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2023 CNDI Negative
Off Case Args › Inflation DA › L – Job Guarantee

The Fed is bound by its dual-mandate – a job guarantee would force rate hikes to combat inevitable inflation

Jeff Spross, 5/2/18, The Week, “How the Democrats’ big jobs idea could upend the Fed,” https://theweek.com/articles/770699/how-democrats-big-jobs-idea-could-upend-fed, mm

This afternoon, the Federal Reserve will announce what it's doing with interest rates. These regular announcements are part of the central bank's sweeping role as the American economy's Great Balancer: eternally choosing how many jobs to create or destroy in exchange for higher or lower inflation. But this almost God-like mission would be completely remade if some ambitious Senate Democrats get their way. I'm referring to a national job guarantee. It's basically a public option for employment: The government would set up a system to track the work that local communities and groups need done, and then everyone who wants work can come and get matched to a job in their area. The government would pay everyone working for the program $15 an hour, plus health benefits. The idea is to drive unemployment as low as it can possibly go, especially for marginalized groups, and keep it there. The job guarantee would also create a floor for pay and benefits that the entire economy would have to meet or exceed. Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) already has legislation that would test run the idea in 15 localities around the country, presumably as a prelude to eventually going national. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), and Kamala Harris (D-Calif.) are co-sponsors. Meanwhile, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) is working on a separate bill that would create a national version right away. What does all this have to do with the Federal Reserve? Like I said, Congress has given the central bank a two-part job: maximize employment and keep prices low and stable. By cutting interest rates, the Fed accelerates job creation, but also potentially accelerates inflation as well. By hiking interest rates, as it's done recently, the Fed applies the brakes to both. This requires an eternal balance between the two priorities. But the issue goes deeper: Right now, the Fed assumes that if unemployment gets too low, inflation will rise unsustainably. The theory is that as jobless Americans become scarce, businesses have to attract already-employed workers to keep expanding. That sets off a bidding war between employers that drives wages up and up, and eventually forces the prices of goods up as well. And we get inflation. As Steve Goldstein pointedly put it, the Fed's mission is to guarantee that everyone doesn't have a job. Of course, that also means a job guarantee would instantly make the Fed a more benign force in the economy. The central bank would no longer move people from employment to unemployment when it hiked interest rates. It would simply move them from private sector employment to job guarantee employment. (This point is made repeatedly by pro-job guarantee economists.) It would also allow the Fed to concentrate on keeping prices low and stable — a change that, ironically enough, right-wing inflation hawks might appreciate. But by taking unemployment out of the Fed's control, we would also upend the conceptual framework it currently relies on. The central bank would have to come up with a whole new strategy, and a whole new set of principles, for when and how to adjust interest rates. The job guarantee would also create millions of new public employees — something conservatives definitely would not appreciate. This might force them to accept higher inflation levels, lest they expand a "nationalized" labor force. On the other hand, they might deliberately try to drive interest rates way up, and flood the program with more workers than it can handle. Then there's the question of how inflation itself would react. Experts who support the job guarantee argue it's not designed to compete with private employers for labor. During recessions, when private businesses lay people off, the size and spending of the job guarantee would naturally expand. That would also stimulate the rest of the economy back to health. As the private sector recovered, it would offer more jobs, outbidding the job guarantee's $15-an-hour floor. That would draw workers back into private employment, and the program's size and spending should shrink. As a result, job guarantee supporters argue the program will hit the economy's sweet spot: Maximizing employment without setting off a perpetual wage-price spiral. Sustained low unemployment will probably juice productivity rates as well, which should also lessen inflationary pressure. Making $15-an-hour the new minimum for the whole economy would likely force a one-time adjustment in wages across the income spectrum. That could lead to a temporary burst of inflation, at least. (Happily, the more private businesses adjust wages to meet that floor, the more workers they'll hold onto, and the more manageable the job guarantee's employment numbers are.) A job guarantee program would likely need some workers with prior experience in a host of fields, to mentor new workers and help them learn on the job. That may require at least some wage bidding wars with private employers. One group of economists also recommended building a wage scale into the job guarantee — i.e. make it possible for workers to get promotions. That would be a good non-punitive incentive for people to work hard and take job guarantee employment seriously. And it wouldn't necessarily lead to bidding wars over workers. (Private businesses promote workers to incentivize them as well, even when they're not looking to expand.) But it's a potential complicating factor. We've just never tried a policy like this before. We don't quite know how it will play out. It would be helpful to prepare the Fed for that, and keep its control over interest rates as a backstop. The simplest fix is probably just changing the Fed's mission: from maximizing employment and stabilizing inflation, to minimizing job guarantee employment and stabilizing inflation. Point being, Congress gave the Fed its current mandate, and it can give the Fed a new one. Should a job guarantee ever pass, the Fed will need the update.

2023 CNDI Negative
Off Case Args › Inflation DA › L – Job Guarantee

A job guarantee would trigger a wage-price spiral – ensures the Fed spikes interest rates

Dean Baker, 4/27/18, The Daily Beast, “Dems’ job guarantee isn’t nearly as easy as it sounds,” https://www.thedailybeast.com/dems-job-guarantee-isnt-nearly-as-easy-as-it-sounds, mm

There has been a surge of interest in the last year in the idea of a government job guarantee. A number of economists associated with the Levy Institute at Bard College and University of Missouri at Kansas City have long pushed the idea. In recent months, several potential candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination have publicly raised the idea, including senators Cory Booker and Kirsten Gillibrand, and of course Bernie Sanders, who has fully endorsed it. While the idea of guaranteeing a decent paying job to every worker who wants one is appealing, it is likely to prove a difficult lift in implementation. A guaranteed job would radically transform the labor market in a way that could put tens of millions of workers on the public payroll. This would almost certainly put many low-wage employers out of business and raise the costs to consumers of services like restaurants, haircuts, and house cleaning. It also effectively gives the government direct responsibility for allocating workers across regions. The basic issue is that the program is designed to guarantee all people decent pay through their work. The problem is that this guarantee will not only provide an opportunity to those currently unemployed or under-employed; it would provide a better option for tens of millions of workers who already have jobs. A key issue here is determining the number of people who might opt for this public program. That will depend on the wage rate. In the plan being pushed by the Levy Institute (politically, most closely associated with Sanders), the wage rate is $15 an hour. This is around the 25th percentile of the wage distribution, meaning that 25 percent of the workforce, or roughly 40 million workers, now gets less. The proposal also calls for health-care insurance equivalent to that received by federal employees. This would make the plan attractive to even more low-wage workers, most of whom do not get employer-provided health-care benefits. In addition, government jobs are likely to offer job security and protection against abuses by an employer, like sexual harassment, which is yet another reason why they may prove attractive to workers in the private sector. Given the number of workers who currently are paid less than the $15 an hour proposed wage, plus health care benefits that are worth at least $4 an hour, it might be that 10 million workers would leave private sector jobs for a guaranteed federal job. And that’s a conservative estimate; it could quite possibly be more than 20 million. With 10 million or so unemployed and underemployed workers, we are likely talking about having at least 20 million people in the program and perhaps over 30 million. Currently the federal workforce, excluding the Postal Service. is 2.2 million, so this is increasing the number of workers employed by the federal government by a factor of at least ten. The proposal calls for the program to be administered at the state and local level. This also presents issues (many of these governments have serious corruption problems), but even using state and local employment as a denominator, we would still be talking about doubling current levels. It requires some serious faith in government to think that this sort of leap in employment levels can be well-managed if done in a short period of time. It doesn’t help that many of these workers will have little education and job experience. There is also the issue of what happens in the private sector. The opportunity to get a public-sector job, with health-care insurance, paying $15 an hour, effectively imposes a floor on wages in the private sector. If we say that 50 million people now earn less than this package (the median wage is around $23 an hour – 80 million workers earn less), and the average gap is $4 an hour, then the additional cost to matching this wage in the private sector will be roughly $350 billion a year (this calculation assumes 1750 hours per worker and 50 million workers). That sum comes to roughly 1.8 percent of GDP. There also has to be some spillover effect. Workers who had been earning $16 or $17 an hour will have to see some bump in pay when the pay for those at the bottom jumps to $15 from levels that are currently as low as $7.25 an hour. If 20 million workers are in the bump range, and they get an average pay increase of $2 an hour, that raises the cost by another $70 billion, putting the total at $420 billion, or 2.1 percent of GDP. And this brings us to inflation. As a first approximation, this 2.1 percent figure would be the impact on the level of prices, although it would be dampened by reduced profit margins and increases in productivity. In any case, a Federal Reserve Board committed to a 2.0 percent inflation target would send interest rates soaring in response to this rise. But even if the Fed can be controlled, this rise in pay for those at the bottom will mean a reduction in living standards for those higher up. They will have to pay more for restaurants and haircuts, as well having their house cleaned and their lawn mowed. Most of us won’t shed any tears for the “hard to get good help” crowd, but if we haven’t taken steps to weaken their economic power—which won’t be easy because they are powerful—we can expect to see doctors, lawyers, and other high-end earners getting pay hikes to protect their living standards. This is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures.

2023 CNDI Negative
Off Case Args › Inflation DA › L – Green New Deal

The Green New Deal would spike inflation to 10% per year

Benjamin Zycher, April 2019, American Enterprise Institute, “The Green New Deal: Economics and Policy Analytics,” https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RPT-The-Green-New-Deal-5.5x8.5-FINAL.pdf, mm

Consider a GND [Green New Deal] to be financed through a fully anticipated inflation, constituting a tax on non-interest-bearing money. Assume also that all money except currency earns interest. Currency in circulation is about $1.7 trillion.129 If we assume, conservatively, that a GND financed with money creation would result in an anticipated inflation of 10 percent per year, then the implicit tax on currency, yielding a transfer of real resources to the government, would be about $170 billion per year. Note that this tax is less than the cost to the economy inflicted by the inflation, as individuals and businesses take actions to protect themselves from this tax. This is another dimension of the excess burden attendant upon governmental acquisition of real resources; estimates of this effect vary, but one survey of the literature finds: A number of empirical studies have sought to measure the interactions between inflation and the nominal nature of the U.S. tax system. Most find the costs are large. Authors James Bullard and Steven Russell, for example, suggest approximately a 1 percent output loss for each 1 percent increase in inflation above price stability.130 This inflationary version of the excess burden created by the government acquisition of resources would take the form of such adverse consequences as a degradation of the currency as a store of value, adverse behavioral responses by holders of currency, and the like. The use of money creation to service debt incurred to finance the GND also is deeply dubious, as any such approach would be based on an assumption that purchasers of government debt instruments will deliver real resources to the government with no expectation of receiving repayment in an equivalent amount of real resources, plus interest. It cannot be the case that lenders to the government are so myopic.

2023 CNDI Negative
Off Case Args › Inflation DA › L – Green New Deal

Financing the Green New Deal will trigger an inflation-interest rate spiral

Greg Ip, 2/20/2019, Wall Street Journal, “Green New Deal Won’t Enjoy a Free Lunch at the Fed,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/green-new-deal-wont-enjoy-a-free-lunch-at-the-fed-11550658601, mm

When advocates of a Green New Deal are asked how the U.S. can afford its lavish promises of 100% renewable energy, millions of high-paid jobs and Medicare for all, they have a ready reply. "We will pay for the Green New Deal the same way we paid for the original New Deal, World War II, the 2008 bank bailout, extended quantitative easing programs, all our current wars," said a blog post that appeared earlier this month on the website of Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D., N.Y.). "The Federal Reserve can extend credit to power these projects." The Fed extending credit is a euphemism for printing money. To critics, it sounds like a guarantee for inflation. Not necessarily: the Fed prints money all the time without creating inflation. The problem is that once you work through the mechanics, it doesn't save any money. At the end of the day, the Green New Deal will face the same constraints that all such undertakings do: They can't spend more than the economy can produce. Ignoring those constraints will either lead to inflation, a politically weakened Fed, or both. By law, the Fed can buy any obligation issued by the Treasury or a federal agency such as Ginnie Mae. From the end of 2008 through 2015, the Fed, via quantitative easing, bought nearly $4 trillion of Treasurys and securities backed by mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which Treasury took over in 2008. So the Fed could certainly buy federally-guaranteed Green New Deal bonds, provided doing so helped it reach its own monetary-policy goals. Quantitative easing, for example, was designed to pull down long-term interest rates, thereby propping up growth and staving off deflation—not to help the federal government borrow. Similarly, the Fed lent to banks and other financial companies during the 2008 crisis as their lender of last resort. To be sure, it stretched the boundaries of that authority, but it didn't need any prodding; the alternative, Fed officials figured, was a complete collapse of the financial system. There have been times, though, when the Fed subordinated its usual goals to help the Treasury. During World War I, it kept interest rates low and lent to private banks to ease the sale of war bonds. During World War II, it agreed to cap Treasury yields and buy debt to support the war effort. On both occasions, wartime spending pressures fueled inflation that the Fed had to beat back after peace returned. Sarah Binder, a political scientist at the George Washington University who has studied the Fed, says the episode most relevant to the present was Congress' decision in 1966 to authorize the Fed to buy federal-agency debt for the purposes of supporting the housing market. In Congressional hearings, "the Fed was vocal about not wanting to make those purchases." It saw them, she said, as "choosing winners and losers and crossing the boundaries into fiscal policy." Suppose a future president or Congress similarly pressures the Fed to buy Green New Deal debt. Since the Fed would ultimately return any interest it earns on such bonds to the Treasury, this might sound like a big money-saver. But it isn't. To buy a Green New Deal bond, it wouldn't buy an equivalent amount of Treasury bonds, so the net savings would be effectively zero. To absorb the extra Treasury debt, investors might have to charge other borrowers more, potentially "crowding out" private investment. What if it bought the bonds by printing money, as quantitative easing involved? As a practical matter, the Fed doesn't literally print new currency, it electronically creates reserves—money that commercial banks keep on deposit at the Fed. If it did so when the economy was depressed, then interest rates would already be zero and the Green New Deal debt could be sold to private investors almost as cheaply. If the Fed bought the bonds in normal times, when interest rates are above zero, it would have to pay interest on the reserves it issues to banks, offsetting the income earned on the bonds, as it has done since 2015. Indeed, between 2014 and 2018, its remittances to Treasury fell by a third. So the Fed can't make a Green New Deal cheaper without compromising its control of interest rates and thus inflation. Green New Deal advocates think inflation risks are exaggerated. A massive increase in the deficit, whether financed by the Fed or private investors, could create many millions of jobs without exceeding the economy's productive capacity, they say. It isn't impossible—unemployment has already fallen lower and employment grown faster than many economists thought possible without triggering inflation. But to run up the deficit on a bet those trends can go considerably further looks unnecessary and risky. Unnecessary because the Fed is already probing how low unemployment can drop without spurring inflation. Risky because if inflation does take off, so will interest rates, and all that Green New Deal debt will start to snowball.

2023 CNDI Negative
Off Case Args › Inflation DA › L – Green New Deal

The Green New Deal would spike inflation and interest rates.

Greg Ip, 2/13/19, Wall Street Journal, “The Unrealistic Economics of the Green New Deal,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-expensive-divisive-way-to-fight-climate-change-11550055780, mm

Because the private market has no incentive to reduce carbon emissions, the government intervention is necessary. But not all interventions are created equal, and the Green New Deal’s seem engineered to be as expensive as possible. Consider its goal of massive public investment to achieve 100% renewable energy in as little as 10 years. Kevin Book, head of research at ClearView Energy Partners, a research firm, estimates replacing the 84% of current U.S. generation that is not renewable with solar photovoltaic, wind and biomass would cost $2.9 trillion - nearly a full year’s tax revenue. This excludes a cost for interest, operations, maintenance, new transmission lines or compensation to private investors for writing off natural-gas and coal plants with plenty of useful life left. It assumes cheap batter storage that doesn’t yet exist. Even so, this works out to $83 to avoid one metric ton of carbon dioxide. The Green New Deal’s plan to upgrade every building in the U.S. to “maximum energy efficiency” is even more questionable. A study by Meredith Fowlie, Michael Greenstone and Catherine Wolfram in the Quarterly Journal of Economics found the federal government paid an average of $4,585 each to weatherize homes in Michigan. Extrapolate that to 95 million homes nationwide, and the bill tops $400 billion. The cost of avoided carbon dioxide: up to $285 per ton. To understand how high $84 to $285 per ton of carbon dioxide is, consider that Barack Obama’s economists put the economic harm of a ton of C02 at $50. Or that you can pay a power producer just $6 to reduce emissions by one ton in New England, $15 in California, and $25 in the European Union, based on emissions permit prices in those jurisdictions, notes Mr. Greenstone, an economist at the University of Chicago. Yet in the Green New Deal, trillion-dollar price tags are a feature, not a bug. That is because its mission is to create “millions of good, high-wage jobs” in “front-line and vulnerable communities.” The higher the price tag, the more jobs it creates. How to pay for it? Its Democratic sponsors would raise taxes on the rich and borrow the rest, including from the Federal Reserve, just as the U.S. did during World War II, dramatically boosting output and employment. But in 1941, the U.S. had plenty of unused resources to mobilize: just 28% of prime-aged women had jobs. By 1945, 35% did and today, 74% do. (The data aren’t strictly comparable due to changing definitions). The war effort still spurred intensive inflation pressure, contained only with wage and price controls. The U.S. is now close to full employment and its debts are far higher. Even in today’s world of low inflation and low interest rates, the scale of deficit spending the Green New Deal implies would likely push both higher.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › No Solvency – Skill Mismatch

No jobs in FJG proposals can be done with the FJG- too vague, and unsuitable for cyclical program with limited training ability

Bruenig 18 (Matt Bruenig, lawyer, political commentator and founder of People’s Policy Project, 3-22-2018, "Some Notes on Federal Job Guarantee Proposals," People's Policy Project, ) @HA?

The Jobs The last problem I will discuss here is the problem of coming up with suitable jobs. This to me remains the biggest challenge that is really not satisfactorily answered in JG programs. Hugh Sturgess has provided the most eloquent articulation of this problem I’ve seen so far. Sturgess argues that JG job ideas, justifications, and criteria combine to form an “impossible quadrilateral:” [I]t is not possible for JG jobs to display all of the following qualities: requiring only basic skills (needed for universal eligibility); socially beneficial; indifferent to time (as JG work is countercyclical); and distinct from the rest of the public sector. Any attempt to achieve one criterion requires abandoning another. He continues: These can be divided into three overarching tensions: (1) many suggested JG jobs require skills that are not commensurate with the minimum wage; (2) most social needs are ongoing, so should not be addressed through short-term jobs provided in a countercyclical fashion; and (3) it is difficult to keep the JG and the mainline public sector distinct. To get more concrete about this point, it’s best to just look at the jobs being proposed. Here’s Paul: [1] the repair, maintenance, and expansion of the nation’s infrastructure, housing stock, and public buildings; [2] energy efficiency upgrades to public and private buildings; [3] assistance with ecological restoration and services to reduce the country’s carbon footprint; [4] engagement in community development projects; [5] provision of high-quality preschool and afterschool services; provision of teachers’ aids; [6] provision of high-quality elder care and companionship; [7] rejuvenation of the nation’s defunded postal service; [8] support for the arts; and [9] other activities that shall support the public good Ideas 3, 4, 7, and 9 are too vague to assess. Ideas 1 and 2 require a lot of skill and training, which is not suitable for a JG program. It is also hard to imagine how a local job guarantee administration would manage to pull off building a bridge or a house by itself. Ideas 5 and 6 require considerable amounts of skill and training and are also permanently needed, which make them unsuitable for a cyclical jobs program. Additionally, we generally expect people who work with children, elderly people, and disabled people to be vetted as most are not comfortable allowing just anyone to care for vulnerable groups. Idea 8 is the only one of the bunch that looks promising, though it’s debatable how much social value it carries and it is also hard to imagine that many of the kinds of people who would go through the JG program would want to do “the arts.” Of course, the “impossible quadrilateral” only presents itself because of the claims made by JG advocates. The challenge posed by it is easily solved once you drop the “socially beneficial” claims, which frankly seem implausible. It seems possible to have a program that absorbs workers in downturns and assigns them to low-value, low-capital, low-skilled (“make-work”) jobs in order to keep them activated. But since this is not a very sexy thing to talk about, proponents inevitably exaggerate in ways that create incoherence.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › No Solvency – Skill Mismatch

Their scholarship relies on fundamentally incorrect assumptions about the economy and technology – our card answers every aff objection.

Morriss, PhD Econ, et. al, 09

(Morriss, Andrew (Prof. Econ, Dean of the School of Innovation, and Vice President for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development@Texas A&M University, PhD Econ@MIT), Bogart, William T. (President of Maryville College, PhD Econ@Princeton), Meiners, Roger (Prof. Econ and Law@University of Texas at Arlington, PhD Econ@Virginia Tech), Dorchak, Andrew (Head of Reference Library@Case Western Reserve University School of Law). “Green Jobs Myths,” Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law, Spring 2009. https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1339&context=jesl)

Unfortunately, the analysis provided in the green jobs literature is deeply flawed, resting on a series of myths about the economy, the environment, and technology. We have explored the problems in the green jobs analysis in depth; we now conclude by summarizing the mythologies of green jobs in seven myths about green jobs: Myth 1: There is such a thing as a "green job." There is no coherent definition of a green job. Green jobs appear to be ones that pay well, are interesting to do, produce products that environmental groups prefer, and do so in a unionized workplace. Yet such criteria have little to do with the environmental impacts of the jobs. To build a coalition for a far reaching transformation of modern society, "green jobs" have become a mechanism to deliver something for every member of a real or imagined coalition to buy their support for a radical transformation of society. Myth 2: Creating green jobs will boost productive employment. Green jobs estimates include huge numbers of clerical, bureaucratic, and administrative positions that do not produce goods and services for consumption. Simply hiring people to write and enforce regulations, fill out forms, and process paperwork is not a recipe for creating wealth. Much of the promised boost in green employment turns out to be in nonproductive (but costly) positions that raise costs for consumers. Myth 3: Green jobs forecasts are reliable. The forecasts for green employment optimistically predict an employment boom, which is welcome news. Unfortunately, the forecasts, which are sometimes amazingly detailed, are unreliable because they are based on questionable estimates by interest groups of tiny base numbers in employment, extrapolation of growth rates from those small base numbers, and a pervasive, biased, and highly selective optimism about which technologies will improve. Moreover, the estimates use a technique (input-output analysis) that is inappropriate to the conditions of technological change presumed by the green jobs literature itself. This yields seemingly precise estimates that give the illusion of scientific reliability to numbers that are simply the result of the assumptions made to begin the analysis. Myth 4: Green jobs promote employment growth. Green jobs estimates promise greatly expanded (and pleasant and well-paid) employment. This promise is false. The green jobs model is built on promoting inefficient use of labor, favoring technologies because they employ large numbers rather than because they make use of labor efficiently. In a competitive market, factors of production, including labor, earn a return based on productivity. By focusing on low labor productivity jobs, the green jobs literature dooms employees to low wages in a shrinking economy. Economic growth cannot be ordered by Congress or by the U.N. Interference in the economy by restricting successful technologies in favor of speculative technologies favored by special interests will generate stagnation. Myth 5: The world economy can be remade based on local production and reduced consumption without dramatically decreasing human welfare. The green jobs literature rejects the benefits of trade, ignores opportunity costs, and fails to include consumer surplus in welfare calculations to promote its vision. This is a recipe for an economic disaster, not an ecotopia. The twentieth century saw many experiments in creating societies that did not engage in trade and did not value personal welfare. The economic and human disasters that resulted should have conclusively settled the question of whether nations can withdraw into autarky. The global integration of wind turbine production, for example, illustrates that even green technology is not immune from economic reality. Myth 6: Mandates are a substitute for markets. Green jobs proponents assume that they can reorder society by mandating preferred technologies. But the responses to mandates are not the same as the responses to market incentives. There is powerful evidence that market incentives induce the resource conservation that green jobs advocates purport to desire. The cost of energy is a major incentive to redesign production processes and products to use less energy. People do not want energy; they want the benefits of energy. Those who can deliver more desired goods and services by reducing the energy cost of production will be rewarded. There is so little evidence that successful command and control regimes accomplishing conservation. Myth 7: Wishing for technological progress is sufficient. The preferred technologies in the green jobs literature face significant problems in scaling up to the levels proposed. These problems are documented in readily available technical literatures, but resolutely ignored in the green jobs reports. At the same time, existing technologies that fail to meet the green jobs proponents political criteria are simply rejected out of hand. This selective technological optimism/pessimism is not a sufficient basis for remaking society to fit the dream of planners, politicians, patricians, or plutocrats who want others to live lives they think other people should be forced to lead. To attempt to transform modem society on the scale proposed by even the most modest bits of the green jobs literature, such as the Conference of Mayors report, is an effort of staggering complexity and scale. To do so based on the combination of wishful thinking and bad economics embodied in the green jobs literature would be the height of irresponsibility. We have no doubt that there will be significant opportunities to develop new energy sources, new industries, and new jobs in the future. Just as has been true for all of human history thus far, we are equally confident that a market-based discovery process will do a far better job of developing those energy sources, industries, and jobs than could a series of mandates based on imperfect information.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › No Solvency – Skill Mismatch

Lack of workforce interoperability and training means that guaranteed jobs can’t engage in building green infrastructure or building energy sources.

Dolan, PhD Econ@Yale, 20

(Dolan, Ed (Snr. Fellow for Fiscal and Monetary Policy@Niskanen Center, Fmr. Prof. Econ@Dartmouth University). “Can We Put Everyone to Work? — The Alternatives to a ‘Job Guarantee,’” Niskanen Center, January 14, 2020. https://www.niskanencenter.org/can-we-put-everyone-to-work-the-alternatives-to-a-job-guarantee)

Second, I think advocates overstate the ease of creating 10 to 15 million meaningful new public service jobs. To avoid competing with the private sector, they could not be jobs in hotels or factories. They could not require advanced skills or investments in heavy equipment, which would mean JG workers could play a limited role in projects like replacing aging bridges or building green energy infrastructure. When we read advocates’ descriptions of JG jobs, they talk about things like teachers’ aides, recycling, and planting trees on vacant lots. How many workers could be absorbed in such jobs before they became mere make-work?

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › No Solvency – Skill Mismatch

No Solvency – Skill mismatches and logistical hurdles

Bhandari, PhD candidate, 19

(Third Way. 3-25-2019, Former Senior Policy Advisor, Economic Programhttps://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it )

#1: It solves a different problem. Right now there are over seven million open jobs and six million unemployed people. Yet, many of these jobs are going unfilled. Why? Many people don’t have the right mix of skills or training. New jobs are often in different places than old ones. Childcare and transportation are often prohibitively expensive. And others struggle with opioid addiction and other conditions. And yet, a federal jobs guarantee doesn’t address any of this. Even during economic downturns, there are better and far more efficient ways to help workers and communities such as targeted public works programs, hiring credits for employers, temporary tax cuts for working families, extended unemployment insurance, and money to shore up state and local budgets.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › Turns Inequality

GND fails – written by professional class for the working class, not of the working class – continues marginalization of communities at the hands of capitalism

Huber 21 – [Matt Huber, Professor at Syracuse University, "Why the Green New Deal Has Failed — So Far," Jacobin, 5-10-2021, https://jacobin.com/2021/05/green-new-deal-climate-change] /jsam

In March 2020, the position of Bernie’s campaign went from front-runner to certain defeat in a matter of weeks — followed by the onset of COVID-19. The GND activist base quickly recalibrated strategy, from building a movement around a candidate we wanted to “pushing” the candidate we were stuck with. In April, a coalition of neoliberal Democrats, large environmental organizations, Sunrise, and other GND leaders was announced called “Climate Power 2020.” In May, Julian Brave NoiseCat, a staffer at Data for Progress, declared that the movement was ready to align with the Democrats: “We’re moving from a phase of contention and division within the party . . . into one of alignment.” Strategically, one could say these alliances were necessary to defeat Trump, but it was a jarringly rapid shift from militancy to assimilation. The most notable collaboration was the Unity Task Force on Climate Change — one of six task forces intended to unite the Biden and Sanders wings of the party. This task force included Ocasio-Cortez and Sunrise cofounder Varshini Prakash, as well as establishment figures like John Kerry and conservative Democrats like Pennsylvania representative Conor Lamb. Out of the negotiations came Biden’s climate plan in July, which was heralded for its historic ambition. It featured a goal of spending $2 trillion and completely decarbonizing the electric sector by 2035. The plan seemed to signal Biden’s endorsement of the Green New Deal, but two months later, both Biden and his vice presidential pick, Kamala Harris, refused to admit this on the debate stages. Since Biden’s win, Sunrise and other GND advocates have been laser-focused on his cabinet appointments. Biden has created two new cabinet-level climate positions and wants to put climate at the center of all the cabinet agencies’ activities. The appointment of New Mexico representative Deb Haaland as interior secretary — an indigenous woman and a supporter of the Green New Deal and Medicare for All — was probably the most significant win on this front. But, overall, the New York Times reports, “Mr. Biden remains a centrist, establishment politician. And he is crafting a centrist, establishment administration.” If Obama’s cabinet picks represented a right-wing administration handpicked by Citigroup, Biden promises a move to the center-right. The once-militant GND movement also shifted to less confrontational and choreographed rallies meant to “push” Biden left. As a journalist reported at a late-November rally, “Their posture was less confrontational than two years ago.” To give credit, the GND movement has clearly shifted the “Overton window” of what is possible in climate politics. From 2008 through 2016, the main policy debate was between neoliberal market schemes — either carbon tax or cap and trade. It is quite impressive to see that Biden’s plan doesn’t even mention carbon pricing and focuses much more on public investment and “good union jobs.” Yet simply granting radical GND activists “a seat at the table” will in no way guarantee them the power to implement their agenda. The fact is that Biden’s $2 trillion climate plan is just as unlikely to pass Congress as Obama’s cap-and-trade legislation was (even with the Senate). The Democrats’ Overton window only appears to shift what can be proposed, not what can be implemented. Biden appears poised to reproduce Obama’s commitment to what Skocpol called “corporatist bargaining” — bringing all the stakeholders to the table, including the affected industries. As Jane McAlevey reminds us, this “confuse[s] access for power.” It is this kind of bargaining that leads to industry-friendly half measures like cap and trade or the Affordable Care Act. Even Janet Yellen, the former chair of the Federal Reserve and the new Treasury secretary — a pick that progressives have largely welcomed — is a founding member of the Climate Leadership Council: a collaboration with major oil and gas firms that remains committed to carbon pricing as the sensible approach to solving the climate crisis. Just recently, Biden’s pick for “climate envoy,” John Kerry, was quoted as saying about oil companies, “I’m reaching out to them because I want to hear from them . . . I’m listening to what their needs are.” The main problem remains that the GND movement is still, at its core, based in professional-class activist networks in academia, NGOs, and think tanks. Take one of the key demands of the Biden plan emerging out of the Climate Unity Task Force: 40 percent of Biden’s $2 trillion in spending was to be allocated to so-called frontline communities. This is the name for communities most at risk from climate disasters (e.g., coastal communities) as well as those directly exposed to risks from fossil fuel systems (e.g., black communities along the “cancer alley” of chemical production on the Gulf Coast). Sunrise’s Prakash called this a “huge” win for the GND movement, and it was seen as one of the main concessions to the task force’s “progressive” wing. Of course, any climate action should focus on those most directly affected by climate risks. But this is less of a real material pledge to these communities than it is a concession to the GND activists’ core moral sensibilities. Indeed, the language of justice, frontline communities, and centering the most marginalized — what I call “livelihood environmentalism” — is like moralistic catnip for this activist base. While this language inundates grant applications and academic jobs, poor and marginalized communities continue to face the injustice of disproportionate environmental risks. They still lack the kind of broad-based coalition — that is, power — to take on capitalist energy firms that threaten their livelihoods. Moreover, the entire plan to devote 40 percent of spending to frontline communities would amount to means testing in practice. Who qualifies as “frontline”? Who speaks for particular communities? Biden’s plan calls for a “Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool to help identify these disadvantaged communities.” I’m sure the communities deemed not “disadvantaged” enough by this tool will find it a fair process.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › Turns Inequality

A green job guarantee hurts the working class

Huber 21 – [Matt Huber, Professor at Syracuse University, "Why the Green New Deal Has Failed — So Far," Jacobin, 5-10-2021, https://jacobin.com/2021/05/green-new-deal-climate-change] /jsam

As I will detail below, however, all the excitement around the GND was predicated on the idea of the Left occupying state power; a prospect that crashed on the electoral realities of 2020. We now face a neoliberal Biden presidency and the slimmest of Democratic margins in both houses of Congress. There are still far too many right-wing Democrats who can stall a GND agenda (not to mention Biden himself). What we need now is a sober analysis of the balance of class forces to understand what is and is not possible. We also need to recognize the ongoing danger of Biden and the Democratic Party — still staunchly a party of capital — assimilating the more radical GND coalition into the dead-end conciliatory politics of compromise and half measures. With the excitement of the Bernie Sanders presidential runs behind us, our only option now is to commit to strengthening working-class organization in the workplace and beyond, where durable political commitments and power can be built. What follows is a narrative history of the climate stalemate over the last twelve years. We still need to understand the almost inexplicable level of inaction on what many describe as the greatest crisis humanity has ever faced. The last four years have built momentum toward real transformation, but the last year shows some concerning trends of movement conciliation before the fight really begins. The Green New Deal Movement’s Failed Bid for State Power, 2017–April 2020 In a case of silver linings, the election of a deranged reality star as president in 2016 emboldened the Left. Having united behind the nearly successful 2016 Bernie Sanders run, Trump’s victory — combined with Hillary Clinton’s incompetent campaign — felt like the death knell of Third Way neoliberalism. Frustration with the neoliberal center pushed left environmental movements to more confidently distance themselves from standard market policies like carbon pricing. For much of the 2010s, the carbon tax was seen as common sense: it was included in Bernie Sanders’s platform, and Jacobin ran articles promoting its policy advantages. By 2017, it was clear that neoliberal market tinkering underestimated the scale of the crisis. As Aronoff put it in her formative essay “No Third Way for the Planet”: “Framing the carbon tax as a silver bullet for the planet’s ills runs a deadly serious risk of obscuring how big the changes physics demands really are.” Additionally, carbon pricing could easily be framed by the Right as “costs” to everyday working people. On cue, the 2018 French “yellow vest” movement proved you can’t implement a climate agenda through carbon taxes on the back of an already strapped working class. A consensus formed on the climate left that we needed to construct political demands that were less about wonky market fixes and more about delivering real material benefits. In early 2018, climate activists were arguing that the GND could be the “Medicare for All of climate change.” The urgency was intensified by the famous October 2018 IPCC report, which suggested that limiting warming to 1.5 degrees required “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.” The GND exploded onto the scene in mid-November 2018, when Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez teamed up with the Sunrise Movement to occupy the office of Democratic Party leader Nancy Pelosi. This sit-in for a GND — with signs reading “Green Jobs for All” — created massive media attention and excitement in the climate policy community. It is notable that Ocasio-Cortez chose climate as her first policy intervention, just weeks before being sworn in as an elected member of Congress. She understood that the scale of the crisis contained all the elements of resurrecting a left working-class agenda: confrontation with corporate power, redistribution from the rich, and massive public investment based on a job guarantee. After the sit-in, Ocasio-Cortez’s office, along with left think tanks like New Consensus, started working out the details of what a Green New Deal could look like. The official rollout came in February 2019, with the introduction of the nonbinding Green New Deal resolution, cosponsored by Ocasio-Cortez and Massachusetts senator Ed Markey. This rollout was, unfortunately, badly botched. Ocasio-Cortez’s office released an FAQ document to the media. The document — which appeared to be written by her then–chief of staff, Saikat Chakrabarti — was not only poorly written and sloppy but contained alienating environmentalist language like describing a long-term goal to “fully get rid of farting cows and airplanes.” Of course, the FAQ document was immediately taken up by Fox News to paint the GND as a liberal austerity plot by elite do-gooders to take things away from the working class. Congressman Rob Bishop from Utah held an event where he accused the GND of wanting to “control [his] life” and take away his right to eat hamburgers: “If this goes through, this [hamburger] will be outlawed.” He took a bite while his allies pleaded, “Pass it around!” This event was specifically reacting to a comment by Ocasio-Cortez suggesting people could eat fewer burgers. While such a statement is undoubtedly true, it shows how difficult it is for the environmentalist left to maintain message discipline and highlight material gains. The typical scolding around what we must all give up plays directly into the Right’s hands. Later in 2019, Bernie Sanders announced his own Green New Deal platform. Many scientists immediately heralded it as the first presidential climate plan that matched the scale of the crisis. In contrast, his apparent progressive rival Elizabeth Warren’s plan promised to green the military. Much of the pundit class focused on the plan’s price tag of $16 trillion, but its most radical and distinctive aspect was Sanders’s proposal to expand publicly owned electricity. Taking its cue from a People’s Policy Project proposal for a green Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Sanders proposed expanding the TVA, in addition to a plan to “pour funding into the four existing ‘power marketing administrations’ that are overseen by the Energy Department.” One In These Times headline read, “Bernie Sanders Calls to Seize the Means of Electricity Production.” Sanders’s plan was exceptional because — unlike much public power activism that focuses on local control or municipalization — it sought large-scale nationwide restructuring of the electricity industry toward public control and planning. This is exactly the approach we need, since we are not likely to “municipalize” individual utilities one community at a time. Neoliberals criticized this plan because it would create a public option for electricity that distorted the market. As Third Way energy expert Joshua Freed put it, “What the Sanders proposal would do is create an 800-pound federally owned power gorilla that would make it very hard for the existing generators to compete.” Given that it is those very same generators who continue to burn fossil fuels to make profit for investors, isn’t that exactly the point? No other Democratic Party contenders, however, were willing to say this out loud. As we know, Sunrise and the larger climate movement got behind the Sanders campaign — but it failed. This loss had unavoidable implications for the entire Green New Deal project that had gained such momentum between 2018 and 2020. I offer three critical appraisals. First, the GND was a breakthrough for environmental politics in its assertion of a working-class program. Yet we should keep in mind a difference articulated by trade unionist Andrew Murray — and repeated by Leo Panitch and coauthors — between a “class-focused” and a “class-rooted” politics. The recent resurgence of the Left — what Anton Jäger calls “left populism” — is clearly a politics for and not of the working class. This was decidedly the case with the Green New Deal. It was a brilliant policy framework but still one formulated by academics, think tanks, and NGO professionals: a politics of the professional class for the working class. Perhaps most of the energy behind GND organizing was driven by aspirant professionals: high school and college students involved in the Sunrise Movement, Zero Hour, and the student climate strike. Although Sunrise boasts an army of young activists and employs militant language, it was itself born from the environmental NGO complex — its origins include a $50,000 grant and office space from the Sierra Club Foundation in 2017. It also runs a political action committee (PAC) that raised $2.3 million in the 2020 election cycle. The professional-class base behind the GND allowed much of the activist language specific to this class to infiltrate the program. Although Sanders and the People’s Policy Project advanced a national public power plan, activists focused on more localist “community-owned, and community-accountable” visions of public power, like a small solar co-op in Brooklyn. These not only fall into the trap of what Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams call “folk politics” — an emphasis on the small-scale, local, and grassroots against any large-scale vision of social change — but are obviously out of step with the scale of the climate crisis, which will not be solved one Brooklyn co-op at a time. Second, much of the organizing between 2017 and 2020 was predicated on the intoxicating promise of the Left winning state power — particularly at the executive level. Prior to defeat, Panitch and coauthors excitedly described the Corbyn and Sanders movements: “Nothing like this has happened in at least three generations.” They speculated about what a “socialist-led government” would face and suggested that much of the Left was still marked by a “failure to prepare adequately for the challenge of transforming state apparatuses.” Similarly, Mike McCarthy, writing in Jacobin, warned that “our first 100 days could be a nightmare.” Now, the nightmare is simply the harsh electoral realities. But the entire GND program had to be delivered through the state. This was so alluring because, as Christian Parenti and Andreas Malm rightly argue, it is hard to imagine such a scale of transformation being achieved without the coercive and fiscal power of the state. After all, it was the state that delivered the original New Deal — much of which consisted of tremendous new investments in energy infrastructure. Third, the theory of change was backward. Sanders had promised that, once in office, he would awaken the sleeping giant of the working class and build an extra-electoral mass movement to confront Wall Street, health insurance conglomerates, and the fossil fuel industry. It was unique that the “organizer in chief” understood that he alone could not implement his agenda. Yet Sanders himself probably suspected that winning state power before achieving mass working-class organization is not how it works. The necessary hordes of formerly disillusioned working-class voters did not turn out in the primaries as we hoped. Quite the opposite — the threat of Sanders led to a turnout surge among suburban liberals and people Matt Karp termed “Halliburton Democrats.” Too much of the existing working class is still beset by apathetic cynicism, or what the late Mark Fisher called “reflexive impotence”: “[People] know things are bad, but . . . know they can’t do anything about it.” It is clear that a working-class politics — let alone a “socialist-led government” — cannot be conjured from nothing. We will need to build capable working-class organizations first (e.g., strong unions, media, and other infrastructure), before we can expect to vie for state power. As Jane McAlevey asserts, there are still no shortcuts to building power. The Green New Deal and Bernie Sanders’s campaign were always a shortcut. Given the intense timeline we are facing on climate change, they were a shortcut worth pursuing.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › Turns Innovation

Federal Jobs guarantee stalls innovation

Bradley Thomas, 10-25-2019 -- creator of the website Erasethestate.com and is a libertarian activist and writer with nearly 15 years experience researching and writing on political philosophy and economics.

"Why Bernie Sanders's Universal Job Guarantee Is Fool's Gold,", https://fee.org/articles/why-universal-job-guarantees-are-fool-s-gold/

Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders doubled down when asked about his universal jobs guarantee included in last Tuesday night’s Democratic debates. “Damn right, we will” create jobs for every adult in the workforce, he insisted. But Sanders’s promise of jobs for all, however appealing it may sound, aims at the wrong target. In what Henry Hazlitt described as “the fetish of full employment” in his 1946 classic Economics in One Lesson, Hazlitt declared that the goal of full employment is fool’s gold. Prioritize Production to Create Jobs Instead of focusing on policies to maximize employment, Hazlitt declared, “We can clarify our thinking if we put our chief emphasis where it belongs—on policies that will maximize production.” Why focus on maximizing production rather than jobs? Creating jobs is easy. As Hazlitt wrote, “Nothing is easier to achieve than full employment, once it is divorced from the goal of full production and taken as an end in itself.” The key to a healthy economy is increasing production using less and less labor. Economist Milton Friedman was once traveling overseas and spotted a construction site in which the workers were using shovels instead of more modern equipment like bulldozers. When his host responded that the goal was to increase the number of jobs in the construction industry, Friedman replied, “Then instead of shovels, why don’t you give them spoons and create even more jobs?” The key to a healthy economy, conversely, is increasing production using less and less labor. Trying to exclusively “create jobs” or provide universal job guarantees can lead to perverse incentives like restricting workers’ access to productivity-enhancing capital goods in order to require more workers than necessary to produce goods and services. Under a plan like Sanders’s, a project would be considered more successful the more people it employed relative to the value of the product of the work performed. In short, success would be measured by making labor less and less efficient. How can it benefit society to demand, say, 200 workers build a bridge that could have been built using 100? As Hazlitt wrote, The economic goal of any nation, as of any individual, is to get the greatest results with the least effort. The whole economic progress of mankind has consisted in getting more production with the same labor. The Power of Creating Value Value creation, not a measure of employment, is the true measure of economic well-being. Imagine if society could enjoy a luxurious standard of living that requires only half of the people to work to provide it. Hazlitt asked, The real question is not how many millions of jobs there will be in America ten years from now, but how much we produce, and what, in consequence, will be our standard of living? Moreover, Hazlitt dismissed concerns that labor-saving capital goods would cause significant unemployment. Indeed, he argued the opposite. “[O]ur real objective is to maximize production. In doing this, full employment—that is, the absence of involuntary idleness – becomes a necessary byproduct,” he wrote. Prioritizing employment over productivity puts the cart before the horse. He noted, [P]roduction is the end, employment merely the means. We cannot continuously have the fullest production without full employment. But we can very easily have full employment without full production. And the labor that is freed up due to productivity gains can be employed in satisfying other needs and wants of consumers, often new or not-yet imagined desires. As Steve Jobs said to Business Week in 1998: "It's really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of times, people don't know what they want until you show it to them." If labor is tied up using spoons in make-work, government-sponsored “job guarantee” jobs, who will produce the next big thing? Government jobs programs will not only tend to reward less efficient labor but will also tend to tie the labor force to current modes of production, allowing less opportunity for life-changing innovations. In sum, high levels of employment do not necessarily mean prosperity. As Hazlitt concluded, “Primitive tribes are naked, and wretchedly fed and housed, but they do not suffer from unemployment.”

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › Alt Causes – Other Countries

Even a 100% green U.S. would do little to combat climate change – other countries pick up the slack in C02 emissions

Loris 19 Nicolas D. Loris is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in Energy and Environmental Policy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom, at The Heritage Foundation. “The Green New Deal: A Raw Deal for American Taxpayers, Energy Consumers, and the Economy,” Heritage Foundation, February 25, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-green-new-deal-raw-deal-american-taxpayers-energy-consumers-and-the-economy ///Mgal

Ineffectiveness. No matter where one stands on the urgency to combat climate change, the Green New Deal policies would be ineffective in combatting climate change. In fact, the U.S. could cut its carbon dioxide emissions 100 percent and it would not make a difference in global warming. Using the same climate sensitivity (the warming effect of a doubling of carbon dioxide emissions) as the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assumes in its modeling, the world would only be less than 0.2 degree Celsius cooler by 2100 Instead of a massive “tax, subsidize, and regulate” approach, policymakers should put forth policy improvements that will drive innovation among all forms of energy. Wishful Thinking. Although one of the priorities of the Green New Deal is to make the U.S. a lead exporter in green technologies, assuming developing countries will forego cheap abundant carbon dioxide–emitting energy for more expensive intermittent sources is pure fantasy. Developing countries will likely expand their use of renewable power sources, but not to the extent it will have any meaningful impact on global temperatures. While some countries are shuttering their coal-fired plants, others in both developed and developing countries are building new plants and expanding the life of existing generators. Affordable, reliable, and widely available energy is essential to lifting people out of poverty and improving the life, health, and comfort of people trying to reach a better standard of living.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › Solvency › Alt Causes – Other Countries

Other emitters are a massive alt cause AND foreign coal dependency zeroes follow-on

Chatzky Siripurapu 21 (Andrew Chatzky and Anshu Siripurapu, Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, and helps edit the Daily News Brief. “Envisioning a Green New Deal: A Global Comparison,” Council on Foreign Relations. Feb 1 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/envisioning-green-new-deal-global-comparison#chapter-title-0-2 ) @ehatt

Introduction The Green New Deal, a broad and sometimes vague aspiration to rapidly mobilize American government, society, and industry to create a sustainable, low-carbon future, has become hotly contested among policymakers. For supporters, such an effort represents a last chance to avoid the worst consequences of catastrophic climate change. For detractors, it’s a financially profligate proposal concerned more with traditional left-wing economic policies than environmental necessity. A congressional resolution on the Green New Deal both motivated and divided Democrats during the 2020 presidential campaign, and it ultimately influenced President Joe Biden’s climate plan. Biden issued a broad slate of executive actions addressing climate change in his first days in office. Such a proposal, affecting all aspects of the U.S. economy and society, is unprecedented. However, major world economies, including China, India, and the European Union, have begun implementing some of the policies envisioned by the Green New Deal, shedding light on the complexities and costs involved. RELATED What the Coronavirus Pandemic Teaches Us About Fighting Climate Change by Alice C. Hill Pricing Our Climate by Gabrielle Sierra, Kate Mackenzie, Michael Greenstone, Asher Ross, Markus Zakaria and Rafaela Siewert What’s in the Green New Deal Daily News Brief A summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. Most weekdays. Email Address View all newsletters > The Green New Deal is a contested concept, but all of its various versions center on a common vision of a government-led, society-wide effort to dramatically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and quickly shift the U.S. economy to be less carbon intensive. The term might have originated in a 2007 New York Times column by Thomas Friedman, and by 2018 the concept had become a rallying cry in Democratic Party politics. In February 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced a nonbinding resolution [PDF] in support of the idea. Their version is essentially a statement of principles backing a ten-year “national mobilization.” The resolution is notable for going far beyond climate change, aspiring to a broad-based industrial policy that would reshape the U.S. economy. It aims for a sweeping social transformation reminiscent of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, which was an unprecedented application of the power of the federal government to dig the United States out of the Great Depression in the 1930s. The goals of the Green New Deal involve: Emissions: cutting net greenhouse gas emissions to zero over ten years. Manufacturing: spurring “massive growth in clean manufacturing.” Power use: meeting all U.S. power demand “through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.” Agriculture: sharply reducing emissions and other pollution from agriculture. Infrastructure: upgrading infrastructure, including transportation and housing, and ensuring all infrastructure bills considered by Congress address climate change. Jobs: guaranteeing a job with a “family-sustaining wage” for everyone. Welfare and social justice: providing everyone in the United States with high-quality health care, affordable housing, economic security, clean water, clean air, and healthy food, while addressing systemic social exclusion and injustice. The specific means to carry all this out are left open, but the resolution stresses that it should be a duty of the federal government and should include public financing, technical expertise, public investment in research and development, stronger enforcement of trade rules relating to the environment, antitrust enforcement, and the expansion of workers’ rights. The Debate The Green New Deal grew out of an increasing urgency regarding climate change, which the resolution calls a “direct threat to the national security of the United States.” But critics argue that the expense of such a mobilization would be astronomical, and some leading Democrats in Congress have been skeptical of what they see as an overly broad approach. Jerry Taylor of the Niskanen Center, a free-market think tank, writes that proponents of the Green New Deal have attached to the plan too many issues unrelated to climate change, and ended up with an inflated price tag that is easy for opponents to attack on fiscal grounds. Economist Noah Smith writes that the plan’s “enormous new entitlements paid for by unlimited deficit spending” could mean that nearly three-quarters of all U.S. economic activity would eventually come from government spending. Many experts say concerns over costs are highly speculative given the plan’s lack of details. The Congressional Budget Office, which provides cost estimates for all proposed legislation, has been unable to do so in this case because there are not yet concrete policy proposals. Many on the left, such as the progressive think tank Data For Progress, argue that dealing with climate change will be expensive either way, and that inaction will be much worse: they point to the National Climate Assessment’s prediction that the effects of global warming could cost the United States upward of $500 billion per year by the end of the century. Indeed, a near-universal consensus has emerged that dramatic action to fight climate change is necessary. A 2018 special report by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that the most harmful effects of global warming could occur by 2040 and suggested there only remained twelve years to cut emissions enough to limit global temperature rises to 1.5°C or 2°C over preindustrial levels and avoid the worst outcomes. The U.S. National Climate Assessment, also released in 2018, raised alarm over the spread of deadly diseases, such as West Nile virus and Zika virus, to new parts of the United States. At the same time, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires that experts say are worsened by climate change have devastated swaths of the country in recent years. Likewise, the U.S. military has warned about the rising threat of climate-driven conflicts. At the same time, growing civil society movements are seeking to force action on climate, from Friday school strikes in Sweden and elsewhere to the Sunrise Movement in the United States to the Extinction Rebellion in the United Kingdom. Cost In the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, President Donald J. Trump cast the plan as a “socialist nightmare” that would ruin the American economy. During his time in office, Trump revoked regulations on coal-based power plants, lifted limits on methane emissions, and weakened automobile fuel-efficiency standards. Biden, however, calls the Green New Deal a “crucial framework,” but he says his climate plan is different: it does not offer guarantees of jobs, food, and housing. Shortly after taking office, Biden issued a string of executive actions addressing climate change: rejoining the Paris Agreement, a global pact to reduce emissions; pausing new oil and gas leases on federal lands and canceling the Keystone XL pipeline; and setting in motion plans to electrify the federal government’s fleet of vehicles. Read More President-Elect Joe Biden on Climate Change As the debate over the Green New Deal rages in the United States, a number of other countries and regional and city governments around the world are moving forward with their own climate policies. How do they compare to the Green New Deal’s proposals? The Two Giants: China and India China is the world’s foremost emitter, producing roughly 28 percent of all emissions in 2018, compared to 15 percent in the United States, while India is responsible for much of the global rise in emissions in recent years. Neither has decarbonization goals anywhere near as ambitious as the Green New Deal, but both have taken steps to scale back emissions, cut pollution, and employ renewable energy resources, even as they continue to seek faster economic growth to lift their people out of poverty. China. The Asian giant produces more than a quarter of global greenhouse gases, emitting nearly as much as Canada, Europe, and the United States combined. Beijing’s buy-in was central to the Paris Agreement, in which China promised that its carbon dioxide emissions would peak by 2030. The country appears on track to keep its commitment, although emissions have again increased in recent years, and President Xi Jinping has pushed several green initiatives. These include efforts to transition from coal to renewable energy, investments in new technologies, and mechanisms to put a price on carbon. In 2020, Xi announced a goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, though Chinese officials have not shared a detailed plan. But China’s climate policy has a coal problem: its power sector runs on it, and the country accounts for over half of global coal consumption, producing worrisome levels of air pollution. Though new coal plants are still being built, China has successfully combated air pollution: it cut fine particulates by more than 30 percent from 2014 to 2017. This has raised hopes it could similarly attack greenhouse gas emissions. “Already, 40 percent of the world’s new renewable power plants are in China, and in 2016 China invested $78.3 billion in renewable energy—exceeding both Europe ($59.8 billion) and the United States ($46.5 billion),” CFR’s Elizabeth C. Economy writes in her book The Third Revolution. The Green New Deal’s commitment to zero-emission power would rule out the use of coal. Xi’s Made in China 2025 policy, a state-led high-tech manufacturing strategy, has started developing industries including electric cars and rail transport. Beijing has already spent some $60 billion to create an electric car industry, and more electric vehicles were sold in China in 2019 than in the rest of the world combined. However, if the underlying power sector that charges all these new modes of transport still uses coal, such technologies might not be as green as they seem. Like the European Union and several other countries, China is trying a national emissions trading scheme (ETS). Emissions trading programs, often known as cap and trade, allow the government to issue permits for emissions. The number of these permits is then capped, and firms that wish to emit must buy permits on an open market, forcing polluters to pay an economic price for their environmental harm. Some analysts, however, say that China’s scheme, which only covers power companies that emit over twenty-six thousand tons of carbon annually, is narrowly applied and has suffered delays and technical problems. India. In 2018, India was the world’s third-biggest national emitter, at 7 percent of the total, behind only China and the United States. New Delhi has set a renewable energy target for 2022 that would require an investment four times the size of its national defense budget. Despite an expansion of solar power, coal still supplies more than half of India’s energy consumption. The latest forecasts predict India will fall short of its 2022 goal, and it remains unclear how disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic will affect India’s energy transition. For many observers, India is a bellwether for determining whether global greenhouse gas emissions reductions can be successful. The country’s population will soon surpass China’s, and its economy is already growing faster. While emissions have at times leveled off or even dipped for China, the European Union, Japan, Russia, and the United States, India’s have steadily risen. The European Union Under the Paris Agreement, the European Union promised to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent, compared to 1990 levels, by 2030. Its members, who collectively account for 9 percent of global fossil fuel carbon emissions, are trying to make reductions at both a European and national level, with efforts centered on an ETS, coal reduction, and agricultural policy reforms. European ETS. Launched in 2005 to much fanfare, the EU’s trading system was promoted as the world’s first major ETS. Companies are required to measure their emissions and buy permits if they exceed a ceiling, which drops by 1.74 percent annually. In practice, the program has struggled. A glut of permits resulted in carbon prices that fell by four-fifths from 2010 to 2017. The problem will be exacerbated if the United Kingdom—the EU’s second-largest emitter of carbon, after Germany—dumps its permits on the market after it leaves the bloc. Stanford University’s Jeffrey Ball writes that trading systems such as the EU’s are often ineffectual because prices are too low to force reductions, and “policymakers and the public delude themselves that they are meaningfully addressing global warming.” National emissions efforts. Individual EU countries have also committed to emissions cuts. Germany plans to shut down all of its coal-fired power plants by 2038, though it opened a new plant in 2020, and it has set aside $45.7 billion in aid for regions that rely on coal jobs. In 2011, after the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, Germany decided to phase out all of its nuclear plants by 2022. The European experience underscores the divisive nature of nuclear power: while many experts see it as one of the most effective ways to cut emissions, Green New Deal proponents side with Germany in rejecting it over concerns about waste disposal and accidents. France has embraced it, currently deriving 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, though policymakers are now seeking to reduce that dependence. Nuclear energy proponents point to France’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions, which have steadily fallen since the 1970s and are now about one-quarter those of the United States. Energy The Green New Deal calls for major investments in transportation; Americans rely on cars much more than Europeans. This is largely due to the higher density of European cities, which makes public transport more viable. But even in the EU, steps to reduce car use remain fraught: in France, the Yellow Vests protests broke out in late 2018 over a planned fuel tax increase. Vehicle gas there is about twice as expensive as in the United States, in large part due to higher taxes. Agricultural reform. Wielding enormous political clout and long supported by state subsidies, Europe’s agricultural sector emits nearly 10 percent of the continent’s greenhouse gases. But the EU has seen a 20 percent drop [PDF] in emissions of agricultural methane and nitrous oxide since 1990, with only two of its members—Cyprus and Spain—moving in the other direction. This decrease is largely the result of tighter regulations on fertilizer and reductions in livestock, both of which are alluded to in the Green New Deal resolution. Small Emitters, Big Ambitions Dozens of smaller countries, regions, and even cities have pushed the envelope on emissions reduction goals and other climate policies. Indeed, their strategies are often closer to the ambitions of the Green New Deal than those of larger economies. Norway and other countries. Norway, which is not an EU member, has been particularly aggressive on energy policy. Norway aims for all new cars to have zero emissions by 2025, and it has exempted electric vehicles from many taxes, tolls, and parking fees. The incentives have had an effect: despite a population of about five million, Norway is the third-largest market in the world for electric cars, after China and the United States. The Netherlands and several other countries have set similar targets. In March 2019, Norway announced its $1 trillion sovereign wealth fund—the world’s largest—would divest from oil and gas firms. However, some analysts question Norway’s green ambitions, given that crude oil and natural gas make up half its exports. Chile became the first South American country to implement a carbon tax in 2014. Mexico launched its own such tax in 2018. Kazakhstan, New Zealand, and South Korea have followed, either taxing carbon or implementing their own ETS. Costa Rica has launched a national program to completely decarbonize its economy by 2050. carbon pricing Cities, states, and regions. These smaller communities are often willing to go further than national politics allow. Copenhagen has announced plans to be carbon neutral by 2025. Dozens of cities around the world have banded together to try to influence climate policy. In the Powering Past Coal Alliance, for instance, eighty cities, states, regions, and national governments have committed to phasing out coal use. States such as California, provinces such as Quebec, and metropolises such as Tokyo have all pledged to start their own emissions trading schemes. California, on its own the world’s fifth-largest economy, has rallied local climate efforts. In 2018 the state mandated that by 2045 it would transition to 100 percent clean electricity. Two years later, Governor Gavin Newsom signed an executive order that by 2035, all new vehicles sold must be zero-emission. Climate experts say that such subnational efforts can serve as laboratories for best practices, and in some cases—such as California’s development of auto emissions standards in the 1960s—regions with enough market power can force national governments to follow their lead. Less Ambitious Alternatives In early 2020, Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the CLEAN Future Act, an attempt to bridge the divide between ardent Green New Deal supporters and moderate Republicans who have voiced concerns about climate change. The legislation would require energy providers to get 100 percent of their electricity from clean sources such as wind, solar, or nuclear power, or from fossil fuels if their carbon emissions were captured, by 2050. However, the proposal has yet to be brought to a vote. In mid-2020, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Representative Kathy Castor (D-FL) released a set of climate proposals—the Climate Crisis Action Plan—that reiterate several points from the CLEAN Future Act. The plan includes a mandate for electric utilities to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2040, a national commitment to produce only electric cars by 2035, new limits on methane emissions, and a carbon pricing system. With Democrats now in control of the Senate, calls for more aggressive actions could increase, but their razor-thin margin will make ambitious legislation difficult to pass.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Impact › A2 Tipping Points

Ecological tipping points are “scientific garbage” and lack data---effects are slow and localized

Brook et al. 18 — Barry W. Brook, ARC Australian Laureate Professor and Chair of Environmental Sustainability at the University of Tasmania in the Faculty of Science, Engineering & Technology, Erle C. Ellis, Ph.D., Cornell University, 1990 Professor, Geography & Environmental Systems University of Maryland, and Jessie C. Buettel, “What Is the Evidence for Planetary Tipping Points?” In Effective Conservation Science: Data Not Dogma, Chapter 8, Oxford University Press (2018). http://ecotope.org/people/ellis/papers/brook_2018.pdf

*The Nine Planetary Boundaries Brook Et Al. Refer Too Are, “Land-Use Change, Rate of Biodiversity Loss, Phosphorus Cycle, Global Freshwater Use, Ocean Acidification, Climate Change, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading, Chemical Pollution, Terrestrial Net Primary Production, and Biodiversity Intactness”

As living standards, technological capacities,

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Impact › A2 Ocean Acidification

No ocean acidification impact and CO2 increases ocean bio-d

Goklany, 15—independent scholar and author, member of the US delegation that established the IPCC and helped develop its First Assessment Report, he subsequently served as a US delegate to the IPCC, and an IPCC reviewer, he is a member of the GWPF’s Academic Advisory Council (Indur, “CARBON DIOXIDE: The good news”, http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/10/benefits1.pdf, dml)

Increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere clearly increase the growth rate of land plants, other things being equal. Is the same true for marine photosynthesisers such as algae, phytoplankton and symbiotic zooxanthellae in corals? Carbon dioxide dissolves in seawater and there is good evidence that this causes enhanced growth rates in many taxa. This is despite the fact that dissolved carbon dioxide forms bicarbonate ions, which slightly decrease the pH of the water, leading to what is often inaccurately called ‘ocean acidification’. There is no likelihood of the ocean’s average pH getting anywhere near as low as 7 because of elevated carbon dioxide concentrations during the next three centuries. Ocean pH currently averages about 8 and is forecast to fall by 0.2 pH units or so during the present century. This change is considerably smaller than the difference in pH between different parts of the ocean, different days in the same part of the ocean, and even different times of day in coral reef lagoons. An examination of upper-ocean pH for a wide variety of ecosystems ranging from polar to tropical, open-ocean to coastal, kelp forest to coral reefs, indicates that variations in month-long pH spanned a range of 0.024 –1.430 pH units, and found that many organisms ‘are already experiencing pH regimes that are not predicted until 2100.’93 In other words, the projected change in pH is much smaller than the noise in its natural variation. So it is highly speculative that this small long-term trend will bring problems for marine life that are greater than the benefits of extra carbon dioxide for photosynthetic marine organisms and hence the whole marine biosphere.

Here follow some examples of studies finding positive or neutral impacts of lower pH on different groups of marine photosynthesisers:

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Impact › Too Late

No climate change solvency—requires impossible international coordination

Falkner & Buzan 22

Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK; Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. “Introduction.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 3. LJS

Climate change is one of the most pressing global challenges of the twenty-first century. To avert catastrophic global warming, international society needs to take urgent, and internationally coordinated, action. Although virtually all nations are united in their desire to tackle the man-made causes of global warming, they have yet to reverse the long-term trend of rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Covid-19 pandemic provided temporary relief in that it led to a drop in global emissions by up to 7% in 2020 (UNEP, 2020), but the post-pandemic economic recovery seems likely to return the world to a path of rising emissions again. As yet, states’ climate policy intentions and emission pledges have proved to be inadequate. Climate change is a truly global problem, requiring all nations to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures. At the same time, the responsibility for causing the problem is unequally distributed, as is the capacity to respond to the climate threat in an effective manner. Two-thirds of current global emissions originate from just 10 major economies, and by and large it is the same countries that also have the economic and technological clout to develop and finance the required global solutions. Climate change and international power inequality are thus closely entwined. Indeed, if the major emitters were to act decisively and in a coordinated manner, the chances of averting a climate catastrophe would be much improved. By the same token, even if only some of them fail or refuse to act responsibly, the world faces a bleak future. The International Relations (IR) literature on global environmental politics (GEP) has tended to acknowledge, implicitly at least, the important role that a few select major powers play, either as international leaders that set an example for others and shape international environmental agendas, or as veto players that block progress in multilateral environmental negotiations (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017; Eckersley, 2020). GEP scholarship has also highlighted the inherent inequalities that structure the environmental policy area, both within societies and between them, and especially with regard to unequal levels of economic development and consumption levels (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan, 2015). However, questions of power asymmetry in international environmental politics, the nature of states’ environmental power, what counts as a great power in the environmental field, and whether great environmental power comes with special responsibilities have not attracted the kind of systematic attention in GEP that they deserve. This book seeks to fill that gap. By connecting the IR literature on great powers and great power responsibility with GEP scholarship, it develops a new analytical perspective on international power inequality and the role of environmental great powers in GEP, with a special focus on international climate politics. The contributions to this volume develop and apply a conceptual framework for the study of environmental great powers and their special international responsibilities. They examine how individual great powers have responded to the global climate challenge and whether they have accepted a special responsibility for stabilizing the global climate. And they place emerging discourses on great power responsibility in the context of wider debates about international environmental leadership and climate change securitization. Great Powers and the Global Climate Challenge The urgency of the climate change problem is now well understood. Man-made global warming, which is caused by GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) and land use changes (e.g. deforestation), has already led to a 1°C increase of average global temperatures since pre-industrial times. If current net emission trends continue unabated, the world is likely to face a global warming trend of between 3°C and 5°C by the end of the twenty-first century. The ecological consequences of such runaway global warming would be catastrophic. If left unchecked, climate change is expected to result in the melting of glaciers and rising sea levels, more extreme weather patterns, heat waves and wild fires even in arctic lands, the destruction of biologically diverse ecosystems, and changes in the amount, frequency, and intensity of precipitation. Some of these changes are already occurring (disappearance of glaciers, coral bleaching, wildfires) while others will only kick in at a later stage. The challenge for humanity is that the longer global warming is allowed to carry on, the stronger future ecological stresses will be and the sooner we may reach ecological tipping points that lock in large-scale and irreversible environmental damage (Lenton et al., 2019; Dalby, 2020). International society has recognized the threat that global warming poses to human well-being and prosperity. What is unclear, however, is whether the UN’s multilateral climate regime can quickly enough come up with an effective response. The 197 countries that negotiated the 2015 Paris Agreement to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed to keep global warming to well below 2°C. In order to stay within this temperature target, they will need to bring GHG emissions under control, first by reaching a global emissions peak as soon as possible and then by bringing them down to reach a balance between GHG emissions and sinks (so-called net zero) by the second half of this century. All of this is to be achieved through a system of voluntary climate mitigation pledges that are to be reviewed internationally. The key question is whether the Paris Agreement’s framework for ratcheting up national climate ambitions can set the world on the path towards deep decarbonization, and within a timeframe that keeps global warming below 2°C (Falkner, 2016b). The past record of multilateral efforts is far from encouraging. Issue complexity, institutional inertia, and diverging national interests have turned climate change into a ‘wicked’ global problem that seems to exceed the problem-solving capacity of environmental multilateralism (Levin et al., 2012; Keohane and Victor, 2016).

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Impact › Too Late

Climate extinction is inevitable—we already hit the tipping point and nothing can solve

Berardelli 21 (Jeff Berardelli is a meteorologist and climate specialist with a masters in Climate & Society fom Columbia University. “Climate tipping points may have been reached already, experts say,” CBS News. April 26 2021. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/climate-change-tipping-points-amazon-rainforest-antarctic-ice-gulf-stream/ )@ehatt

Through decades of research, and now lived experience, it has become clear that the impacts of climate change will have drastic and far-reaching consequences on our planet. And while some of those consequences are predictable — like more extreme weather, sea-level rise and loss of biodiversity — the pace at which these unfold and their eventual severity hinge on what happens with key linchpins in the climate system, called tipping points. A tipping point is a threshold or point of no return in the climate system that once passed can no longer be reversed. Passing a tipping point does not necessarily mean immediate, drastic consequences, but it does mean those consequences become unavoidable, and over time the impacts may be dramatic. In a 2019 paper, Professor Timothy Lenton, a global leader on the subject, identified nine climate tipping points, from melting permafrost in the Arctic to the loss of tropical coral reefs. Here we will focus on what he deems the three most critical tipping points: the Amazon rainforest, the West Antarctic ice sheet and the Gulf Stream system. Lenton highlights these three because the West Antarctic ice sheet may have already passed a tipping point; the Amazon because it is a crucial crucible of biodiversity and for its warehouse of carbon; and the Gulf Stream system because of its potential for profound changes with connected ramifications all around the planet. CBS News spoke to Lenton and several other scientists about the state of climate tipping points. While they have different areas of expertise, ranging from oceans to atmosphere to biosphere, their message was unanimous: Changes are happening faster than what was expected and the chance of hitting tipping points in the climate system, which just a decade ago appeared remote and far off, now seems much more likely and more immediate. "This is why I have been raising the alarm," Lenton said. "In just a decade the risk level has gone up markedly — that should be triggering urgent action." The Amazon rainforest For 55 million years the Amazon rainforest has weathered all of nature's ups and downs, but just one century of human negligence — a geological blink of an eye — threatens to be the nail in the coffin for this ancient forest. The Amazon is huge — almost the size of the contiguous United States. Home to an estimated 3 million species, about 10% of the Earth's known biodiversity, and half of the planet's remaining rainforest, the Amazon is among the most diverse places on Earth. But many experts believe the Amazon may have already entered tipping point territory. Having studied the Amazon for 56 years and visited hundreds of times, Dr. Thomas Lovejoy is one of those experts. "We are really right at that tipping point. We see the signs in longer dry seasons, hotter dry seasons, tree species that prefer drier conditions gaining dominance over those that prefer wet conditions," explains Lovejoy, a professor at George Mason University and founder of the Amazon Biodiversity Center. "So we know that it's right there at the tipping point right now." When Lovejoy started studying the Amazon in the 1960s, 10 million people lived there and the forest was 97% intact. Now there are 30 million people living there and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is at 20% — the critical level at which scientists believe the Amazon starts to tip towards the point of no return, where it no longer survives as a lush wet rainforest and transitions into an arid savanna. Lovejoy says this transition from rainforest to savanna could happen as fast as a mortgage cycle. "I would say it's a matter of something that happens on the timescale of decades like 10, 20, 30 years, not centuries. So, a lot of the people alive today would actually get to see that negative consequence." rainforest-to-savanna-in-20-years.png Some experts believe most of the Amazon rainforest could transition to drier savanna in just a few decades if we keep deforesting and warming. CBS NEWS Lenton is less sure. "I wish I knew how close we are to a tipping point," he said. But he agrees the signs are pointing in that direction. "We have work submitted showing early warning signs that the whole forest is losing resilience. I'd say that for the drier southeast side of the Amazon it is already under serious risk of fire-amplified loss." A rainforest is only a rainforest because it is a rain-making machine — generating 50% of its own rainfall. That phenomenon is made possible as the leaves that make up the canopy of trees exhale moisture upward (a process called evapotranspiration), condensing in the cooler air above and forming a river of clouds that rains the moisture back down. "Just by watching what happens after a rainfall in the Amazon and afterwards you see plumes of moisture coming up out of the canopy of the forest and that all moves westward to become rainfall once again, " explains Lovejoy. amazon-cbsnews.png A river of clouds forms over the Amazon as water vapor evaporates from the canopy of trees and condenses above. CBS NEWS But as the trees disappear and the forest becomes fractured, so does the moisture. Lovejoy says this destruction is due to fires and deforestation from small landowners grabbing land and to large corporations engaged in industrial agriculture, mainly growing soybeans and supporting livestock. In 2020, fires reached their highest number in a decade in the Brazilian Amazon and deforestation in the Amazon surged to its highest point in 12 years. Critics blame Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro for looking the other way on enforcement of environmental regulations and even encouraging agriculture and mining activities, which undermine the health of the forest. Since the 1980s, NASA has observed a significant increase in something called the vapor pressure deficit (VPD) over the Amazon rainforest. The VPD is the difference, or gap, between the amount of moisture in the air and the amount it can hold. That gap is widening, which represents a drop in relative humidity, due to an increase in greenhouse warming from human-caused climate change and aerosols from biomass burning. amazon-vapor-pressure-def.png NASA measures more vapor pressure deficit increasing in the Amazon Basin over recent decades which means the atmosphere trend is toward a lower relative humidity. Overall it is an indicator of drying. NASA When the atmosphere is less humid, it has room for more moisture and it becomes more thirsty, pulling that moisture out of the ground and making the vegetation drier. This leads to more drought and is very similar to what is happening in California, which is making wildfires worse. Over the past century temperatures in the Amazon have risen by over 2 degrees Fahrenheit and in the past 50 years the dry season has expanded by a month. Lovejoy says the impacts of a transition of the Amazon rainforest to a more arid savanna would be devastating both locally and globally. Locally, the 30 million people who live there, many of them Indigenous, depend on the reliable rainfall produced by the rainforest. Significant loss of rain means an escalation of drought that may be devastating to agriculture. A drier Amazon would also mean a significant loss in biodiversity — the extinction of unique creatures which only exist in that one region. Globally, the Amazon rainforest is a tremendous repository for the planet's carbon, but if it becomes a savanna much of that carbon will be unleashed, magnifying climate change, "It does matter in a very, very big way in terms of the global carbon cycle and climate change," says Lovejoy. He estimates the forest contains a staggering 100 billion tons of carbon in its lush vegetation and soils — equivalent to about three times the amount of greenhouse gases emitted from the burning of fossil fuels each year. If the Amazon crosses the tipping point, "It not only absorbs a lot less, but all the forest that is being replaced by grassland, all that carbon ends up in the atmosphere," Lovejoy warns. Lovejoy says there is still hope we could stop this from happening, but the task is urgent. He says the nations which make up this unique ecosystem must cooperate and immediately work to reforest the Amazon. "There is a very urgent priority to move to a point where we are actually collectively managing the Amazon as a sustainable system," he said. West Antarctic ice sheet Of all the threats posed by climate change, sea level rise is arguably the biggest. That's because with billions of people living along the world's coastlines, rapid sea-level rise will force massive disruption. Given the immense amount of heat already absorbed in the ocean system due to human-caused climate change, there's no doubt several feet — and likely much more — of sea level rise is already locked in, but the question is how fast will it happen? The latest research finds that global warming thresholds that would trigger tipping points on both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are not that far away. The authors of a 2018 study find that these tipping points will likely occur between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius of global warming above pre-industrial levels — the level at which the Paris Climate Agreement aims to halt warming. The Earth has already warmed by 1.2 degrees, and 1.5 degrees of warming may be less than 15 years away. Because of the complexity of ice sheet dynamics, it is hard to know exactly when a tipping point will be reached, but Lenton warns we may already be there: "It is plausible we are already past a tipping point." With ice more than a mile thick and a size almost double the contiguous United States, the Antarctic landmass holds enough ice to raise sea levels by 200 feet. For decades it was assumed the frigid Antarctic ice sheet was fairly stable, so most glacier headlines were focused on the other massive ice sheet in Greenland. But in just the past few years, researchers have become alarmed at several areas in Antarctica which are showing signs of instability due to a warming climate and shifting ocean and atmosphere currents. The most pressing concern appears to be in West Antarctica — namely the Pine Island and Thwaites Glaciers. A paper published this past fall uncovered the rapid development over just the past decade of damage areas on the ice shelves of these two glaciers causing structural weakening which the authors say "preconditions these ice shelves for disintegration." pine-island-thwaites-nasa.jpg In West Antarctica, the Pine Island Glacier and Thwaites Glacier are becoming more unstable, shedding more ice to the sea, indicated in red. NASA Ice shelves are giant walls of ice floating on the oceans that act as dams on the edge of the glaciers, holding the land ice (ice sheets) behind them in place. If the ice shelves break apart, it's like pulling the cork out of a wine bottle: the ice behind it flows freely into the sea, raising sea levels. collapse.png Warm water undercut the ice shelf, breaking up the ice, allowing the ice sheet sheet behind it to become unstable and flow into the sea. CBS NEWS What makes the situation at Pine Island Glacier, and especially Thwaites Glacier, so precarious is that the ice shelves float far out over the sea. Warm water, about 2 degrees Celsius above the historical average, is now undercutting the marine ice. That is destabilizing the base of the ice shelf where it is propped up on land (called the grounding line) and accelerating its retreat. If and when the base of the glacier lifts off the ocean floor, it will no longer be supported by land and thus will become floating ice. Just like adding ice cubes to a glass, this raises the water level. Because Thwaites, also known as the Doomsday Glacier, is below sea-level, that means much more ice is vulnerable to warming seas. grounding-line-blue.jpg Pine Island and Thwaites Glaciers have significant ice shelves which float on the sea. Lately, warmer water is getting underneath, breaking up the ice shelf and eating away at the grounding line. As that happens, more of the ice floats off the sea bed and then adds to sea level rise. Since the backside of the glacier is below sea level, as the grounding line retreats, an increasingly thicker portion of the ice floats, adding even more to sea level rise. CREDIT: NATIONAL SNOW AND ICE DATA CENTER NSIDC, NASA A study published last month found early warning indicators of the onset of marine ice sheet instability, and thus the authors were able to identify distinct tipping points on Thwaites and Pine Island, but they did not give a timeline. If Thwaites Glacier collapses, sea levels would rise by 1.5 feet. If that collapse destabilized its neighbor Pine Island, sea level would rise 4 feet. And if the whole West Antarctic ice sheet collapsed, 10 feet of sea level rise would follow. While most scientists agree this is likely to unfold over centuries, not decades, increasingly ice experts are warning that higher-end estimates of sea-level rise are becoming more likely. In 2017, NOAA projected sea levels could rise 5 to 8 feet by 2100. Lenton agrees that if we are indeed in the midst of, or near, a tipping point, "It opens up the possibility that we could get greater than 1 meter (and perhaps up to 2 meters) of sea-level rise from all sources this century which would already have huge impacts." This kind of sea-level rise, over such a short time span, would threaten or displace hundreds of millions of people who live near rising waters, and the ramifications would ripple through much of human civilization "On the longer term it could mean a commitment has already been made to multi-meter sea level rise that will pose major challenges to future generations," warns Lenton. The fact that sea levels will rise dramatically is not a matter of scientific controversy and is all but assured. About 125,000 years ago, before the last Ice Age, sea level was likely at least 20 feet higher than it is today. At that time global temperatures were just a couple of degrees warmer than today. Three million years ago sea levels were 75 feet higher than today in a climate that was 4 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than now. So, over centuries and millennia, these types of sea-level rise are not just possible, they are probable. Even if humans were able to stop warming in the next few decades, temperatures equivalent to that last interglacial will likely be equaled. That's why experts say at least 20 feet of sea-level rise is inevitable. The critical question is will it happen gradually over many centuries, or will coastal regions be swallowed up in just decades? Oceanographer John Englander, author of the new book "Moving to Higher Ground," says this is a tough question to answer because sudden geophysical events, like the collapse of glaciers, are not accurately predictable — much like an earthquake, mudslide or avalanche. That's why Englander says we must look to history as a guide for what is possible. Since the last Ice Age, sea-level rise has not been linear and predictable. To the contrary, Englander explains, it has occurred in fits and starts, at times stable and at other times rising abruptly. "11,000 years ago, the last time that sea-level rise was rising quickly, it rose at about 15 feet per century. That's amazing, more than a foot a decade of sea level rise," Englander warns. "Now, there was more ice on the planet back then, but we are warming a lot faster now. So, in terms of looking for real-world historical rates, we could be looking at a foot a decade." sea-level-rise-since-lgm.jpg Since the last Ice Age peaked about 20,000 years ago, sea level has risen hundreds of feet. But sea-level rise is not linear; it can happen abruptly. 11,000 years ago sea level rose as much as 15 feet in one century. For our future, this is evidence sea level can rise fast again. JOHN ENGLANDER Right now, sea levels are rising at nowhere near those rates, only at about 2 inches per decade, but rates are doubling every decade. To help illustrate the power of doubling, in his book Englander uses the analogy of how long it would take to fill a soccer stadium with water if you started with a single drop of water and doubled it every minute. The answer is shocking: only 47 minutes! Englander says the point is that small changes in sea-level rise today will mount quickly over the decades, and if tipping points are crossed, society should be prepared for abrupt changes. That's why he says it would be wise for nations to invest in preparation now and not wait for the inevitable water to come. The Gulf Stream system Lenton described a potential tipping point in the Gulf Stream system as "profound." That's because the Atlantic Ocean circulation is a linchpin in Earth's climate system. It is the driving force behind the Global Ocean Conveyor Belt (pictured below) and transports 20% of the excess heat which accumulates at the Equator towards the Northern Hemisphere polar regions. This is how Earth attempts to balance out unequal heating from the sun, and the flux of heat is a big factor controlling weather patterns. What concerns scientists is that this current is slowing down. In fact, a new study found it is moving the slowest it has in at least 1,600 years and may decrease speed by up to 45% by 2100, possibly tipping the circulation into collapse. ocean-conveyor.png WMO Before we go any further, it is worth mentioning that the Gulf Stream system is a newly popularized nickname for the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC for short). One look at that name and it's clear why the Gulf Stream system may be preferable. But in that AMOC name there are some clues as to why this current system is so important. "Meridional" means transport in a north-to-south or south-to-north direction. And "overturning" implies that the current moves vertically as well. So this current is the engine that propels ocean heat to the ends of the Earth. gulf-stream-current-2.jpg CBS NEWS Being that it takes any one water parcel around 1,000 years to complete a full journey, anything we do today lingers in the system for a great many generations. We have already done a lot. Each year ocean heat content hits a new record high because 93% of the excess heat trapped by greenhouse gases is stored in the ocean. That's equivalent to 5 Hiroshima atomic bombs worth of heat per second. This is a big reason why ice melt has already locked in 20 feet or more of future sea-level rise. But this ice melt poses another problem, because everything is connected. Accelerated meltwater from Greenland ice is rushing into the North Atlantic. That combined with heavier rainfall is likely responsible for a slowdown of the AMOC by 15% since 1950. Here's how it works. In the North Atlantic, east of Greenland, water is cold, salty and dense. Therefore it sinks. That vertical movement of the AMOC is the driving force, the momentum which keeps the whole system moving. But the water is changing in this region. That's because, according to NASA, a warmer climate is melting ice at 6 times the rate of the 1990s. That is pumping a layer of fresh water — which is not as heavy — into the North Atlantic, resulting in a decreased ability to sink, slowing down the overturning. gulf-stream-current-5-new.jpg CBS NEWS Michael Mann, a distinguished professor of atmospheric science at Penn State, authored the 2015 paper which found the 15% slowdown in the AMOC, which he calls "unprecedented" in recent history. "The Greenland ice sheet appears to be disintegrating decades ahead of schedule and so that fresh water, as that ice melts, runs off into the North Atlantic earlier than we expected it to," Mann explains. Mann says some of the evidence for the impact this is having in the North Atlantic is right there in plain sight. While the vast majority of Earth is warming, a big "cold blob" near Greenland sticks out like a sore thumb — as seen in the maps below. earth-warming-compare-ed-hawkins.jpg Top: Areas that have warmed since 1950 are shaded in red. Notice the blue hole south of Greenland, evidence of the slowing of the AMOC. Bottom: Shows temperature changes relative to other regions. The red is the fastest warming areas. The blue are the areas warming less fast, or even cooling. Particularly apparent is the cold blob south of Greenland. DR. ED HAWKINS Mann says this colder region is a "fingerprint" for the slowdown of the AMOC. It's a result of a decrease in heat transfer northbound due to the slowing of the Gulf Stream. And Mann warns this is all happening much faster than projected. "The observations tell us we are about 50 years, or more, ahead of where the climate models say we should be at this point," he said. The mounting evidence, and the speed at which changes are taking place, lead Mann to believe that a collapse of the current is possible. "It's hard to rule out the scenario of a full on collapse sometime in the next few decades. We have continued to be surprised by how fast some of these processes appear to be playing out." Lenton agrees and says while he may not be alive to see it, the next generation could be. "A collapse this century can't be ruled out (so within my kids lifetimes)," he said. Given the major amount of heat displaced by the AMOC, if the current slows dramatically or stops, weather patterns would be thrown off-kilter in the Northern Hemisphere and extreme weather would escalate. In addition, Mann says it would have a direct effect on the Atlantic Ocean, pushing sea level up by a foot along the U.S. Eastern Seaboard and impacting fish stocks in the North Atlantic. Lenton believes the impacts would be profound. "Western Europe would have to try and adapt to a completely different climate. Major monsoons could shift, in a bad way, e.g. in India and West Africa." To put it simply, Lenton says, "It would change the world." While some of these tipping points are now only decades away, or perhaps even upon us, scientists say we can still avert worse disaster if we act now. This argument is bolstered by new research from the University of Exeter which shows the disastrous consequences of climate "tipping points" could be averted if global warming was reversed quickly enough — concluding that thresholds could be "temporarily exceeded" without prompting permanent shifts. We may still pass some of these tipping points, but the less we warm the Earth, the slower the impacts will unfold, and the more time our children and grandchildren will have to adapt to the changes.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – China

China Climate leadership good

Jeffrey Ball ’23 -- a writer whose work focuses on energy and the environment, is a scholar-in-residence at Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance and a lecturer at Stanford Law School and is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings

"Power play: How the US benefits if China greens the Global South," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/power-play-how-the-us-benefits-if-china-greens-the-global-south/

China bankrolls more infrastructure in EMDEs than any other country. But much of that infrastructure has been dirty. According to a Boston University database, Chinese companies and so-called policy banks – large government-affiliated institutions – have financed 648 power plants in 92 countries.1 Of those plants’ collective power-generation capacity, more than 50% burn fossil fuel, and 34% burn the dirtiest sort of fossil fuel: coal. But China, facing criticism and sensing shifting economics, has pledged to change that. In November 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that his country “will step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energy, and will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.”2 Today, more than a year later, China must make good on that pledge through deep, structural changes to its political economy; otherwise, changes in its outbound investment will not take hold. China’s task is daunting, threatening some of the biggest companies in China and thus in the world. It is even more intimidating because it looms at a time of perilous animosity between Washington and Beijing, evidenced by military brinkmanship over Taiwan, tit-for-tat trade barriers on products ranging from computer chips to solar panels, and superpower shadowboxing over Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yet China’s decarbonization of its foreign infrastructure finance is existentially important — for the planet, the Chinese economy, and U.S. citizens and firms. Contrary to the zero-sum view toward China that constitutes conventional wisdom in Washington, the winning strategy for the United States is not merely to try to eclipse China as an international financier of green infrastructure. The United States is trying to do that, notably through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a plan the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden and its G-7 allies announced last June to boost infrastructure investment in EMDEs, in large part to fight climate change. That effort was conceived broadly as a geopolitical counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s decade-old infrastructure- and market-building campaign across the Global South, and to the BRI’s newer sibling, China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI).3 To be sure, a greening of U.S. and G-7 infrastructure investment abroad is needed and welcome. But it is insufficient. The smart strategy for the United States, even as it decarbonizes its own outbound infrastructure finance, is to encourage maximal greening of China’s massive infrastructure investment abroad — and to leverage that Chinese spending to create new opportunities for export-focused U.S. firms in a decarbonizing world.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – China

US not key—China fills in

Eckersley 22

Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 80-81. LJS

The financing and transfer of green technology are the most obvious examples of positive environmental power in the climate change arena, in terms of diffusing innovative policy ideas and providing technological and economic aid in support of environmental policies. At every COP, Beijing has maintained that the responsibility for climate finance and capacity-building lies primarily with the developed countries. But apart from acting as a staunch advocate, China has also become more proactive over time as a provider of green financing and technology transfers to the developing world—an emerging trend that is congruent with China’s rapid transformation into the world’s largest market for green finance. While China’s stated commitment to these issues can be traced back to at least 2007 (Ministry of Science and Technology (China) et al., 2007), it was arguably from 2015 that the scale and scope of its commitment expanded significantly. In that year, as part of China’s broader climate commitments, Beijing announced the creation of a US$3-billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) and an additional US$3.1-billion fund to support other developing countries in climate change mitigation. The latter, popularly referred to as the ‘10-100-1000 Initiative’, commits Beijing to implementing in developing countries ‘ten low-carbon development demonstration projects, one hundred climate mitigation and adaptation projects, and climate training programmes for one thousand representatives from developing countries’ (Ma, 2017). Until now, the initiative’s shorter-term objectives have reportedly been actioned mainly through equipment donations and the organization of training modules, whereas the impacts of those components that require longer-term policy formulation (i.e. the low-carbon development demonstration projects) have yet to be implemented fully (Ma, 2017). According to China’s ‘White Paper on China and the World in the New Era’, by 2018, the country had launched over 200 SSCAF programmes in over 30 industrializing countries in a range of issue-areas, including environmental protection (State Council Information Office (China), 2019). And notably, in addition to cooperative initiatives at the interstate level, Chinese government agencies have become more embedded in public-private partnerships, working with philanthropic foundations and billionaires—foreign and home-grown—such as Bill Gates and Niu Gensheng to fund, inter alia, clean energy research, conservation, and environmental restoration initiatives (Glowezewska, 2018; see also Geewax, 2015). Some observers, including the vice-minister of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, posit that ‘China has its own methods’ when it comes to its South–South cooperation on climate change mitigation (Liu, 2014; Urban, 2018). Whilst reflecting the ‘unique Chinese characteristics’ of China’s ‘responsible great power’ intentions (see Liu, 2014) that have the positive potential to further catalyze Chinese overseas financing in this space, there are some noteworthy limitations. Even though there are reportedly more successful examples of local skills and knowledge-sharing, such as HydroChina’s expertise transfer to local engineers and university academics during the construction of Ethiopia’s Adama wind farm (Chen, 2018), questions remain as to the extent to which localized learning and institutional capacity-building are facilitated by Chinese financiers in different developing-country contexts (Chen and Landry, 2018).