespread job displacement and unemployment. This could have significant consequences for affected workers and their families, who may face financial insecurity and a lack of job opportunities. In addition to the impact on workers, there are also ethical considerations surrounding the use of AI and chatbots more broadly. For example, the use of AI in decision-making processes, such as hiring or loan approval, raises concerns about bias and fairness. There are also concerns about the potential for AI to be used in ways that harm or exploit people, such as in the development of autonomous weapons and the launch of cyber attacks. Given these ethical considerations, it is important that companies and governments take responsibility for addressing the potential consequences of AI and chatbot adoption. This may involve regulatory measures to ensure the responsible and ethical use of these technologies, as well as efforts to support affected workers through retraining and education programs. It is only by considering the potential impacts of AI and chatbots on all stakeholders that we can ensure their responsible and ethical use. Steps That Can Be Taken to Mitigate the Potential Negative Impacts of AI and Chatbots on Employment While the potential for mass unemployment due to the adoption of AI and chatbots is a concern, there are steps that can be taken to mitigate the potential negative impacts on employment. One important step is to provide retraining and education programs for affected workers. This can help ensure that workers have the skills and knowledge needed to transition to new roles or industries. Governments and companies can also work together to provide support for affected workers, such as financial assistance and job placement services. Another important step is to ensure that AI and chatbots are used ethically and responsibly. This may involve launching awareness programs and regulating the use of these technologies to prevent abuses and ensure fairness, as well as promoting transparency and accountability in their development and deployment. Finally, there may be a need to regulate the use of AI and chatbots to prevent widespread job displacement. This could involve measures such as requiring companies to demonstrate that the adoption of these technologies will not result in significant job loss, or setting limits on the use of AI and chatbots in certain industries or for certain tasks. By taking these steps, we can help ensure that the adoption of AI and chatbots is balanced with the protection of human workers and their livelihoods. Bottom Line As expressed, the rise of AI and chatbots brings with it many potential benefits, including improved efficiency and cost savings for companies. However, it also raises concerns about the potential for mass unemployment due to the automation of tasks currently performed by humans. We must carefully consider the impact of AI and chatbots on employment and take steps to mitigate any negative consequences. This may involve providing retraining and education programs for affected workers, ensuring the ethical and responsible use of these technologies, and regulating their use to prevent widespread job displacement. Finding a balance between the use of AI and chatbots and the protection of human workers is essential. By doing so, we can ensure that the advancements of these technologies are a positive force for society rather than a source of disruption and inequality.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › FJG Solves Infra

Providing services to expand the labor force solves for declined economic infrastructure

Darity and Milam 20; William Darity Junior, Samuel DuBois Cook Distinguished Professor of Public Policy, Duke Sanford School of Public Policy; Dawn Milam, Senior Advisor, The Justice Collaborative Institute, The Case for a Federal Job Guarantees Program, The Justice Collaborative Institute, September 2020, Isim

A federal job guarantee is needed to eliminate working poverty and stabilize the pandemiccrushed economy. A permanent public work sector offsets the private sector by competitively providing goods, services, and opportunities as a path toward economic security. The government serves as the guarantor and supplier of jobs that provide training, living wages, benefits, better working conditions, and full worker rights, as a true alternative to the private job market. The availability of such an alternative has the added benefit of protecting workers who wish to unionize because it effectively eliminates employers’ ability to threaten workers with job loss. Like a public banking option for financial services, a federal public job sector would not replace the private market, but instead compete with the private sector, particularly at the low end of the labor market, increasing job quality, quantity, and accessibility. Another critical element of a federal job guarantee is the opportunity to invest in projects that benefit the public, but may be undervalued by the private sector. For instance, child and elder caregiving is poorly served by the private market, where services are costly for clients while provider wages are extremely low. A public option for dependent care, among other important services, is a better tool to ensure that everyone has access to the services—and, for providers, the THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE PROGRAM 4 compensation—needed for individual and social wellbeing. Other federal jobs programs should similarly serve the public good, investing in projects such as sustainable and energy-efficient infrastructure, conservation, and emergency relief projects. Finally, a comprehensive federal jobs program is an important part of addressing urgent crises like the pandemic. By offering safe, reasonable working conditions and adequate compensation, public sector jobs would eliminate the need for individuals to seek out unsafe or inadequate private sector jobs. The infrastructure of federal jobs programs would also allow for quick deployment of emergency relief services, such as contact tracing and production of personal protective equipment. Particularly in an economic crisis, a federal job guarantee will have a critical impact on expanding labor force participation and restoring the economy.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › FJG Solves Infra

Providing services to expand the labor force solves for declined economic infrastructure

Darity and Milam 20; William Darity Junior, Samuel DuBois Cook Distinguished Professor of Public Policy, Duke Sanford School of Public Policy; Dawn Milam, Senior Advisor, The Justice Collaborative Institute, The Case for a Federal Job Guarantees Program, The Justice Collaborative Institute, September 2020, https://socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final.-The-Case-for-a-Federal-Job-Guarantee-Program-1.pdf

A federal job guarantee is needed to eliminate working poverty and stabilize the pandemic crushed economy. A permanent public work sector offsets the private sector by competitively providing goods, services, and opportunities as a path toward economic security. The government serves as the guarantor and supplier of jobs that provide training, living wages, benefits, better working conditions, and full worker rights, as a true alternative to the private job market. The availability of such an alternative has the added benefit of protecting workers who wish to unionize because it effectively eliminates employers’ ability to threaten workers with job loss. Like a public banking option for financial services, a federal public job sector would not replace the private market, but instead compete with the private sector, particularly at the low end of the labor market, increasing job quality, quantity, and accessibility. Another critical element of a federal job guarantee is the opportunity to invest in projects that benefit the public, but may be undervalued by the private sector. For instance, child and elder caregiving is poorly served by the private market, where services are costly for clients while provider wages are extremely low. A public option for dependent care, among other important services, is a better tool to ensure that everyone has access to the services—and, for providers, the THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE PROGRAM 4 compensation—needed for individual and social wellbeing. Other federal jobs programs should similarly serve the public good, investing in projects such as sustainable and energy-efficient infrastructure, conservation, and emergency relief projects. Finally, a comprehensive federal jobs program is an important part of addressing urgent crises like the pandemic. By offering safe, reasonable working conditions and adequate compensation, public sector jobs would eliminate the need for individuals to seek out unsafe or inadequate private sector jobs. The infrastructure of federal jobs programs would also allow for quick deployment of emergency relief services, such as contact tracing and production of personal protective equipment. Particularly in an economic crisis, a federal job guarantee will have a critical impact on expanding labor force participation and restoring the economy.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › FJG Solves Infra

Federal jobs guarantee solves infrastructure needs- it invests resources at the state level

Carpenter and Hamilton 2020

Daniel and Darrick, professor of government and chair of FAS department and professor at the new school for social research, a federal job guarantee: anti-poverty and infrastructure policy for a better future, Scholars Strategy network, https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee

What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs. 1. Jobs to support state and local governments. State and local governments account for most of the government employment in the United States, and they comprise an important part of our federalist system. In a range of policy domains – public health, education and job training, infrastructure, health provision and conservation – it is state and local governments that have the legal authorities and historical capacities to act. Yet state governments also have the weakest capacity to respond to an economic crisis. First, state governments have nothing like the Federal Reserve to back their debt (this is one among several reasons that the Federal Reserve has recently been looking into mass purchases of municipal bonds). They cannot print money. Second, state governments lack the expansive revenue-generating capacity of the federal government. Beyond this, state governments have in recent decades constrained their powers with balanced budget amendments, while a number of states (Illinois and Connecticut are two examples) have badly underfunded pension systems, and still others have tethered their income to commodity (especially petroleum) sales, which are at historically low prices and whose price declines have damaged state revenues. Workers and some capital costs for projects at the local, county, or state levels can be funded in a way to provide regional full employment and infrastructure needs. The projects and areas with the greatest needs could be cued to receive the federal intervention sooner. The Department of Labor would work closely with local governments. Local and state governments would, in conjunction with community organizations, develop project proposals to address local infrastructure needs, similar to the local, state, and federal collaborations in the design of direct government employment programs of the New Deal. Localities are likely most aware of the infrastructure needs to offer the greatest benefit to their communities. In order to minimize inequality across states and reduce the burden of discrimination, the workers under this program would be federally employed but would be tasked or apportioned (perhaps by formula, to reduce near-term political discretion) to states according to their economic, public health, and infrastructure needs. Even if the work occurs at the state and local level, the federal government needs to step in to provide the jobs, and there are a range of tools it has to do so. The traditional tool consists of program-specific block grants that have been an important feature of American government since the New Deal and especially the Nixon era. The problem with these grants is that they often permit state and local officials to withhold important resources from populations in need, as occurred with so many states’ refusal to take Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act. Our proposal would build upon the strengths of grants by making the jobs available to states and local governments, but would address the inequality-related weakness of these programs by making the employees federal workers who, as such, are made available to state and local governments. In order to avoid potentially unconstitutional imposition of requirements upon state governments (which were declared unconstitutional in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)), the federal government could offer these jobs as an option, as it did with Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act. Another alternative is to allow state and localities to develop a bank of proposals for physical and human infrastructure from which a federal authority (operating under formulaic or discretionary procedures) can prioritize with regards to urgent and useful needs. The state and localities can even administer the program with federal oversight, however, the workers would be ultimately employed by the federal government, as opposed to state or local employees by way of a federal grant.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › FJG Solves Infra

Federal jobs guarantee solves infrastructure- leads to expansion in investment and resources

Carpenter and Hamilton 2020

Daniel and Darrick, professor of government and chair of FAS department and professor at the new school for social research, a federal job guarantee: anti-poverty and infrastructure policy for a better future, Scholars Strategy network, https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee

To combat the current health and economic crisis, and build national infrastructure in the public health, environmental and transportation domains, American government should directly hire millions of citizens in the coming two years, offering a federal job guarantee (FJG) that strengthens government at all levels, especially local and state. Doing so would transcend the limits of current stimulus programs. Those programs confer money but not stable, dignified work. This direct government employment (DGE) would rebuild sectors of our country that have withered – our public health clinics and agencies, our transportation network, our physical plant for education and services in both urban and rural settings. DGE would also supply workers for the vital transition to a new, energy-efficient, reduced-carbon infrastructure. Unlike other relief programs, a federal job guarantee can eliminate involuntary unemployment, directly build the capacity of government to reduce the likelihood of future crises and respond effectively to those crises that do arise. A FJG can complement other relief programs including social insurance and income support, but there is no substitute for its poverty-combatting, inequality-reducing, worker-empowering, nation-stabilizing, and infrastructure-building potential. Scale matters. To meet the needs of the nation, a FJG would provide millions of new jobs, ranging from public health positions (at least 250,000 jobs), enhanced postal services, including postal banking (at least 100,000 jobs), construction, rehabilitation, retrofitting and staffing of schools, clinics, parks, senior centers and civic centers (at least 1 million jobs), new infrastructure, energy transition and conservation work, including solar installation (many millions of jobs), as well as investments in unemployment and social insurance and job training (hundreds of thousands of jobs). And a FJG would rejuvenate America’s civil service at a moment of mass impending retirements, injecting greater diversity and youth into a system that sorely needs it.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › US- China War !- Nuclear

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

The risk of great power war is high – it could cause nuclear escalation

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › At: Heg Unsustainable

Heg is strong now. Prefer empirically backed models of testing.

Feirut Murat Ozkaleli and Gunes 21, Professor at School of Public International Affairs in international relations and comparative politics, Ph.D. from University of Colorado, MA from University of Denver, form chair of international relations department at Harran University, former associate director of graduate school at Lefke, former director of the Middle East Research Center at Zirve; Ali Gunes, ADA University, School of Public and International Affairs, Teaching Fellow CERGE-EI Foundation, December 2021, "Allied but Deviating NATO in the Multipolar World: Exploring Time Profiles of Western Alliance Cohesion Using Ideal Point Estimations," Global Governance 27(4) p. 561-586, , kav

Utilizing ideal points, we proposed cohesion, deviation, and adhesion measures to empirically explore security alliance cohesion, Member State deviations, and third state adhesions. Our findings suggest that security alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact had higher cohesion than other UN members, that external threat increased security alliance cohesion, and that the United States turned out to be the most significant deviating member in NATO since 1980, while third countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan were more aligned with the NATO alliance whereas Israel was more aligned with the United States. By using our measures, one can study any alignment pattern among any state groups in the UN, even without a priori identifications of state groupings. Measures developed and tested in this study can provide researchers with strong diagnostic tools. The study contributes to the overall UNGA voting literature by providing statistical inferences about the validity of the data.

We believe that the approach and new measures presented here could be useful to investigate cohesion levels in other intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as economic communities like BRICS, while pinpointing each state’s political distance vis-à-vis each other or to a defined group of states. Furthermore, using this approach and these new measures could help researchers to concentrate on specific questions (e.g., whether the foundation of BRICS really brought Member States together on the issues of high politics, or whether Brexit could have been predicted). In other words, while the approach offered here was utilized more for descriptive purposes, it presents a superior alternative to measure variance across time, increasing our predictive power for actual or potential dramatic policy shifts at Member State and at (any) group level by using the UNGA voting data.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › At: Heg Unsustainable

Renewed US leadership counters Russia and reinvigorates US hegemony

Brands and Beckley, 22 (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)

The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.

This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Heg !- China

US needs to sustain economic hegemony or else China will be the next hegemon- evidence proves they remain unaffected from financial crises

Louis 21, Patrick Louis, One-year Political Science MA programme in Global Politics and Societal Change Dept. of Global Political Studies, “American Economic hegemony – under threat or unsurpassable?”, Malmo University, May 20, 2021, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1562120/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Hegemony in a politics-setting represents the material power and economy In order to undertake the task of exploring whether China poses a threat to the US world order, it is first important to define what is meant by term ‘hegemony’. Throughout this paper reference to a hegemonic power shall borrow from the description given by Robert Gilpin in which he describes the concepts of a hierarchy of prestige and power, “The hierarchy of prestige in an international system rests on economic and military power. Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of the state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise power”. (Gilpin, 1981, pp30-31). From this it can be taken to understand that when using the term American hegemony, we are referring not only to the strength of American military and economic power in relation to other states, but the perception from other states that America is willing to exercise said power. However, the concept of prestige in global politics is a contentious and debated topic that includes concepts such as soft power and roles of institutions which lies outside the remit of this essay which is focussing on the material reality of the economic power of the US as a hegemon with direct reference to Strange’s analysis of the structural power of finance not the concept of prestige. Therefore, for the purpose of this essay we shall focus on hegemony as the power of the United States’ economic capabilities. This is an interpretation of hegemony also supported by John Mearsheimer (2001) who points out that it is within every state’s best interest to be the hegemon, as a method of protection 18 and defence against other states ambitions. (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.3). For Mearsheimer, the international system shapes the actions and decision making of states, in the sense that the international system increases the motivation for states to maximise their power as this will in turn maximise their security from other states. His theory of ‘offensive realism’ is a descriptive theory, explaining how states act and why they act this way (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.11). A central question important to Mearsheimer’s theory, and this essay’s explanation of American hegemony can be found in Mearsheimer’s analysis of power, and as mentioned above Mearsheimer’s analysis of power concludes that “Power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses” (Mearsheimer, 2001; p.55). Susan Strange presented an argument stating that hegemonic power is made up of four key structures: security, production, finance and knowledge. The main purpose of this essay shall be the investigation of America’s economic hegemony and the US Dollar and therefore mostly exploring Strange’s concepts of financial power. (Strange, 1987; p.565). Strange’s definition of financial power is applied to a state that is “able to determine the structure of finance and credit through which (in all but the most primitive economies) it is possible to acquire purchasing power without having to either work or to trade it” (Strange, 1987; p.565). Moreover, some analysis on Strange’s concept of production is also referenced in the literature of hegemonic studies and the international system (Babones and Aberg, 2019; Starrs, 2013) therefore for the purpose of this literature review we shall also explore this concept, however the central topic of this essay is solely concentrated on Susan Strange’s concept of structural power in finance. Noting this, the structural power of production was defined by Strange as a state “able to control the system of production of goods and services” (Strange, 1987; p565) in order to 19 assert their power and maintain their position of hegemons. This paper shall show in detail how these two structures work in the American context and seek to show how they are not under threat from China. International finance is a key way in which America has maintained its hegemonic power, as Strange mentions “What I am comparing is the structural power to extend or restrict the range of operations open to others which has been, and still is, exercised by the United States” (Strange, 1987; p.259). In her analysis of how America holds structural power in the domain of finance, Strange refers to “the system by which credit is created, bought and sold and by which the direction and use of capital is determined”. (Strange, 1990; p259). Strange’s work (1990) focusses on the relationship of Japan and America in the 1980s in the sphere of international finance. Although Japan in contemporary political literature is no longer considered to be a hegemonic rival to the United States, Strange’s analysis can also be used to analyse the current Sino-American relationship. Strange notes how the Japanese Yen is not widely used in international markets, a similar problem also facing the Chinese Renminbi. Strange concludes “Japanese power in finance is relational only whereas that of the United States is structural. The process of equalization if it ever happens will take a long time and would involve radical reform if the international economic organisations over which the US has a constitutional veto power.” (Strange, 1990; p.273). This conclusion, although concerning Japan, can also be applied to the case of China today. The IMF is still working under the structure in which the United States alone has veto power, therefore it can be said international institutions continuously work in a way which reinforced American dominance in the field of finance making a hegemonic challenge from China difficult. 20 Babones and Aberg (2019) further Strange’s analysis on structural power defining structural power as “the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other actors, political institutions, economic enterprises and (not least) scientists, and other professional people have to operate.” (Babones and Aberg, 2019; p.301). This definition used of structural power can also be used in the analysis of hegemony, for example, it is clear when analysing hegemony that the hegemonic power uses it status to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy. It is also of importance to clarify what is meant by the term ‘international order’ and show how China poses a threat to such an order, in order to signify how relevant this essay’s research is to global politics. Simply put the characterisation of order can be seen to be the “interstate agreement over the norms, rules and institutions that regulate interstate behaviour” (Johnston, 2019; p.23). When discussing this supposed order therefore it is important to understand America’s role in forming and maintaining this order, to then determine how China poses a threat to it. America is the lone state which holds veto ability at the IMF, this indicates clearly the central role and power the United States has in shaping the global economy, as well as also being one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council which holds veto power, again signalling the central role America has in the current international order. Khanna and Winecoff (2020) make the important point that when analysing hegemonic orders and hegemonic powers, too often in literature analysis is concerned solely on the attributes of the dominant state not its relation to the international system; “Hegemonic powers gain influence through their structural prominence, and this is a function not only of their attributes but also of their connections to the rest of the system.” (Norrlof et al, 2020; p114). In the analysis section of this essay, this shall be taken into account as we are exploring how US Dollar centrality affects and shapes the rest of the international system to maintain hegemony. 21 Khanna and Winecoff (2020) view “international orders as overlapping, multidimensional sets of durable arrangements, that can be theorised, and measured as a multilayer network” (Norrlof et al., 2020; p114). These international orders change and shift in response to unpredicted, unforeseen or even predictable damaging events. Historical cases of this can be the two world wars which resulted in a global order realignment in favour of America as the central state in the global order, replacing Britain. The early 21st century has seen a financial crash that created economic instability throughout the international system, as well as a global pandemic which the effects of are still being recorded. These two events suggest that there could be a redrawing of lines in the global order. China remained relatively unscathed from the financial crisis and continued its strong economic growth as Khanna and Winecoff state “If there was to be a major reorganisation of the system then the critical components seemed to be in place: a rising power, a major crisis in the central status quo power, and a perceived de-legitimation of the ex ante order.” (Norrlof et al., 2020; p.115). From this we can see a view that is found in much of the literature concerning American hegemony, that being the challenge of a rising power, and a supposed decline of the United States which threatens its status specifically following a crisis such as the 2008 financial crash or the global Coronavirus pandemic

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Heg !- China

Heg prevents Chinese military expansion and nuclear war through containment

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But spheres of influence during the Cold War did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which nuclear war was a real possibility. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the “Third World.” Throughout history, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years’ Peace between Athens and Sparta to the Peace of Amiens between the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France have often ended, sooner or later, in war. The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium. The trouble is that these premises don’t always hold. Ideology and the quest for greatness—not simply insecurity—often drive great powers. Rising states are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so. Offering concessions to a revisionist state may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a better position from which to realize its ambitions. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions. A growing body of literature by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective. Meanwhile, the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. Russia and China, by contrast, still have to deal with U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Heg !- Generic

US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly,

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Heg !- Generic

U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

Betz 21 [11/3/2021, Betz, Hans-Georg, Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Zurich. Before coming to Zurich, he taught at various universities in North America, including Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC, and York University in Toronto. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book chapters on radical right-wing populism. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT., “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony”, Fair Observer, ]//AA

The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on coastal areas predicts catastrophic devastation as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in combating climate change. In theory, this would entail an active involvement in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, “there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.” With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, one without clear leadership and global cooperation. Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Heg !- Generic

Loss of hegemony causes global wars and extinction

Keck 14—Managing Editor of The Diplomat (Zachary, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, , CMR)

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 Heg

Domestic economic competitiveness is key to US global preponderance

Hughes in 21

Kent, Public Policy Fellow and Chief Economic and International Trade Advisor in the Office of the Director, CEO and President of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; The New Economy and U.S. Global Competitiveness; https://www.kas.de/documents/283221/283270/The+New+Economy+and+US+Global+Competitiveness.pdf/89a84838-1ab7-1310-6977-095ccce95521?version=1.0&t=1615905263752

In the coming post-pandemic world, the United States will have to deal with several accelerating trends that have taken on new prominence: these include globalization, rising international competition posed by China and others, insecure supply chains, climate change, and new fields of competition. The challenge for the United States is compounded by the urgent need to craft an equitable recovery from the pandemic, restore confidence in public institutions, and to formulate a new national mission. In responding to global challenges, the President cannot neglect the domestic dimension. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, penned a book emphasizing that “Foreign Policy Begins at Home” (Haass, 2013). The same is true in forging a competitiveness policy for the new economy. The once easy separation of domestic and international policies and the separation of the domestic economy from global competitiveness have long passed. In forging the new economic strategy, the U.S. will have to modify old ideas including America’s frequent resistance to setting national economic, technological, and industrial priorities.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
AFF › Competitiveness Advantage › Econ Comp k2 Heg

US economic competitiveness is key to hegemony-economic power leads to US influence

Jones 2012

James, former national security advisor to the president of the United States, Economic Competitiveness and US National Security, Atlantic Council,

In ‘pivoting’ ourselves to better face emerging global trends and an evolving security environment, it is logical to attempt to increase America’s influence by capitalizing on the enormous potential of our private sector. Doing so is imperative in this era of global economic integration in which prosperity and security are inseparable. Today, entrepreneurs, investors and innovators are as instrumental as diplomats, generals and politicians in winning friends and influencing attitudes at the all-important grass-roots level of the global community. Background Many allies, friends and influential parties in strategically vital regions of the world (the Middle East, South Asia and Africa) remain eager for economic engagement with the US More often, however, they find the Chinese knocking at their door. China’s ‘go-out’ strategy is increasing its global influence and competitiveness in up-and-coming regions while America’s economic engagement in many of these areas is slipping behind. Increasingly, leaders in these regions are asking: “Where is America?” President Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan region gave powerful expression to the dynamic recently, noting that “four American companies (in Kurdistan) are worth two Army divisions” when it comes to building goodwill and sustaining influence. Yet he remains frustrated by the relative absence of the US private sector and by obsolete US policies that impede greater American business engagement in a region which has been defined by many as “the next Dubai.” Partly, the absence of America’s private sector from less-developed but strategically key areas is the result of market factors and a high level of risk aversion on the part of mature enterprises. The problem, however, is deepened significantly by 20th century impediments erected by the federal government for a world that no longer exists. These range from specific policies, such as over-restrictive travel restrictions that discourage economic interaction, to more general and pervasive problems such as the reflexive distrust and adversarial approach that government too frequently adopts in dealing with the private sector. In today’s global economy and complex security environment, our public and private sectors must work together to advance US interests and values abroad. This memo suggests strategic areas where we should focus on bolstering US private-sector presence and identifies steps that we can take to foster better positioning.