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2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Unipolarity

Unipolarity solves conflict – no one challenges the US

Aktunç 22 Deniz Aktunç Has a bachelors degree in International Relations,“The International Systems: Unipolarity, Bipolarity and Multipolarity?”, Arcadia, Mar 27, 2022, https://www.byarcadia.org/post/the-international-systems-unipolarity-bipolarity-and-multipolarity

Unipolarity is a position in which one state is superior to others in terms of power as it possesses a significant part of resources. In a unipolar system, existence of multiple states is possible, however, the hegemon has no challengers in the international arena. This is because the hegemon has a level of power that other states cannot match even if by banding together. The position of the United States in the post-Cold War period is an example of unipolarity. With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the bipolar system was disrupted due to the absence of competition between the US and USSR as two poles. As a result, the United States became the hegemon, owning the largest economic, political, and military resources. According to some scholars, especially proponents of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the unipolar system is the most stable and durable system that can endure peace. After the Cold War, the raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system because no other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry (Wohlforth, 1999, p. 8). This indicates that since the major powers will not be willing to challenge the hegemon, and the hegemon has the resources to direct any conflict among them, unipolar systems tend to be more durable and peaceful.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Unipolarity

Unipolarity solves for bipolar proxy wars that extend conflict and stops states from forcing intervention

Anderson 19 (Noel Anderson, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, “Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly, June 21, 2019, ) [CC]

Consider the pervasiveness of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. Bipolarity extended the geographic scope of concern and broadened the range of factors included in the competition between the superpowers. American and Soviet leaders worried that challenges to the existing distribution of power might raise doubts about the credibility of their alliance commitments, thereby encouraging their allies to drift toward neutrality or, worse still, switch sides (Hironaka 2005, 107–11). Because challenges to the status quo were perceived to threaten the relative balance of power and credibility, they were resisted. Yet, because any action by one superpower was perceived as an attempt to gain a geostrategic advantage, it demanded a response. The end result was a proliferation of US-Soviet competitive intervention, wherein the superpowers committed resources to opposing government and rebel forces fighting on the periphery of their spheres of influence. That many civil wars during the Cold War were superpower proxy wars is a well-rehearsed perspective, but what is missing from existing accounts is an explanation for why superpower sponsorship should be associated with longer conflicts. If foreign civil wars played such a key role in the larger Cold War struggle, why did the superpowers not do what was necessary to help their respective sides win? The theory outlined above provides an answer: challenges to the relative balance of power and credibility necessitated reflexive responses, but the impossible stakes of direct confrontation advised caution. While the superpowers were compelled to intervene, they were simultaneously—and paradoxically— compelled to do so with restraint. Superpower rivalry also had secondary duration effects. Constrained by the need to both deter and avoid direct confrontation, Washington and Moscow employed indirect strategies for projecting power. Military aid was an integral element of their competition for influence, and accordingly, money and weapons diffused not only to civil wars, but across the international system. This assistance empowered client states, providing a set of Cold War framings and superpower arms that could be used to justify and implement independent foreign policy objectives. Notably, the superpowers struggled to control their clients’ adventurism; by exploiting fears of defection to the opposing bloc, clients found ways to commandeer superpower aid for their own self-interested ends (Krause 1991). The net result was a proliferation of interventions by otherwise weak states in civil wars across the globe. In the post–Cold War period, by contrast, state clients have a harder time garnering American aid. Regional powers continue to intervene in civil wars, but they can no longer rely on the reflexive support of the USSR when conflicts of interest arise vis-à-vis US policy, nor can they threaten defection to the Soviet-bloc in the face of American sanction. In the unipolar period, the United States has greater choice in which state clients it chooses to support, enjoys greater flexibility to discipline adventurism by weaker powers, and maintains “command of the commons” to restrict flows of economic and military aid around the globe (Posen 2003). Together, these features of the unipolar system constrain foreign adventurism by lesser powers relative to the Cold War period, thereby reducing—though not eliminating—the prevalence of competitive interventions among neighboring states and regional rivals. In this way, the transition from a bipolar to unipolar system not only terminated superpower proxy warfare, but also decreased the rate of competitive intervention by lesser powers.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Unipolarity

Wohlforth 08

William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, of which he was chair for three academic years. Wohlforth was Editor-in-chief of Security Studies from 2008 to 2011 “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Cambridge University Press, 18 December 2008,

Most scholars hold that the consequences of unipolarity for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article calls into question the core assumptions underlying the consensus: (1) that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity and (2) that major powers' satisfaction with the status quo is relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. in fact, it is known that people are motivated powerfully by a noninstrumental concern for relative status, and there is strong empirical evidence linking the salience of those concerns to distributions of resources. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. Building on research in psychology and sociology, the author argues that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. and the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus augurs for great power peace, and a shift back to bipolarity or multipolarity raises the probability of war even among great powers with little material cause to fight.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Ukraine

US hegemonic power helps support Ukraine financially

Baldor and Lee 4/4 Al Jazeera English Lolita Baldor is the military/national security reporter for The Associated Press. She has covered military, counterterrorism and national security issues for The Associated Press since 2005, including travel with top defense, military and national leaders all over the world, Matthew Lee is an American journalist and diplomatic writer who has been working for the Associated Press since 2007, “US is providing Ukraine with $2.6 billion in military aid” Associated Press, April 4, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-security-aid-billions-e02b957dc15fcb1004bf54a2232c1f5e

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. will send Ukraine about $500 million in ammunition and equipment and spend more than $2 billion to buy an array of munitions, radar and new weapons to help Kyiv counter drones in the coming months, the Pentagon said Tuesday, as Ukrainian troops gear up for a spring offensive against Russian forces. The aid to be taken from military stockpiles so it can be in the war zone quickly includes “ammunition for U.S.-provided HIMARS, air defense interceptors, and artillery rounds that Ukraine is using to defend itself,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement. HIMARS are multiple rocket launchers. The package includes at least two new weapons systems that are designed to counter drones — specifically the Iranian-made Shahed, which Tehran has provided to Russia and has been heavily used in attacks on Ukrainian cities. The U.S., for the first time, will send nine 30mm gun trucks and an undisclosed amount of ammunition for them, and 10 mobile laser-guided rocket systems, also developed to counter drones. The wide array of ammunition being sent from Pentagon stocks includes 155 mm artillery rounds for howitzers as Ukraine burns through the rounds fighting back against Russia’s ground invasion. The Pentagon does not provide the amounts of munitions in most cases. The immediate assistance also includes anti-armor systems, small arms, heavy equipment transport vehicles, 61 fuel tankers and maintenance support, the Pentagon said in a statement. A senior defense official said the focus is on helping Ukraine change the dynamic on the ground. Right now, the official said, the battle lines are relatively static and neither side has gained much territory. The official, who briefed Pentagon reporters on condition of anonymity to provide military details, said the U.S. wants to help Ukraine advance and hold its positions in the expected counteroffensive. “We very much appreciate everything that the United States has done specifically in the last month to help our army prepare itself for the counteroffensive,” said Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, speaking at NATO headquarters in Brussels before a meeting with with Blinken. “The Biden administration has upheld its commitment to provide Ukraine with a lot of what we need and set an example to other allies.” The $2.1 billion in longer-term aid, which is being provided under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, will buy missiles for the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or NASAMS, as well as radar, additional satellite terminals and fuel tanker trucks, anti-armor rockets and bridging systems. It also will fund additional training for Ukraine’s forces. The defense official said weapons already bought using the security assistance funding in previous packages are beginning to make their way to the battlefield. That is key because in some cases — such as with the 155 mm rounds — the Pentagon had been sending its own stocks, which are also needed for American troop training, and there is a finite supply. Now, the official said, the deliveries of 155 rounds Ukraine is getting include ammunition that was bought a number of months ago through the USAI program. The new weapons and money come as Russia has continued to bombard Ukraine with long-range missiles and the hotly contested battle for the eastern city of Bakhmut drags on. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told The Associated Press in an exclusive interview that unless his country wins that fight, Russia could begin building international support for a deal that could require Ukraine to make unacceptable compromises. Zelenskyy said if Moscow’s forces take Bakhmut, Russian President Vladimir Putin would “sell this victory to the West, to his society, to China, to Iran.” The latest U.S. package, with its mix of short-term and long-term aid, involves a wide variety of ammunition from Pentagon stocks, 23 million rounds of small arms ammunition and 200,000 grenades, mortars, rockets and an array of precision guided munitions. It brings the total amount of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to more than $35.1 billion since Russia invaded in February 2022. Defense leaders testifying on Capitol Hill last week said the U.S. is prepared to support Ukraine for as long as needed. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has echoed that sentiment, saying the alliance’s foreign ministers meeting in Brussels were discussing how to step up support for Ukraine’s armed forces. “Our support is for the long haul,” he said before the meeting Tuesday. The White House said last week that it has new evidence that Russia is looking again to North Korea for weapons as it also prepares for a spring offensive. Russia would provide Pyongyang with needed food and other commodities in return. U.S. officials also are concerned that the president of Belarus has warned that Russian strategic nuclear weapons might be deployed in his country, along with part of Moscow’s tactical nuclear arsenal. Putin has said he planned to place tactical nuclear weapons in neighboring Belarus. Those weapons are comparatively short-range and low-yield. Strategic nuclear weapons, such as missile-borne warheads, would be a greater threat. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, while talking up the possibility of nuclear weapons, has also called for a cease-fire in Ukraine. He said a truce must have no preconditions and all movement of troops and weapons must be halted. Russia, however, has rejected a cease in fighting, claiming that Ukraine has refused to enter talks under pressure from its Western allies. Lee reported from Brussels. Associated Press writer Tara Copp contributed to this story from Washington.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Ukraine

US dollar heg supports Ukraine’s fight

Al Jazeera 2/24 Al Jazeera is an international 24-hour English-language news channel owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network, which is owned by the monarchy government of Qatar. It is the first English-language news channel to be headquartered in Western Asia, “Five key ways the US has supported Ukraine’s war effort” Al Jazeera, February 24, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/five-key-ways-the-us-has-supported-ukraines-war-effort

The core component of US support has been the military, humanitarian and budgetary aid the Biden administration has been providing to Kyiv. The US Congress, which dictates the federal government’s budget, moved quickly after the invasion on February 24, 2022, to authorise billions of dollars for Ukraine, giving the Pentagon, State Department and other agencies the resources to keep the assistance flowing. In March, US legislators approved $13.6bn for Kyiv. That was followed by $40bn in May and another $12bn in September. In December, Congress passed another government funding bill containing $45bn in Ukraine aid. The Biden administration has been dispensing the aid in periodic packages over the past year. While the US often says it is not seeking a direct confrontation with Russia in Ukraine, Washington has been using economic measures to penalise Moscow for the invasion. Since the start of the war, the US has imposed hundreds of sanctions against Russian government officials, companies and wealthy elites connected to President Vladimir Putin. The first round of US sanctions was announced on the day Russia launched its invasion. The sanctions were aimed at tech imports and large financial institutions in Russia. Many more sanctions would follow. “Putin is the aggressor; Putin chose this war and now he and his country will bear the consequences,” Biden said as the invasion began. In March, Biden banned US imports of Russian oil. After Moscow announced the annexation of four eastern Ukrainian territories in September, Washington also imposed sanctions on hundreds of Russia-linked firms and officials. For his part, Putin has called US and Western sanctions “stupid”, stressing that Russia will not be deterred by the economic measures. “We are strong people and can cope with any challenge. Like our ancestors, we will solve any problem. The entire thousand-year history of our country speaks of this,” the Russian president said in June.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Ukraine

US military influence is key to Ukraine victory

Al Jazeera 2/24 Al Jazeera English is an international 24-hour English-language news channel owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network, which is owned by the monarchy government of Qatar. It is the first English-language news channel to be headquartered in Western Asia, “Five key ways the US has supported Ukraine’s war effort” Al Jazeera, February 24, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/five-key-ways-the-us-has-supported-ukraines-war-effort

Over the past year, the US administration has announced dozens of military aid packages to Ukraine – assistance that the Pentagon says is tailored to the needs of the battlefield. Early in the conflict, US-made Javelin anti-tank missiles proved decisive in repelling the Russian campaign for Kyiv. As Russia shifted its focus to capturing eastern parts of Ukraine, Washington likewise adjusted its military assistance. The US began supplying Ukrainian forces with howitzers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), helping Ukraine recapture the city of Kherson, as well as significant parts of the eastern region of the Donbas and the southern region of Kharkiv. A Patriot missile air defence system followed in December as Russia intensified its attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Last month, Biden announced more military equipment for Ukraine, including its first delivery of Abrams tanks. “They need to be able to counter Russia’s evolving tactics and strategy on the battlefield in the very near term,” Biden said of Ukrainian forces in January. “They need to improve their ability to maneuver in open terrain and they need an enduring capability to deter and defend against Russian aggression over the long term.” Russian officials have said sending arms to Ukraine prolongs and intensifies the conflict.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › GPW

No one can or will try to match US hard power—they have the best tech, spend more than everyone else, and have an unrivaled global reach

Montgomery ’14

[Evan Braden Montgomery, PhD in Foreign Affairs from U of Virginia, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (a public policy research institute focusing on national security strategy, defense planning, and military investment options), “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” Spring 2014, International Security, Volume 38, Number 4, project muse, wyo-sc]

What accounts for this consensus? The existing literature identifies two principal barriers to internal balancing against the United States, both of which suggest that its military primacy will endure even if its relative economic strength declines.19 First, prospective balancers are likely to incur significant opportunity costs, because competing with the United States would inhibit their ability to manage more pressing security challenges. As Robert Jervis notes, while the leading power in a unipolar system is “concerned with everything that happens everywhere,” other nations “are primarily concerned with what happens in their neighborhoods.”20 In most cases, therefore, they will prioritize addressing nearby threats over counterbalancing a distant hegemon. Because these objectives ostensibly require very different military capabilities, few nations can afford to pursue them both at the same time.21Second, even if prospective balancers were not distracted by more urgent demands on their attention and resources, they would still incur enormous sunk costs given the magnitude of the United States’ conventional military edge. By nearly any measure, the United States possesses the world’s most advanced ground, amphibious, naval, aerospace, and special operations forces. It also devotes more resources to defense than almost every other nation combined.22 Most important, its “command of the commons” provides an unparalleled ability to deploy, operate, and sustain military units overseas.23 Other nations, by contrast, can conduct large military operations only in close proximity to their own territory, and it is debatable whether any rising powers, including China, will be able to match the United States’ global reach for decades.24 According to [End Page 123] primacy optimists, this gap is so wide that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”25 Even primacy pessimists acknowledge that nations hoping to constrain the United States and frustrate its objectives must settle for nonmilitary options, including diplomatic, economic, and institutional measures they refer to as “soft balancing.”26

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › GPW

Great power competition causes extinction – grad strategy is the only solution

Kumar 18 [Rajeesh Kumar is an Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining IDSA in 2016, he taught at JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi (2010-11& 2015-16) and University of Calicut, Kerala (2007-08). His areas of research interest are International Organizations, India and Multilateralism, Global Governance, and International Humanitarian Law. "Will Great-Power Conflict Return?" ]

Great power conflict is becoming a reality on the global agenda, once again. For the past nearly three decades, the primary focus of the global strategic community was on small wars, counter-terrorism, and climate change, poverty, pandemics and transnational organized crime. Further, during these years, there was optimism that globalization and interdependence could bring about political and economic transformation inducing global peace and stability. The post-Cold War world with the United States as the superpower, a weak Russia, and rising China did not witness the intense geopolitical struggles of the earlier generations. The realigned blocs and alliances and growth of regional organizations across the globe also limited the possibilities of such conflict.

But developments in the past couple of years herald a new era of high politics. The relative decline of the US, the rise of China as America’s leading competitor, the re-emergence of Russia and its desire for greater role in global politics all seem to be serving as stimuli for a renewed round of great power competition. The mounting tensions in East and South China Seas, ‘trade war’ between China and the US, and Russia's assertive engagement in Ukraine and Syria are cases in point.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › GPW

The US will try to defend it inevitably – decline causes war

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and Internatio nal Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, )

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › GPW

Heg solves great power war

Zhang, 11 -- Carnegie Endowment researcher [Yuhan, and Lin Shi, independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank, "America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry," East Asia Forum, 1-22-11, www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, accessed 10-19-12]

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Democracy

That’s key to preventing China from invading Taiwan and becoming the new Indo-Pacific hegemon

Diamond 22 (Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, "All Democracy Is Global," Foreign Affairs, 9-6-2022, ) [CC]

There is another reason why failure is not an option in Ukraine, and it is the next and possibly imminent existential priority: Taiwan. China appears increasingly determined to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland for symbolic, political, economic, and strategic reasons. Symbolically, the Chinese Communist Party’s rulers claim that annexing Taiwan would end a long humiliation and restore China’s rightful status as the dominant power in Asia. Politically, the Chinese leadership’s absorption of Taiwan would extinguish the living proof that a Chinese society can govern itself as a liberal democracy. Economically, Taiwan hosts the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities, producing roughly 90 percent of the world’s most powerful chips. And strategically, taking Taiwan would enable China to break past the first island chain—the first chain of archipelagoes out from the East Asian continental mainland—and assert control over not only the South China Sea and its passageways to the Indian Ocean but also the entire western Pacific. China could then push the United States out of Asia and become the hegemon of the Indo-Pacific. This prospect horrifies the countries of the region, beginning with Washington’s vital democratic partner in East Asia, Japan. But if conquest looks inevitable or if Taiwan eventually falls, most regional states will opt to ride the wave of China’s hegemonic ascent rather than be drowned by it. For this reason, preserving Taiwan’s autonomy as a thriving democracy is an overriding strategic priority not just for the region but for the entire world. If Taiwan can maintain its current course of moderation, avoiding any hint of movement toward de jure independence, and if China can be deterred from attacking Taiwan, crucial time will be purchased for China to change politically. With a rapidly shrinking and aging population and huge contradictions in its excessively state-dominated economy, China will increasingly face deep domestic challenges that may press it in the direction of pragmatism, reform, and a more enlightened vision of what constitutes national greatness. To secure a democratic Taiwan, the United States and its strategic partners—including Australia, Japan, and allies in Europe—must avoid pointless provocation. This means adhering to the diplomatic status quo, including the “one China” policy, and avoiding the temptation to take steps such as announcing formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, which would be symbolically gratifying but would back China’s leaders into a corner. It will also be important for Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s successor to continue her stance of pragmatism and restraint in cross-strait relations. Preserving U.S. military strength is vital to keeping democracies secure. At the same time, both the United States and Taiwan must address the deteriorating military balance with Beijing. China is modernizing militarily, acquiring the ships and weapons systems it would need to mount a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. It is stepping up disinformation in Taiwan, with a continuous barrage of “news” and social media messages smearing Taiwan’s democracy, trying to tilt its politics toward Beijing-friendly politicians, and portraying other democracies as weak and incompetent. Beijing is also escalating military intimidation, including repeated incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. With support from Japan, the United States, and Europe, Taiwan needs to reshuffle this strategic picture. That means more emphasis on asymmetric warfare and larger military reserves. Above all, it means spending more on defense, which, at roughly 2.1 percent of GDP, is still a fraction of the 5.2 percent Taiwan spent in 1990. Finally, Taiwan could change the dynamic of the political impasse with a dramatic gesture. Taking a page from the National Unification Guidelines adopted by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in 1991, Taiwan could establish that as a condition for negotiations on the future shape of its sovereignty, mainland China would have to be a democracy and guarantee fundamental human rights to its citizens. This would signal to the people of mainland China that the real obstacle to dialogue is China’s authoritarian Communist Party, which does not respect the rule of law or political accountability and, therefore, as it showed in Hong Kong, cannot credibly commit to “one country, two systems.” A U.S. information campaign could then puncture Beijing’s social media firewall to amplify this message to the Chinese people.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Democracy

US heg key to global democracy

Diamond 22 (Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, "All Democracy Is Global," Foreign Affairs, 9-6-2022, ) [CC]

There is no more important priority than ensuring that Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine’s democracy ends in Moscow’s defeat. In the four months following Russia’s February 24 invasion, the United States committed $5.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including heavy artillery, drones, missiles, and aircraft. But U.S. delivery of that military aid has often been slow, and some of Ukraine’s requests for advanced weapons have not been met. Meanwhile, Russia has continued its withering assault. Led by the United States, the NATO alliance must provide Ukraine with the arms, ammunition, and intelligence it needs to successfully counter Russian aggression. Victory is not just imperative to protect the Ukrainians’ right to self-governance. How the war ends will prompt other countries to draw conclusions about which way global politics is heading and which type of political system has the greater will and tenacity. If Ukraine emerges from this conflict substantially free and secure, with its prewar territory intact and with aid and investment flowing in to rebuild, several powerful lessons will become clear. Bystanders will realize that democracy is not a weak system but provides the legitimacy, solidarity, and steadfastness necessary for victory, just as it did for the United Kingdom in World War II. The world will also see that the United States, its European allies, and their democratic partners will sacrifice to help an embattled democracy defend itself and to reaffirm the most vital principle of the international order, that territorial aggression will not stand. Finally, it will demonstrate the disastrous incompetence and miscalculation of Putin’s authoritarian state and thus illustrate a larger lesson: when leaders are not constrained by checks and balances and alternative flows of information, they are prone to ruinous blunders.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › Dollar Heg

Loss of US dollar heg leads to WWIII

Tharappel 22 Dr Jay Tharappel is an early career researcher. His research spans monetary theory, financial technology, world systems analysis, international relations, geostrategy, and ‘longue durée’ economic history. “Imperialism: How Declining Currency Hegemony Leads To War” PPE (Progress in Political Economy), December 13, 2022, https://www.ppesydney.net/imperialism-how-declining-currency-hegemony-leads-to-war/

I argue that in Marxist political economy, national exploitation cannot be reduced to class exploitation. This is because with class exploitation the underlying assumption is that both capitalists and workers are paid in the same currency, whereas with national exploitation, the currency of the exploiting nation is backed by wealth extracted from the colonized nations under its control. From this distinction, the following cyclical law can be observed throughout history. The currency hegemon is the state that extracts the largest quantity of wealth from those nations that it violently subjugates, which allows it to issue the currency that becomes the global measure of value. This hegemon creates its own gravediggers in the form of the mercantile rivals, which are those states that develop their productive forces by producing in exchange for the hegemonic currency. This creates the conditions for hegemon-rival warfare. The contradiction is that the currency hegemon must keep its markets open to incentivize countries to hold its currency. However, this leads to its own deindustrialization, which gradually disincentivizes states from holding its currency. Meanwhile, the nations subjugated by the hegemon and the rivals are prevented from developing, or become ‘underdeveloped’, and thus tend towards the production of periphery commodities like food and raw materials. From 1870 onwards, Britain’s mercantile rivals like the US, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan industrialized by producing in exchange for Pounds Sterling, which in turn was backed by the draining of Britain’s extractive colonies like India. Eventually, Britain found it difficult to meet its gold liabilities as those rivals began buying gold to establish gold standard currencies of their own. Through the lens of my thesis, one major reason why the Soviet Union faced hostility was because it championed the ‘right of nations to self-determination’ as its foreign policy. This angered states like Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium that feared that the colonized nations under their control could liberate themselves with Soviet help. This policy also worried those states, like Germany, Italy, and Japan, that lacked the colonies needed to feed their industrial ambitions. These would-be Axis states had industrialized from 1870 onwards by producing in exchange for Pounds Sterling, but in 1931 Britain ended the convertibility of its currency to gold. The ensuing depression compelled the Axis states to establish their own relations of national exploitation, that is, to acquire what they lacked through military conquest, thereby initiating WW2. However, these attempts failed primarily because the USSR and China resisted. My thesis argues that inter-imperialism ended after WW2 as a consequence of the former empires, including the Axis powers, ceasing hostility with each other, and huddling under the leadership of the United States, leaving only a single imperialist alliance, led by the US, also known as ‘the West’. Does imperialism persist in the absence of formal empire after WW2? Yes, because the West inherits an interest in keeping its former colonies poor in order to suppress inflationary pressures on the US Dollar. Therefore, imperialism must also include in its definition all attempts to maintain the trade relations historically established through violent conquest. After the US ended the convertibility of the Dollar to gold in 1971, new pillars were needed to support its currency. To that end, OPEC agreed to price its oil in Dollars in 1975, and the post-Soviet space was bled by capital fleeing to Western banks after 1991. Meanwhile, China produced large quantities of goods in exchange for Dollars, thereby rapidly industrializing in the process to become the leading mercantile power of the current cycle. The industrial productivity that propelled the US Dollar to its hegemonic status in the first place has been eroded by decades of deindustrialization as shown by trade deficits since 1977. After WW2 the US was the largest absolute net-exporter of capital, then it became a net-importer of capital from 1989 onwards, and today the US is the largest absolute net-importer of capital by way of its enormous net-external debt. As the technological gap between East and West closes, demand for US Dollars will decline. The hegemony of the US Dollar embodies all economic advantages won by the West at the expense of the rest, but those advantages are unravelling. Upon recognizing that the global tensions being witnessed today have their parallels in past lifecycles of currency hegemony, the question arises, can the same fate be avoided?

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › China/Taiwan War

Taiwan conflict goes nuclear

Klare 22 (Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent and professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C., “Could the Fight Over Taiwan Trigger Nuclear War?”, The Nation, October 13 2022, , AYW)

The Pentagon’s new strategic outlook was first spelled out in the  of February 2018 in this way: “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” with China and Russia. (And yes, the emphasis was in the original.) China, in particular, was identified as a vital threat to Washington’s continued global dominance. “As China continues its economic and military ascendance,” the document asserted, “it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” An ominous “new Cold War” era had begun. Taiwan’s Strategic Significance Rises To prevent China from achieving that most feared of all results, “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony,” Pentagon leaders devised a multipronged strategy, combining an enhanced US military presence in the region with beefed-up, ever more militarized ties with America’s allies there. As that 2018 National Defense Strategy put it, “We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.” Initially, that “networked security architecture” was only to involve long-term allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Soon enough, however, Taiwan came to be viewed as a crucial part of such an architecture. To grasp what this meant, imagine a map of the Western Pacific. In seeking to “contain” China, Washington was relying on a chain of island and peninsular allies stretching from South Korea and Japan to the Philippines and Australia. Japan’s southernmost islands, including Okinawa—the site of major American military bases (and a vigorous local )—do reach all the way into the Philippine Sea. Still, there remains a wide gap between them and Luzon, the northernmost Philippine island. Smack in the middle of that gap lies… yep, you guessed it, Taiwan. In the view of the top American military and foreign policy officials, for the United States to successfully prevent China from becoming a major regional power, it would have to bottle up that country’s naval forces within what they began calling “the first island chain”—the string of nations stretching from Japan to the Philippines and Indonesia. For China to thrive, as they saw it, that nation’s navy would have to be able to send its ships past that line of islands and reach deep into the Pacific. You won’t be surprised to learn, then, that solidifying US defenses along that very chain became a top Pentagon priority—and, in that context, Taiwan has, ominously enough, come to be viewed as a crucial piece in the strategic puzzle. Last December, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner  the Pentagon’s new way of thinking about the island’s geopolitical role when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last December. “Taiwan,” he said, “is located at a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of US allies and partners that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific.” This new perception of Taiwan’s “critical” significance has led senior policy-makers in Washington to reconsider the basics, including their commitment to a One China policy and to strategic ambiguity. While still claiming that One China remains White House policy, President Biden has repeatedly insisted all too unambiguously that the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan if attacked. When  on Sixty Minutes whether “U.S. forces…would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion,” Biden said, without hesitation, “Yes.” The administration has also upgraded its diplomatic ties with the island and promised it billions of dollars’ worth of arms transfers and other forms of military assistance. In essence, such moves constitute a de facto abandonment of “One China” and its replacement with a “one China, one Taiwan” policy. Not surprisingly, the Chinese authorities have reacted to such comments and the moves accompanying them with increasing apprehension and anger. As seen from Beijing, they represent the full-scale repudiation of multiple statements acknowledging Taiwan’s indivisible ties to the mainland, as well as a potential military threat of the first order should that island become a formal US ally. For President Xi and his associates, this is simply intolerable. “The repeated attempts by the Taiwan authorities to look for US support for their independence agenda as well as the intention of some Americans to use Taiwan to contain China” are deeply troubling, President Xi  Biden during their telephone call in November 2021. “Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burned.” Since then, Chinese officials have steadily escalated their rhetoric, threatening war in ever more explicit terms. “If the Taiwanese authorities, emboldened by the United States, keep going down the road for independence,” Qin Gang, China’s US ambassador, typically  NPR in January 2022, “it most likely will involve China and the United States, the two big countries, in military conflict.” To demonstrate its seriousness, China has begun conducting regular air and naval exercises in the air- and sea-space surrounding Taiwan. Such maneuvers  the deployment of five or six warships and a dozen or more warplanes, as well as ever greater displays of firepower, clearly with the intention of intimidating the Taiwanese leadership. On August 5, for example, the Chinese  13 warships and 68 warplanes in areas around Taiwan and two days later, . Each time, the Taiwanese scramble their own aircraft and deploy coastal defense vessels in response. Accordingly, as China’s maneuvers grow in size and frequency, the risk of an accidental or unintended clash becomes ever more likely. The increasingly frequent deployment of US warships to nearby waters only adds to this explosive mix. Every time an American naval vessel is sent through the Taiwan Strait—something that  almost once a month now—China scrambles its own air and sea defenses, producing a comparable risk of unintended violence. This was true, for example, when the guided-missile cruisers USS Antietam and USS Chancellorsville sailed through that strait on August 28th.  Zhao Lijian, a spokesperson for the foreign ministry, China’s military “conducted security tracking and monitoring of the U.S. warships’ passage during their whole course and had all movements of the U.S. warships under control.”

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › China/Taiwan War

US heg is key to deterring Chinese aggression over Taiwan

Hass 17 (Ryan Hass, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and the Chen-Fu and Cecelia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings and Senior Fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, “The Case for Continued American Leadership in Asia”, Brookings Institution, December 29 2017, , AYW)

When America has been active in the region, it has spurred Asian countries to share the burden in responding to humanitarian disasters, dealing with climate change, increasing pressure on North Korea and agreeing on trade rules for nearly 40 percent of the global economy. At the same time, the U.S. has led efforts to push China to emerge as a constructive — and not a coercive — actor. If the U.S. withdraws from these roles, there is no other country capable of pulling the region together in common purpose to address shared challenges. Second, America’s long and steady presence in the region has helped deter aggression, cool historical rivalries, and support the spread of market-based democracies. While the people of the region deserve credit, the U.S.-provided security umbrella also enabled progress. Up to now, the U.S. has served as a buffer in regional disputes, and a check against China or others seeking to use their military to move borders or seize resources. If confidence in U.S. resolve to protect the peace recedes, the risk of interstate conflict will rise. Countries will confront a choice between becoming more deferential to Beijing’s interests in exchange for hoped-for security and economic benefits, or developing military capabilities — including nuclear weapons — to guard against coercion by China or North Korea. If Japan goes nuclear, for example, South Korea and Taiwan could follow. A pattern of nuclear dominoes would elevate risk of a catastrophic conflict that could crater the global economy and create unimaginable destruction. Third, sustained U.S. support for rule of law and human rights has helped generate a more just and predictable environment for American businesses and travelers. For decades, the U.S. has promoted freedoms of speech, worship and peaceful assembly; the ability to choose leaders democratically; and the right to due process and equal administration of justice. These efforts have garnered goodwill for the U.S. by aligning U.S. power with aspirations of ordinary people. If the U.S. pulls back from promoting human rights, China will step up its efforts to influence domestic politics throughout the region — pressuring politicians, entrapping special interests, and filtering what information reaches the public. Beijing would like to normalize its model of privileging internal security over individual liberties. There also could be heightened risk of democratic backsliding, as leaders feel less inhibited from resorting to strongman governance. Fourth, a diminished U.S. role would embolden China to seek to hasten the return of a Sino-centric regional order. Broadly speaking, Beijing would like to maximize its influence and minimize Washington’s throughout the region. In instances where interests clash, such as over trade and maritime disputes and America’s alliance relationships, Beijing would like regional governments to side with it. Beijing also would like to lock in trade agreements and investment patterns that place China at the center and the U.S. on the outside. This would put U.S. firms at a disadvantage. Beijing does not seek to conquer new territories, but rather hopes to gain regional acceptance of the notion that China sits atop a hierarchical regional structure. Beijing views such a distribution of power as a restoration of a natural order. So, why does it matter if the U.S. remains the agenda-setter in the Asia-Pacific? Because American leadership still holds the most promise of protecting the peace, preserving respect for rule of law and human rights, unlocking opportunities for American businesses, and increasing burden-sharing for dealing with transnational challenges. And if the U.S. withdraws, Beijing will seek to fill the vacuum. That outcome would raise the risk of democratic backsliding, nuclear proliferation, disadvantaging U.S. companies and intensifying great power competition. Given the growing importance of Asia to America’s national security and economic well-being, this is an outcome the U.S. can ill-afford.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › General

Effective heg solves nuclear war- AND strong US military de-escalates all conflict

Barnett, 11 -- Naval War College Warfare Analysis & Research professor

(Thomas, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” 3-7-11, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads)

Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › General

US heg key to sustaining world order

McTague 22[Tom McTague,Tom McTague is a former staff writer at The Atlantic based in London,” What America’s Great Unwinding Would Mean for the world.” The Atlantic monthly group August 12, 2022 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/08/europe-america-military-empire-decline/670960/]

peculiar cognitive dissonance seems to have taken hold in the world. The Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—led and propped up by the United States—has reminded the world that the international order is, if anything, more dependent on American military, economic, and financial might now than only a few years ago. Yet everywhere you turn, there is a sense that the U.S. is in some form of terminal decline; too divided, incoherent, violent, and dysfunctional to sustain its Pax Americana. Moscow and Beijing seem to think that the great American unwinding has already begun, while in Europe, officials worry about a sudden American collapse. “Do we talk about it?” Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador to Syria who remains well connected within Europe’s diplomatic network, told me, somewhat indignantly, after I asked whether an American implosion was ever discussed at the highest levels of government. “We never stop talking about it.” Again and again, when I spoke with officials, diplomats, politicians, and aides in Britain and Europe over the past few weeks, the same message came back. “It’s weighing on people’s minds, big time,” one senior European Union official told me, speaking, like most of those I interviewed, on condition of anonymity to freely discuss their concerns. From outside the U.S., many now see in America only relentless mass shootings, political dysfunction, social division, and the looming presence of Donald Trump. All of this seems to add up in the collective imagination to an impression of a country on the brink, meeting all the conditions for a descent into civil unrest. Many Europeans have long considered American decline an inevitability and have looked to prepare themselves for such an eventuality. Pushed by Germany and France, the EU has sought out trade and energy deals with rival global powers, including Russia and China. The idea was that as the U.S. disengaged from Europe, the EU would step up. But then Russia invaded Ukraine, and everything changed. Suddenly, Europe’s grand strategy was in tatters, and American strength seemed to reassert itself. Europe discovered it had not become more independent from the U.S. but more dependent on it. In fact, Europe was dependent on everyone: Russia for its energy, China for its trade, America for its security. In pursuing a slow, cautious disengagement from the U.S., Europe found itself in the worst of all worlds. And in a desperate bid to reverse out of the mess, it was forced to rush back into the arms of the very leviathan it fears might be not only slowly losing its power but in danger of suddenly imploding. This, then, is the difficult situation of America’s protectorates today. Worried about the decline of the U.S., much of the American-led world has clung even more tightly to Washington than before. In Asia, the U.S. remains the only power capable of balancing against China’s bid for regional hegemony. In Europe, something similar is true with regard to Russia. To the continent’s eternal shame, as one senior British official told me, the apparently divided, dysfunctional, and declining power of the U.S. has still managed to send drastically more lethal aid to save a European democracy than any other NATO power. Such is America’s continuing dominance, in fact, that the world’s fixation on the idea of its impending demise seems both a dramatic overreaction and a dramatic underreaction. The depth of America’s military-industrial complex and the scale of its imperial bureaucracy mean that they are simply too heavy for a single president or Congress to remove in one go. To an extraordinary degree, American power has been vaccinated against its own political dysfunction, as Trump’s time in office showed. And yet the very weight of this Pax Americana means that if the vaccine ever stopped working, the consequences would be globally historic. In Poland and Japan, Taiwan and Ukraine, the very basis of the world order today rests on American supremacy. But besides talking about the fragility of these foundations, no one is actually doing anything to secure them.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › General

Hegemonic decline leads to global instability

Paudel 20 (Sirish Paudel is currently pursuing his Master's degree in International Relations from SIPA Jilin University, “Decline in US Hegemony: Will this Result in Hegemonic War or not?”, Modern Diplomacy, September 3 2020, , AYW)

According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system.

The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. [4]

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › Impacts › General

Heg maintains peace – key to global economic stability and preventing war

Paudel 20 Sirish Paudel is currently pursuing his Master's degree in International Relations from SIPA, Jilin University, “Decline in US Hegemony: Will this Result in Hegemonic War or not?”, Modern Diplomacy, September 3, 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/03/decline-in-us-hegemony-will-this-result-in-hegemonic-war-or-not/

norm to its former allies and enemies aftermath the second world war that led to the formation of the current liberal economic world order provides an explanation as to why in spite of US’ relative decline there is continuity for America’s liberal economic order. The rising challenger China can be considered to have been socialized – it has accepted US led international norms, and participates in various International Organizations. Thus, it makes less sense for China to wage war against the hegemon whose ideals it has internalized. According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system. The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise

China’s military is still far behind the US – nuclear subs, aircraft carries, and transport planes prove.

Stephen G. Brooks 23, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and a Guest Professor at Stockholm University, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, 4-18-2023, Foreign Affairs, "The Myth of Multipolarity," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-multipolarity-myth //AS

Militarily, meanwhile, most analysts still see China as far from being a global peer of the United States, despite the rapid modernization of Chinese forces. How significant and lasting is the U.S. advantage? Consider the capabilities that give the United States what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, the open sea, and space. Command of the commons is what makes the United States a true global military power. Until China can contest the United States’ dominance in this domain, it will remain merely a regional military power. We have counted 13 categories of systems as underlying this ability—everything from nuclear submarines to satellites to aircraft carriers to heavy transport planes—and China is below 20 percent of the U.S. level in all but five of these capabilities, and in only two areas (cruisers and destroyers; military satellites) does China have more than a third of the U.S. capability. The United States remains so far ahead because it has devoted immense resources to developing these systems over many decades; closing these gaps would also require decades of effort. The disparity becomes even greater when one moves beyond a raw count and factors in quality. The United States’ 68 nuclear submarines, for example, are too quiet for China to track, whereas China’s 12 nuclear submarines remain noisy enough for the U.S. Navy’s advanced antisubmarine warfare sensors to track them in deep water.

A comparison with the Soviet Union is instructive. The Red Army was a real peer of the U.S. military during the Cold War in a way that the Chinese military is not. The Soviets enjoyed three advantages that China lacks. First was favorable geography: with the conquest of Eastern Europe in World War II, the Soviets could base massive military force in the heart of Europe, a region that comprised a huge chunk of the world’s economic output. Second was a large commitment to guns over butter in a command economy geared toward the production of military power: the percentage of GDP that Moscow devoted to defense remained in the double digits throughout the Cold War, an unprecedented share for a modern great power in peacetime. Third was the relatively uncomplicated nature of military technology: for most of the Cold War, the Soviets could command their comparatively weak economy to swiftly match the United States’ nuclear and missile capability and arguably outmatch its conventional forces. Only in the last decade of the Cold War did the Soviets run into the same problem that China faces today: how to produce complex weapons that are competitive with those emerging from a technologically dynamic America with a huge military R & D budget (now $140 billion a year).