2022
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Kritik
War turns—distinctly bad for people with disabilities
Maria Berghs and Nawaf Kabbara 16 (November 8, 2016, “Chapter 17 Disabled People in Conflicts and Wars” , Disability in the Global South by Disability in the Global South The Critical Handbook, Editors: Shaun Grech, Karen Soldatic , https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-42488-0 )// RB
The long-term consequences of protracted confl ict on disabled people and the creation of impairment need more research. This calls for a longitudinal or life-course approach (Priestley 2007 ) to see how identities, single and multiple impairment(s), health and social care needs differ as the age of populations and their environments change. A life-course approach can also explore how the concept of disability is changing intergenerationally, whether passed on biologically (e.g. HIV/AIDS) and socially (e.g. stigma), or through ascription of a new kinship identity (e.g. amputee) (Berghs 2012 ). Yet, research, funding and planning to understand the long-term effects of confl ict on disability is rarely available (Wehbi 2011a ). Inhorn and Kobeissi ( 2006 ) usefully note how there are six long-term effects of confl ict on civilians: physical, mental, reproductive/demographic, social structural, infrastructural, and environmental. We briefl y discuss each of these in turn in an effort to illustrate what is missing from current debates in relation to disability.
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Kritik
State action can be good for people with disabilities – ADA proves
Mckeever 20 (Amy Mckeever, JULY 30, 2020, "How the Americans with Disabilities Act transformed a country," History, ) //RB
More than 2,000 disability rights advocates gathered on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on a hot summer day. It was July 26, 1990, and they’d come together to witness one of the most momentous civil rights victories in decades: President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.
2022
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Kritik
Ruckelshaus 17, (Jay Ruckelshaus is a Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, The Non-Politics of Disability, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)
Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Ruckelshaus 17 (Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, "The Non-Politics of Disability”, 1/18/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)
Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Badano 13 (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)
I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net benefit to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a benefit to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An affirmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled. 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly fits with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive benefits that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to fit a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.
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Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Disease
Burkle 20 – (Frederick Burkle, Senior Fellow & Scientist, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H., “Declining Public Health Protections within Autocratic Regimes: Impact on Global Public Health Security, Infectious Disease Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Pandemics,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol 35, Iss 3, June 2020, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/prehospital-and-disaster-medicine/article/declining-public-health-protections-within-autocratic-regimes-impact-on-global-public-health-security-infectious-disease-outbreaks-epidemics-and-pandemics/8D8927B7B4117E07B666E83D8605D085)
Conclusions Lipsitch predicts that some 40%-70% of the world’s population will be infected this year.78 Despite political claims, a vaccine is more likely seen within a year or two at best.79 It is no longer realistic to expect the management of these gaps in infectious disease outbreaks, especially those that threaten to be epidemics and pandemics, are to be capably managed in their present state of willful denial and offenses by many countries, especially those that are ruled by authoritarian regimes.80 Despite resistance to globalization’s health benefits that would markedly benefit the global community during these crises by authoritarian regimes, in 2015, I called for a new WHO leadership granted by the International Health Regulations Treaty that has consequences if violated. I stated: The intent of a legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats are being ignored. While there is a current rush to admonish globalization in favor of populism, epidemic and pandemics deserve better than decisions being made by incapable autocrats. During Ebola, a rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas was crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the global leadership as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the [International Health Regulations] Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of on-going failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction world-wide. Practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. Health practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO’s undisputed global authority.81 Will China’s unilateral decisions just be a temporary stay as it was post-SARS, or is China capable of adopting, without conditions, the WHO public health requirements they have so far ignored? Autocratic leaders in history have a direct impact on health security. Dictatorships, with direct knowledge of the negative impact on health, create adverse political and economic conditions that only complicate the problem further. This is more evident in autocratic regimes where health protections have been seriously and purposely curtailed. This summary acknowledges that autocratic regimes are seriously handicapped by sociopathic narcissistic leaders who are incapable of understanding the health consequences of infectious diseases or their impact on their population. They will universally accelerate defenses indigenous to their personality traits when faced with contrary facts, double down against or deny accurate science to the contrary, delay timely precautions, and fail to meet health expectations required of nations under existing International Health Regulations, laws, and Epidemic Control surveillance.82 Kavanaugh’s Lancet editorial initially praised Chinese tactics that reflected a level of control only available to authoritarian regimes. As days and weeks passed, it revealed a government that inherently became victims of their own propaganda based on “need to avoid sharing bad news.” He concluded that authoritarian politics inhibited an effective response, and that openness and competitive politics favor a strategically fair public health strategy.83 Democratic nations in comparison to autocratic regimes recognize that public health fundamentally depends on public trust.84 The WHO’s China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease report has applauded China’s eventual response capability and capacity with strict measures to interrupt or minimize transmission chains with extremely proactive surveillance, rapid diagnosis, isolation tracking, quarantine, and population acceptance of these measures, to implement the measures to contain COVID-19 within the country.85 It must not be forgotten that China’s authoritarian rule “put secrecy and order ahead of openly confronting the growing crisis and risking alarm or political embarrassment,” 86 arrested and compelled Dr. Li Wenliang to sign a statement that his warning constituted “illegal behavior,” all of which delayed a concerted public health offensive that led to his death.86 This was an “issue of inaction” that would have contained COVID-19 within China and remains a potent symbol of China’s failures.86 There is no evidence that the authoritarian regime has or will change to prevent this from happening again.87 I suspect China’s sophisticated censorship and propaganda systems will outlast any public health improvements.
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Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Disease
Bollyky et al. 19 (Thomas; Tara Templin; Matthew Cohen; Diana Schoder; Joseph L Dieleman; Simon Wigley; Senior Fellow for Global Health, Economics, and Development and Director of the Global Health Program @ the Council on Foreign Relations; Lancelet; March 19th; The relationships between democratic experience, adult health, and cause-specific mortality in 170 countries between 1980 and 2016: an observational analysis; ; accessed 7/11/19)
The theoretical reasoning that democracy should improve population health is straightforward. First, when enforced through regular, free, and fair elections, democracies should have a greater incentive than autocracies to provide health-promoting resources and services to a larger proportion of the population.9 Second, democracies are more open to feedback from a broader range of interest groups, more protective of media freedom, and might be more willing to use that feedback to improve their public health programmes. Autocracies reduce political competition and access to information, which might deter constituent feedback and responsive governance.10 Various studies (11, 12, 13, 14, 15) have concluded democratic rule is better for population health; almost all focus on infant and child mortality or life expectancy at birth. Some academics16 have questioned those studies' results, arguing that democratic leaders do not need the electoral support of low-income voters to stay in office. Others17 have claimed that the underlying determining factor is wealth or the quality of government institutions, rather than the democratic process. At least four studies16, 18, 19, 20 have found that democracy has no clear relationship with child and infant mortality.
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Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Disease
Karabulut et al. 21 — Gokhan Karabulut is Prof. Dr. Department of Economics, Istanbul University. Klaus Felix Zimmermann is a German economist and emeritus professor of economics at Bonn University. Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin is professor of economics at the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Medeniyet University. Gokhan Karabulut, Klaus F. Zimmermann, Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin, Asli Cansin Doker, Democracy and COVID-19 outcomes, Economics Letters, Volume 203, 2021, 109840, ISSN 0165-1765, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109840. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521001178) WMK
3. Results In the Table 1, Panel A reports the baseline regressions includ- ing only the democracy indicators for the full sample (N = 128), and Panel B presents the estimates with all control variables (N = 99). The baseline equations show that democracy is positively re- lated to infections at the 1% significance level. When control variables are added, coefficients of the democracy variables con- tinue to be statistically significant at the 1% level except for column 3 where the Civil Liberties Index is used. In panel B, both temperature and population share of 65 and older variables’ coefficients are negative and significant for all five equations. Li et al. (2020), reach similar results for the temperature variable and (Zimmermann et al., 2020), for the older population group variable. Haischer et al. (2020) argue that people who are 65 and older are more likely to wear a mask, and thus the government’s stringency policies are mainly targeted towards this group. Using data from an earlier stage of the pandemic, Zimmermann et al. (2020) noted that the older age group has standard activities that make it less exposed to the virus. Both lines of argument would explain why the possibility of infection is lower for the older group compared to the younger population. Testing policy and doctor per 1000 variables are positively related to CP (ex- cept column 3 for testing policy), which is intuitive and confirm expectations. Finally, the Government Censorship Effort variable is negatively related to CP in general and significant in column 2 (Panel B). This indicates a weak tendency where more media control leads to higher infection rates since public attention to the disease is possibly smaller. The results of the regressions for the Case Fatality Rate are quite different. There is a negative relationship between all democracy measures and CFR. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level except for column 5 where it is 10%. We observe COVID-19 to have a smaller effect on mortality for more democratic countries. Government Censorship has the largest coefficient at the 1% significance level and the sign of the coefficient is positive. This implies that a lower degree of censorship is associated with a larger case fatality rate. Beds per 1000 population and testing policy both have a negative relationship with the Case Fatality Rate. Therefore, more hospital beds and more tests may help to decrease CFR. GDP is also negatively related to CFR. This result is consistent with the results of previous studies (Liu et al., 2020; Zimmermann et al., 2020). On the other hand, the share of the population over the age of 65 is positively related to CFR at 1%; this means that once elderly people get the disease, they are more likely to die (Zimmermann et al., 2020). Results remain robust (see Online Appendix Table A5) for more detailed controls for the age distribution of the populations (estimates are not significant) and the inclusion of continent dummies with the exceptions of temperature (no longer affect- ing infection rates) and older age (somewhat weaker size and significance without changing conclusions). 4. Conclusion Democratic countries may react slowly in the short term but place a higher value on human life and health.
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Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Drones
Goure ‘12
[Jan, Daniel Goure is a vice president of the Lexington Institute. In 2001, he was a member of the Defense Department’s Transition Team. Prior to that, he served as director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of Defense and was a senior analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, Dr. Goure has been a consultant for the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. He has taught or lectured at the Johns Hopkins University, the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Inter-American Defense College. Since 2001, Dr. Goure has been an adjunct professor in graduate programs at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an adjunct professor at National Defense University since 2002. Dr. Goure a Ph.D. in international relations and Russian studies from the Johns Hopkins, “Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses! “http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses]
Modern drones provide many of the best features of both cruise missiles and manned aircraft. Most significantly, they provide the tactical and operational flexibility of manned platforms with the reduced risk to personnel associated with cruise missiles. Unlike the former, they allow for man-in-the-loop control and vehicle recovery. Unlike the latter, they can operate at altitudes and in environments unsuited to manned systems and, in some cases, for extended periods of time. Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence. Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system. Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation. It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya, these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force, then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone. The availability of unmanned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. I might go even farther than Goldstein and argue that Cortright should advocate the greater use of drones, armed and otherwise, precisely due to his interest in reducing the frequency, intensity, and costs of conflicts. Just as dash cameras in police cars and cell phone cameras have led to a decrease in police brutality and the ability to bring those who violate procedures to account, the electro-optical sensors on drones can be used to increase oversight over military forces in the field. In fact, cameras can reduce what Cortright calls “the psychological distance that separates the launching of a strike from its bloody impact.” It can also help reduce the alleged isolation of the American people from the use of force in their name.
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Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Drones
Singh and Wittes 12 – *Research Assistant, Governance Studies @ AEI **Senior Fellow, Governance Studies @ AEI
Ritka and Benjamin, 1-11-12, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity”
Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Warming
Kendall-Taylor 16 – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, populism and threats to democracy, and the state of the Transatlantic alliance (Andrea, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, )
Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Warming
Casas-Zamora 21 — Kevin Casas-Zamora is a Costa Rican politician, lawyer and political scientist. Kevin Casas-Zamora Why democracy is the key ingredient to battling climate change,” 6-29-2021, https://www.euronews.com/green/2021/06/29/why-democracy-is-the-key-ingredient-to-battling-climate-change, accessed 7-5-2022, WMK
What unites nearly all of these cases? They are taking place in democracies.
The recent court rulings tell us a lot, not just about the powerful assets that democracy can deploy in the struggle against climate change, but also the long-term robustness of the case for democracy as a political system.
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Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › ATs Demo Bad T/s › AT: Warming
Willis 21 — Rebecca Willis is a professor of energy and climate governance at the University of Lancaster, and the author of Too Hot to Handle? The Democratic Challenge of Climate Change. Willis, Rebecca. “The big idea: Is democracy up to the task of climate change?” The Guardian. November 1st, 2021. WMK
Yet proposals for some sort of eco-authoritarianism raise more questions than they answer. How, exactly, do we move beyond democracy? Who appoints the experts? Scientists may have evidence at their disposal, but how would they make deeply social decisions about who wins and who loses? Under whose authority would they regulate, and how exactly would that regulation happen – how would laws be made? The best that can be said about these proposals is that they gloss over the complex realities of political, social and legal change.
There’s also the fact that authoritarian states have not performed better, historically. A recent study by the University of Gothenburg’s V-Dem Institute showed that autocratic regimes lag significantly on climate action. Given the economic and political might of China, we have to hope that they find a way to buck this trend – but it would be reckless, not to mention ethically dubious, to suggest China as a political role model on climate. Despite the considerable flaws in our democratic systems, the alternatives crumble under any sort of close inspection. It is hard to disagree with Churchill’s pithy summary that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others”.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › I/L Terrorism
Abrams 16 – Former assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs (Elliott, lead author on a foreign policy essay written along with 145 other influential ambassadors, former members of Congress, NED and UNCHR staff, etc.,“U.S. Must Put Democracy at the Center of its Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/the-u-s-must-put-democracy-at-the-center-of-its-foreign-policy/)
The United States is founded on the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and for decades, support for democracy and human rights around the world has been a central tenet of American foreign policy. While the United States must maintain relations with many autocratic governments abroad, there are excellent reasons why most of our closest allies are democracies. Free nations are more economically successful, more stable, and more reliable partners for the United States. Democratic societies are less likely to launch aggression and war against their neighbors or their own people. They are also less likely to experience state failure and become breeding grounds for instability and terrorism, as we have seen, for example, in Syria. This means that the advance of democracy serves U.S. interests and contributes to order and peace around the globe. During the past four decades, the number of countries that are free and democratic has more than doubled. From Latin America and Central Europe to East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, people have opted for accountable government. This remarkable progress is rooted in the universal longing for liberty and dignity — but it is also due to America’s strong support for human rights and democracy, under administrations of both parties. This support has been not only a means of expressing the values upon which our nation was founded, but also a pragmatic choice to promote the governing system that advances security, provides stable markets, and protects human rights. We write to urge you to embrace this cause and to make it a central part of your foreign policy platform. In recent years, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have become more repressive; they see the advance of democracy not only within their borders but in neighboring states as a threat to their monopoly on political power. A regime’s treatment of its own people often indicates how it will behave toward its neighbors and beyond. Thus, we should not be surprised that so many of the political, economic and security challenges we face emanate from places like Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. Repressive regimes are inherently unstable and must rely on suppressing democratic movements and civil society to stay in power. They also are the source and exporter of massive corruption, a pervasive transnational danger to stable democratic governance throughout the world. The result is that democracy is under attack. According to Freedom House, freedom around the world has declined every year for the past decade. That heightens the imperative for the United States to work with fellow democracies to reinvigorate support for democratic reformers everywhere. Supporting freedom around the world does not mean imposing American values or staging military interventions. In non-democratic countries, it means peacefully and creatively aiding local activists who seek democratic reform and look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society, and their resilience and courage amid such threats demand our support. Helping them upholds the principles upon which our country was founded. Supporting democracy involves partnerships between the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations that are struggling to bring freedom to their countries. Often, it means partnering as well with emerging democracies to strengthen their representative and judicial institutions. This requires resources that Congress must continue to provide, and foreign assistance must be linked to positive performance with regard to human rights and the advancement of fundamental freedoms. It also requires diplomatic backing at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, throughout the different agencies of government, and from the Congress as well. It means meeting with democratic activists from various parts of the world and speaking out on their behalf. Demonstrating solidarity with and support for these brave individuals’ efforts to build a better future for their country is the right thing to do. In aiding their struggles for freedom and justice, we build a more secure world for the United States. There is no cookie-cutter approach to supporting democracy and human rights, but there are fundamental, universal features we should emphasize: representative institutions, rule of law, accountability, free elections, anti-corruption, free media (including the Internet), vibrant civil society, independent trade unions, property rights, open markets, women’s and minority rights, and freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion. Many Americans question why the United States should have to shoulder the burdens of supporting freedom and democracy throughout the world. But a growing number of democracies in Europe and Asia, as well as international organizations, are expending significant resources to lend this kind of assistance. We should continue to build on our partnerships with like-minded organizations and countries, including relatively new democracies that are eager to help others striving for freedom. Some argue that we can pursue either our democratic ideals or our national security, but not both. This is a false choice. We recognize that we have other interests in the economic, energy, and security realms with other countries and that democracy and human rights cannot be the only items on the foreign policy agenda. But all too often, these issues get shortchanged or dropped entirely in order to smooth bilateral relationships in the short run. The instability that has characterized the Middle East for decades is the direct result of generations of authoritarian repression, the lack of accountable government, and the repression of civil society, not the demands that we witnessed during the Arab Spring of 2011 and since for dignity and respect for basic human rights. In the longer run, we pay the price in instability and conflict when corrupt, autocratic regimes collapse. Our request is that you elevate democracy and human rights to a prominent place on your foreign policy agenda. These are challenging times for freedom in many respects, as countries struggle to make democracy work and powerful autocracies brutalize their own citizens while undermining their neighbors. But these autocracies are also vulnerable. Around the world, ordinary people continue to show their preference for participatory democracy and accountable government. Thus, there is real potential to renew global democratic progress. For that to happen, the United States must exercise leadership, in league with our democratic allies, to support homegrown efforts to make societies freer and governments more democratic. We ask you to commit to providing that leadership and to embracing the cause of democracy and human rights if elected president of the United States.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › 2ac – Terrorism
Arguello 18, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. She holds a degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security. Arguello previously worked on nuclear projects for the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission. (Irma, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post-Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › 2ac – Terrorism
Magen 18, Amichai; head of the Diplomacy and Conflict Studies Program at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel. He is also a senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). (Fighting Terrorism: The Democracy Advantage; Journal of Democracy Volume 29, Issue 1, Pages 111-125; ; accessed 7/22/19)
The scourge of terrorism is real, yet summary data tell us little about the distribution of attacks or the rates of increase in terrorist incidents across various regime types. In reality, the disparity in the internal distribution [End Page 115] of terrorism incidents across regime types is already immense and seems to be getting wider.
A number of insights can be gleaned from the aggregate trends. Contrary to the traditional view, we observe a robust and growing “double democracy advantage” among liberal democracies and polyarchies over the 2002–16 period, and especially since 2007. Not only are higher-quality democracies less prone to terrorist attacks than all other regime types, but the rate of increase in the number of attacks among such democracies is substantially lower in comparison to the rest.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › XT: War – DPT
Diamond 19 – PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University (Larry, “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition)
To make our republics more perfect, established democracies must not only adopt reforms to more fully include and empower their own citizens. They must also support people, groups, and institutions struggling to achieve democratic values elsewhere. The best way to counter Russian rage and Chinese ambition is to show that Moscow and Beijing are on the wrong side of history; that people everywhere yearn to be free; and that they can make freedom work to achieve a more just, sustainable, and prosperous society. In our networked age, both idealism and the harder imperatives of global power and security argue for more democracy, not less. For one thing, if we do not worry about the quality of governance in lower-income countries, we will face more and more troubled and failing states. Famine and genocide are the curse of authoritarian states, not democratic ones. Outright state collapse is the ultimate, bitter fruit of tyranny. When countries like Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan descend into civil war; when poor states in Africa cannot generate jobs and improve their citizens’ lives due to rule by corrupt and callous strongmen; when Central American societies are held hostage by brutal gangs and kleptocratic rulers, people flee—and wash up on the shores of the democracies. Europe and the United States cannot withstand the rising pressures of immigration unless they work to support better, more stable and accountable government in troubled countries. The world has simply grown too small, too flat, and too fast to wall off rotten states and pretend they are on some other planet. Hard security interests are at stake. As even the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, the main threats to U.S. national security all stem from authoritarianism, whether in the form of tyrannies from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea or in the guise of antidemocratic terrorist movements such as ISIS. 1 By supporting the development of democracy around the world, we can deny these authoritarian adversaries the geopolitical running room they seek. Just as Russia, China, and Iran are trying to undermine democracies to bend other countries to their will, so too can we contain these autocrats’ ambitions by helping other countries build effective, resilient democracies that can withstand the dictators’ malevolence. Of course, democratically elected governments with open societies will not support the American line on every issue. But no free society wants to mortgage its future to another country. The American national interest would best be secured by a pluralistic world of free countries—one in which autocrats can no longer use corruption and coercion to gobble up resources, alliances, and territory. If you look back over our history to see who has posed a threat to the United States and our allies, it has always been authoritarian regimes and empires. As political scientists have long noted, no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other—ever. It is not the democracies of the world that are supporting international terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, or threatening the territory of their neighbors.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › XT: War – DPT
Imai 21 — Kosuke Imai is Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University. Imai, K., & Lo, J. (2021). Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis. International Organization, 75(3), 901-919. doi:10.1017/S0020818321000126 WMK
The proposition that democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other is one of the most enduring and influential ideas in international relations. The idea is theoretically rooted in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that interactions between states with a republican form of government give “a favorable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.”Footnote1 This has led to a large literature empirically documenting a negative association between democracy and conflict,Footnote2 leading one scholar to comment that the democratic peace is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”Footnote3
Despite the law-like nature of this association, no scholarly consensus has emerged on whether the observed association reflects a causal relationship or a spurious correlation. According to a recent survey, more than 30 percent of international relations scholars disagree with the democratic peace theory.Footnote4 In particular, skeptics have challenged the democratic peace by arguing that alliance structures from the Cold War,Footnote5 capitalism,Footnote6 and contract-intensive economiesFootnote7 confound the observed association. These authors find that adding certain confounding variables to regression models eliminates the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for the joint democracy variable.Footnote8
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › XT: War
Kendall-Taylor 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (Andrea, February 26th, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World”, , accessed 7/21/19)
The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford.
Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
DEMOCRACY GOOD › XT: War
Diamond 19, PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University (Larry, “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition)
In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of self-doubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.