2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT CCW / UN Solve Now
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
Why regulating weapon autonomy is difficult: Conceptual pitfalls and power politics From UN Secretary-General António Guterres to prominent members of the artificial intelligence (AI) and tech communities7 to most States Parties of the CCW, there is near unanimity that LAWS raise various legal, strategic and ethical questions and concerns.8 Even so, within the CCW States Parties, a consensus on new, binding international law is still a long way off. Regulating weapon autonomy through this multilateral forum is a particularly tough nut to crack. As I will argue in this section, this is due to two reasons. First, weapon autonomy as an issue is comparatively elusive and hard to conceptualize. Second, its perceived military value is exceptionally high, and the current geopolitical landscape is not conducive to new arms control breakthroughs. Any discussion of the conceptual challenges regarding weapon autonomy has to begin with pointing out a common misunderstanding: the lack of progress in the CCW cannot be attributed to States Parties not having arrived at a shared definition of LAWS yet.9 Quite to the contrary, it has much more to do with the fact that the attempt to define LAWS was misconceived from the very beginning. This warrants further elaboration. The first two to three years of the CCW process on LAWS were indeed plagued by confusion and definitional struggles. Considerable effort was required to delineate the LAWS debate from the disputes surrounding remotely piloted aerial vehicles (drones) as well as to avoid anthropomorphizing LAWS as a one-to-one replacement for human soldiers.10 All stakeholders were seeking – and quite a few lamenting the lack of – a “possible definition of LAWS”, sometimes deliberately so in order to justify political heel-dragging. The underlying rationale was that arms control always requires a precise categorization of the object in question, such as a landmine, before any regulative action can be taken.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT CCW / UN Solve Now
Miller, 2021 - Flight Chief, US Air Force [Amanda, Dec 14 Air Force Magazine “UN Addresses Lethal Autonomous Weapons—aka ‘Killer Robots’—Amid Calls for a Treaty” https://www.airforcemag.com/un-addresses-lethal-autonomous-weapons-aka-killer-robots-amid-calls-for-a-treaty/ Acc. 4/5/22 TA]
The United Nations’ secretary-general advocated for new restrictions on autonomous weapons as a U.N. group that negotiates weapons protocols started a week of meetings, in part, to discuss the matter. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the Review Conference of the U.N.’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Taking place in Geneva, Switzerland, the Review Conference happens every five years. Guterres preceded the weeklong meeting with a Dec. 13 message encouraging conference members “to agree on an ambitious plan for the future to establish restrictions on the use of certain types of autonomous weapons.” He described autonomous weapons as those “that can choose targets and kill people without human interference.” The conference has identified artificial intelligence, for one, as an “increasingly autonomous” technology. The Air Force has experimented with autonomous weapons such as the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Golden Horde, which did not become a program of record but did succeed in getting Small Diameter Bombs to collaborate with each other after receiving and interpreting commands mid-flight. The experimental Perdix micro-drones, under the DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, rely on AI. And although the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s Gremlins drones don’t rely on AI yet, they’re designed to accommodate that level of computing. Some countries and international rights groups want the convention to negotiate a treaty that would ban what the U.N. calls lethal autonomous weapons systems—and what others call “killer robots”—but diplomats told Reuters that’s not likely to happen this week. It would require a consensus, and the U.S., for one, has already rejected the idea. Russia was expected to do the same.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT CCW / UN Solve Now
Kahn and Horowitz, 2021 – Research and Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Lauren and Michael, The Washington Quarterly 44:4 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TA]
One might argue that the United States should let others lead on AI, focusing instead on developing AI-enabled capabilities and not concerning itself with how other countries behave. But there is no substitute for American leadership and its ability to rally countries around the world to support shared standards. If promoting norms of responsible behavior with AI encourages other states to use military applications of AI in more responsible ways, it will create a more ethical and predictable security environment, likely benefiting the United States. Additionally, current international dialogue about military uses of AI focuses almost exclusively on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), the subject of a Group of Governmental Experts in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.39 Currently, the international conversation has been largely been driven by NGOs such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.40 While such conversations help bring attention to some of these issues, they oversimplify the risks and fixate on worst-case scenarios that are more likely outcomes of artificial general intelligence or human level machine intelligence rather than technology today. LAWS represent only a small fraction of the universe of potential issues surrounding military applications of AI. Broadening the international conversation about military uses of AI to incorporate the full scope of potential applications would generate better dialogue because it would include more of the real-world AI scenarios likely to confront militaries. Expanding the discussion would also allow states to pursue levels of control and regulation other than an all-or nothing ban and create a more calibrated and flexible range of approaches to different technologies with various levels and types of associated risks.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT CCW / UN Solve Now
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
The United Nations (UN) Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is the epicentre of the global debate on autonomy in weapons systems. The CCW's purpose “is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately”.1 In CCW parlance, the weapon autonomy issue is called “emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS). In November 2019, CCW States Parties decided to, once again, continue their deliberations on LAWS. For the first time, however, these talks, which had previously been conducted between 2014 and 2016 in informal meetings and since 2017 within the framework of an expert subsidiary body called a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), were mandated to produce a specific outcome. For ten days in 2020 and for an as-yet unknown number of days in 2021 (when the CCW's next Review Conference is due), the GGE was and is tasked with debating and fleshing out “aspects of the normative and operational framework” on LAWS.2 In addition, in Annex III of their 2019 report, States Parties adopted eleven guiding principles to take into account going forward.3 After the first five-day meeting of 2020 was postponed and then conducted in a hybrid format due to the current global COVID-19 pandemic, the second meeting had to be shelved, and it is currently unclear when and how the talks can resume. While some States – most prominently Russia – have displayed no interest in producing new international law in the CCW, arguing that “concerns regarding LAWS can be addressed through faithful implementation of the existing international legal norms”,4 others – such as Germany – claim that nothing short of “an important milestone” has already been reached with the 2019 report cited above, even describing the adopted eleven guiding principles as a “politically binding regulation”.5 Meanwhile, the international Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (Killer Robots Campaign, KRC) is criticizing CCW diplomacy as “moving forward at a snail's pace”, with low ambitions and negligible outcomes despite widespread public opposition to LAWS and some thirty countries (twenty-six of which are CCW States Parties) calling for the immediate negotiation of a new, binding legal instrument rather than continuing talks on frameworks and principles, which the KRC tends to consider vague and redundant respectively.6
2022
Michigan
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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT Partnership for Defense Solves Now
Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA]
Despite the many benefits and opportunities, the partnership will face challenges as it defines the boundaries and practices of the collaboration. I believe three challenges ought to be raised at the outset. DoD officials have discussed interoperability as a an explicit goal of the partnership – interoperability being an umbrella term referring to group integration in order to operate cohesively and share information effectively. Interoperability is a necessary yet difficult achievement in any kind of partnership, but the AI partnership has a unique challenge. Namely, one of legal interoperability. Legal interoperability is one subset of the broader partnership interoperability and refers to the pursuit of the partnership’s goals within the participating state’s diverse legal obligations and interpretations. The partnership must find a way to achieve their ultimate goal in a manner consistent with domestic and international legal obligations of the participating states. Differing regulatory frameworks and data strategies among participants could lead to inadvertent challenges to the AI partnership legal interoperability. This is particularly relevant for the European partners, which currently constitute over half of the AI partnership. The European Union has deliberately distinguished the European approach to AI from China and the US, instead situating itself as the global leader advancing responsible and trustworthy AI. As part of this strategy, the EU submitted substantial proposals for data regulation and restrictions. Public and private organizations in these states are subject to European data regulation and restriction. It is not yet clear how these differences may affect the AI partnership; largely because it is still in its infancy and the DoD has not offered many specifics about the partnership in practice. But the issue could become a major one as the partnership moves forward. If the US hopes to expand the partnership to include more European partners, then the different approaches to data sharing could become a legal hurdle that hinders the legal interoperability – and thus partnership interoperability – potentially requiring special agreements. The second challenge is about which states are – and which states are not – included in the partnership (so far). The larger trans-Atlantic implications of the partnership should not be neglected as the collaboration moves forward. Crucial European partners are missing, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Germany is the biggest economy in Europe and a readily acknowledges the economic possibilities of AI development. The Netherlands has yet to reach the AI development of some of its European counterparts, but the Dutch government has been explicit about investing into research initiatives to bolster the Netherlands in the AI landscape. Mark Beall, JAIC Chief of Strategy, expressed his hope that more states will join the AI partnership in the future; but the absence of some of Europe’s heavy hitters could signal a bigger issue for the partnership. Commentators have expressed concern of a trans-Atlantic divide, and an intra-European divide, on AI in the military domain. See, for example, here and here.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT JAIC Solves Now
Freedberg, 2019 – deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney J “The frontline of a new age in defense Artificial Intelligence” https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2097098/MCM120_BreakingDefense_AI_ebookR1%20(1).pdf Acc 5/25/22 TA]
Well, the Pentagon has released its AI strategy. There are virtually no mentions of increased funding in it. But it does make the stakes clear: “Failure to adopt AI will result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, reduced access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to societies that have been built upon individual freedoms.” It identifies the center of gravity for AI work in the military, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). And it sets some priorities: “We will launch a set of initiatives to incorporate AI rapidly, iteratively, and responsibly to enhance military decision-making and operations across key mission areas. Examples include improving situational awareness and decision-making, increasing the safety of operating equipment, implementing predictive maintenance and supply, and streamlining business processes. We will prioritize the fielding of AI systems that augment the capabilities of our personnel by offloading tedious cognitive or physical tasks and introducing new ways of working.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT JAIC Solves Now
Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA]
Which brings me to the third challenge. The AI partnership symposium did not offer a coherent strategy for the partnership beyond advancing core values the participating nations find important to the AI pipeline. Peter Singer, New America Foundation fellow and strategist, noted that the US has not yet offered a coherent strategy to contrast its “near peers.” In one article, Singer said, “China has a fairly clear and robust vision of this [AI and its applications] and it is actively exporting that vision. There is absolutely no way the US can compete without offering a different and compelling vision and one that involves our friends and allies.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT DOD Solving now
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” TA]
One risk to such statements is that if they appear manifestly at odds with a state’s actions, they can ring hollow, undermine a state’s credibility, or undermine the norm itself. For example, loudly proclaiming the importance of AI ethics while using AI systems in a clearly unethical manner, such as for internal repression or without regard for civilian casualties, could not only undermine a state’s credibility but also undermine the value of the norm overall, especially if other states fail to highlight the disconnect. Following through with meaningful actions to show how a state puts these norms into practice is essential for them to have real value.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT DOD Solving now
Freedberg, 2020 - deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney, Sept 16 Breaking Defense “Military AI Coalition Of 13 Countries Meets On Ethics” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/13-nations-meet-on-ethics-for-military-ai/ Acc. 4/22/22 TA]
Defense Secretary Mark Esper officially adopted a set of AI ethics principles in February, although implementation is still nascent. He has also repeatedly denounced China and Russia for developing, deploying, and in some cases exporting AI systems that disrespected human rights or human control of lethal force.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT DOD Solving now
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Executive Summary Since the U.S. Department of Defense adopted its five safe and ethical principles for AI in February 2020, the focus has shifted toward operationalizing them. Notably, implementation efforts led by the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) coalesce around “responsible AI” (RAI) as the framework for DOD, including for collaboration efforts with allies and partners.1 With a DOD RAI Strategy and Implementation Pathway in the making, the first step to leading global RAI in the military domain is understanding how other countries address such issues themselves. This report examines how key U.S. allies perceive AI ethics for defense. Defense collaboration in AI builds on the broader U.S. strategic consensus that allies and partners offer comparative advantages relative to China and Russia, which often act alone, and that securing AI leadership is critical to maintaining the U.S. strategic position and technological edge. Partnering with other democratic countries therefore has implications for successfully achieving these strategic goals. Yet the military aspects of responsible AI that go beyond debates on autonomous weapons systems are currently under-discussed.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › On Case Responses › AT DOD Solving now
Freedberg, 2019 – deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney J “The frontline of a new age in defense Artificial Intelligence” https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2097098/MCM120_BreakingDefense_AI_ebookR1%20(1).pdf Acc 5/25/22 TA]
The revised solicitation for ATLAS adds a paragraph emphasizing the system will be “consistent with DoD legal and ethical standards,” especially Department of Defense Instruction 3000.09 on “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.” The final decision to fire will always be a human being’s job, the Army insists, in keeping with Pentagon policy. But policy is not law, and the Pentagon leadership can change it unilaterally. What’s more, even though the military’s AI policy is usually described as requiring a “human in the loop,” there’s actually an enormous loophole. “It authorizes the development of weapons that use autonomy...for defensive purposes like in Aegis or Active Protection Systems,” Scharre said. “For anything else, it creates a review process for senior leaders to make a determination.” “It’s not a red light,” Scharre told me. It’s a stop sign: You halt, you check out the situation — and then you can go.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
One vital and unique contribution for NATO is facilitating legal interoperability among the Allies to resolve some of the most pressing legal barriers for AI implementation in future Allied operations. Legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability, refers to the operational coordination around partner legal obligations and interpretations.75 It ensures “that within a military alliance, military operations can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”76 Legal interoperability is a critical component of multilateral operations that has thus far been under-examined, despite its centrality to successful military operations. This is largely because “legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliances and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinances that may be used.”77 To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing.
2022
Michigan
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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Gilli, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College [Andrea, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA]
Implementation and execution. The transition from principles to action is critical in any activity. Ethics is no exception, and while issuing comprehensive principles is difficult in any organisation, ensuring their implementation is an even greater challenge so as to strike the fine line between ethics washing and ethics “bashing”.113 Indeed, governance is an important factor in ensuring that technology is used responsibly and in line with the Alliance’s desired outcomes.114 In this respect, NATO may have a relevant role in supporting its Allies. A dedicated organization, such as an Artificial Intelligence Integration & Implementation-Enabling Centre (next chapter), could prove particularly useful, not least because it could help Allies share concerns, considerations, solutions and best practices as well as support them with ad hoc training activities.115 Similarly, aligned principles may eventually be translated into standards – and related measures such as benchmarks and annotations – an aspect which will be discussed towards the end of this Research Paper.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
While the issuance of principles and commitment to uphold shared values through responsible use are undoubtedly important, it is worth noting that NATO does have different considerations from nations (and militaries) as a supranational, non-regulatory body. Its more unique contribution could be standardization, as already incorporated into standardization agreements and training publications—the latter of which could focus on responsible AI in training. In anticipation of forthcoming guidelines or standards for industry, it is worth noting that NATO operational standardization also encompasses work implementing the Law of Armed Conflict into operational practice.160 For NATO, building on General Mercier’s remarks that ethics and interoperability are linked, standardization on safe and ethical AI can likewise link to interoperability at the technical and procedural levels.161
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Similarly, doctrine is the appropriate tool to define ethical standards for the development, acquisition, and use of AI systems. As military doctrines are drafted in accordance with international law and generally call upon members of armed forces to respect international law, doctrine can also define the modalities for AI systems and operators’ compliance with international law. As such, doctrine is an important tool to impose constraints regarding AI and human-machine teaming which apply across services to all members of the armed forces. This can imply the general need for meaningful human control of AI systems or the prohibition of the delegation of certain functions to AI systems. More specifically, doctrine can set the principles and parameters for the integration of AI into organizational processes. For example, AI systems working on the consolidation, prioritization, and framing of data are likely to require revised military doctrine and guidelines on armed forces’ use and collection of information.52 While systems whose tasks are limited to observation would require limited doctrinal adjustments, systems that have more ‘active’ tasks will likely necessitate more specific guidelines on elements such as safeguards, degree of autonomy, and communication with the operator as well as on their interaction with human forces, including human-machine teaming.53 Furthermore, it has been argued that tactical applications generally make rule-based decisions, whereas operational and strategic decisions are often value-based. In this case, what type of decision-making process is preferred at each level, and whether it should be standardized among all systems are questions that should be explored at the doctrinal level.54
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]
To conclude, it is unlikely that AI will have a substantial function for establishing military doctrine since it serves to define and regulate military organizational issues and aspects of military operations which strongly relate to beliefs, values, and identity. Yet because of this function, doctrine has an important role to define armed forces’ fundamental relation to AI. In particular, doctrine is appropriate for establishing in general terms for what tasks AI will (not) be used, how AI will (not) be used, and how the organization and its members perceive and value AI. Most importantly given AI’s characteristics, doctrine can establish how humans can and should interact with AI and what organizational culture should reign in this regard. This can set the normative framework for further military directives and military procedures. States’ emerging ethical guidelines may serve as a basis and be incorporated into military doctrines. Produced in accordance with the respective military doctrine, military operation or action plans are concepts and instructions to achieve military objectives in line with the available means. Plans reflect the commander’s intent and oftentimes include different courses of action (COA). A variety of military planning and decision-making models exist. NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) provides a good overview and synthesis of various Western models.69 The Canadian Armed Forces, for instance, follow six steps, namely initiation, orientation, concept development, decision plan development, and plan review.70 According to a general description, planning consists of ‘[p]lanning and scheduling the detailed tasks required to accomplish the specified COA; [a]llocating tasks to the diverse forces […]; [a]ssigning suitable locations and routes; [e]stimating friendly and enemy battle losses (attrition); [and p]redicting enemy actions or reactions.’71
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]
ROE are appropriate tools to determine how to use AI under which conditions for specific contexts and missions. ROE – or related rules of behaviour – may set the parameters for diverse military applications of AI, thereby translating given political, military, legal, and ethical considerations and limitations of documents at a higher echelon, such as doctrine or international legal obligations, into concrete instructions. This can represent a framework for action to be programmed into the AI system. For example, ROE could determine a geographical zone or a certain list of potential tasks for which systems are authorized to take action. Outside those limits, they would not act on the processed information. Time checks or other limits, such as pre-set permission to (not) engage specific targets, may also be fixed by ROE.100 Similarly, ROE can foresee that a system needs to flag unexpected events or issues. In this context, some have suggested that AI may be able to choose which ROE to apply based on the environment or its programmed mission.101 ROE can also define the interaction between humans and AI systems for specific missions. In particular, ROE can establish how a commander or operator needs to monitor and control the system during deployment. As the need for human control may vary according to the specific task attributed to an AI system and the respective context and operation, ROE for AI can define the level of autonomy for certain types of operations or phases thereof.102 ROE can further address or refer to other sources, such as manuals and directives, on how to implement various forms of human control, such as direct, share, or supervisory control.103 Importantly, ROE may limit commanders’ or operators’ authority, which may force them to refer up in the chain of command. This can be a significant role of ROE for the human-machine teaming in military operations, notably when confronted with unanticipated situations or issues for which the system or its use had not been previously authorized. ROE are particularly relevant when AI is used for or in relation to targeting as this implies harming persons and objects. Notably if considered that AI cannot incorporate ethical or contextual assessments into its decision process,104 human control and judgment should be meaningful in the context of decisions regarding the use of lethal force.105 While most publicly available policies establish this principle, as described above, they do not specify its precise meaning. ROE and directives can fill this gap. To this end, a code of conduct for operators of AI systems related to targeting or a model of ROE for such systems could be established.106
2022
Michigan
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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO is Key to Solvency
Allison, 2020 - has a degree in Cyber Security from Glasgow Caledonian University [George, Nov 2 UK Defence Journal “Cooperation on AI will ‘boost security’ say NATO” https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/cooperation-on-ai-will-boost-security-say-nato/ Acc 4/22/22 TA]
“There are considerable benefits of setting up a transatlantic digital community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and emerging and disruptive technologies, where NATO can play a key role as a facilitator for innovation and exchange”, said NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană. On Wednesday he took part in a high-level virtual discussion on transatlantic cooperation in the era of AI, organised by the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative and GeoTech Center. Mircea Geoana, NATO DSG participated in a webstreamed meeting on artificial intelligence AI NATO say that Mr. Geoană engaged in this conversation alongside the Chair and Vice Chair of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), Dr. Eric Schmidt and Secretary Robert O. Work, and the Head of Cabinet of European Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager, Ambassador Kim Jørgensen. They discussed what modern technologies mean for European and American defence and security stakeholders, why the United States and the European Union should cooperate on AI, and how best to promote shared values in the field. “NATO is a natural platform for transatlantic cooperation of AI,” the Deputy Secretary General underlined. “NATO offers its consultative mechanisms and unique networks for collaboration on defence and security questions. Bringing together Allies and partners, public and private sector, innovators and industry. We have great communities in areas like military capability development, science and technology, standardisation – and of course our Command Structure and military exercises. We also have new cross-cutting policy teams on Innovation Policy, who cover AI, and on Data Policy,” he pointed out.
2022
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Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › NATO says Yes
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
European Union: The European Union, like the United States, intends to leverage AI’s potential as a strategic and transformative technology. 17 However, the EU has positioned itself as a leader in trustworthy, human-centric, ethical, and values-based AI,18 in comparison to the US government’s emphasis on the need for AI innovation to protect American values, civil liberties, and privacy. The EU recognizes that it trails behind the US and China in terms of volume of investment and maturity of its tech industry.19 Nonetheless, the EU believes it can capitalize on its underlying structural strengths (e.g., academic and innovation record) and on its values to compete globally and reaffirm its digital and technological sovereignty. 20 Starting with its 2018 Communication: Artificial Intelligence for Europe,21, 22 the European Commission (EC) has launched a coordinated effort promoting AI.23 Policies include increasing public and private investments from $5.6 billion to $22 billion annually;24 coordinating research and innovation across Europe; devising ethical guidelines; fostering digital skills in its workforce; and promoting public and private sector adoption of AI.25 To support and counsel these efforts, the EC has established the High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG) comprising 52 experts who advise the Commission on policy and regulatory changes.