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2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Arctic War

Russia’s peaceful in the Arctic and will pursue cooperation.

Jeremy Tasch 20. Professor of Geography & Environmental Planning, Towson University. “Why the Talk of an ‘Artic Cold War’ Is Exaggeration”. Valdai Club. Jul 7 2020. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/why-the-talk-of-an-artic-cold-war-is-exaggeration/

As Russia’s government has promoted a more visible presence in the Arctic—nervously observed by international governments aware of Russia’s increased military presence in its High North—a few related critical points seem often disregarded.

In summer 2007, while both the Mir-1 and Mir-2 submersibles were assisting a planned Russian government expedition to map the seabed, the famous flag-planting performance was funded by Frederik Paulsen, a Swedish pharmaceutical entrepreneur and the event was organized by an Australian-American group of deep-sea exploration enthusiasts. In other words, this feat, which drew the ire of Canada’s Foreign Minister and focused international media attention on a “new Cold War,” was unlikely prearranged either to perform scientific research in support of Russia’s Lomonosov territorial claims nor as a statement of territorial acquisition.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Arctic War

No Arctic war---their ev is all hype.

Øystein Tunsjø 20, professor and head of the Asia programme at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College, “The Great Hype: False Visions of Conflict and Opportunity in the Arctic,” Survival, Vol. 62, No. 5, 09-23-2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1819649

In recent years there has been an abundance of studies, reports, articles and statements presenting the Arctic as a new frontier for resource extraction and sea lanes of communication.1 These studies claim that the receding Arctic ice provides not just commercial opportunities, but also security challenges that could fuel great-power rivalry and conflict.2 Yet, despite the hype, there is little likelihood of a shipping bonanza or a natural-resource boom in the Arctic.3 This does not mean that climate change is unimportant for the region – we can expect more shipping activity, investment and competition as the ice cap recedes. But it is important to maintain a balanced view of the opportunities and challenges presented by the ‘new Arctic’.4

Equally important, the stakes in a changing Arctic are not high enough to warrant a great-power conflict. As in the past, it remains unlikely that military force will be used to resolve a conflict originating in the Arctic. It is more likely that any potential great-power competition in the High North between Russia and NATO will reflect the more consequential sources of competition and conflict in Eastern or Southern Europe – in other words, that conflict might spill over into the High North from somewhere else.5 Developments in the Arctic appear to have caused some observers to forget that Russia’s recent naval build-up is primarily focused on safeguarding traditional Russian security interests, such as maintaining its sea-based nuclear deterrent and contesting sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic. Thus, it is a familiar security challenge – Russia’s rivalry with the United States and NATO over the European security order – that has the highest potential for creating conflict in the Arctic.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › AT Baltic War

There’s no chance of US/Russia war.

Aleksandr Khramchikhin 18, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, 1/25/2018, “Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

But conventional wisdom is often wrong, and so it is this time. The hysteria that has engulfed public commentary throughout Europe about this ostensibly dire military situation on the brink of getting out of hand has little, if any, basis in fact. Both sides in the standoff exaggerate the tensions and the danger of escalation, and the risks of the military moves—their own and their adversary’s—supposedly driving these tensions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Swindland Bad

Escalates to nuclear war

Buchanan 22, author of “Nixon’s White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever.” (Pat, “Why would US give a war guarantee — to Finland?,” The Journal,

Nervous about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions, Finland wants America legally and morally bound to fight Russia on its behalf, should Putin invade Finland as he invaded Ukraine. From the Finnish point of view, this is perfectly understandable. But why would the United States consent to go to war with Russia, the largest nuclear power on earth, for violating Finland’s frontiers? Finland is not Alaska; it is not Canada; it is 5,000 miles away. And no one ever asserted during the Cold War, or for the decades since, that Finland was a U.S. vital interest. Why, then, would we consent, in advance, to go to war with Russia over Finland? President Joe Biden said last week that NATO has an “open door” policy and Finland and Sweden are welcome, and he looks forward to their joining. Consider what Biden is actually saying and doing here. He is ceding to Finland, a country of 5.5 million people with an 830-mile border with Putin’s Russia, the right to obligate the United States of America to go to war with Russia, if Russia attacks Finland. What patriot would commit his own country, in perpetuity, to go to war on behalf of another country not his own? Why would America surrender to the Finns our freedom of action in deciding whether or not to fight a nuclear-armed Russia? NATO is not a country club; it is a military alliance Putin regards as an enemy. Every member of that alliance is obliged to treat an attack on any one of its 30 members as an attack on all, and all are obligated to come to the defense of the nation attacked. By welcoming Finland into NATO, Biden is offering Helsinki the kind of war guarantee Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave to Poland in the spring of 1939, which led to Britain’s having to declare war on Sept. 3, 1939, two days after Germany invaded Poland. How did that work out for Britain and the empire? In his farewell address, President George Washington warned his countrymen against “permanent alliances.” In conscious echo of our first president, Thomas Jefferson warned against “entangling alliances.” NATO is a military alliance that has been in existence since 1949. While it began with the U.S., Canada and 10 European nations, it ended the Cold War with 16. We have since added 14 more. Six of the nations NATO added since the Cold War — Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania — were members of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact. Three of the newest NATO members — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — are former republics of the Soviet Union. The last quarter-century of NATO’s encroachment into Russia’s space and onto Russia’s front porch has been a leading cause of the worsening relationship between the world’s two great nuclear powers. The repeated refusal of Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to rule out NATO membership for Ukraine was a primary cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This does not absolve Putin of culpability in launching the war on Ukraine, but it should tell us that any new members of NATO, in Russia’s “near abroad,” especially a new NATO member with an 830-mile border with Russia from the Baltic to the Arctic, is running a real risk and raising the possibility of war. Indeed, with Russia’s war in Ukraine in stalemate, having failed to achieve its objectives in Kyiv, Kharkov and Odessa, Russian officials have repeatedly raised the prospect of a desperate resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop the bleeding. “Escalate to de-escalate” is the slogan. Bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO, which has already elicited rage from Moscow and ominous threats, is unlikely to reduce whatever pressure currently exists to escalate to nuclear war.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Swindland Bad

Expansion alienates Russia---triggers arms racing and escalation.

Stephen Collinson 22. Politics Reporter at CNN. "The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO." CNN. 5-18-2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/18/europe/sweden-finland-nato-analysis-intl/index.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO is how little debate there is about whether it's a wise idea.

The entry of the two Nordic nations would be the most significant geopolitical outcome of the Ukraine war, transforming the strategic security picture in northeastern Europe and adding hundreds of miles of direct NATO borders with Russia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Swindland Bad

Inducting Sweden and Finland leaves NATO exposed and vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Emma Ashford 22. Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden." Washington Post. 5-30-2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62_story.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

Yet from the point of view of existing NATO members — and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a net win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of NATO’s charter.

And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Impact

Middle East war escalates.

Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,” )

The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Impact

Turkey’s key to ME stabilization

Sandano 3/4- Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Sindh (IMRAN ALI SANDANO, “Change in Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East,” MAR 04, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/change-in-turkish-foreign-policy-toward-the-middle-east)//mcu

Turkish foreign policy mainly aims to protect its interests in a strained global and regional environment. Turkey always tried to create conditions for sustainable peace and development with both neighboring and more distant states. Ankara has recently become more involved and active in the Middle East. Some analysts are of the view that this change indicates Turkey is moving away from the West, as they observe that Turkey's confidence in the region is mismatched with its Western coordination. However, others believe that security, power projection, rational considerations and a mix of national interests have forced Turkey to drive its foreign policy toward the Middle East. After the Arab uprising, regional geopolitics and security challenges opened new channels for Turkish foreign policy, which led Ankara to even get involved in the region. It started humanitarian and economic engagements. With the passage of time, Ankara’s involvement in the Middle East has extended and it has become the third party in the regional conflicts. To normalize ties with the Middle Eastern countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, would open new channels for augmenting Turkey’s diplomatic, strategic and economic assets in its foreign policy. The strained ties the between leading regional actors have proven deleterious to understanding the true prospect of economic relations. A shift and a response The shift in Ankara’s Middle East policy is a response to external factors – both regional and international, and domestic issues related to security and economy. Turkey has begun to change its positions and restart its relations, which had previously been based on hostility. Washington has always remained a key player in the Middle East, but the United States administration under President Joe Biden prioritized East Asia, focused on its own domestic matters and has pushed away diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the previous Donald Trump administration. In the meantime, the U.S. has started reevaluating its military forces from the region. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not be part of the Saudi intervention of Yemen, and Washington may go back to the nuclear deal with Iran. These changes triggered and pushed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE towards a de-escalation process. On the other hand, Russia's growing influence and the U.S. decreasing engagement in the region pushed Turkey to act it to balance between the two. Turkey has a long relationship with the U.S. and Russia, but with some differences – however, it has maintained a good balance in Syria and Libya. In this context, Ankara’s Middle East policy has shifted into a new track to rebalance the region. Saudi Arabia a key actor Last year at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, Gulf countries signed the Al-Ula declaration and formally ended the dispute with Qatar. This regional development created further encouragement for Ankara to take the plunge with Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Since then, Turkey and Qatar have started negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is one key regional player in the Middle East region. The good relations between Ankara and Riyadh would prove to be a game changer for this region. The cooperation initiative has been started between Ankara and Riyadh, their relations have appeared in a positive dynamic after a phone conversation between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman ahead of a G-20 leaders summit in 2021. Recently, Erdoğan visited the UAE for bilateral and economic cooperation with a flurry of agreements during his first visit to the Gulf state since 2013. No doubt, Riyadh also wants close relations with Ankara, which will help Saudi to counter rivals or disrupters. The normal ties between Riyadh and Ankara would take preference over all regional reconciliation efforts. This move would be a good option for Saudi Arabia to get much-needed space to enhance its capacity for political activity, connectivity, and cooperation with various other regional states, which are perceived as Riyadh’s rivals. Better relations between both states would open new economic, political and defense opportunities, where Saudis may retain their traditional regional role and effectively deal with security challenges. The regional power game between the main stakeholders of the region is persistent strategic competition, which will only destabilize their diplomatic positions, and create more economic cost than benefits. The current developments and the changing nature of their regional de-escalation approach is a sign of a reconciliatory drift in the region, which will normalize the strategic and economic situation in the region. To sum up, regardless of the problems in balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, the current change in the foreign policy of the Middle East is a good option for Turkey to move forward with win-win cooperation. Certainly, Turkey possesses such capability to go with Middle Eastern countries for their collective cooperation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Link

Turkey-US relations are impossible

Dalay 21, research director @ Brookings (Galip, “US-Turkey relations will remain crisis-ridden for a long time to come,” Brookings,

At this stage, there is limited room for progress on the above-mentioned five main areas of contention in relations. A mutually acceptable formula on the S-400 systems is unlikely to be found anytime soon, and this issue is set to become a long-lasting irritant in the relationship. On the Eastern Mediterranean, at best, the crisis can be refrozen, which means launching bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece and both sides refraining from sending ships into contested waters for exploration. Plus, on the Eastern Mediterranean, we are likely to see more policy coordination between the U.S. and Europe. The future of Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian Kurds is intimately linked with the future of the ruling coalition in Turkey, and political developments inside Turkey. As long as Erdoğan’s coalition with the far-right MHP remains in place, the prospect for a policy recalibration is limited. And the Biden administration will likely be more vocal on high-profile, politically-motivated cases such as against the former co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş, philanthropist Osman Kavala, and novelist Ahmet Altan. Similarly, the Halkbank case will continue to cast a shadow over bilateral ties. All these feuds will make crisis a permanent fixture of U.S.-Turkey relations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Link

Turkey is key to effective Afghanistan stabilization

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

Turkey will likely perceive one or multiple of the following objectives in the near term as advantageous to its regional and global standing: Deliver legitimacy to a new Afghan government: As a Muslim NATO country, Turkey could be a useful partner for the Taliban leadership to gain international acceptance and legitimacy as well as access to global financial systems. Advance the Turkish security role in line with, and beyond, NATO goals: Turkey has been offering military training and security cooperation deals to an increasing number of developing countries. Turkish forces have hosted Afghan, Somali, Azerbaijani, Pakistani, Libyan, and other security forces for capacity-building trainings as part of, or beyond, NATO missions. Turkey will likely continue its trainings with Afghanistan and offer new technical and military cooperation opportunities to the Taliban government. Insert Erdogan-friendly Turkish companies to Afghanistan for profit: Turkish companies with strong ties to the Erdogan government have won significant reconstruction contracts in Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and elsewhere. Turkey will likely look for similar construction and investment opportunities in Afghanistan for profit and to benefit the crony network Erdogan cultivates for government-friendly companies. Improve Turkey’s position within NATO: Turkey is one of the few, if not the only, NATO countries that will maintain a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan. It has also been in frequent contact with many NATO allies to discuss developments in Afghanistan and demand financial support.[12] Ankara will seek to use its unique position in and access to Afghanistan to improve relations with NATO allies, particularly the United States, and gain concessions. Position Turkey as a regional power for security and stabilization: President Erdogan suggested that Turkey, Turkic Central Asian countries, and Pakistan could work with the Taliban if they take “positive steps” during a speech on August 29.[13] Erdogan has not specified what those steps include or how Turkey might support them, but Turkey could leverage its ties to Central Asian countries to promote regional security initiatives. Meanwhile, Ankara also faces the risks of deteriorating public opinion, increased refugee flows, and growing financial costs

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---AT NATO Withdrew

True, but that makes Turkish alignment with NATO all the more important

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

The Turkish Armed Forces left Afghanistan, but Ankara is poised to play key security and diplomatic roles in the country. Turkish officials announced the evacuation of the Turkish military contingency from the Kabul Airport on August 25, 2021, despite separate discussions with the United States and the Taliban for Turkey to continue running the Kabul International Airport.[1] Top Turkish officials had argued that the Turkish forces could continue to manage the security and operations of the airport as they had since 2015 if the Taliban so desired.[2] Ankara also pivoted to establishing relations with the Taliban through the Turkish Embassy in Qatar at least as early as August 15, when the Taliban reached Kabul, in a likely bid to maintain and expand the Turkish role in Afghanistan.[3] The bulk of Turkish forces left Afghanistan by August 27 under reported Taliban pressure, but the Turkish Embassy is continuing its operations as of September 3.[4] Recent statements by both the Taliban and Ankara indicate that Turkey is exploring ways to help run the Kabul Airport and support the new Taliban government.[5] Ankara and the Taliban both believe Turkey can play a role in shaping the new Afghanistan. Ankara will likely double down on its political and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to prove its ability to stabilize and shape conflicts as a regional power. Turkey has provided training for Afghan security forces, political outreach to various Turkic communities, aid and private sector investment, and non-combatant military services. Turkey refrained from participating in military campaigns against the Taliban and instead took on logistical and security duties like Kabul Airport security, intelligence sharing, and funding and training at Afghan military schools.[6] Turkish officials leveraged this non-combatant history when they offered the Taliban further “technical and security assistance” in August.[7] Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Naeem said that the Taliban wants Turkey’s support in areas ranging from reconstruction and economy to healthcare and education on August 25.[8] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views such a Turkish role as a natural one, underlining Turkey’s long-standing ties to its fellow Muslim country with a significant Turkic population. Ankara and the Taliban are also in talks about the future of Kabul Airport. President Erdogan stated that the Taliban asked Turkey to run the operations of Kabul International Airport if the Taliban provided its security instead of Turkish forces. However, anonymous Turkish officials claimed that Turkey would only run the airport in partnership with Qatar and only if security was provided by a private security firm of former Turkish soldiers.[9] SADAT International Defense Consultancy, known for credible reports of its supervision and payment of Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Libya and Azerbaijan, is the only private Turkish security company that could adopt such a duty.[10] Discussions are ongoing as of September 3 and the Taliban’s position remains unclear. Turkey’s Ambitions and Constraints Afghanistan is a theater of opportunity, but not an existential security problem for Ankara. Afghanistan poses little direct threat to Turkish national security, in contrast to the perceived terrorism and internal stability threats the country is fighting in northern Iraq and Syria. Afghanistan’s current situation presents an opportunity for Ankara to maximize its political and security reach by filling growing gaps in foreign investment, projects, and support and by advancing NATO interests. Turkey can advance its mutual interests with NATO in Afghanistan while pursuing its own objectives as an aspiring power in the region. A successful bid in helping stabilize Afghanistan could elevate Turkey as a necessary and capable security player in the region and to its allies—two longstanding goals of the Erdogan government. During an August 25, 2021, speech to celebrate the anniversary of a historic Turkic battle, Erdogan said “We transformed from a country of existential battles inside its own borders to one that has a say in every critical matter in the world.”[11] This self-perception of Turkey as a regional powerbroker helps drive President Erdogan and Ankara’s top leadership’s pursuit of more activist policies beyond Turkey’s immediate neighborhood—including in Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---ME

Specifically, Afghanistan unstable now and will escalate drawing Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia

CPA 5/11- aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.(Center for preventative Action, “War in Afghanistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, May 11 2022, )//mcu

In February 2020, after more than a year of direct negotiations, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace agreement that set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the United States pledged to draw down U.S. troops to approximately 8,500 within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. However, no official cease-fire was put into place. After a brief reduction in violence, the Taliban quickly resumed attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. Direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began months after the agreed upon start of March 2020, faced multiple delays, and ultimately made little progress. Violence across Afghanistan continued in 2020 and 2021 as the United States increased air strikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked Afghan government and Afghan security forces targets and made territorial gains. Civilian casualties across Afghanistan have remained high over the past several years. The United Nations documented a then–record high of 10,993 civilian casualties in 2018. Although 2019 saw a slight decline, civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 for the sixth year in a row and brought the total UN-documented civilian casualties since 2009 to more than 100,000. Despite another decline in 2020, the first half of 2021 saw a record high number of civilian casualties as the Taliban ramped up their military offensive amid the withdrawal of international troops. In addition to the Taliban’s offensive, Afghanistan faces a threat from the Islamic State in Khorasan, which has also expanded its presence in several eastern provinces, attacked Kabul, and targeted civilians with suicide attacks. Uncertainty surrounding the future of international assistance has strained the Afghan economy. Although the United States and its allies pledged in late 2020 to continue providing support to the Afghan government, they could reduce aid following the Taliban takeover. Such a move could compound Afghanistan’s deteriorating economic situation. Concerns The United States has an interest in attempting to preserve the many political, human rights, and security gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. The Taliban takeover of the country could once again turn Afghanistan into a terrorist safe haven, as the group is believed to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. The takeover also threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls. Moreover, increasing internal instability, a mass exodus of refugees, and a growing humanitarian crisis could have regional ramifications as neighboring countries respond. In addition, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia are all likely to compete for influence in Kabul and with subnational actors.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---ME

Turkey is an essential ally in NATO key to stabilization measures in the middle east

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nation in 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat. We, as former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, are proud to confirm that our country has assumed its responsibilities toward the Alliance in their entirety. Turkey is one of the few allies to fulfil its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; it has the second largest army in NATO, and it ranks fourth in contributions to NATO operations and fifth in NATO expenditures. In an Alliance of thirty nations, there are inevitably ups and downs in the relations between allies. In the past, these differences have turned out to be circumstantial and temporary. They were eventually resolved, mostly bilaterally, but sometimes with the use of good offices of the Secretary General or other Allies. There is no reason to suppose that the current spate of disputes will not be resolved in the same way. During the recent tension in the eastern Mediterranean, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, took the welcome initiative of inviting Greece and Turkey to agree upon deconfliction measures. The parties concerned must be engaged in a dialogue in order to achieve an equitable solution in line with international law. Other countries should facilitate this process by encouraging dialogue among two longstanding allies. To conclude, there needs to be a solution to the impasse presented by the procurement of Russian-made S400s and the U.S. decisions both to disengage Turkey from the F35 program and to apply sanctions on its ally’s defence procurement agency. A compromise would unleash much positive momentum. We believe that Turkey will continue to observe its obligations and commitments as a reliable member of the Alliance. It will continue to support the Alliance efforts toward global peace and security. The Alliance would, no doubt, be weaker without the active participation and support of Turkey.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

Security commitments are key to effective non-prolif---sustains the NPT – Russia cooperation is irrelevant in a world with the NPT BUT we can walk and chew gum at the same time with prolif and Russia

Daalder 20 [Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, “Can 50 Years of Minimizing Nuclear Proliferation Continue?” 3-5, , y2k]

Imagine we are living in the year 2030. New seismic activity indicates an underground nuclear explosion somewhere near the Arctic Circle. One more country announces it’s joining the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons states that has now grown to 20 nations — more than double the number in 2020.

The trouble started in 2023, when a group of former allies of the United States renounced their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and opted to acquire the very nuclear weapons capabilities that they foreswore decades earlier.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

Even if it collapsed, the US can use the alliance network to tamp down proliferation

Onderco 20 [Michal Onderco, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “If Kroenig is right, the United States needs a new nonproliferation policy. Soon,” New Perspectives, 2020, Vol. 28(1) 118–122, , y2k]

An argument could be made that even if the rest of the world somehow lost interest in the NPT, the United States would remain the ‘‘enforcer of last resort’’ (cf. Horovitz, 2015 for a version of this argument). This argument is consistent with the standard account of the success of the United States’ unilateral attempts to constrain the nuclear developments among friends and enemies alike (Gavin, 2012; Miller, 2018). Yet many of the tools that the United States would use to compel countries to give up their nuclear ambitions stem from the United States’ unique position within the international system, where the United States sits in the center of various political and economic networks (cf. e.g. Winecoff, 2015). These tools, however, work only as long as the United States and its allies dominate the world (Nexon, 2018). Yet the centrality of the United States in various networks comes under strain, not least because the United States decided to ‘weaponize’ these interdependence networks (Farrell and Newman, 2019). One only needs to listen to the repeated calls for alternative payment channels (such as the EU’s Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, known as INSTEX, a channel for conducting business with Iran) and different currencies to settle transactions to understand the phenomenon (for a recent overview, see McDowell, 2019). And while the rising powers do not fundamentally question the goal of nonproliferation, they are not as heavily invested in it. Shell

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NPT will survive despite member backlash over various issues

Lyon 20 [Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. “Will the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Survive the 2020s?” 2-21, , y2k]

Treaty members will vent about a range of issues during the upcoming five-yearly review conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 27 April to 22 May. North Korean nuclear and missile developments, the trials of the Iranian nuclear deal, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the continuing modernisation programs of the five recognised nuclear weapon states—instead of disarmament—provide plenty of new grist for the mill.

Still, every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the future of the treaty. This year’s no different. Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too, because most treaty members continue to believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would make for a more dangerous international security environment than the one we already have. Moreover, few states would want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field.

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US has 50 nukes in turkey—removal from NATO causes them to prolif

Fernholz 19- covers space, the economy and geopolitics for Quartz (Tim Fernholz “The US is rethinking the 50-plus nuclear weapons it keeps in Turkey,” Quartz, October 13, 2019, ty owen

Turkish forces are pushing into northern Syria, replacing and sometimes even firing on the US troops retreating at Donald Trump’s orders. The question of whether Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is really a US ally was put to US defense secretary Mark Esper on Fox television this morning. “No, I think Turkey, the arc of their behavior over the past several years has been terrible,” he said. Which brings up a problem: The US is storing perhaps 50 air-dropped thermonuclear bombs at its Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey, less than 100 miles from the Syrian border where this conflict is taking place. The nuclear stockpile dates back to the Cold War, when the US sought to keep a sufficient supply of atomic weapons deployed in Europe to deter potential Soviet aggression. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy also host similar arsenals, and the US trains the participating nations in the use of the doomsday devices. Today, these bombs remain in place largely because of inertia, and the hope that countries like Turkey will see the depot as sufficient reason not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. It doesn’t seem to be working: Last month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he could “not accept” efforts to prevent Turkey from developing its own atomic bombs. But instability in Turkey and the region, along with Ankara’s close relationship with Russia, have had American strategists talking about re-locating their weapons for years. (The US does not officially discuss the arsenal, but there is no indication that the stockpile has been removed.) A 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan saw power to the base cut off for several days, raising questions about the safety of the stash. More recently, Turkey has purchased advanced air defense technology from Russia, which has raised hackles in the US defense community because Turkey was a partner in developing the US F-35 fighter-bomber. The US Air Force canceled the partnership over worries that Russia would be able to learn from Turkey how to better shoot down US aircraft. Now, Russia and Turkey are coordinating military policy in northern Syria, with the US as a bystander. The move to exploit a civil conflict in Syria to gain a geopolitical advantage typify how strategists see a new era of great power competition playing out. One reason to be worried is that the recent shift in US strategy launched by Trump appears to have caught the US military establishment by surprise. It’s not clear how prepared the US is to deal with the knock-on effects of the about-face, whether it is disappointed former allies like the Kurds (paywall) or ISIS fighters escaping from prison camps, much less the calculus of nuclear deterrence.

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Studies prove

Philip Baxter 15, Ph.D. Candidate in International Affairs, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Turkey’s Nuclear Move: Deciphering the Developments”, https://duckofminerva.com/2015/10/turkeys-nuclear-move-deciphering-the-developments.html

A recent  in the National Interest by Hans Rühle, former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense, argues that Turkey is positioning itself similarly to Iran in its leveraging of civilian nuclear power for potential nuclear weapons breakout capability. His argument, meant largely to justify German spying on the NATO-ally, posits that since Turkey is developing nuclear power plants, potentially developing its own nuclear fuel production capacity, and does not have a provision for spent nuclear fuel to be return to suppliers (a provision not necessary if producing fuel domestically), it is obviously shadowing the Iranian proliferation formula. These arguments are significantly flawed. While the Turkish movement into the nuclear arena could be afforded more clarity, particularly on the heels of a decade of efforts to corral the Iranian program, nefarious purposes should not be assumed; nor, are they immediately apparent. Rühle argues that the size of the nuclear industry that Turkey is planning, as well as the amount of fuel that would be needed to supply that industry, would provide ample material for a nuclear weapon. From a purely technical perspective, nuclear fuel from most civilian power reactors is not ideal for a weapons program. Turkey plans to construct four light-water pressurized reactors. These light-water reactors make breeding the type of plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons difficult – as purity is key in having a safe and reliable arsenal. Rühle dismisses the point that the less-pure plutonium from a civilian power reactor would not be used for military program. Rather, Ruhle argues that regardless of plutonium purity, a state will seek to acquire any form of nuclear material and use it for a nuclear arsenal. However, the quality of plutonium is a critical factor in understanding and forecasting proliferation strategies. Not all plutonium is created equal. Having impure plutonium in a nuclear arsenal, an arsenal that a nation would use to deter attack by other states, would be extremely dangerous. When uranium (particularly civilian reactor-grade uranium) is used in a power reactor, plutonium-239, the fissile material used for the production of nuclear weapons, is created. However, other by-products and isotopes of plutonium are also generated. The ratio of these by-products depends on the type of fuel you start with and how long the fuel is used in a power reactor. The longer it is in there, the less pure the plutonium output. While Rühle dismisses this point, other isotopes of plutonium which would be created in the civilian power reactor would be dangerous in a nuclear arsenal, particularly Pu-240 due to its unstable neutron flux which makes the long-term viability of the warhead questionable. With a quicker decay rate than Pu-239, comes the potential for spontaneously released neutrons – which is what starts the chain reaction to detonation. In the short-term, this is less of an issue, but the risk of unintended detonation increases over time. For a state that wishes to have a nuclear arsenal that will be able to deter the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, a stable arsenal is critical for reliable use if necessary and for the warheads not to detonate on your own territory. The type of reactor that is used is also important. The reactor models that Turkey plans to build make hiding illicit activities, such as diverting material, difficult. Reloading the fuel in the models being sought halts reactor operations and would stop operations for days or weeks at time. Turkey desperately needs energy. It imports roughly . Domestic energy production, particularly electricity, is lacking. Expanding its energy capacity is critical to Turkey’s economic development strategy. Shuttering a nuclear reactor for weeks or months at a time in order to extract costly fuel does not align with this policy objective. Further, plans for a nuclear energy sector of two dozen or so power reactors, with contracts in place already for eight, points to a desperate need for energy, not a mask for illicit activities. There are also significant differences in Iran and Turkey’s nuclear sectors. Iran purchased one power facility, Bushehr, from Russia, and then justified its expansion of uranium enrichment by the need for medical isotopes. This justification enabled Iran to enrich up to 20% U-235, which accounts for roughly 80% of the work load to get to weapons-grade material. In terms of breakout capacity, this strategy is designed to conduct enrichment in the open, and then quickly escalate to weapons-grade. Turkey, on the other hand, is justifying its nuclear expansion for economic reasons, driven by shortages in energy. Additionally, recent studies have found that a could be developed in Turkey. With developing nuclear energy sectors in number of countries (China, Vietnam, UAE, etc.), uranium ore and fuel services will likely be in greater demand. Again, the economic motivations appear to outweigh the security explanations. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency would also have greater access in Turkey than it did in Iran in the early years of the Iranian program. Currently, Turkey is a member in good standing and a signatory to the (AP). The current safeguards regime in Turkey, which includes the advanced monitoring and access that comes from the AP, requires early notification and cooperation with the IAEA as sites that deal with nuclear energy are developed. This access is well beyond what Iran was subjected to during the early stages of its program. As Turkey expands into nuclear energy, be it mining and milling or energy production, under the current safeguards regime, the IAEA would be engaged during the planning stages and would be able to identify at the outset possible anomalies. Turkey, in order to move into the nuclear arena, also , known informally as a 123 Agreement, with the United States in 2008. This agreement places stringent controls on the technologies that Turkey receives from the US, or the technologies from any other state that has a 123 Agreement with the US. With the IAEA safeguards system and other international regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, this additional layer of protection would help to prohibit illicit use of materials Finally, Turkey’s external security outlook and alliance structure are also dramatically different than that of Iran’s. Scholars have examined in depth the determinants of proliferation, with security demands often found to be the primary motivating factor. However, Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber, among others, have that security guarantees significantly reduce the likelihood for proliferation. While Iran could be said to have sponsor states in China and Russia, these relationships are largely driven by economic interests and self-interested foreign policy. Conversely, Turkey is a long-standing member of the NATO alliance. The Article V security guarantee ensures Turkey’s existential security. Iran lacked this protection.

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NATO prevents Turkish prolif now---but it’s the last barrier.

Larrabee & Nader 13, *PhD, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation. **MA, former International Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation. (F. Stephen and Alireza, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND_RR258.pdf)

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

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Regional arms racing and nuclear war

Adam Garfinkle 18, Founding Editor of The American Interest and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”, American Interest, 09-03-2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs///SJ

Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.

But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course.