2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT CCW CP
Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Effective control of the humanitarian, human rights and security risks posed by LAWS will require legally-binding obligations on states negotiated in a multilateral forum. To date, the most likely venue for negotiating such a mandate would be within the CCW, in the form of negotiating a new protocol. However, the CCW’s consensus rules of procedure have been interpreted as requiring agreement of all states – effectively granting a veto to the most intransigent and often resulting in lowest common denominator decisions. Given this context, more ambitious states and other actors may in time consider other potential avenues, including a UN General Assembly-mandated process or one analogous to the Ottawa and Oslo processes on landmine and cluster munitions.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT CCW CP
Kahn and Horowitz, 2021 – Research and Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Lauren and Michael, The Washington Quarterly 44:4 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TA]
One might argue that the United States should let others lead on AI, focusing instead on developing AI-enabled capabilities and not concerning itself with how other countries behave. But there is no substitute for American leadership and its ability to rally countries around the world to support shared standards. If promoting norms of responsible behavior with AI encourages other states to use military applications of AI in more responsible ways, it will create a more ethical and predictable security environment, likely benefiting the United States. Additionally, current international dialogue about military uses of AI focuses almost exclusively on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), the subject of a Group of Governmental Experts in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.39 Currently, the international conversation has been largely been driven by NGOs such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.40 While such conversations help bring attention to some of these issues, they oversimplify the risks and fixate on worst-case scenarios that are more likely outcomes of artificial general intelligence or human level machine intelligence rather than technology today. LAWS represent only a small fraction of the universe of potential issues surrounding military applications of AI. Broadening the international conversation about military uses of AI to incorporate the full scope of potential applications would generate better dialogue because it would include more of the real-world AI scenarios likely to confront militaries. Expanding the discussion would also allow states to pursue levels of control and regulation other than an all-or nothing ban and create a more calibrated and flexible range of approaches to different technologies with various levels and types of associated risks.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT CCW CP
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Another reason the analysis focuses on AI and not autonomy in weapons systems is that the topic is already well covered in other literature.14 The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has focused on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) since 2013, and this has been the primary format for technical expertise, civil society engagement, and diplomatic engagement to converge.15 As a result, questions about ethics and legality of autonomy in weapons, and specifically LAWS, often involve diplomatic actors at the fore of domestic government approaches. Concerns about the ethics of intelligent systems, on the other hand, currently receive less attention in military debates. To maintain a stricter focus on AI rather than autonomy in weapons systems, this study focuses more on technical and policy approaches in defense ministries, which have more agency in ethical and responsible AI policy.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT OSCE CP
Burns and Lute, 2019 - Prof of International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School and former Representative to the North Atlantic Council [Nicholas and Douglas, February “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis” TA]
Allies must continue bolstering deterrence by ensuring consequences for Russian actions. Recent examples include sustaining U.S.-Canadian-EU economic sanctions five years after Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Netherlands’ public commitment to holding Russia accountable for its role in the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014 and the responses after the Novichok chemical agent attacks in the U.K. 66 Going forward, the U.S. and the EU together must never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and reaffirm economic sanctions will stay on Moscow for as long as it occupies Ukrainian territory. These measures, however, have not changed Russian behavior. Even less impressive are the reactions to Russian interference in elections and recent aggression in the Black Sea and denial of Ukrainian access to the Sea of Azov.67 While confronting Russian aggression and bolstering deterrence, NATO must remain open to dialogue with Russia when it is in the West’s interest. Russia is a major European power that must be taken into account.68 First, dialogue is fundamental to deterrence, as Russia must clearly understand NATO’s intent and the consequences of aggression. Second, even in a period of increased tensions, there are topics for dialogue that serve common interests. The NATO-Russia Council should continue to meet regularly to address risk reduction measures, provide transparency on military exercises and exchange views on priority political issues, including the conflict in Ukraine. Allies should press the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to update the Vienna Document to improve predictability and transparency of conventional forces in the region.69 Russia should return an ambassador to NATO and NATO should re-open military-military contacts below the four-star level. It is not in NATO’s interest that the Russian military liaison cell at Allied Command Operations’ SHAPE remains closed. Third, balancing deterrence and dialogue is essential to sustaining political cohesion among allies some of whom have differing perspectives on the nature of the Russian threat and the best responses to it.70 NATO should not return to “business as usual” with Russia as before 2014, but restricting dialogue is not an effective form of punishment. In periods of increased tension, the risk of accident and unintended consequences increases—dialogue can mitigate some of that risk. In short, sustaining and even expanding dialogue with Russia is in NATO’s interest.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT OSCE CP
Sánchez-Cobaleda, 2020 - prof of Public International Law at the University of Barcelona [Ana 2020-11-30 “Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE” Acc 6/22/22 TA]
The lack of trust between participating states, particularly the situation of growing tension between Russia and the other participating states is not only an internal and political challenge for the OSCE, but also directly related to its survival. This tension, which can be felt at various levels,73 makes collaboration and decision-making within the OSCE very difficult. Russia continues to exert great influence in the region and it has proved to be willing to use its military force against sovereign states to pursue political goals (Baqués Quesada, 2018, pp. 16–17). The climate created by the conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 – both OSCE Member States – as well as the military developments in Crimea and the Donbass, question the foundations laid down in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and call into question the effectiveness of the CBMs set out in the Vienna Documents. Restoring the trust among participants would also involve restoring the trust in the measures aimed at guaranteeing transparency in the OSCE's acquis that has existed in Europe for 20 years (De Salazar Serantes, 2016, p. 367). Currently, building back trust, re-establishing a “security community” and restoring the OSCE's original function as one of the leading forums for mutually beneficial dialogue and collective consensual decisions on European security issues (Azintov, 2012, pp. 19–22) are both objectives and challenges. Paradoxically, Ukraine's crisis, which is one of the main current difficulties for the OSCE, has also been an opportunity for the organisation to demonstrate its worth and relevance (Smolnik, 2019, p. 5; Zannier, 2018, pp. 35–36). Moreover, the conflict in Ukraine underscores the need – and difficulty – to adapt the arms-control regime in Europe due to the importance of military transparency like the one achieved with the CFE, the Vienna Documents or the Open Skies Treaty (Bieri & Nünlist, 2018, pp. 407–423). However, these and other OSCE instruments become useless in the absence of political will on the part of one, several or all the parties involved. Being an intergovernmental forum, the weight and influence of some participants, the historical relations between states, and the lack of trust in general (worsened in the last decade) make decision-making difficult, even leading the OSCE to be somewhat paralysed in taking forceful and avant-garde decisions (Bieri & Nünlist, 2018). There seems to be an excess of tepidity. This difficulty stems from the very nature of the institution, whose informality determines the limits of its ability to act, insofar it cannot impose itself on the will of governments, whose trust in each other is greatly weakened. Although improbable, it would be desirable for the OSCE to increase its influence on individual participating states. Political differences among OSCE's participating states, apart from constantly delaying the adoption of budgets, have also caused mistrust and the discontinuation of the organisation’s work.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT OSCE CP
Zięba, 2018 – prof at University of Warsaw [Ryszard April “The Marginalization of the OSCE” In book: The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the 21st Century (pp.213-224) TA]
The eighth chapter briefly describes the decline of the OSCE—the largest security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area, encompassing 57 states, and disposing of unique, so-called soft security ensuring instruments. This process was due to the dominant position in the entire system of NATO, an institution with hard security guarantees. Attempts to revive the OSCE were undertaken in 2010 at the Astana Summit, and then during the Ukraine crisis, in which the OSCE, as the sole multilateral institution, played a modest role in the monitoring of the cease-fire agreements concluded in Minsk in 2014 and 2015. The OSCE still has a chance of playing a greater role in the shaping of the Euro-Atlantic security system, but this would require an agreement between its principal participants, especially the western countries and Russia.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT OSCE CP
Sánchez-Cobaleda, 2020 - prof of Public International Law at the University of Barcelona [Ana 2020-11-30 “Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE” Acc 6/22/22 TA]
NATO, the OSCE and the EU all strive to maintain peace and security in their member states. The way they work to achieve this, however, differs. While NATO has traditionally focused on direct territorial defence, the EU has pursued this goal more indirectly, carrying out missions beyond its borders to ensure stability in its neighbourhood. And it is precisely in the area of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood where the OSCE is working most actively to also guarantee peace and security – in its specific way, namely through the advancement of democracy and human rights throughout the territory of its 57 participating states. Nonetheless, “maintaining peace and security” is too general an idea. Instead of condensing the objectives of these actors to such a high degree, it is useful to assess in greater detail which objectives coincide and where functional overlap is occurring. NATO defends the peace and security of its members in two ways: directly, through its collective defence objective (centred mainly on the eastern flank of the Alliance and consisting of the maintenance of peace and security on its eastern border), and indirectly, through the projection of stability in other territories (especially, but not only, in the region bordering the south of the Alliance). In the collective defence field NATO retains, for now, exclusivity. The relationship between the EU and NATO in this area is clearly defined by role specialisation and division of labour. The Alliance provides what the EU lacks insofar as NATO's raison d'être is collective defence and its comparative advantage remains its military power. Thus, they are “interlocking” institutions that cooperate in an architecture based on comparative advantage and effective multilateralism to address challenges both in Europe and beyond. However, it is important to stress the transitory nature of this situation. If the EU continues to develop its cooperation in defence (as seems to be the case), it could well result in a functional overlap in matters of defence not seen until now. Stronger defence cooperation is indeed one of the EU’s current objectives, and one that is already regarded with suspicion by some of the member states of both NATO and the EU itself. These member states do not welcome the overlap for fear of possible rivalry.115 Beyond pure defence objectives, both the EU and NATO are engaged in crisis management. It is important to subdivide this in two different dimensions, as the organizations’ levels of involvement differ when it comes to (a) the deployment of troops to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire and (b) political and diplomatic efforts in crisis prevention or post-conflict reconstruction. In the first dimension, field-level overlap can exist, but this is not always the case, as it depends on the configuration of missions and the organisations’ mandates. While the EU’s legal framework establishes that territorial defence remains NATO’s responsibility, Page 64 from 109 the EU’s capacity to act independently from NATO’s assets in external crisis management continues to grow.116 In fact, the EU’s goal of obtaining full strategic autonomy has placed the EU on a similar footing with NATO. It is in the second, more civilian and political dimension, however, where the level of functional overlap is the largest. NATO’s and the EU’s missions and operations focus on preventive measures, training and, most of all, security sector reform in partner countries. The convergence in this area that was traditionally occupied by the EU has occurred since NATO progressively expanded its agenda to become more than just a military Alliance. In conclusion, the trend of greater regime complexity in the field of European security has accelerated over the last decade, partly as a result of the expansion of NATO's strategic concept and, potentially soon, as a consequence of the still ongoing development of a stronger security and defence component by the EU. The OSCE, for its part, does not have and neither does it foresee creating a defence component or a military crisis management goal. Instead, the OSCE continues its efforts to enhance cooperative security through arms control agreements. Through this objective, it complements the EU’s efforts to maintain peace and stability in its neighbouring areas. In addition, if the OSCE achieves its goals in this area, NATO would also benefit from respect for arms control treaties and the reduction of arsenals. Thus, while the OSCE does not focus on territorial defence nor military crisis management, its cooperative security mandate can be understood within that same division of labour framework.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT OSCE CP
Sánchez-Cobaleda, 2020 - prof of Public International Law at the University of Barcelona [Ana 2020-11-30 “Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE” Acc 6/22/22 TA]
Despite its brief prominence in the early 1990s and its significant daily work both on the diplomatic front and through its 16 field operations,72 the OSCE has been, and indeed continues to be, largely unknown to the general public (Dominguez, 2014, pp. 17–27; Mosser, 2015a, p. 590) and lacking in credibility (Trenin, 2003, p. 11; Webber et al., 2004, p. 19). The most inclusive security organisation in Europe has been rapidly losing relevance after the enlargements of NATO and the EU, and its geographical exclusivity has been reduced to Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Its secondary role in the European security architecture implies that experts and observers question its relevance (Azintov, 2012, pp. 19–22; Fernandes, 2015, p. 92; Stewart, 2008, p. 268; Zellner, 2005, p. 391) especially when compared to NATO or the EU (Aybet, 2000; Møller, 2008) and particularly on relevant dates for the organisation such as 2020, which marks the 45th anniversary of its creation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Heyns, 2016 - Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Pretoria [Christof, Human Rights Quarterly 38 (2016) 350–378 “ Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
It should also be kept in mind that the answer to the question of whether particular weapons should be banned does not merely depend on whether they can within a limited range of conceivable circumstances and will be used in conformity with the applicable legal regime, be it under international human rights law or IHL. Many of the weapons that are banned today can, in fact, be used in a closely controlled environment in ways that comply with the law. At some point, a practical decision needs to be made whether the weapon in question poses an unacceptably high risk of not being used in such a way.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Although the ability of fully autonomous weapons to process complex information might improve in the future, it seems implausible that they could ever be identical to humans. As a result, these weapons would find it difficult to meet the three criteria for use of force in law enforcement or comply with the rules of distinction and proportionality in armed conflict. Fully autonomous weapons would have the potential to kill arbitrarily and thus violate the right that underlies all others, the right to life.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
There is no way to regulate fully autonomous weapons short of a ban that would ensure compliance with the principles of humanity. Fully autonomous weapons would lack the compassion and legal and ethical judgment that facilitate humane treatment of humans. They would face significant challenges in respecting human life. Even if they could comply with legal rules of protection, they would not have the capacity to respect human dignity. Limiting the use of fully autonomous weapons to certain locations, such as those where civilians are rare, would not sufficiently address these problems. “Harm to others,” which the principle of humane treatment seeks to avoid, encompasses harm to civilian objects, which might be present where civilians themselves are not. The requirement to respect human dignity applies to combatants as well as civilians, so the weapons should not be permitted where enemy troops are positioned. Furthermore, allowing fully autonomous weapons to be developed and to enter national arsenals would raise the possibility of their misuse. They would likely proliferate to actors with no regard for human suffering and no respect for human life or dignity. The 2017 letter from technology company CEOs warned that the weapons could be “weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use against innocent populations, and weapons hacked to behave in undesirable ways.”[178] Regulation that allowed for the existence of fully autonomous weapons would open the door to violations of the principles of humanity.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Fully autonomous weapons threaten to contravene foundational elements of human rights law. They could violate the right to life, a prerequisite for all other rights. Deficiencies in judgment, compassion, and capacity to identify with human beings could lead to arbitrary killing of civilians during law enforcement or armed conflict operations. Fully autonomous weapons could also cause harm for which individuals could not be held accountable, thus undermining the right to a remedy. Robots could not be punished, and superior officers, programmers, and manufacturers would all be likely to escape liability. Finally, as machines, fully autonomous weapons could not comprehend or respect the inherent dignity of human beings. The inability to uphold this underlying principle of human rights raises serious moral questions about the prospect of allowing a robot to take a human life. Proponents of fully autonomous weapons might argue that technology could eventually help address the problems identified in this report, and it is impossible to know where science will lead.85 In a 2013 public letter, however, more than 270 roboticists, artificial intelligence experts, and other scientists expressed their skepticism that adequate developments would be possible.86 Given this uncertainty, the potential of fully autonomous weapons to violate human rights law, combined with other ethical, legal, policy, and scientific concerns, demands a precautionary approach. The precautionary principle of international law states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures.”87 When applied to fully autonomous weapons, this principle calls for preventive action to be taken now.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Robots would also not possess the legal and ethical judgment necessary to minimize harm on a case-by-case basis.[65] Situations involving use of force, particularly in armed conflict, are often complex and unpredictable and can change quickly. Fully autonomous weapons would therefore encounter significant obstacles to making appropriate decisions regarding humane treatment. After examining numerous studies in which researchers attempted to program ethics into robots, Sharkey found that robots exhibiting behavior that could be described as “ethical” or “minimally ethical” could operate only in constrained environments. Sharkey concluded that robots have limited moral capabilities and therefore should not be used in circumstances that “demand moral competence and an understanding of the surrounding social situation.”[66] Complying with international law frequently requires subjective decision-making in complex situations. Fully autonomous weapons would have limited ability to interpret the nuances of human behavior, understand the political, socioeconomic, and environmental dynamics of the situation, and comprehend the humanitarian risks of the use of force in a particular context.[67] These limitations would compromise the weapons’ ability to ensure the humane treatment of civilians and combatants and comply with the first principle of humanity.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
In addition, the deployment of fully autonomous weapons in law enforcement situations could affect the actions of the individual posing a potential threat. He or she might not know how to behave when confronted with a machine rather than a human law enforcement officer. The individual might respond differently to a robot than to a human and as a result unintentionally appear threatening. A robot’s misinterpretation of the necessity of force could trigger an arbitrary killing in violation of the right to life.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]
The human rights implications of fully autonomous weapons compound the many other concerns about use of the weapons. As Human Rights Watch and IHRC have detailed in other documents, the weapons would face difficulties in meeting the requirements of international humanitarian law, such as upholding the principles of distinction and proportionality, in situations of armed conflict. In addition, even if technological hurdles could be overcome in the future, failure to prohibit them now could lead to the deployment of models before their artificial intelligence was perfected and spark an international robotic arms race. Finally, many critics of fully autonomous weapons have expressed moral outrage at the prospect of humans ceding to machines control over decisions to use lethal force. In this context, the human rights concerns bolster the argument for an international ban on fully autonomous weapons.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Johnson and Axinn, 2013 - Prof of Philosophy at the Univ of South Florida and PhD Candidate in Engineering at Penn [Aaron and Sidney, Journal of Military Ethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, August “The Morality of Autonomous Robots” www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15027570.2013.818399 Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Healthy Emotions Arguments have been offered holding that robots/drones may do a better job than humans in making target decisions because they have no revenge motive (Arkin 2010). They are not enraged, as humans may be, by the killing of their buddies. But having no emotions, they do not have the attitude toward people that ‘healthy’ humans are expected to have. They do not realize the enormity of an error in killing the ‘wrong’ person. Why is killing with emotions morally superior to killing without emotions? As noted above, honor requires the willingness to risk sacrifice, which in turn requires intention and feeling—emotion. Since morality requires respect for duty rather than following selfish goals, that respect also requires a certain intention or feeling/emotion. The need for human emotion in warfare is cited by at least some authors writing about drones in the general press, for example John Sifton says, ‘The unique technology allows the mundane and regular violence of military force to be separated further from human emotion. Drones foreshadow the idea that brutality could become detached from humanity—and yield violence that is, as it were, unconscious.’ (Sifton 2012).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Improving communication between policymakers and scientific and technical experts is crucial given the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence. Indeed, a prohibition on weapons outside of human control would not be counterproductive to technological development. Rather, there is a need to fully harness technological progress while maintaining and advancing international law that safeguards humanitarian protections, human rights and international peace and security.
Therefore, in September and October 2020, the Friedrich-
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Further progress toward stigmatization of LAWS will require engaging with multiple stakeholders, including industry, academia and civil society. However, inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders should not distract from the onus of responsibility for action remaining on states. Expecting the private sector to establish and maintain voluntary guidelines or codes of conduct on meaningful human control is unrealistic, given that states are the customers of weapons contracts and stipulate their expectations to the private sector. In fact, technology companies themselves have stressed the need for clear guidelines from states to help engineers, designers and technology workers make moral, ethical, and legal judgements about the systems they build.11
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]
Industry High-profile technology companies and their representatives have criticized fully autonomous weapons on various grounds. A Canadian robotics manufacturer, Clearpath Robotics, became the first company publicly to refuse to manufacture “weaponized robots that remove humans from the loop.”[132] In 2014, it pledged to “value ethics over potential future revenue.”[133] In a letter to the public, the company stated that it was motivated by its belief that “that the development of killer robots is unwise, unethical, and should be banned on an international scale.” Clearpath continued: [W]ould a robot have the morality, sense, or emotional understanding to intervene against orders that are wrong or inhumane? No. Would computers be able to make the kinds of subjective decisions required for checking the legitimacy of targets and ensuring the proportionate use of force in the foreseeable future? No. Could this technology lead those who possess it to value human life less? Quite frankly, we believe this will be the case.[134] The letter shows that fully autonomous weapons raise problems under both the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience. In August 2017, the founders and chief executive officers (CEOs) of 116 AI and robotics companies published a letter calling for CCW states parties to take action on autonomous weapons.[135] The letter opens by stating, “As companies building the technologies in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics that may be repurposed to develop autonomous weapons, we feel especially responsible in raising this alarm.”[136] The letter goes on to highlight the dangers to civilians, risk of an arms race, and possibility of destabilizing effects. It warns that “[o]nce this Pandora’s box is opened, it will be hard to close.”[137] In a similar vein in 2018, Scott Phoenix, CEO of Vicarious, a prominent AI development company, described developing autonomous weapons as among the “world’s worst ideas” because of the likelihood of defects in their codes and vulnerability to hacking.[138]
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Industry Innovation DA
Heikkilä, 2021 - Politico’s AI Correspondent in London [Melissa, Politico March 31 “AI Decoded: NATO on AI warfare — AI treaty consultation — Unions call for more AI protections” https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/ai-decoded/politico-ai-decoded-nato-on-ai-warfare-ai-treaty-consultation-unions-call-for-more-ai-protections/ Acc 4/9/22 TA]
AI LAWS WHY REGULATION WON’T KILL INNOVATION: The Council of Europe, the Strasbourg-based human rights organization, is hard at work on a draft proposal on artificial intelligence. If ratified, the treaty could become national law in the group’s 47 member countries. AI: Decoded rang up Gregor Strojin, the chair of the group’s committee, called CAHAI, that’s drawing up the rules to hear the latest developments. The goal: CAHAI is working on an AI treaty with additional rules for specific sectors, such as social affairs and justice systems, and problems, like the discrimination of minorities. The plan is to have a draft ready by the end of they year, after which the Committee of Ministers — national representatives to the Council of Europe — will debate it. “In the past, there have been examples of treaties that were adopted in a matter of months. But sometimes it can take years. Sometimes it can be never. But I think we’re making a pretty strong point that in this case, delaying it could lead to irreparable damage,” Strojin said. “We are seeing increasing use of technologies that’s being imported from other parts of the world, without any risk assessment, without any impact assessment in a way that’s actually dumping the technology on certain countries,” he continued. Been there done that: Strojin also pushed back against industry jeremiads that regulation would “hamper innovation.” He said that AI regulators can actually learn a lot from past negotiations around pharmaceuticals and bioethics as an example of how regulation can help innovation. In 1964, the Council of Europe adopted the European Pharmacopoeia, which is the official standard and scientific basis for the quality control of pharmaceuticals. “Before that medical products and also services were like snake oil. There was no common assessment of what are the ingredients [or] what are the side effects of drugs,” Strojin said. (Sound familiar?) “I don’t think we have a problem with the lack of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector at this point,” Strojin said.