2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › Climate Not Existential: 2NC
Nordhaus, Breakthrough Institute Executive Director, ’20
[Ted Nordhaus, Executive Director, Breakthrough Institute, “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1—23—20, , accessed 6-12-23]
Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem.
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › Climate Not Existential: 1NC
Hausfather and Peters 20 (Zeke and Glen. Director of climate and energy at the Breakthrough Institute; Research director at the CICERO Center for International Climate Research. Emissions – the ‘business as usual’ story is misleading. Nature. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00177-3)
In the lead-up to the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), researchers developed four scenarios for what might happen to greenhouse-gas emissions and climate warming by 2100. They gave these scenarios a catchy title: Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)1. One describes a world in which global warming is kept well below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial temperatures (as nations later pledged to do under the Paris climate agreement in 2015); it is called RCP2.6. Another paints a dystopian future that is fossil-fuel intensive and excludes any climate mitigation policies, leading to nearly 5 °C of warming by the end of the century2,3. That one is named RCP8.5.
RCP8.5 was intended to explore an unlikely high-risk future2. But it has been widely used by some experts, policymakers and the media as something else entirely: as a likely ‘business as usual’ outcome. A sizeable portion of the literature on climate impacts refers to RCP8.5 as business as usual, implying that it is probable in the absence of stringent climate mitigation. The media then often amplifies this message, sometimes without communicating the nuances. This results in further confusion regarding probable emissions outcomes, because many climate researchers are not familiar with the details of these scenarios in the energy-modelling literature.
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › Just Transition Fails: 1NC
Banerjee and Schuitema, University College Dublin researchers, ’22
(Aparajita Banerjee, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at College of Business at University College Dublin; Geertje Schuitema, Associate Professor in Consumer Behaviour and Technology Adoption at UCD's College of Business, “How just are just transition plans? Perceptions of decarbonisation and low-carbon energy transitions among peat workers in Ireland,” Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 88, June 2022, 102616, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102616)
A just transition is often described as an ideology [8], [25], that is, a system of ideas and ideals that aims to reduce the negative impact of energy transition on vulnerable groups. This idea of a just transition as an ideology has gained much traction in recent years, especially in the context of decarbonisation and the energy transition. On an ideological level, stakeholders have reached consensus that vulnerable groups should be protected and supported. This, however, is often challenging in practice, as the interpretation of what is just and how a just transition is achieved is often approached from very different perspectives. In the case study presented in this paper, we found that, in principle, all key stakeholders, including peat workers and community members, agreed that a just transition programme for the Irish Midlands was a critical policy tool that could support vulnerable groups. We also found, however, an apparent discrepancy between the “theory” and “practice” of the just transition. That is, those who were meant to be supported by the just transition felt that the just transition programme itself fell short on its basic tenet (i.e being “just”).
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › Green Growth Is Fake: 2NC
Avram Alpert- lecturer at Princeton University and coeditor of Shifter magazine.. Princeton University Press. Why tech innovation alone isn’t good enough. . April 20, 2022. DOA: 06/18/23. AR.
The list of crises we face today seems to grow daily. As if inequality and civil wars and global warming and refugee crises weren’t enough, we have also grappled with a global pandemic and the sudden threat of nuclear war. When faced with such crises, it is not uncommon, and perfectly logical, to hear calls for investments in cutting-edge, technological innovations that can protect us from climate change, increase crop yields, improve health outcomes, and spur economic growth. The success of these technologies promises a safer and greener future. A relentless focus on technological innovation alone, however, can create as much harm as good. The kinds of innovations that are most needed today are as much in ourselves and our societies as they are in our inventive prowess. If we cannot work collectively to make a world that provides genuine forms of meaning, purpose, and decency for everyone—what I call a “good-enough world”—then our technological innovations will simply lead into the next major set of crises. In fact, we can achieve greater innovations simply by working together in a collaborative and ethical manner than if we continue on our current path of competitive greed. Most contemporary pursuits of innovation aim to find the most talented people in the world and let them compete with each other to win the vast rewards that can come with their inventions. On the surface, this seems to make sense. Obviously to make progress we need talented people. And, we assume, those people need to be offered incentives in the form of great wealth and power. Otherwise, they would not work so hard or so quickly. But does this image of how progress occurs really make sense? The prevailing model assumes that, unless they are competing for riches, humans are willing to let the planet die before they will extend themselves to help bring about change. If you ask most research scientists or activists working on climate change, you will find that in fact, almost none of them are doing it for the money. They are doing it because they believe in another kind of value system, one that is about the value of life itself. This other value system not only motivates great numbers of talented people; it also helps ensure that the resulting innovations actually serve our planet. Consider messenger RNA vaccines. Although they were developed with billions of dollars in support from public funding and collaborations between scientists, the monetary rewards have largely gone to a few corporations. The results of this process show both the logic of our competitive system and its terrible dangers. Perhaps incentives for profit led to some part of the final breakthrough. However, the continued seeking of profit has meant that companies have been slow to get vaccines to low-income countries (LICs) and have refused to allow generic versions of their products to be reproduced and created at scale. As of March 2022, while 70% of people in high-income countries had one dose of a vaccine, that number is only 14.3% in LICs. Such discrepancies have led to uncounted numbers of preventable deaths. They harm rich nations as well by allowing variants to grow and spread, while this damage to public health, in turn, undercuts the global economy. A 2021 report by The Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that the loss caused by vaccine nationalism alone would be upwards of $2.3 trillion over the next three years. If negative feedback loops are occurring with vaccines, what is to stop them from happening with advanced climate technology? Will rich nations and corporations refuse to share their advances equitably? Bill Gates, in his 2021 book How to Avoid a Climate Disaster, in fact encouraged this, saying that one incentive for advanced industrial nations to pour money into climate solutions was that they could then sell these innovations to poor countries (likely with high-interest loans provided by wealthy banks in their home countries). Again, not only is such a position unethical, but it may also damage the likelihood of success. While profit motives may help incentivize creating green technology, they also undercut transitioning away from fossil fuels. Many good ideas are excluded because they do not conform to the current demands of profit and power. For example, according to a major global model for how to decarbonize the economy, from a team of more than twenty authors, we may not even need many new technologies to avert climate catastrophe. What’s really needed is the political will to decrease wasteful consumption and transition to the already-existing green technologies that can solve this problem in the short term.
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › Green Growth Is Fake: 1NC
Monbiot, Guardian columnist and author, ’21
(George Monbiot is a Guardian columnist and the author of Feral, Regenesis and Out of the Wreckage: a New Politics for an Age of Crisis, 9-29-2021, "‘Green growth’ doesn’t exist – less of everything is the only way to avert catastrophe," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/29/green-growth-economic-activity-environment)
The various impacts have a common cause: the sheer volume of economic activity. We are doing too much of almost everything, and the world’s living systems cannot bear it. But our failure to see the whole ensures that we fail to address this crisis systemically and effectively.
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › China: No War—1NC
Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3094121/why-risk-us-china-hot-war-small-despite-heated-talk)
Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › China: China Tech Leadership Ans—2AC
Lu 21 (Jie Lu is Head of Investments China in the Asia Pacific team. Before joining Robeco in 2015, he worked at Norges Bank Investment Management as a Portfolio Manager in Shanghai from 2011 to 2015, and as an Analyst in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2011. Prior to that, he worked at the M&A department of Morgan Stanley Asia. Jie started his career at Motorola in 2000 and is a native Mandarin Chinese speaker. He holds an MBA with Distinction in Finance and Marketing from Northwestern University in the US. He also holds a Master’s in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Illinois and a Bachelor's in Biochemistry from Fudan University in China. “China: navigating the push towards technology leadership”, May 10th 2021, https://www.robeco.com/us/insights/2021/10/china-navigating-the-push-towards-technology-leadership.html)
After more than three decades of accelerated catchup with more advanced economies, China is now engaged in a race for global technology leadership. Having turned into ‘the world’s factory’, China now aspires to become the planet’s innovation barycenter too. Research and development (R&D) statistics illustrate this ambition. Supported by higher economic growth, China is actually expected to take global R&D leadership this year, and outspend the US for the very first time.1 China now leads the pack in many areas, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G telecommunication networks, ultra-high voltage electricity networks or high-speed rail. While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight. Over the past few years, Chinese officials have increased their emphasis on the need to become less dependent on foreign technology. Some have even theorized a so-called ‘technology decoupling’, advocating self-sufficiency in a number of critical industries. However, one key consideration to bear in mind is that China’s technology push amid rising tensions with the US does not necessarily herald a full economic decoupling, nor an era of deglobalization, as some have argued.2 For now, US restrictions on exports to China issued in 2020 remain essentially focused on a few select technologies, where non-US alternatives are difficult to find. Meanwhile, China's main policy goal remains to improve the country’s manufacturing capability to produce higher value-added goods and services, and keep the economic growth engine roaring. Policy makers acknowledge that this will be impossible without importing advanced technologies from the US, Europe, Japan, or South Korea. China’s technology ambitions were formally articulated in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC 2025) initiative, a ten-year comprehensive blueprint aiming to modernize further the country’s industrial base. MIC 2025 identifies ten strategic sectors, including aerospace equipment, medical devices, or high-tech ships, in which China intends to excel and secure a leading position. Focus on a few selected technologies Even under the MIC 2025 umbrella, the designated ten core industries are clearly not all being pursued with the same intensity. In recent years, China has been prioritizing efforts in a small number of emerging technologies, including AI, semiconductors, robotics, and new energy vehicles (NEVs), 3 with colossal efforts being deployed from a human and a financial perspective. AI, for instance, is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level.4 The Chinese AI-related ecosystem benefits from various supporting factors, including the country’s gigantic market size which provided a unique opportunity to assemble large datasets, and a long-standing friendly policy environment. AI is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level China seems therefore poised to become a leader in AI-empowered businesses, like speech and image recognition applications. At global level, the main AI services providers remain large US technology giants, but Chinese firms are catching up fast. China already employs the world’s largest cohort, by far, of AI professionals, with over 12,000 AI jobs in 2019, versus roughly 7,500 for the US.5 Another area where strong progress has been made NEVs. China has the world’s largest fleet of NEVs in circulation, far ahead of Europe and the US, as well as the world’s largest battery-charging network. And although the country’s NEV car registrations were overtaken by European ones last year, it remains one of the most dynamic markets, largely dominated by local manufacturers. Figure 3: Market share of top five battery makers China has also managed to secure a leading position in various areas of the NEV supply chain. This is especially the case for electric battery production, where the largest Chinese manufacturers have emerged as global leaders along with their South Korean and Japanese competitors. Altogether, China accounts for over 70% of global battery cell production capacity. 6 Three investment themes China’s technology push is offering opportunities in many industries, but finding these is not always straightforward. Not all initiatives have lived up to expectations, so far, and political will does not warrant success. Yet that does not mean opportunities in areas where results have been mixed are entirely absent, nor that policy success will necessarily lead to attractive returns for investors. From this perspective, we have identified three major investment themes worth considering: the relentless rise of NEVs, the advent of ‘industry 4.0’ in China, and an increased focus on the localization of supply chains. Given the bright prospects these three trends offer, we believe this is where some of the most interesting opportunities are to be found
2023
GDI
Negative
Green Jobs Advantage Answers › China: China Leads Tech Now—2AC
REUTERS 23. China holds 'stunning lead' over US in competition for key technology. . MARCH 2, 2023. AR.
China has a "stunning lead" in 37 out of 44 critical and emerging technologies as Western democracies lose a global competition for research output, a security think tank said on Thursday after tracking defense, space, energy and biotechnology. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said its study showed that, in some fields, all of the world's top 10 research institutions are based in China. The study, funded by the United States State Department, found the United States was often second-ranked, although it led global research in high-performance the most-cited scientific papers, which it said are the most likely to result in patents. China's surprise breakthrough in hypersonic missiles in 2021 would have been identified earlier if China's strong research had been detected, it said. "Over the past five years, China generated 48.49% of the world's high-impact research papers into advanced aircraft engines, including hypersonics, and it hosts seven of the world's top 10 research institutions," it said. In the fields of photonic sensors and quantum communication, China's research strength could result in it "going dark" to the surveillance of western intelligence, including the "Five Eyes" of Britain, United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, it said. National talent flows of researchers were also tracked and monopoly risks were identified. China was likely to emerge with a monopoly in 10 fields including synthetic biology, where it produces one-third of all research, as well as electric batteries, 5G, and nano manufacturing. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, a government research body, ranked first or second in most of the 44 technologies tracked, which spanned defence, space, robotics, energy, the environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials and quantum technology. China was bolstering its research with knowledge gained overseas, and the data showed one-fifth of the top Chinese researchers were trained in a Five Eyes country, it said. The study recommended visa screening programs to limit illegal technology transfers and instead favour international collaboration with security allies.
computing, quantum computing, small satellites and vaccines. "Western democracies are losing the global technological competition, including the race for scientific and research breakthroughs," the report said, urging greater research investment by governments. China had established a "stunning lead in high-impact research" under government programs. The report called for democratic nations to collaborate more often to create secure supply chains and "rapidly pursue a strategic critical technology step-up".
2023
Northwestern
Kritik
Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Imperialism
Michael Walzer 14, a professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in Princeton. Walzer was first employed in 1962 in the politics department at Princeton University. He stayed there until 1966, when he moved to the government department at Harvard. He taught at Harvard until 1980, when he became a permanent faculty member in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study. He is co-editor of Dissent and he has written 27 books and published over 300 articles, essays, and book reviews in Dissent, The New Republic, The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The New York Times, Harpers, and many philosophical and political science journals. – “A Foreign Policy for the Left” - Dissent – Spring, 2014 – obtained via OmniFile Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson) database
The second shortcut, perhaps even more popular than the first, is to stand up always against “imperialism”—or, a shortcut inside the shortcut, always to oppose American policies abroad. Anti-Americanism is a common left politics, which, again, sometimes gets things right, and sometimes doesn’t. I believe that it got things right in Vietnam in 1967; it mostly got things right from the beginning of the twentieth century to the end in Central and South America; it got Iran right in 1953 (when leftists criticized the anti-Mossadegh coup), and Iraq in 2003; it gets NAFTA right, and the IMF, too. But that’s still not enough to make it a reliable shortcut. Remember that the defeat of Nazism and Stalinism, the two most brutal political regimes in world history, was in significant ways American work. This was work that many people on the left supported, as we should have. In 1967 Dwight Macdonald wrote to Mary McCarthy that the American war in Vietnam proved “that despite all the good things about our internal political-social-cultural life, we have become an imperialist power, and one that, partly because of these domestic virtues, is a most inept one.” We have continued to be inept: in December 2005, with 100,000 American soldiers in Iraq, we organized an election—and our man came in third. This is a result, I think, without precedent in imperial history. Macdonald’s understanding of U.S. imperialism reflects a political intelligence and a moral balance that is mostly missing in contemporary anti-American writing. The anti-American shortcut sometimes produces a short-circuited politics—as in the Syrian case where leftist writers predicted terrible consequences if the Americans inter - vened on the side of the anti-Assad forces. The predictions have come true even though the United States didn’t intervene, but once it was clear that the awfulness was not America’s fault, many leftists simply lost interest— except for an ongoing but not very effective engagement on behalf of the war’s victims. Who was responsible for the ongoing war, for the killing, the terror, and the refugee crisis; what social forces were involved; what should we (on the left) make of them and how should we respond to them? This kind of analysis, standard in left critiques of impe - rialism, has mostly been missing. One reason for its absence is that it offers no opportunity to criticize America; a second reason is that it would require a close reading and sharp critique of Islamist politics. Another much-used shortcut (though it doesn’t work in the Syrian case) is to oppose everything Israel does and to blame it for much that it hasn’t done, since it is the “lackey” of American imperialism or, alternatively, the dominant force in shaping American foreign policy. The policies of the current Israeli government require radical criticism—the occupation, the settlements, the refusal to suppress Jewish hooliganism on the West Bank. Nonetheless, the anti-Israel shortcut is an example, to paraphrase August Bebel, of the leftism of fools. The last shortcut is simply to support every government that calls itself leftist or anti-imperialist and sets itself against American interests. This is different from the old Stalinist shortcut: support the Soviet Union whatever it does because it is the first proletarian dictatorship and the first workers’ paradise. That kind of politics is, I think, definitively finished, though it had a brief afterlife, focused on China and then, with very few believers, on Albania and North Korea. The more recent version celebrates Maximal Leaders like Nasser, Castro, or Hugo Chávez— along with occasional short-lived infatuations, as in the case of Michel Foucault and the future Ayatollah Khomeini. Leftist enthusiasm for populist dictatorships is one of our sad stories, which ends when resources run out, the failure to build the economy is suddenly apparent, and the military takes over. But often the Maximal Leader is a military man himself, and the repressive role of the army simply becomes more obvious over time. In Latin America today, the better left is repre - sented by socialists and social democrats who reject demagogic populism and struggle to produce economic growth, greater equality, and a stronger welfare state—and who attract less enthusiasm from American leftists than they deserve. Most leftists are idealists, and so we tend to idealize other people and to imagine that the world is more hospitable to our ideas than it actually is. At the same time, we know better; so I call this the politics of pretending. Consider the response of many leftists to the al Qaeda attack of 9/11. They argued that the United States should call the attack a crime and look to the UN and the International Criminal Court to deal with the criminals. That was the “Dial 911” response to 9/11 (it has been repeated again and again in response to later terrorist attacks), and it would have made sense if we lived in a world that was actually run by the UN and the ICC. But, as I argued in Dissent at the time, there was no one answering the phone at 911. Self-help isn’t, indeed, the only effective and justified response to criminal attacks; different forms of mutual assistance and collective security are possible, and the left should take a forward position in exploring them. But self-help has to be part of the story, given the world we live in, and it isn’t a good idea to pretend otherwise. Another example: some leftists who opposed the Kosovo intervention argued that it didn’t have what every legal and justified use of force requires: UN authorization. Indeed, it didn’t. The UN Security Council is incapable, almost all the time, of acting in a timely way. Think of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to shut down the killing fields; or the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, to end the terror there; or the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda to overthrow the murderous regime of Idi Amin. None of these had or could have gotten UN approval. Many leftists opposed each of these interventions, pretending that the UN was already what leftists want it to be, an effective political agent. It isn’t that, and so the unilateral use of force is often, as Jürgen Habermas said of the Kosovo case, “illegal but morally necessary.” The best and last example of leftist pretending is the insistence on the reason - ableness of people who give no sign of being reasonable. Paul Berman writes of the large numbers of French socialists who supported the Munich Agreement that “they gazed across the Rhine and simply refused to believe that millions of upstanding Germans had enlisted in a political movement whose animating principles were paranoid conspiracy theories [and] blood-curdling hatreds. . . .” In the same spirit, many leftists were eager to describe the Chinese communists as “agrarian reformers.” And many today have been quick to grant the legitimacy of Islamist opposition to American bases in Saudi Arabia, say, or to the exis - tence of Israel—and to ignore the demand for a shari’a state and the radical subordination of women. I am fairly sure that most of the people involved in all these cases knew, deep down, that they were pretending. There is a lot to be said for the default position. We should work in the place we know best to make things better. The improvement of humanity begins at home. This argument has special force for Americans, who live in an increasingly inegalitarian society that is also a near-hegemonic world power: we need to be wary of adventures abroad that make our work at home more difficult. Still, good leftists can’t avoid internationalism. We can’t escape what Václav Havel in 1993 called “the feeling of co-responsibility for the world.” Our deepest commitment is solidarity with people in trouble, and some of the worst troubles—poverty, hunger, tyranny, and mass murder—are being experienced right now in other people’s countries. So we are going to be engaged again and again in arguments about what we can do to help. There is no magical way of getting these arguments right. But certain ideological positions, rigidly held, are almost certain to get them wrong: that the use of force is never justified; that “imperial” powers, like the United States, can never act well in the world; and that revo - lutionaries and fighters for liberation, populist leaders and political vanguards, must never be criticized. In all these cases, ideological commitment means that we will only get things right by accident. Political intelligence and moral sensitivity work much better than ideology, and it is these two that should guide our choice of comrades and our decisions about when and how to act abroad. Dictators and terrorists are never our comrades, but only those men and women who really believe in, and who practice, democracy and equality. We should act abroad only with those who share our commitments, and we should act only in ways consistent with those commitments. Leftists have done that often in the past, but often also, we have not: we have mistaken or betrayed our comrades and acted in ways that did not serve either democracy or equality. We need to learn from our history—and the first lesson is this: no more shortcuts, no more pretending.
2023
Northwestern
Kritik
Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Heg Link/Liberal Wars
David Chandler 9, Professor of IR at University of Westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics", Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler_18-1.pdf
This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’(p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’(p.84). In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity(p.6). As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’(p.84).¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic(p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human(against humans)are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’(p.85)Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war(the asserted purpose of the book). Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…(p.84)¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Liberalism
G. John Ikenberry 18, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, August 2018, “Liberal World
The Resilient Order,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world
Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Colonial/Imperial IR Theory
Amitav Acharya 7, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service @ American University, Fellow of the Asia Center, Harvard University, Fellow of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 9-27-2007, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/Theoretical%20Perspectives%20on%20International%20Relations%20in%20Asia.pdf
Moreover, theory is too “Western”. Thus, even among those writers on Asian IR that are theoretically oriented, disagreement persists as to whether IR theory is relevant to studying Asia, given its origin in, and close association with, Western historical traditions, intellectual discourses and foreign policy practices. International relations theory, like the discipline itself, has been, and remains, an “American social science” to quote Stanley Hoffman’s much quoted phrase.3 The recent advances made by the “English School” and continental European constructivism have not made IR theory “universal”; it might have entrenched and broadened the Western dominance. The question of how relevant is IR theory to the study of Asian security have evoked strikingly different responses. On the one hand, David Kang has seized upon the nonrealization of realist warnings of post-war Asia being “ripe for rivalry” to critique not just realism, but Western IR theory in general for “getting Asia wrong”.4 In analyzing Asian regionalism, Peter Katzenstein comments: “Theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism.”5 Although Katzenstein’s remarks specifically concern the study of Asian regionalism, they can be applied to Asian IR in general. And it is a view widely shared among Asian scholars. On the other side, John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, defend the relevance of Western theoretical frameworks in studying the international relations of Asia. While intra-Asian relationships might have had some distinctive features historically, this distinctiveness had been diluted by the progressive integration of the region into the modern international system. The international relations of Asia has acquired the behavioral norms and attributes associated with the modern inter-state system which originated from Europe and still retains much of the features of the Westphalian model. Hence, the core concepts of international relations theory such as hegemony, the distribution of power, international regimes, and political identity, are as relevant in the Asian context as anywhere else.6
To this writer, this debate is a healthy caveat, rather than a debilitating constraint, on analyzing Asian international relations with the help an admittedly Western theoretical literature. To be sure, theoretical paradigms developed from the Western experience do not adequately capture the full range of ideas and relationships that drive international relations in Asia. But IR theories - realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical IR theories - are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian IR provided they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, events, trends, relationships) which fit with them and against that which does not. IR scholars should feel free to identify and study phenomena that are either ignored or given scarce attention by these perspectives. They should also develop concepts and insights from the Asian context and experience, not just to study Asian developments and dynamics, but also other parts of tGutmhe world. In other words, Western IR theory, despite its ethnocentrism, is not to be dismissed or expunged from Asian classrooms or seminars, but universalized with the infusion of Asian histories (Sam Kim essay), personalities, philosophies, trajectories and practices.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: China Link
David Martin Jones 14, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online
Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). This is a large claim.¶ Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).¶ Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property.¶ It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.¶ Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady:
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Extinction Rhetoric Link
Robert Wuthnow 10, Gerhard Andlinger Prof of Sociology at Princeton, PhD in Sociology from Cal Berkeley, “Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Response to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, Nuclear Annihilation, and Other Threats,” p. 21, google books
The notable feature of the perilous times that humanity has faced over the past half century is that the response has made them seem manageable enough that we roll up our collective sleeves and work on practical solutions. There have been relatively few panics involving spontaneous outbreaks of irrational behavior. Work, family life, and other routine activities have continued. Individuals have sometimes shouldered the small tasks of learning about impending crises and pitching in to support research or protect their families. These responsibilities, though, have seldom required great sacrifices on the part of large populations, at least not in the Western world. Social movements have emerged and policies have been affected, but regimes have rarely been toppled as a result. None of this can be understood simply as denial. Were denial the correct interpretation, billions would not have been spent on weapons, deterrence programs, research, and communication. Millions of readers and television viewers would not have paid attention to warnings and documentaries. People responded, but in ways that incorporated the problem solving into ordinary roles and competencies. Nor can the normality of the response be explained by arguing that the dangers envisioned generated little upheaval because they never happened. A nuclear holocaust did not occur, but enough destruction did take place that people could imagine the results. There were also chemical spills, accidents at nuclear plants, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters. Enough went wrong, even with well-intentioned planning, that danger could not be ignored. Indeed, it is truly surprising that more chaos, more panic, more soul searching, and more enervating fear did not ensue.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › AT: Extinction Rhetoric Link
Yuval Noah Harari 18, PhD from University of Oxford, Professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9/26/18, “We need a post-liberal order now,” https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now
Yet that is not our inescapable destiny. We can still push forward with a truly global agenda, going beyond mere trade agreements, and stressing the loyalty all humans should owe to our species and our planet. Identities are forged through crisis. Humankind now faces the triple crisis of nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. Unless humans realise their common predicament and make common cause, they are unlikely to survive this crisis. Just as in the previous century total industrial war forged “a nation” out of many disparate groups, so in the 21st century the existential global crisis might forge a human collective out of disparate nations.
Creating a mass global identity need not prove to be an impossible mission. After all, feeling loyal to humankind and to planet Earth is not inherently more difficult than feeling loyal to a nation comprising millions of strangers I have never met and numerous provinces I have never visited. Contrary to common wisdom, there is nothing natural about nationalism. It is not rooted in human biology or psychology. True, humans are social animals through and through, with group loyalty imprinted in our genes. However, for millions of years Homo sapiens and its hominid ancestors lived in small intimate communities numbering no more than a few dozen people. Humans therefore easily develop loyalty to small groups such as families, tribes and villages, in which everyone knows everyone else. But it is hardly natural for humans to be loyal to millions of utter strangers.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Links › 1AR---Perm
Stuart J Kaufman 9, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, p. 433
Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side’s felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence.¶ A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.
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Rita Floyd 11, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, 2011, “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory,” http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.989.5383&rep=rep1&type=pdf
All this could hold true for a just securitization theory. Not only does such a theory promise to morally constrain securitization, making its occurrence less likely, but also general knowledge of such a theory could help to democratize the process of securitization itself. Both results are desirable because, like war – and regardless of what analysts might wish – securitizations are a recurrent feature of international relations, and the abnegation of moral reflection on securitization is simply not an option (see Rengger, 2002: 363). With this in mind, I will now discuss my three criteria in detail.
Objective existential threats
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Joe Barnes 15, Bonner Means Baker Fellow, Rice University’s Baker Institute For Public Policy; and Andrew Bowen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest, 2015, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,” https://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/0b23aade/CME-Pub-StrategyMiddleEast-061915.pdf
We may argue about the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place. We can enter into what is now an extensive debate upon the success or failure of the 2007 “surge” or the advisability of withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in 2010. But the bottom line remains: the experience of the Iraq invasion is a cautionary tale about the limits of U.S. power— however immense—to remake fractured polities. Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been fighting for 13 years without a conclusive victory over the Taliban, is another case in point.
One might contend that the U.S. response to such failures should be to increase the human and financial resources it commits to “victory,” however defined: more troops, more budgetary outlays, permanent stationing of significant numbers of U.S. troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Putting aside the question of whether such a response would merely mire the U.S. even more deeply in never-ending conflict, there is little evidence that the American public would support such a policy. U.S. power is not just limited by its ability to shape developments on the ground; it is also limited by the necessity of creating and, more importantly, sustaining domestic support for costly foreign military ventures. Finally, there are real financial limits to U.S. freedom of action. After all, the U.S. already spends immense sums on defense; a major new military intervention would further increase the cost. The public might accept substantially higher taxes, sharply reduced expenditures, or the acquisition of even greater debt in a true national emergency. But there is little taste to do so, for the sake of yet another large-scale intervention in Iraq.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Impacts › 1AR---AT: Impact
Vera Zimmerman 15 has served as a research analyst at the Hudson Institute. Her scholarship has been published in World Politics Review. The author is currently a graduate student of political science in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. Article Title “Book Review: The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror. By Joseph Masco Durham and London: Duke University Press” – May 23rd, 2015 – Modified for potentially objectionable language - available at: https://verair.wordpress.com/2015/05/23/the-theater-of-operations-national-security-affect-from-the-cold-war-to-the-war-on-terror-by-joseph-masco-durham-and-london-duke-university-press-2014/
In chapter four, “Biosecurity Noir: WMDs in a World without Borders,” Masco singles out concrete evidence of the amplification of the invisible biothreat triggered by the receipt of a few anthrax letters in 2001 to support his argument about the made-up ambiguous link to WMD. The author highlights that by proliferating visions (depictions) of catastrophic danger, biosecurity created a militarized response of global preemption in the name of domestic defense. Masco argues his case well and sharply, providing compelling evidence, but his interpretations of evidence at times seems exaggerated and biased. Though Masco does not deny the existence of the real threats, his recognition of them is too brief, while consideration of an alternative view is rather weak. He acknowledges that terrorist violence is not fictitious but insists that for the most part the United States inflated threats and politically exploited potential danger to declare and maintain the state of emergency. Such focus on the amplification of threats seems to suggest that for the most part the threats are not that real. Masco suggests that the link between terrorists and WMD is mainly inflated. Yet there is a real global concern about 2,000 tons of highly-radioactive nuclear materials being stored in poorly secured civilian locations around the world. The book never mentions the threat of a dirty bomb, which today is viewed as a more likely occurrence than an atomic bomb explosion. The IAEA cites a hundred reported thefts of nuclear materials on average each year. There is a good chance terrorists can get their hands on enough nuclear materials to produce a dirty bomb. The United States meets these challenges with increased international cooperation. Masco’s main argument that “the US is no longer constrained by territorial limits” is exaggerated. The only two cases cited when the United States appeared unconstrained were the invasion of Iraq. Though the invasion of Iraq was opposed by some U.S. allies (France, Germany, and New Zealand), it was still a combined force coalition from the U.S., the UK, Australia, and Poland. The United States does not have an unrestricted reach as Masco wants to depict. It is constrained by sovereignty and territorial integrity of other stable states. The unstable nuclear regimes in North Korea and Iran present that existential nuclear threat to the U.S. described by Masco, but the United States is in no rush to invade these countries. According to the anticipatory and preemptive logic Masco prescribes to the United States, it could have already invaded those states to prevent the disaster. Another limitation of his argument is that he paints the nuclear and counterterror states as consistent through all the presidencies, thus, drawing all administrations under a common denominator. Under Obama, the counterterror state became a liberal democracy again. The ‘unrestrained’ theater of operation has shrunk by ending the presence in Iraq and withdrawing from Afghanistan, even though our presence there could have been extended based on the preemption logic. Obama recognized the faults of the Bush administration in acting unilaterally, scaled back stability operations, and emphasized sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The emergence of the real ISIL threat undermines the book’s core argument of threat amplification, the U.S. preemption logic of response, and unconstrained global reach. The U.S.-led global effort against ISIL amounts to more than 50 nations, which shows the unified nature of the fight. Masco asserts that U.S. superpower depends on the ability of the state to monopolize a discourse of danger, but he doesn’t discuss how the United States succeeded in doing that. Masco could have developed his argument by tracing how the United States was able to use its soft power to mobilize like-minded states to agree with U.S. hegemony on WOT. It will be interesting to trace the U.S. internalization of fear and terror. He could have examined how allies responded to U.S. domestic mobilization of its population and whether other states imitated U.S. emotional management projects to mobilize their own populations. This would boost his argument that the U.S. was able to project its power on the global scale. In Theatre of Operations, Masco makes a compelling argument about the creation of the unrestrained theater of operations via domestication of fear and terror carried over from the Cold War days. His anthropological study reveals the extent to which a democracy is willing to use fear to assure the core principle of the social contract, defined by Hobbes as the exchange of public obedience for collective security. A democracy that chooses to be preoccupied with security risks to forgo core democratic values resulting in the lack of transparency, restriction of free flow of information, and negligence of non-military threats—no less threatening than nuclear terrorism. Making criticism of U.S. actions the main focus of the book, however, Masco’s interpretations are not properly balanced and sometimes appear biased. Still, reading Masco’s insight of the purpose of U.S. actions in the post-9/11 context offers opportunities to think critically about the effects of 9/11 emotional reprogramming of society and state of emergencies in U.S. history.
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Aff – Security Kritik › AT: Impacts › 1AR---AT: Impact
David A. Lake 17, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, with; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Stephan Haggard, and David G. Victor; 4/21/17, “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/behavioral-revolution-and-international-relations/C00E297DF5801C7A09F5334ABE40E54D
However institutions may also be designed and used precisely to correct individual bias or offset cognitive limitations, as Bendor and Hammond show in their influential critique of Allison.82 Bureaucratic procedures are often designed to collect and disseminate information, evaluate options, and study the consequences of choice more systematically and thoroughly than a single and especially “intuitive” decision maker can do. Contestation between rival departments can also lead to the airing and resolution of differing views, leading to more “rational” decisions. What appear to be slow, dysfunctional, and contentious procedures from a rationalist perspective may be quite effective and appropriate if we begin with the assumption that individuals working within complex organizations are vulnerable to cognitive biases, misperception, mistaken beliefs, and outright error. Bureaucratic procedures in effect transform possible System 1 decisions at the level of the individual into slow, agonizing, but more rational System 2 policies at the level of the aggregate. This suggests the counterintuitive possibility that policy can be more “rational” than any of the individuals involved, at least in settings where institutions successfully incentivize robust decision-making processes.